I. German and British Documents

                On November 28, 1941, at 11:45 AM,  Adolf Hitler attended a State Funeral in the new Chancellery in Berlin for Colonel Werner Mölders, the Luftwaffe ace who had died in a plane crash. On the same day, the German Foreign Minister, von Ribbentrop, had requested the Japanese Ambassador, General Baron Oshima to see him at the Ministry on a matter of some importance. The Ministry subsequently called the Ambassador and advised him that the Foreign Minister was in an important conference at the Chancellery and wished to speak with him as soon as the conference was concluded.
                This conference, which began at four in the afternoon and ran through, with a dinner break, until ten that evening, had been called by Hitler in light of important information he had received and was attended by the leadership of the Third Reich, including Göring, Goebbels, Bormann, Himmler and others.
                No stenographer was present but Bormann, in his role as Hitler's secretary, took notes, which are reproduced here.

                At the request of the Führer, a conference was held today in the Chancellery commencing at 1600 and continuing, with a pause for dinner, until 2200. Present were the Reichsmarschall (Göring), the Foreign Minister (von Ribbentrop), Grand Admiral Raeder, the Field Marshals Keitel and Milch, the State Ministers Dr. Goebbels, Rosenberg, Dr. Lammers, the Reichsführer-SS (Himmler),  SS-Gruppenführer Müller as Deputy for SS-Obergruppenführer Heydrich, Minister of State Dr. Meißner and myself (Reichsleiter Bormann).               

                The Führer opened the conference by personally thanking the Reichsführer as well as the Reichspost Minister Ohnesorge for obtaining under most difficult technical conditions, vital intelligence information that reflected strongly on the policies he was now formulating for the prosecution of the war in the east. 

                 We had received information from the former Japanese Foreign Minister, Matsouka during his visit to Berlin earlier that Japan would move north and finish off the ongoing affair with the Soviets. The point of attack would be their important naval base at Vladivostok to prevent a Russian attack on them if they chose to move south against the British and Dutch. 

                With Barbarossa, it now became important that the Japanese move against Stalin's rear and draw off as many troops as they could. This would, of course, greatly assist our major drive against Moscow. 

                The removal of Matsuoka as Foreign Minister and his replacement by Togo was, it must be admitted, a disappointment but one that had to be accepted. Oshima has repeatedly told me that an attack against Russia was not abandoned but over the intervening months, the extreme economic pressure the Americans have applied to the Japanese threatened the very existence of her Empire and specifically the oil embargo pinched off any future operational ability of her navy. 

                This was on the one hand a very clever move on the part of Roosevelt because it now became imperative that Japan must either surrender to his crude demands and in effect dismantle her military forces or if they wished to survive as a nation, they must secure the vital oil. We have Romania as our other source but Japan only had the United States and some oil from the Dutch. We now know that Roosevelt ensnared the Dutch into his web and got them to also deny oil to the Japanese. 

                The Führer continued that the results of his pressure were entirely premature and have resulted in the Japanese deciding on war against the United States, Britain and the Dutch. There is also the consideration that Roosevelt was acting thusly to aid his friend Stalin in his fight with us and we know also that the British are not pleased with the course of events. On the one hand the British are able to keep Stalin in the field against us, secure the assistance of the rich United States in the same war but on the other hand, they will certainly lose all their colonial control in the East Asian area and this is an area that is vital for them to hold on to. 

                The Großadmiral reminded the Führer that captured British documents indicated that Churchill was entirely unable to defend these areas and only recently has decided to send two British battleships and an aircraft carrier to the British base at Singapore as a deterrent to Japanese moves. 

                The Führer responds that the might of the Japanese navy, and here he enumerated a list of the naval units under their command, was so great that this gesture was doomed to failure from the very beginning. But the most important facts now in hand indicate that without a doubt, the Japanese will certainly attack both the Americans and British in the Pacific within ten days from today. The information comes from the highest sources and is absolutely reliable. 

                The Reichsführer quickly confirms this but states that no further information can be given due to its sensitivity.

                 The Führer continues that this is a momentous matter and in fact it represents to him a significant turning point in the history of the war. Britain will certainly lose her holdings in the Pacific and the United States will have to fight against the Japanese from a very long distance.

                 The Großadmiral then asks about the American naval units available against Japan to which the Führer replies that the Japanese plan of action is to attack both American and British military and naval units where they are found, either in harbor, on land or at sea. It is impossible for him to go any further with this matter. Now there must be a discussion of how this new factor must be used by Germany against her enemies. The German army will certainly destroy the Russian forces in Moscow and will sweep Stalin east of the Urals where he will be so far removed from Reichs territory that it will be impossible for him to launch any counterattacks. 

                As for the Americans, if their military units in the Pacific are neutralized at the beginning, they will have a long time before they can launch an attack against the Japanese who, if they are successful, will have not only enough oil to fuel their navy but the very important issue of space on their side. 

                The Foreign Minister states that the Japanese Ambassador has an appointment with him this day but this has been postponed because of the unexpected conference and the Führer requests the Foreign Minister to closely question the Ambassador as soon as he is able about any knowledge he might have about these plans but under no circumstances to indicate that we have any news of them. The Ambassador is very friendly to Germany and he might well prove to be cooperative in this matter. In any case, we will privately declare to him that in the event Japan should become involved in a war with the United States, Germany certainly will join Japan. Be sure to point out to him that we are already at war with Roosevelt and a declaration of war on our part will only allow us to openly attack their illegal convoys and perhaps find a method of shutting off the use of the Panama Canal which would effectively prevent the US naval units from moving from one coast to the other without a very long and dangerous trip around the tip of South America. I will speak to the Ambassador about this if and when the attack happens and perhaps we can coordinate such an attack on this vital constriction point. 

                The Reichsmarschall brings up the matter of the Japanese air forces and wonders if they can obtain bases in the Pacific would they be able to effectively bomb the United States. To this the Führer replies that Japanese bombers do not have the range to fly from the nearest US islands of Hawaii against the mainland and return. Such attacks would have to be launched from aircraft carriers but before this could be done, the Japanese must first wipe out American naval units in the Pacific and including bases in Hawaii and on the western American coastline.

                Here the Führer addresses the Großadmiral on the subject of aircraft carriers and states that in a short time it will be possible to see how effective a carrier force might be and that it is his present opinion that work ought to progress on the one carrier and conversion plans should be continued for other units. The Japanese have a number of large carriers, more than the Americans and certainly the airplanes to launch a serious air attack on American military targets on the North American continent.

                Whether or not the Japanese are prepared to do this or merely destroy US and British military power and stand fast behind the boundaries of their Empire is not at this time known. He again presses the Foreign Minister to attempt to ascertain from Oshima any information on this matter.

                 The Großadmiral indicates that the more British naval units that can be lured to the Pacific the better because then they would be unable to defend the convoys without which England will quickly collapse.

                 The Führer reminds him that the Navy has obtained the proof that Churchill will be unable to defend that area by himself and his information, which is entirely reliable, is that the movement of the battleships and carrier to Singapore is one that he had to fight to get from the British naval command and he is not likely to get any more ships without a bigger fight with his commanders than he is now having with Rommel.

                 Minister Goebbels suggests that play be made with the use by Churchill of colonial troops, especially from Australia and New Zealand, in Africa where as is known, they have suffered heavy causalities. A case could surely be made through the usual channels which he did not want to discuss here but which might convince the colonials to demand the return of their troops to defend their own country.

                 The Führer is in entire agreement with this.

                 Field Marshal Keitel comments that if this can be done in a timely way and is successful; these troops might be caught by the Japanese and destroyed before they could be returned to Africa.

                 The Führer responds that ten days is certainly not enough time to accomplish this, something the Field Marshal should recognize but he supports the Minister's suggestion because it will certainly create dissension between the colonies and Churchill's government. He does not see how a determined Japanese military assault on the southern areas cannot help but succeed and if this is the case, the United States will not be able to secure any bases close enough to Japan to threaten her. He also discusses his projected plan to provide Mussolini the equivalent of a Fliegerkorps for use in the campaign in Africa. These aircraft will be taken from the eastern front where they are no longer needed due to the wholesale destruction of the Soviet air force.

                 The Reichsmarschall then asks the Führer if he will declare war simultaneously with the Japanese but is told that since Germany is officially unaware of this move on the part of Japan, he can only pretend ignorance but at the same time can prepare both the declaration and the required speech to the Reichstag and the German people.

                 It is stressed here that this information is considered to be secret to the highest degree and under no circumstances will it leave the security of these four walls. He tasks both the Reichsführer and Gruppenführer Müller of the Gestapo to exercise the closest scrutiny of all communications and report any slips to him at once. He also informs the Reichsmarschall that his own Research Offices are to watch for this but without being told any specifics. They can be told that the situation in the Far East is particularly sensitive and they must be on the lookout for absolutely any information that relates to this. The Führer also discusses the discovery of a Russian spy ring in Japan with connections to the highest government levels that was uncovered by Standartenführer Meisinger acting under the orders of Gruppenführer Müller. He comments to the Foreign Minister that the leader of this ring, a German journalist, had close connections with the Ambassador in Japan and the Foreign Minister replied that there was still some question about whether the man was acting for Germany or Russia and had, in any case, supplied the Ambassador very valuable secret information about high level Japanese cabinet decisions in the past. The Führer remarked that the fact that the spy had been born in Russia with a Russian mother should certainly have aroused suspicions in the Foreign Ministry and that Meisinger had certainly performed a very valuable service. He also requested that the information from this source be very carefully checked for its accuracy and insisted that such sources ought, at the very least, be confirmed by an outside agency. 

                 The Führer secures an oath from all the parties participating that this prohibition will be honored.

                 The subject then turns to the situation of the army before Moscow. The onset of the winter is not unexpected and if the capture of the city does not appear possible, it is his belief that the army might have to go into winter quarters.

                 Field Marshal Keitel says that he has received numerous such comments from field commanders who also complain that there is not enough cold weather clothing available for the men. A quick end to the campaign was expected but the Balkan incident threw off the timetable.

                The Führer replied that if anyone was aware of this, he certainly was and everything was being done now to alleviate the condition. If the troops had to dig in, they had best prepare heavy defensive positions but still always keep in mind that the aim is to smash the center of Stalin's empire and not merely keep warm through the winter. Reinforcements must then be built up for what he feels should be a final assault on Moscow. Leningrad and Stalingrad are certainly important goals but Moscow is the primary one and that should always be kept in mind.

                 There is a general discussion about the undeclared war between Germany and the United States and its consequences.

                 The Führer responds that Roosevelt had done everything he could to provoke Germany to attack him and this is something he himself would not allow to happen. He spoke about the objections of the Großadmiral in the past about this but while he certainly was in agreement with him about illegal attacks by the neutral America against Germany, he would not be tricked by Roosevelt, whom he considered a mentally defective individual who had no knowledge of anything except his own cunning domestic manipulations and was certain that the judgment of history would condemn this maniac to oblivion as another Caligula. Churchill was another defective who has destroyed his precious Empire with his actions and the next generation will curse him because they will have been reduced to beggars. It is certainly time for Japan to take her rightful place as one of the great world powers and her abusive treatment by Roosevelt has never ceased to astonish him

                 Then followed a lengthy discussion with the Reichsmarschall about not only the future plans of the Luftwaffe but of the strengthening of the Reichs air defenses against aerial attack.

                 This report of a November 28 meeting is mirrored in another report, this one contained in a coded telegram sent by General Oshima, Japan's Ambassador in Germany to Japanese Foreign Minister Togo on November 29, 1941.

                Both the British and Americans had broken the Japanese "Purple" diplomatic code but the US authorities have not released the following document. This was released by British authorities.

 From: The Japanese Ambassador, BERLIN.
To: The Foreign Minister, TOKYO.
No: 1393
Date: 29th November, 1941 

(British intercept number: 098541)
(Date of British translation: December 4, 1941)

                 I was to have had an evening meeting yesterday, the 28th, with RIBBENTROP at his request, but he suddenly asked me to postpone it, and it was ten at night before we met.

                The reason for the postponement was that GOERING and leading Government and Forces personalities met at the Fuehrer's official residence and held an important conference lasting for many hours. Now that the objects of the Russian campaign have for the most part been achieved, and the results of interviews with the Premiers and Foreign Ministers of the European communities collated, they discussed the direction and policy  of next year's campaign, and I have no doubt that at this conference JAPAN'S action was also discussed.

                1. First of all RIBBENTROP asked again if I had received any news about the Japanese-American negotiations. I replied that I had not yet received any official news. RIBBENTROP said JAPAN must not lose this opportunity of achieving the establishment of the New Order in East Asia, and never had there been a time when close cooperation between the three Allies was more imperative. If JAPAN hesitated and GERMANY carried through the New Order in EUROPE alone, BRITAIN and AMERICA would turn the brunt of their attack against JAPAN. He insisted that, as the Fuehrer had said that day, the existence of GERMANY and JAPAN on the one hand and of AMERICA on the other was fundamentally incompatible, and the Germans were in receipt of reports that, owing to the stiff attitude of the Americans, there was practically no possibility of the Japanese-American negotiations being successful. If this was so, and if JAPAN determined on war against BRITAIN and AMERICA, not only would this be to the common advantage of JAPAN and GERMANY, but he believed it would be to JAPAN'S advantage also.

                I said I know nothing of JAPAN'S plans and therefore could not answer; but I asked whether His Excellency really thought a state of war would arise between GERMANY and AMERICA. He replied that Roosevelt was diseased, and there was no way of knowing what he would do.

                Considering that hitherto RIBBENTROP has always answered that AMERICA would avoid war, and in view of recent speeches by HITLER and RIBBENTROP, it seems to me that GERMANY'S attitude towards AMERICA is gradually stiffening, and that she has reached the stage whether she would not shun even war with AMERICA.

                2. I inquired about the future of the war against RUSSIA. RIBBENTROP replied that the Fuehrer had said it was now his inflexible determination to sweep away and crush the SOVIET once and for all. The most important military operations had been concluded, and a large part of the army would be withdrawn to GERMANY. They would, however, continue operations in the CAUCASUS, and next spring with a part of it they would make an attack on and beyond the URALS and chase STALIN into SIBERIA. I asked when approximately this was to be, and he said it was intended that the attack should start in about May of next year.

                I next observed that I gathered from what he said that they were quite determined on attacking the SOVIET, and the thing I should like done as soon as possible was the creation of air communications between MANCHURIA and GERMANY. He replied that the Germans had been thinking of this for some time past, and he thought that next Summer it would not be impossible to fly in one hop from somewhere near the URALS to MANCHURIA.

                3. I asked about plans for an attack on BRITAIN. He said that before the landing in BRITAIN they would chase British influence clean out of the NEAR EAST, AFRICA< GIBRALTAR and the MEDITERRANEAN. I gather from this statement by RIBBENTROP that they attach even more importance than before to this area. I asked if they intended to carry on without attacking the BRITISH ISLES. RIBBENTROP said that GERMANY was of course making preparations for that: but according to reports reaching Germany, the internal situation in BRITAIN was not any too good. For instance, the split in the Conservative Party, the lack of confidence in CHURCHILL and the revolutionary ideas of BEVIN, the Labor leader, were making internal conditions quite difficult. There were, of course, some people who did not believe this: but the Fuehrer believed that conditions in BRITAIN were bad and thought that as a result of GERMANY'S future operations even, it might be without an invasion, BRITAIN would be beaten.

                In any case, however, GERMANY for her part had no intention whatever of making peace with ENGLAND, and the plan was to drive British influence out of EUROPE entirely. After the War, therefore, BRITAIN would be left absolutely powerless, and although the BRITISH ISLES would remain, all other British territory would be split up in thirds under GERMANY, ITALY and JAPAN. In AFRICA, GERMANY would, generally speaking, be satisfied with her old colonies and would give a great part to ITALY. It was, he said, to obtaining GIBRALTAR that GERMANY attached the most importance.

                4. Remarking in conclusion that the very satisfactory progress of the War under German leadership was fully recognized and that GERMANY naturally had to extend the area of operations by regarding as enemies not only BRITAIN but also countries under British influence and those helping BRITAIN, I asked him when he thought the War would end. To this he replied that, although he hoped it would be brought to a conclusion in the course of the next year, it might possibly continue until the following year.

                He also said that if JAPAN were to go to war with AMERICA, GERMANY would, of course, join in immediately, and HITLER'S intention was that there should be absolutely no question of GERMANY making a separate peace with ENGLAND.

                At the end of this talk, RIBBENTROP asked that the substance of it should be kept strictly secret, so please pay special attention to its handling.

                This telegram has been given to the Naval and Military Attachés and to Vice-Admiral NOMURA and Major-General ABE. Please have it shown to the Army and Navy. 

                                                                                                OSHIMA

                On November 30, 1941, the Japanese Foreign Minister in Tokyo sent the following cable in diplomatic code to the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin. It is a lengthy message and an entire section has mysteriously vanished from US files. The first section is quoted here and the contents of the missing section can only be conjectured. 

From: The Foreign Minister, Tokyo
To: The Japanese Ambassador, Berlin
Date: November 30, 1941
Purple (CA) #985 (Part 1 of 3) 

                1. The conversations begun between Tokyo and Washington last April during the administration of the former cabinet, in spite of the sincere efforts of the Imperial Government, now stand ruptured--broken. (I am sending you an outline of developments in separate message #986) [Missing from US files] In the face of this, our Empire faces a grave situation and must act with determination. Will Your Honor, therefore, immediately interview Chancellor HITLER and Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP and confidentially communicate to them a summary of the developments. Say to them that lately England and the United States have taken a provocative attitude, both of them. Say that they are planning to move military forces into various places in East Asia and that we will inevitably have to counter by also moving troops. Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams.

                (The next part of the message has never been released by US agencies) 

                This was intercepted by the American intelligence community on November 29 and decoded, translated and delivered to Roosevelt and his high command on December 1, 1941. Some of these important intercepts, all of which were seen by Roosevelt, have been released in the postwar period but far more have either been withheld by US agencies either in part or in whole and a comparison between the same documents intercepted and decrypted by the British and those in US files shows that the American releases have been deliberately redacted or rewritten to remove damaging material.

                The Japanese attack on the headquarters of the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii on December 7, 1941 was one of those watershed events which mark the history of all nations.

                The facts of the attack have never been in doubt. The ships comprising the Imperial Japanese naval task force are as well known as the ships of the U.S. Navy that were sunk during the raid. The losses in men and material on both sides are a matter of uncontested public record as are the names of the various military and political leaders of both Japan and the United States.

                What has been a matter of conjecture from the moment that the last carrier-based

            Japanese bomber left Hawaii is why did the attack happen and who or what was responsible for the unleashing of a destructive war in the Pacific that killed hundreds of thousands of American, British, Dutch, Australians, New Zealanders, Indians, Burmese and Koreans as well as one and a half million Chinese soldiers and left a similar number of Japanese dead. Not taken into account in most chronicles of the war are the numbers of civilian dead. The Chinese totals are unknown but estimated to be between 700,000 and 10,000,000. The number of Japanese civilians killed in air raids or other war-related casualties were about 953, 000.

                In apportioning the guilt of war, it is the victors who write the histories and the losers who are condemned to a generation of silence.

                There is no point, and certainly not sufficient space, to chronicle the complete root causes of this war. The actions and attitudes of past generations can be sifted and analyzed, circumstances and happenings viewed from a multitude of different angles and blame or praise apportioned by historians according to their personal opinions or, more often, by the official attitudes of those who command their works.

                The 1941 war in the Pacific, like any incident, cannot be dissected with any degree of accuracy without exploring the history, politics and personalities of previous generations and to this prolix roll must be added such factors as economics, demographics and natural resources.

                A kaleidoscope is a pleasant toy with which to amuse children but its concept can serve as an example of the extraordinary problems that face historians who wish to explore the avenues of history and to write about them without prejudice.

                The mirrored tube of the toy contains bits of colored glass. What can't be known are what patterns that will form each time the tube is rotated. This is the problem that faces historians. Facts and dates are certainly easily recognized but all of the various factors involved in historical occurrences become blurred and confusing when viewed across the distance of time.

                The further the observer is removed from the moment, the more confusing the patterns become because the literature he must consult is blurred with personal opinion, clumsy and inaccurate analysis and the reality that the winners never admit their victory was either unnecessary or accidental.

                With this in mind, where is a beginning to be made concerning the great Pacific war? Does one go back to the beginning of the century or the beginning of the millennium?

                It may be erudite for a writer to bring forward chapters of ancient history and to spangle his works with his own opinions and psychological insights into the motives and personalities of the leaders of the period but all this does is serve as a vehicle for the writer's ego and can only entertain but rarely inform.

                This study will present a series of overviews which will condense historical background into readable form and devote the balance of the work to a through chronology of the events as well as supportive material that covers the period just prior to the Pearl Harbor attack. Since the end of the war and the death of all the major leaders, more and more valuable records are becoming available to the public. When these are gathered, studied and finally compiled in chronological order, many of the myths, legends and deliberate untruths dissolve to be replaced with as much of the truth as can ever be found concerning a controversial issue.

                No one wishes to take the responsibility for deliberately beginning a war that might have had no real reason for its commencement and whose course slaughtered millions of people.

                Those in power in the United States when the war broke out cannot have been expected to write memoirs in which they would admit to having instigated such a war. It is far easier to blame the Japanese for launching the bloody conflict with a surprise attack than to suggest that perhaps Japan had been maneuvered into launching the attack.

                The supporters of President Franklin Roosevelt have poured out hundreds of books since the end of the war in 1945, not only in praise of the American president's actions but to place the blame for Pearl Harbor squarely on the expansionism and treachery of Imperial Japan. The basic themes of these essays in justification are Japanese treachery and American innocence.

                Roosevelt's role in the Pearl Harbor attack has been a subject of intense speculation from the very day of the debacle in Hawaii. His opponents, and he had many, claim that he deliberately pushed the Japanese into a war to permit him to fight his archenemy, Adolf Hitler. His supporters, and they are equally legion, have repeatedly, often and at length denied this thesis but as their ranks thin and as more and more important material become available, their defenses have been seriously breached.

                In this protracted debate, several valid points have been brought out by Roosevelt supporters that ought to be carefully considered. The most important point is concerned with U.S. military intelligence achievements and mainly deals with the interception and decoding of secret Japanese radio messages. Historians agree that the Japanese diplomatic code, called "Purple" after the color of their diplomatic codebook, was broken by military intelligence and consequently, all high-level diplomatic messages between the Japanese Foreign office in Tokyo and Japanese diplomats stationed throughout the world were being decrypted and read almost as soon as U.S. intelligence intercepted them.

                The question of the Japanese Army and Navy operational codes is an entirely different matter. The American establishment and its in-house historians have firmly denied for a half-century these military codes were broken until the end of the Pacific war in 1945.

                While all of the diplomatic "Purple" decrypts have been made public in the intervening years, only a few of the coded Japanese naval messages have been released and then only in a highly edited and factually vague form.

                Another issue is the timing on the decryption of the Japanese messages and the actual distribution of them to U.S. military and governmental figures in Washington. Highly significant messages are claimed not to have been decoded for four years and a number of messages of a lesser importance have no indication as to whom they were delivered or when.

                In general, the official governmental position is that no really significant military messages were seen prior to the attack and therefore, neither the President or his ranking military subordinates could have possibly had any knowledge of a pending attack.

                The Japanese task force did not transmit any messages during their foray across the deserted waters of the north Pacific but they did receive a considerable number of transmissions sent to them, in naval code, from the CIC Combined Fleet, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, and other military officials. A reading of this traffic makes it very clear indeed that an attack against Pearl Harbor was in train and for this reason, admission of the existence and knowledge of these transmissions by political and military figures in the U.S. has been very strongly, and officially, denied in the intervening years.

                The argument has been well made, specifically by Roberta Wohlstetter in her 1961 book, 'Pearl Harbor, Warning and Decision', that so many Japanese coded messages were intercepted that it was extremely difficult for American intelligence agency personnel to winnow the wheat from the chaff. In retrospect, historians have stated, a Japanese attack was certainly in the offing but the direction of this attack was lost in the muddle of complex and difficult-to-translate messages.

                One of the areas of great interest to historians has been the possible motivation for Roosevelt's increasing pressure on the Japanese government, a pressure that culminated in seizure of Japanese assets and an embargo on oil, gas and scrap metal which were vital to maintaining the Japanese military machine. Many reasons have been given for the President's action including a personal prejudice in favor of China. His maternal grandfather had a very lucrative opium smuggling operation with that country in the nineteenth century. Other, more likely scenarios encompass Roosevelt's personal hatred of Hitler in particular and all Germans in general as well as an overriding determination to remain President of the United States until carried out of the office.

                Both of these reasons are valid but in and of themselves do not fully explain the dangerous brinkmanship practiced by Roosevelt in his 1941 dealings with Japan. It is painfully and very clearly evident from reading the intercepts of the Japanese diplomatic messages that Tokyo was not only not interested in pursuing war against the U.S. but was seriously engaged in frantic attempts to defuse a dangerous situation which its accelerating progress caused them great alarm. There is no question that Roosevelt and his top advisors were reading all the Japanese diplomatic intercepts and were made fully aware the ease by which they could establish effective dialog with the Japanese government. All diplomatic approaches by Japan were rebuffed by Roosevelt and Cordell Hull, his Secretary of State. The artificial diplomatic crisis deepened and as the year waned, the probability of Japanese military action was clearly evident at the highest official levels in Washington.

                To attempt to ascertain Roosevelt's actual motives in his attitude towards Japan, it might be instructive to consider the situations in both Europe and the United States in 1941.

                War between Germany and Poland had broken out on September 1, 1939 and rapidly escalated when France and Britain declared war on Germany several days later. The German army quickly crushed Poland but Hitler made no effort to attack either France or England, hoping that eventually some kind of a settlement could be made with both countries.

                In spite of a number of diplomatic moves, Hitler could achieve nothing with either party although the French certainly were not interested in a reprise of the terrible First World War in which their country was turned into a shell-pocked ocean of mud and destruction.

                In 1940, the British under their new Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, decided to attack neutral Norway and by doing so, deprive Germany of Swedish iron ore shipments that came by sea along the Norwegian coast from northern Sweden. Hitler noted that the British had violated Norwegian neutrality on February 16 when Royal Navy destroyers entered Norwegian territorial waters and attacked the German tanker Altmark despite the protests of Norwegian naval units. The British now began to plan the invasion of Norway and this information came to German intelligence from a neutral diplomat in London.

                This knowledge propelled Hitler into immediate action and German troops struck preemptively into Norway and Denmark on March 1. With an improvement in the weather, the Wehrmacht launched an attack on the western front on May 10 and by June 21, had forced the French to surrender and had driven the defeated British out of Europe

                During this period, Roosevelt could not intervene in the conflict because the law constrained him from declaring war without a mandate from Congress and, given the public American sentiment then prevailing, this would never be forthcoming.

                Exactly when Roosevelt determined to attack Hitler is not known but there is a considerable body of evidence that his hatred of the German leader stemmed from a speech Hitler gave to his Reichstag on April 28, 1939. This speech, which was a masterpiece of sarcasm, was given in response to an address Roosevelt had made to Hitler a week earlier in which he demanded the German leader give assurances that he would not invade such countries as Ireland and Palestine. As Roosevelt had little actual knowledge of European politics, Hitler was able to very effectively demolish the American president's arguments. Roosevelt could not stand any kind of criticism from any source and his response to Hitler's speech was fury and a determination to attack Hitler at the first opportunity.

                On June 22, 1941, Hitler launched a massive attack against the Soviet Union, at the time his ally. Many reasons have been given for this attack but a careful study of German and Soviet records indicates that Hitler viewed this campaign solely as a preemptive strike against a country which was rapidly preparing to attack him first.

                Since the beginning of his presidency, Roosevelt had actively sought the support of the well-organized Communist party in the United States. This group was influential in certain industrial areas and especially in New York State who’s Governor Roosevelt had once been. There is no question that the Communist support was vital in Roosevelt's election and would continue to be vital in maintaining him in the White House. A man of almost no ideological understanding, Roosevelt was an extremely shrewd domestic politician and he realized the active support of the radical left was vital to his survival in office. His administrations were rapidly filled with a significantly large number of members of the left and Roosevelt went to great lengths to support their aims. The Hitler-Stalin pact in 1939 came as a great shock to American Communists but when Hitler invaded Stalin's Russia in June of 1941, the Soviet dictator once again resumed his place as the champion of the workers and peasants and a very sought-after ally of Roosevelt and his administration.

                The swift advances of the German Army and the virtual collapse of the Soviet Army became a source of great concern to Roosevelt. The large losses in territory and manpower suffered by the Soviets convinced many in Washington that the complete disintegration of the Soviet government was only weeks away. This caused great consternation in both London and Washington because Stalin was the last viable enemy of Hitler. England was militarily wrecked and could not launch a meaningful attack against Germany and the neutral U.S. could do nothing to assist Stalin but give him as much financial support as they could.

                If, as it appeared in the autumn of 1941, Russia could collapse, the last major hope for the containment and destruction of Hitler and his country would be gone.

                The point of balance now shifted from European Russia to the Far East.

                When the leading edge of the German Army was before Moscow, the capital was subject to heavy air raids by the Luftwaffe, and the bulk of the Soviet government and the diplomatic corps had fled. What was left of the decimated Soviet Red Army was engaged in a protracted death struggle for the capital.

                There was a very acute possibility the Japanese, chronic enemies of Russia and officially allied with Germany, would take advantage of Stalin's major preoccupation with the siege of his capital and fall onto his rear, invading the eastern province of Siberia. This area was extraordinarily difficult to supply as the Czar's generals discovered in 1904. The hostility between Japan and Russia which erupted in that year and the Russo-Japanese war ended in a defeat for Russia and Japan's elevation to the status of a world power. The animosity between the two countries never abated and in July of 1938, an expansionist Japan, engaged in a protracted and very savage war with the provincial warlords of China, turned its attentions towards Russia and attempted to seize land inside the Soviet Union at Chankufeng near the vital Soviet naval base of Vladivostok.

                The Soviets counterattacked and drove the Japanese back into their own territory. Undaunted by their defeat, Japan attacked the Soviets again in May of 1939 and for four months a series of battles raged back and forth. Eventually, in late August of that year, Soviet General Zhukov launched a powerful attack against the invader with nine divisions and 600 tanks. The Japanese were severely beaten, suffering the loss of 18,000 men and considerable aircraft.

                Following this humiliating defeat, there was a strong movement in the Japanese high command to prepare for war against the Soviet Union. This project was called the Strike North plan and their plans for an attack on Vladivostok were shown to Hitler by General Baron Oshima, Japan's pro-German ambassador as early as March 1941. Hitler discussed the probability of this attack with members of his military staff throughout the balance of the year.

                The major problem facing Roosevelt then is evident. Stalin was the linchpin of the Roosevelt-Churchill military policy. If Stalin fell, Hitler was certain to destroy Russia's capacity to remain in the war and this could not be allowed to happen. Roosevelt was able to give funds to Stalin but could send no supplies or weapons of war to the dictator without the approval of Congress. If Japan decided to move against Stalin's eastern territories, he would then be fighting a two-front war and without any question, would be quickly defeated.

                In autumn of 1941, therefore, Roosevelt's most urgent task was to prevent Japan from launching any military actions against Russia. As the President was well aware, there was another military faction in Japan that wished to expand in a southern direction and secure the natural resources of Southeastern Asia. This faction was called the Strike South Force and their aims were far more acceptable to Roosevelt than their rivals' one.

                By applying both diplomatic and economic pressure against Japan, Roosevelt obviously hoped to distract the Japanese from embarking on a Russian adventure and to encourage them to move, if move they did, in the opposite and far more acceptable direction. Roosevelt was safe enough in embracing this southern concept because the U.S. had very little invested in the Far East with the exception of a few mid-Pacific islands and the Philippines, which, in any case, were slated for independence in 1948.

                The British, on the other hand, had a great deal of capital invested in the same area so Churchill was equally fearful of the southern plan of the Japanese. By 1941, however, Britain had been reduced to the level of a client state of America.

                Although professing great sympathy for Churchill's war, Roosevelt had no problem whatsoever in securing the most advantageous financial position he could when England found it must replenish its military equipment losses. When the British Expeditionary Force had fled France in 1940, they had to abandon all of their heavy equipment, vehicles, artillery and small arms on the beaches of Dunkirk.

                Roosevelt was most pleased to resupply the British Army...at a price. He sold them obsolete American rifles, equipment, and outdated ammunition and sent them on trade fifty destroyers dating back 30 years and in deplorable repair. In return for this largesse, Churchill had to pay in gold, paper money not being wanted, and to find the gold, he had to empty the treasury and the banks of England. When the gold had all vanished into the U.S. Fort Knox repository, Roosevelt then demanded, and got, the surrender of all British assets and business holdings in the United States and Canada. These his Treasury Department consistently undervalued and these minimal values were credited to the account of the British government for arms purchases.

                The assets were later resold by the government to private parties at a considerable profit. This Yankee trading also extended to other, similar spheres when in April of 1941, Roosevelt had the Treasury Department freeze the assets of the Swiss bank branches in the United States on the flimsy grounds that German funds might be involved. What was actually involved were $230 million in Jewish refugee funds, all but $500 thousand of which were kept by the U.S. government.

                When the possibility of a Japanese invasion of British territories arose, Churchill expressed great alarm to Roosevelt but the American President then held all the cards and brushed aside the Prime Minister's concerns with vague promises that America would regain any lost territory at the conclusion of what Roosevelt was certain would be a successful war.

                In actuality, Roosevelt was a bitter opponent of the colonial system and expressed to his inner circle that he had no intentions of returning any former colony to its ante bellum masters.

                American pressure on Japan to prevent any attack on Russia is certainly the simplest answer to the complex welter of issues raised in the postwar years concerning the outbreak of war in the Pacific. In reality, Roosevelt was completely successful in his goal of distracting the Japanese military but the price the American public eventually paid was enormous.