Nous sommes desoles que notre president soit un idiot. Nous n'avons pas vote pour lui.

Voice of the White House

In recent past issues, we have carried comments from a reporter assigned to the White House press corps. Some of these remarks, most especially one about Bush’s physical and mental problems, drew an enormous number of viewers and hundreds of inquiries, most especially from foreign press entities. The reporter advised us by email that there was rampant fury in the White House and security was becoming very tight. As a result of this, he decided to lay low for a few weeks and see how the wind was blowing. Yesterday, he sent us the following material which we are now posting. Some of it is outrageous in the extreme but to date, no one has proven him wrong. Our source was the first to expose and we were the first to make public, the accusations that the President of the United States was a man that suffered from serious psychological problems. Since our initial publication of what we call the Madness of King George, there has been increasing interest in the subject and herewith, we present additional input from inside the White House.

October 15, 2004: “ The last material I sent you, about a pending war, is causing pandemonium inside the Monkey Palace. They have been looking for the leaks for months now and we have the Secret Service, the FBI and Homeland Security all involved at one level or another. Phones are being watched, laptops searched physically, in some cases we have seen staff taking lie detector tests and over all of this, threats of arrest and imprisonment for violating National Security! I will have more for you tomorrow on the possibility/probability of military action against Iran but in the meantime, here is a juicy bit for you. For the present, no names but they will follow. Seems a former White House aide, (Reagan White House) was caught running a male prostitution service and got fired from the Monkey Palace, and later from the RNC for supplying muscular boy toys to some top Beltway gays. Well, after being fired, our bozo got together with a Muslim druggie and set up operations at the Kennedy-Warren, a landmark DC apartment/business complex. They ran a male escort service supplying young studs to older Beltway citizens. Among these citizens were: Federal judges, top political figures, mostly Republican, very senior military people and certainly members of Congress. The head of this service, that utilized credit cards for payment, supplied young men, mostly young servicemen, between 18 to 25 for sex. They kept very complete records, including names and address of the johns as well as credit card receipts. And later there was blackmail and now, I have learned from the inside, this joker has sold the lists to: Iranians( through his partner’s Arab connections)  and a gay group in DC. Sold the lists twice and got twice the money. I have seen a partial list and it reads like the DC social register, believe me! This enterprising young man is very liable to end up at the bottom of the Potomac River just like ex-CIA chief Bill Colby who was terminated by his former employees because he just couldn’t keep his mouth shut about certain things. I won’t have old Bill’s problem because I am not a Princeton man and even you don’t know who I am. You had the intestinal fortitude to print the material about the planned Iranian attack and maybe you will do the same with this one. I know a number of people inside the Beltway read your site…and loathe you…and if they read this and are closet queens, the sale of dignity pants will soar in the next few weeks. My, my, such lovely names! The Washington Times did a front page story on this joker some time back, by the way, but no one dared to touch him because of what, and whom, he knew…and serviced…”

October 16, 2004: “There is now some debate about the subject of the planned and proposed joint US/Israeli attack on Iran. There is no question it passed from the drawing board to the paper stage but with all the negative publicity generated, mostly by your publication of my comments, some are having second thoughts. I had some fun today reading a Russian website..www.Iraqwar.ru that discussed all of this. One drooling idiot said that I did not exist. Remind me to tell my wife about this! There are some strange ones running loose out there, for certain. The next bit of information for your readers concerns Vladimir Putin, the Russians and the CIA. It is common knowledge that Reagan played high stakes poker with the Russians, using the completely  phony Star Wars project to force them into an escalating hardware war that they lost. After the fall of Communism, the economy collapses and US oil interests moved right in to lay their hands on the potentially vital Russian oil fields. They operated via the CIA through Moscow street thugs who grabbed the properties when the state privatized them, looted everything in sight and got their friends in the US to loan them huge sums of cash…which they also stole and stashed in Swiss and Israeli banks. Putin came into power when the CIA’s Yeltsin drank himself into a permanent stupor. Putin, an ex-KGB man, is not stupid and is not a drunk. He stopped the takeover of Russian oil, broke up the Russian/US cartels and caused spastic colon in boardrooms all over the United States and England. The US could not tolerate well-heeled and generous friends of the Republicans being deprived of their profits so they embarked on a clandestine campaign to discredit Putin and get their hands back on the Russian oil-producing areas. The CIA ran the show. They overthrew the government of Georgia and put their man in power and moved on Azerbaidschan and Cechenia. To make a long story short, it turns out that the CIA  supported fully the Chechen leader that was directly responsible for the Russian school massacre. They have a lovely habit of doing such things. After all, the CIA killed Allende in Chile and replaced him with their man, Pinochet, who slaughtered God knows how many Chileans. The point is here that Putin found out about our official but clandestine support of this monster and to say he and his people are angry and determined to put a stop to any future adventurism of this kind goes without saying. This leads me up to tacit Russian support of Iran. Today, Russia is fishing in troubled waters because no one in the Middle East, and I mean no one, wants American troops in that area. Bush is seen as a madman and American activities against the citizenry of Iraq has outraged not only the locals but the entire Muslim community plus all of Europe and much of Asia. We are caught between a rock and a hard place. Bush is absolutely incapable of admitting he is wrong and the fanatic Neocons so determined that the US  fully support Israel that if this new Vietnam continues for much longer, the results will be absolutely devastating. I know a number of senior and very professional military men of rank and position who are horrified at Bush’s activities and the activities of the savage gang of private murderers he turned loose on the Iraqi population and who can clearly see what is going to happen. They all know what a treacherous man Bush is and if and when things really explode, he will quickly blame them even though they want nothing to do with his Mad Hatter Empire building. Notice that the CIA also loathes him and has been leaking very important anti-Bush documents to their many friends in the American media. Bush blames them for his own gross stupidity and fanaticism and they are getting their revenge on him and his corrupt administration.  It is a really terrible thing to sit by and watch a major disaster slowly building and know that there is nothing anyone can do about it. …”

Comment: The complete intelligence report on US attempts to gain control of Caucasus oil areas, to include support of local terrorist groups, will be serialized here soon.

An Israeli/U.S. strike on Iran?

When we published the story about a pending attack by US and Israeli forces against Iran, out site was so flooded with viewers that it shut itself down for two days. TBR news was flooded by emails from all over the world, which is not surprising because at least a dozen foreign websites ran the story and linked to our site.  Although most of the correspondence was positive, there was a recurring theme in the balance of the messages: This was all a vicious anti-Semitic, anti-Bush attack by Kennedy communists and secular humanists. No sane person, these negative missives insisted, could believe such nonsense. Neither the United States nor Israel, both democracies and strong advocates of peace, would ever contemplate such a vicious and unprincipled attack. To answer these writers, we are publishing several in-depth articles on the subject. It is also interesting to note that the great bulk of mail from foreign countries completely believes the thesis of a US/Israeli military strike on Tehran.

'We're done:' Iran reactor ready despite 2-year delay claim

SPECIAL TO WORLD TRIBUNE.COM

October 15, 2004

MOSCOW — Iran and Russia said they have completed construction of the nuclear power reactor at Bushehr.

The announcement came less than two months after Iran said Bushehr would not begin operations until late 2006, three years behind schedule. At the time, officials said Bushehr — a project estimated at $1 billion — was delayed by the Russian revision of the original nuclear reactor design, drafted by the German firm Simens in the 1970s.

But officials from both countries said on Thursday that Russia completed the construction of Bushehr and the installation of the first 1,000-megawatt light-water reactor unit. They said the key remaining task was for Russia to supply Iran with the nuclear fuel required to operate Bushehr, Middle East Newsline reported.

"We're done," a spokesman for Russia's Federal Atomic Energy Agency, known as Rosatom, said. "What remains is for the Russian specialists to assemble the unit's control and safety equipment."

Last week, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov visited Iran and assured his hosts that his government would provide the nuclear fuel for Bushehr, a move that has been delayed because of Iran's refusal to bear the costs of returning the spent nuclear fuel to Moscow. Earlier, a senior Iranian official said nuclear fuel deliveries must begin seven months before the facility was scheduled to launch operations.

"All we need to do now is work out an agreement on sending the spent fuel back to Russia," the Russian Atomic Energy Agency spokesman was quoted by Itar-Tass agency as saying.

The spokesman made his remarks after Rosatom director Alexander Rumyantsev met a key Iranian parliamentarian to discuss Bushehr. Iran has long complained of delays in the project, and in a briefing in August Mehran Zia Sheikholeslami, head of technical operations at Bushehr, said Teheran was pressing Moscow to meet Iran's latest deadline for the start of the facility's full operations, October 2006.

The Iranian who met Rumyantsev was identified as the chairman of parliament's Foreign Policy and National Security Committee, Alaeddin Borudjerdi. Borudjerdi agreed that Russia was required to do little more than provide the nuclear fuel for Bushehr.

"The [nuclear fuel] agreement is practically ready," Borudjerdi said. "If the experts agree on a few remaining commercial matters, it could be signed in November."

Rumyantsev could visit Iran in December to conclude the nuclear fuel agreement, officials said. They said Russia would first wait for the meeting of the board of governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency on Nov. 25, meant to determine whether Teheran was honoring its pledge to cooperate with the international community regarding Teheran's nuclear program.

http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/breaking_7.html

A Preemptive Attack on Iran's Nuclear Facilities: Possible Consequences

by Sammy Salama and Karen Ruster

At a time when Iraq and the war on terrorism tend to dominate the debate on international affairs, the possibility of an attack on Iran's nuclear facilities has not been a major topic of discussion in the United States. There are reports, however, that the Bush administration has seriously considered this option but opted to put it on the back burner for the time being.[1] Further, on May 6, 2004, the U.S. House of Representatives passed Resolution 398 in a 376-3 vote, calling on the U.S. government "to use all appropriate means to deter, dissuade, and prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons."[2] If a similar resolution passes the Senate, it will give President Bush or any future administration the ability to launch a preemptive strike on Iran's nuclear facilities whenever this is deemed necessary.

In Israel, planning and rhetoric appear to have progressed quite a bit further[3]; it appears that some in Israel are seriously considering a preemptive attack similar to the June 1981 attack on Osirak that destroyed Iraq's nuclear reactor.[4] Meir Dagan, the Chief of Mossad, told parliament members in his inaugural appearance before the Israeli Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that Iran was close to the "point of no return" and that the specter of Iranian possession of nuclear weapons was the greatest threat to Israel since its inception.[5] On November 11, 2003, Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom said that Israel had "no plans to attack nuclear facilities in Iran."[6] Less than two weeks later however, during a visit to the United States, Israel's Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz stated that "under no circumstances would Israel be able to tolerate nuclear weapons in Iranian possession"[7] and just six weeks earlier, Mossad had revealed plans for preemptive attacks by F-16 bombers on Iranian nuclear sites.[8] This report will examine the following: The Iranian nuclear facilities most likely to be targeted and their proliferation risk potential; the likely preemptive scenarios involving Israel or the United States; and the possible consequences of any preemptive action.

Current Status of Iran Vis-à-Vis the IAEA

On December 18, 2003, Iran signed the NPT (nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) Additional Protocol on Nuclear Safeguards, according greater access and the possibility of intrusive inspections to Iran's nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).[9] Since then, IAEA inspectors have carried out various inspections all throughout Iran that revealed a lot of new information about the scale and history of the Iranian nuclear program. While Iran has in general been forthcoming and helpful to the IAEA, some issues remain outstanding. Some IAEA board members, primarily the United States, have accused Iran of pursuing an underground nuclear weapons program that has yet to be substantiated by IAEA inspectors. The United States argues that this constitutes a violation of the NPT and necessitates the referral of Iran's nuclear file to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). In its last resolution on Iran on June 18, 2004, the board reprimanded Iran for not providing the agency with fuller, more timely, and more proactive cooperation; specifically Iran postponed mid-March visits to a number of locations involved in Iran's P-2 centrifuge enrichment program.[10] In addition, while Iran claims that it has furnished the IAEA with relevant information in a timely and responsible manner, the IAEA deplored Iran's omission of any reference in its October 21, 2003 declaration of it possession of P-2 design drawings, research, manufacturing, and mechanical testing activities.[11] The IAEA also called on Iran to "be proactive in taking all necessary steps on an urgent basis to resolve all outstanding issues" including issues related to LEU and highly enriched uranium (HEU) contamination and the limited production of polonium-210 and plutonium.[12]

IAEA director Mohamed El-Baradei is all too aware of the current dilemma with regard to Iran, and is wary of referring Iran's file to the Security Council. He fears that exerting too much pressure might well push Iran into choosing to opt out of the NPT, in which case, as he mentioned recently to a gathering of academics in Israel, "you have another North Korea."[13] To the barrage of critics who insist that, despite the lack of proof, Iran's intentions are obvious, El-Baradei has decried the lack of a "smoking gun" providing evidence of Iran's engagement in a nuclear weapons program. As he stated, "We are not God. We cannot read intentions."[14] Iran continues to assert that its nuclear program envisages peaceful applications only, and El-Baradei continues to support a diplomatic solution to the situation.[15] In addition, Russia, which is currently building the Iranian Bushehr reactor, has been unequivocal in its opposition to UN sanctions on Iran, especially in the absence of concrete evidence of a weapons application. Russia has asserted complete Iranian disclosure, despite Putin's recent charge of bad faith on the part of Iran in its failure to comply with IAEA inspections.[16]

Iranian Facilities Likely To Be Targeted in a Preemptive Strike

Bushehr:

Bushehr is a complex of light water reactors located on the Persian Gulf southwest of Isfahan. Construction started in mid 1975 under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Following the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Ayatollah Khomeini deemed nuclear weapons research un-Islamic and ordered the project shut down. In 1995, however, Tehran signed an $800 million deal with Russia to complete the construction of the Bushehr reactor. Bushehr is a 1,000 MW reactor, expected to be operational by 2005.[17] The contingent of Russian experts and workers at the facility is currently estimated at around 300 persons from among a 900-person strong workforce.

During talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin in early July 2004, El-Baradei basically concurred with the Russian assessment and Iranian claims, stating that "Bushehr is not apparently at the center of international concern because Bushehr is a project to produce nuclear energy."[18] El-Baradei also praised Russia's resolve to get its spent fuel back from Bushehr. Russia intends to provide fuel to Bushehr after it reaches an agreement with Iran to secure the return of all spent fuel. From a nonproliferation standpoint, Bushehr is not currently a major concern as long as it is open to intrusive IAEA inspections and the spent fuel is returned to Russia, but this arrangement may change in the future. Iran has stated that in the long term, it intends to produce its own fuel for Bushehr. Without consistent intrusive inspections and verifications, there is a potential proliferation problem if spent fuel rods from Bushehr can be diverted to secret undisclosed facilities for plutonium production. Once enough plutonium has been produced, Iran could build nuclear weapons in a short time.

Natanz:

Natanz is a nuclear facility, the previously secret existence of which was disclosed by the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) an Iranian opposition group in August 15, 2002.[19] Satellite imagery made available in December 2002 indicated that Natanz may be used as a gas centrifuge facility for uranium enrichment.[20] Iran subsequently invited IAEA inspectors to visit the facility under construction at Natanz in early 2003. During a February 2003 visit, Iran advised IAEA chief Mohamed El-Baradei of the near-completion of a uranium pilot fuel enrichment plant (PFEP) and continuing construction of a large fuel enrichment plant (FEP). Upon completion, the pilot plant will house approximately 1,000 P-1 gas centrifuges.[21] During the 2003 visit, the IAEA inspectors noted, fully operational new centrifuges in the nuclear complex and the IAEA reported the possible presence of HEU at the PFEP facility later that year, apparently contradicting Iran's claim that it had not carried out enrichment procedures. Iran has suggested that the HEU particles that were found must have been on imported centrifuge equipment. The FEP complex is very large and being built partially underground, leading some to question its purported peaceful character.[22] From a nonproliferation standpoint, in the absence of IAEA intrusive verifications and inspections, the facilities at Natanz can become a major concern. When completed, it is estimated that Natanz will be capable of producing weapons-grade uranium sufficient for several weapons per year, employing more than 50,000 centrifuges.[23] Uranium extracted from mines in Yazd Province will allow Iran to be self-sufficient in its quest to produce the fuel needed to run its nuclear power stations, obviating the current need for regulated Russian nuclear fuel.

Arak:

Arak is the site of two planned heavy water facilities. The first is a heavy water production facility, the existence of which was disclosed by an Iranian opposition group in August 2002. When IAEA inspectors visited the site in February 2003, Iran claimed that it planned to produce heavy water for export to other countries. Three months later, Iran clarified that it intends to use the heavy water to moderate a prospective heavy water research reactor in Arak.[24] The second facility is a 40 MW heavy water reactor, which Iran announced its plans to start building in 2004. This plant may present a serious nonproliferation challenge when completed. The Arak heavy water reactor will use uranium dioxide and enable Iran to produce plutonium suitable for nuclear weapons assembly. Some estimate that this plant will be able to produce 8 to10 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium every year, a sufficient amount to build one to two nuclear weapons annually.[25] The Iranians claim the plant is for peaceful purposes only and is intended for medical research and development.

A Preemptive Attack on Iran Compared to the Osirak Example

On June 7, 1981, in a surprise air attack the Israeli Air Force using F-15 and F-16 fighter jets destroyed the Iraqi Osirak nuclear reactor located 30 kilometers South of Baghdad.

If Israel were to decide to act alone and attack Iran's nuclear facilities, it would face a greater challenge than it did with Osirak. Natanz, Bushehr, and Arak are much farther away from Israel than Osirak. Moreover, these facilities are located hundreds of miles from each other, which makes them more difficult to attack simultaneously. Yiftah Shapir, an Israeli analyst, explains: "Israel's options to counter the threat are limited. A preemptive strike against Iran's missile or nuclear assets is problematic because the targets are too far away, too numerous and dispersed, and too well protected - some of them in deep underground installations."[26] Furthermore, it is unlikely that Israel would receive permission from Turkey, Saudi Arabia, or Jordan to pass through their airspace en route to Iran. Due to widespread domestic opposition, Turkey denied the United States use of its territory in the attack on Iraq despite large financial inducements. It would be difficult for the Turkish government to justify cooperating with an Israeli attack on another Muslim country. The Saudi government is currently in a severe struggle with domestic militant Jihadi elements who deem the al-Saud ruling family Western lackeys and infidels. Under these circumstances, it would be very difficult and dangerous for the Saudis to grant Israel permission to overfly their airspace to attack Iran, given its potential to further destabilize their domestic security position. The Jordanian regime is in a position similar to Saudi Arabia, although it has usually been more accommodating of Israeli needs. Should Israel use the Jordan route to Iran, it would have to overfly Iraqi airspace, which is controlled by the United States. For the United States to agree to allow Israeli overflight of Iraqi airspace en route to Iran would necessarily be seen as equal American complicity in the attack.

Another possible scenario is a U.S. attack on Iran's nuclear facilities. U.S. forces have at their disposal a very impressive array of smart bombs and guided munitions, as evidenced during the "Shock and Awe" campaign in the first few days of Operation Iraqi Freedom. A U.S. attack on Iran's nuclear facilities, using an array of Tomahawk cruise missiles and/or guided munitions from stealth bombers would surely be much more effective than anything Israel could muster at this point. It is difficult, however, to estimate the likely extent of damage to Iranian installations, given that the more sensitive portions of these facilities were built underground - specifically to guard against a destructive attack. In addition, Iran has purchased and deployed advanced Russian air defense systems to guard these nuclear facilities. Since 1993, Iran has purchased an unknown number of S-300PMU-1 missiles from Russia, and in 2003-2004, Iran and other Middle Eastern nations have purchased additional quantities of the Russian made S-300.[27] These last shipments may have included the more advanced S-300V.

Consequences of an Attack on Iran's Nuclear Facilities

Effect on Iran's Nuclear Program

Contrary to popular belief, it appears that Israel's attack on Osirak in June of 1981 did nothing to hinder Iraq's nuclear aspirations. Although it temporarily set back its capabilities, it served rather to reinforce and increase Saddam's desire for a nuclear arsenal. In fact, Iraqi nuclear scientist Imad Khadduri claims that Israel's preemptive strike against the French-built Tamuz Iraqi nuclear reactor, which was not really suitable for plutonium production anyway, had the exact opposite effect of the one intended: it sent Saddam Hussein's A-bomb program into overdrive and convinced the Iraqi leadership to initiate a full fledged nuclear weapons program immediately afterwards.[28]

Khidir Hamza, another Iraqi nuclear scientist and one of the leading proponents of Operation Iraqi Freedom and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, gave a near identical assessment. He told Mike Begala on CNN's Crossfire on February 7, 2003:

Israel -- actually, what Israel [did] is that it got out the immediate danger out of the way. But it created a much larger danger in the longer range. What happened is that Saddam ordered us - we were 400... scientists and technologists running the program. And when they bombed that reactor out, we had also invested $400 million. And the French reactor and the associated plans were from Italy. When they bombed it out we became 7,000 with a $10 billion investment for a secret, much larger underground program to make bomb material by enriching uranium. We dropped the reactor out totally, which was the plutonium for making nuclear weapons, and went directly into enriching uranium.... They [Israel] estimated we'd make 7kg of plutonium a year, which is enough for one bomb. And they get scared and bombed it out. Actually it was much less than this, and it would have taken a much longer time. But the program we built later in secret would make six bombs a year.[29]

Furthermore, in his book Saddam's Bombmaker, Dr. Hamza states that following the destruction of Osirak in June 1981, Saddam Hussein decided not to repeat the mistake of concentrating all of Iraq's nuclear assets in a single declared location. With the help of the Soviets, the Iraqis embarked on a covert nuclear program that simultaneously extended and hid Iraq's uranium enrichment facilities. Many of these facilities were disguised as warehouses or schools; others were hidden behind farmhouses - all of which was aimed at confusing the IAEA inspectors and preventing them from discovering Iraq's true nuclear potential.

It was Saddam's 1990 invasion of Kuwait, compounded by the difficulty of acquiring sufficient fissile material that doomed Iraq's nuclear prospects. Prior to the invasion, Iraq's nuclear program was moving full speed ahead to produce enough fissile material for nuclear bomb assembly, assuming it could obtain enough uranium. But Iraq's invasion of Kuwait changed everything, resulting in UN Security Council Resolution 687, which banned Iraqi possession of any WMD programs.[30] Iraq's defeat in the 1991 Gulf War, in addition to more than a decade of UN sanctions and inspections, virtually stripped Iraq off its nuclear technology gains and bomb-making ability.

With regard to Iran, there is no reason to believe that an attack on the facilities in Bushehr, Arak, or Natanz would have any different consequence than the Osirak example. Such an attack would likely embolden and enhance Iran's nuclear prospects in the long term. In the absence of an Iranian nuclear weapon program, which IAEA inspectors have yet to find, a preemptive attack by the United States or Israel would provide Iran with the impetus and justification to pursue a full blown covert nuclear deterrent program, without the inconvenience of IAEA inspections. Such an attack would likely be seen as an act of aggression not only by Iran but most of the international community, and only serve to weaken any diplomatic coalition currently available against Iran.

The most troubling aspect of such a scenario is that, unlike Iraq in 1981, Iran is not dependent on foreign imports for nuclear technology and already has available the raw materials, and most of the designs and techniques, required to pursue a nuclear weapons program. Iran has the necessary know-how and has already produced every stage of the nuclear fuel cycle.[31] Furthermore, Iran has uranium mines in Yazd and is in the process of constructing milling plants to manufacture yellow cake uranium and conversion plants that convert it to UF6 gas.[32] Iran has also begun manufacturing its own gas centrifuges used to enrich uranium. Even if Natanz, Arak, and Bushehr were destroyed in a preemptive strike, Iran probably has duplicate equipment that can be activated and has the know-how to produce more, to pursue a more vigorous and unabated nuclear weapons program in the long term.

Effect on Iran's Relationship Vis-à-Vis the IAEA and International Coalition

In the event of an unprovoked preemptive attack on its nuclear facilities, Iran could justifiably argue that it requires nuclear weapons to guard against aggression and protect its sovereignty, effectively announcing its intention to withdraw from the NPT and altering the current international dynamic. Especially given the recent lack of substantiation in the Iraqi WMD case, such a strike would undoubtedly result in U.S. or Israeli diplomatic isolation.

The practical diplomatic consequences of a preemptive attack in Iran are worth considering. In the aftermath of such a strike, it is highly unlikely that the United States would be able to convince members of the UN Security Council to impose sanctions on Iran. Without international sanctions, Iran will be able to allocate greater financial and human resources to its nuclear program. If the Iraqi Osirak example is any indication, the size of Iran's nuclear program would probably increase dramatically, as the Iranian government touts an expanded nuclear program as the key to deterring Iran's enemies.

As the target of an unprovoked attack, Iran gains by pointing to justifications for escaping the constraints of the NPT, therefore becoming a much greater proliferation threat. Unrestrained, the Iranians will have the means and technology to eventually manufacture gas centrifuges and mine, mill, convert, and enrich uranium. Even under IAEA intrusive inspections, Iran has assembled more than 920 gas centrifuges, 120 of which were assembled in just two and a half months, between November 2003 and mid-January 2004.[33] To enrich enough HEU to make one nuclear bomb requires running 750 gas centrifuges for one year.[34] If Iran seceded from the NPT, and increased the size of its nuclear program, it would be able to manufacture and assemble many more gas centrifuges, and therefore rapidly enrich uranium. Once sufficient fissile material is obtained, designing a basic nuclear warhead can be easily accomplished. In the absence of intrusive inspections or threat of UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions, the only way to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapons capability would be to occupy Iran, a very unlikely occurrence given the serious challenges already faced by the United States in a smaller, weaker Iraq.

Effect on U.S.-Russian Relations

Attacking Iranian nuclear facilities also has the potential of igniting a diplomatic crisis between the United States and Russia. The Russian Federation is not only Iran's foremost supplier of nuclear technology and training, it is reported that hundreds of Russian scientists and technicians currently work in Bushehr. A preemptive attack on Bushehr may kill a large number of Iranian and Russian personnel; the ensuing diplomatic crisis could seriously affect not only Russian-U.S. trade but also cooperation on international matters, including the war on terrorism.

Effect on Iranian Domestic Policies

An attack on Iran's nuclear facilities that are viewed by most Iranians as a symbol of national pride and technological progress would provide the Iranian mullahs the necessary justification to intensify their crackdown on dissidents and moderates, whom the hawks are likely to brand as agents of foreign powers. It is equally plausible that, fearing such a backlash, domestic opposition forces in Iran would band together with Iran's new hawkish majority in parliament and abandon their calls and protests for reform.

Likely Responses to an Attack by Iran's Conservative Government

Unlike Iraq, which in June 1981 was in the midst of a major war with Iran and lacked the military means to retaliate for Israel's attack on its nuclear reactor in Osirak, Iran is not only capable but very likely to respond to a preemptive attack on its nuclear facilities. Various Iranian leaders have already promised very strong reactions to such an event. On July 5, 2004, during a visit to Hamedan in western Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei told a crowd of thousands: "the United States says that we have endangered their interests... if anyone invades our nation, we will jeopardize their interests around the world."[35] In December 2003, Iran's Air Force Commander General Seyed Reza Pardis, said in response to statements by Israeli Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz that if Israel attacks Iran it will be "digging its own grave."[36] Considering the extensive financial and national policy investment Iran has committed to its nuclear projects, it is almost certain that an attack by Israel or the United States would result in immediate retaliation. A likely scenario includes an immediate Iranian missile counterattack on Israel and U.S. bases in the Gulf, followed by a very serious effort to destabilize Iraq and foment all-out confrontation between the United States and Iraq's Shi'i majority. Iran could also opt to destabilize Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states with a significant Shi'i population, and induce Lebanese Hizbullah to launch a series of rocket attacks on Northern Israel.

Immediate Iranian Retaliatory Missile Attacks and Countermeasures

Open source information suggests that currently Iran possesses more than 500 Shehab ballistic missiles. Most of these missiles are Shehab-1 and -2, with a 300- to 500-kilometer (km) range and a 700- to 985-kilogram (kg) payload.[37] With these missiles, Iran is capable of reaching U.S. bases in Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, and Iraq. Iran is also believed to possess 25 to100 Shehab-3 ballistic missiles, displayed in a military parade marking the anniversary of the Iran-Iraq war on September 22, 2003.[38] The Shehab-3 has a 1,300km range, a 700kg payload, and is capable of reaching Israeli cities and bases (See: Chart 1). Iran could launch dozens of these ballistic missiles in the direction of Israel; and U.S. targets in the region, over a long period, depending on the size of the Iranian arsenal, the desired severity of the counterattack, and the ability of U.S. forces to find and destroy their missile launchers.

On the one hand, the destructive potential of these ballistic missile systems should not be underestimated. Although these Scud variants are relatively inaccurate - they are certainly incapable of the pinpoint accuracy associated with U.S. cruise missiles and guided munitions - they do have much greater accuracy and higher payloads than the Iraqi al-Husseins that turned out a mediocre CEP (circular error probability) of 1 to 3km in 1991.[39] Multiple missiles attacks on U.S. or Israeli targets carrying large warheads can potentially be very deadly, as demonstrated by an Iraqi Scud attack on barracks in Saudi Arabia in early 1991. It turned out to be the deadliest such incident of the entire war for U.S. troops, killing 28 and injuring 98.[40]

On the other hand, even given their relative improvements in accuracy, this may be a risk that the United States or Israel would be willing to take. Administration officials may argue that it is preferable to take on Iran now, rather than allow more time to improve its existing missiles and develop the Shehab-4. In fact, some Israeli officials claim that Israel currently has the wherewithal to neutralize Iran's ballistic missile arsenal using the Arrow anti-ballistic missile system, which some Israelis claim is fully capable of defending Israel from the Shehab-3. Arye Herzog, head of the Israeli Homa Missile Defense Program at the Israeli Defense Ministry, stated on July 8, 2003: "We are fully capable of dealing with whatever the Iranians have today, which is the Shahab-3."[41]

Chart 1: Iran's Ballistic Missile Capabilities[42]

It is difficult to assess whether the Israeli Arrow system is truly capable of neutralizing Iran's arsenal of Shehab-3 as it has yet to be battle tested. In 1991, the American Patriot system deployed in Saudi Arabia and Israel was hailed as a "Scud-Buster" and during the 1991 Gulf War, U.S. officials repeatedly claimed that it had been able to intercept and neutralize the majority of Iraqi Scud missiles launched at Israel and Saudi Arabia. However, a Congressional investigation of the Patriot's performance led by Joseph Cirincione revealed that administration claims of success were highly exaggerated for political effect and in actuality, the Patriots were less that 10% successful in intercepting Iraqi Scuds. Cirincione told 60 Minutes, "the best evidence that we found supports between two and four intercepts out of 44."[46] More than a decade later, during Operation Iraqi Freedom, news reports reveal that the Patriot has yet to live up to its promise. Its continued inability to intercept Iraqi missiles has been compounded by its tendency to shoot down friendly allied fighter planes.[47] Israel's Arrow system looks good on paper, and in its latest test on July 29, 2004, off the coast of California it successfully intercepted a confiscated Iraqi SCUD, but its true combat potential remains to be seen.[48]

Destabilizing Iraq by Inducing the Shi'a to Rise Up Against the U.S. Occupation

Iran's most dangerous potential response to an American or Israeli attack on its nuclear facilities might be a serious and sustained Iranian effort to destabilize post-war Iraq. Coalition forces there have faced a deadly insurgency, primarily from Iraqi Sunnis and a small number of foreign Jihadis who have infiltrated Iraq to target Coalition forces and their allies in Iraq. Deadly suicide bombings and mortar attacks have become almost a daily occurrence, claiming the lives of hundreds of Coalition personnel and thousands of Iraqis, most of whom have been Iraqi Shi'a. The insurgents have also struck at various Iraqi officials who have cooperated with the Coalition authorities. However thus far, with the exception of the relatively marginal Muqtada al-Sadr and his followers in the Mahdi Army, the Shi'a of Iraq have taken a rather pragmatic approach to the situation on the ground. Most Iraqi Shi'a leaders and their followers opposed neither the U.S. presence in Iraq nor the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime. In fact, most Shi'a have shown remarkable restraint and avoided being dragged into a civil war, reasoning that the Shi'a majority will be the primary beneficiary of the popular elections scheduled for January 2005.

So far, Iran and its allies in the region have encouraged the Iraqi Shi'a to continue to show restraint and work for social stability in post-war Iraq, even in the face of what would otherwise be deemed egregious provocations, such as the bombing of Shi'a holy sites in Karbala, Najaf, and Baghdad that killed hundreds of Shi'a, including dozens of Iranian pilgrims.[49] Many in Iran have reasoned that they will benefit greatly from a stable Iraq ruled by a Shi'a government, which will necessarily be closer to Iran by virtue of shared religious and historical affiliations. However, in the event of an attack on Iran, this calculus would likely yield to a desire for revenge. In such a scenario, Iranian Revolutionary Guards could cross the border in great numbers to promote a full-blown guerrilla war against the large U.S. presence in Iraq. Iranian intelligence agents, who are currently in Iraq in significant numbers, could provoke clashes between the U.S. forces and Shi'a majority, precipitating a general uprising against Coalition forces in Iraq. It is important to note that, unlike the foreign Salafi Jihadi fighters (a la Abu Musab al Zarqawi and his Tawhid network) who infiltrated Iraq to fight the Americans and are despised by the Iraqi Shi'a, Iranian infiltrators in Iraq are likely to be seen by Iraqi Shi'a in a very different light.

Iran's Formidable List of Allies in Post-War Iraq

Most major Iraqi Shi'a groups have considerable connections with Iran due primarily to common religious, cultural, and historical bonds. Throughout centuries of struggle against the more numerous, sometimes hostile, Sunni Arab majority in the Middle East, the Shi'a of Iran and Iraq have more often than not come out on the short end of the stick. The Iraqi Shi'a were Saddam's primary enemies and victims; tens of thousands of them were killed, imprisoned, and abused by the secular ruling Ba'ath party. Similarly, following the Iranian Revolution, Iran took the brunt of Saddam Hussein's aggression and military adventurism. In the eight-year-long Iran-Iraq war, which began with Iraq's invasion of Iranian territory in 1980, Iran suffered 500,000 to 600,000 casualties, including up to 60,000 Iranians killed by Iraqi chemical weapons.[50] Under Ba'ath Party rule, many Iraqi Shi'a escaped Saddam's tyranny and sought refuge in Shi'i Iran. As a result, many of Iraq's leading Shi'i figures and organizations have deep roots and affiliations inside Iran.

The list of Iranian allies in Iraq is impressive. Iraq's most influential leader and the highest-ranking religious cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, is an Iranian national who has lived in Najaf, Iraq for most of his professional life.[51] Since the fall of the Ba'ath regime, al-Sistani has wielded remarkable influence over the Iraqi Shi'a population who see him as "marjaa` al taqlid," their highest religious authority and the leader worthy of emulation. In January, when Sistani called on Iraqi Shi'a to undertake peaceful demonstrations demanding immediate free elections, in the absence of UN verification, tens of thousands of Iraqi Shi'a poured into the streets of Baghdad, Basra, Karbala, and Najaf. This forced the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to request that the United Nations send a delegation to convince Sistani that Iraq was not ready to hold elections before 2005. The CPA also had to invite the United Nations to participate in the selection of an Interim Iraqi Government and promise the Iraqi Shi'a free and direct elections by January 2005 as demanded by Grand Ayatollah Sistani.

One of Iraq's two most popular Shi'i organizations, the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) headed by Abdel Aziz al-Hakim, was founded by his brother Ayatollah Mohammed Baqr al-Hakim in Iran in the 1982; its military wing, the Badr Brigade, was trained by Revolutionary Guards in Iran. The Dawa party, founded in the 1950s, is the oldest of all Iraqi Shi'a parties in Iraq. This group achieved prominence in the 1970s by targeting and attacking Saddam's regime. Due to the ensuing suppression of the Dawa party, many of its members left Iraq and established two main factions, one located in Iran and the other in London. The Iran-based faction, "Islamic Dawa," participated in the founding of the SCIRI in Tehran in 1982.[52]

Members of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) once favored by the Americans, including Ahmad Chalabi, have turned out to have very strong connections to the Iran. In the last few months, various reports have alleged that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has hard evidence that INC officials, including

Ahmad Chalabi and his intelligence chief, Aras Karim Habib, passed sensitive information about U.S. military operations in Iraq to Iranian intelligence, including the breaking of Iran's intelligence communication codes. Indeed, some U.S. intelligence officials claim that Aras Habib has been an Iranian agent for years and was part of an elaborate Iranian plan to provide inaccurate intelligence on Iraqi WMD to encourage the United States to overthrow Saddam Hussein, Iran's greatest enemy.

According to an intelligence source in Washington, "it's clear that the Iranians had us for breakfast, lunch and dinner... Iranian intelligence has been manipulating the US for several years through Chalabi."[53] This view was seconded by Larry Johnson, former senior counter terror official at the CIA and the State Department, who added: "When the story ultimately comes out we'll see that Iran has run one of the most masterful intelligence operations in history. They persuaded the U.S. and Britain to dispose of its greatest enemy."[54] In recent weeks, the U.S. Justice Department has launched an investigation into the dealings of the Ahmed Chalabi and his associates, specifically to discover whether American secrets in Iraq were compromised for Iran's benefit. U.S. and Iraqi forces raided his house in Baghdad and are still looking to arrest Aras Habib. Dr. Chalabi and his associates deny any wrongdoing and claim that the Central Intelligence Agency is setting him up.

Regardless of the veracity of these accusations, it is evident that many in the INC have had very close relations with the Iranian government and whereas Iran's list of allies in post-war Iraq is growing apace, the list of American allies is growing thin. While most of these Shi'i organizations actively or passively supported the overthrow of Saddam's secular regime, it is not likely that any of these groups would side with the United States in the event of an attack on Iran. After all, Iran has shielded, supported, and nurtured these organizations for decades, since long before anyone in the West showed any sincere interest in the welfare of the Iraqi Shi'a or their liberation from the Ba'athist yoke.

Ironically, Muqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army are not traditional allies of Iran; Sadr has been vociferous in his opposition to Iranian influence in Iraq. Muqtada al-Sadr is the son of the late Muhammed Sadiq al-Sadr who was killed by Saddam in 1999, and is a relative of the former Grand Ayattolah Mohammad Baqr al-Sadr.[55] The young and inexperienced Muqtada favors a more "nativist" approach to Shi'i rule in Iraq, and previously called on the Iran-born al-Sistani and Iran-supported al-Hakim to leave Iraq.[56] However, ever since the CPA shut down his Hawza newpaper and issued a warrant for his arrest for the killing of Abd al-Majid al-Khoei a rival Shi'i cleric, Sadr and his Mahdi Army militia have been involved in various clashes with Coalition troops around Iraq.

In the event of an American or Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear facilities, it is likely that Iran would attempt to take advantage of its extensive list of allies in Iraq to further sour the U.S. occupation and provoke clashes between U.S. troops and Iraqi Shi'a, which may well result in a popular Iraqi Shi'a uprising against the American presence in Iraq. In such an event, American casualties and costs would multiply exponentially as Iraq further disintegrates into Lebanon-style violence. Such developments would prove disastrous for U.S. interests in the Middle East and negate any perceived or actual benefits that may be gained from destroying Iran's nuclear facilities. The fact is that the strategic usefulness of a successful preemptive attack on Iran's nuclear facilities is likely to be short-lived if the United States gets further bogged down in Iraq.

Fool's Gold - The Limits of Military Success in Recent Middle Eastern History

Israel's Remarkable Air Force Victory Over Syria in 1982

Middle Eastern history is rife with examples of the short-lived usefulness of overwhelming military successes. None may be more relevant than Israel's stunning victory over Syrian troops during the onset of "Mivzaa' Shlom Hagalil," Israel's invasion of Lebanon. In the period June 6-11, 1982, the Israeli Air Force scored one of the most impressive military achievements in the history of modern warfare. Within a matter of hours, the Israeli Air Force annihilated Syria's surface-to-air missile batteries in the Beka'a Valley and downed 25 Syrian fighter planes.[57] Over the next few days, the Israelis virtually decimated the Syrian Air Force by shooting down a total of approximately 80 Syrian fighter planes, without a single Israeli casualty.[58] The first few months of the Israeli invasion were very favorable to the IDF (Israeli Defense Forces), who where able to force their way north to Beirut while overpowering Syria's troops in Lebanon and compel Palestinian Liberation Organization guerrillas to accept an American-brokered cease-fire plan that included the relocation of all Palestinian fighters to Tunisia.

Syria's Revenge in Lebanon & the Road to Israel's First Military Defeat

Soon after these stunning Israeli achievements in Lebanon, Israel's fortunes began to decline rapidly in the face of Syrian payback. Unable to confront Israel in a conventional military conflict due to inferior training, logistics and Soviet weaponry, the Syrian Allawi leadership embarked, with the help of Iran, on a full blown campaign to target the pro-Israeli Lebanese factions and Christian Maronite-dominated Lebanese government, while nurturing the Lebanese Shi'i militias. Shortly thereafter, on September 14, 1982, Lebanon's President and Israel's foremost ally, Bashir Gemayel was assassinated by a Syrian agent.[59] In the following years, the Lebanese Shi'i militias headed by AMAL, Lebanese Islamic Jihad and later Hizbullah carried out a relentless guerrilla war against Israeli forces in Lebanon and their allies, including the U.S. Marines stationed in Beirut. By 1985, this guerrilla warfare waged by the Shi'i militias forced the IDF to withdraw from most of Lebanon, limiting Israeli presence to a narrow security zone in South Lebanon. By the end of the 1980s, Syria emerged as the clear benefactor in Lebanon. In 1989, Syria was recognized at an Arab League summit in Taif, Saudi Arabia, as the primary powerhouse in Lebanon by most Lebanese factions and Arab countries - and tasked therefore with disarming the Lebanese militias and restoring order at the end of the civil war in Lebanon.

In 2000, Israel withdrew from Southern Lebanon, after which Hizbullah decimated the Israeli-trained and financed South Lebanon Army. In less than three years, Israel's once promising invasion and brilliant military victory had turned into a guerrilla war nightmare, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of Israeli soldiers, more than 241 American Marines and considerable turmoil within Israeli society. It was the first humiliating defeat of Israel's once invincible military since its inception in the1940s.

By invading and occupying Iraq, the United States has inherited its own "South Lebanon" and is now responsible for managing 14 million Iraqi Shi'a. An attack on Iran's nuclear facilities has the potential for a scenario similar to the Israeli experience in Lebanon. An initial successful military operation by the United States or Israel, followed by a long and very bloody campaign by Iran to destabilize a fragile post-war Iraq, could in turn develop into a full blown confrontation between U.S. forces and the Iraqi Shi'a who account for more that 60% of Iraq's population. Such a scenario would spell disaster for U.S. interests in Iraq and the Middle East in the long-term, especially given the considerable difficulty and casualties the United States has already endured since the fall of Baghdad fighting Iraqi Sunni insurgents, foreign Salafi fighters, and members of the marginal Mahdi army.

Conclusion

An attack on Iranian nuclear facilities in Bushehr, Arak, and Natanz, could have various adverse effects on U.S. interests in the Middle East and the world. Most important, in the absence of evidence of an Iranian illegal nuclear program, an attack on Iran's nuclear facilities by the U.S. or Israel would be likely to strengthen Iran's international stature and reduce the threat of international sanctions against Iran. Such an event is more likely to embolden and expand Iran's nuclear aspirations and capabilities in the long term.

On Monday July 19, 2004, President Bush stated that the United States is investigating any connection between Iran and al-Qa'ida, and whether Iran played any role in the 9/11 attacks on the United States.[60] A day before, acting CIA chief John McLaughlin told Fox News that eight of the 9/11 hijackers traveled through Iran but added, "however, I would stop there and say we have no evidence that there is some sort of official sanction by the Government of Iran for this activity."[61] These reports come on the heels of news articles stating that the administration has examined the possibility of a preemptive strike against Iran's nuclear facilities. It remains to be seen whether the timing of these revelations is just coincidence, election year politicking, or the inception of a campaign aimed at cultivating domestic support for an attack on Iran. Whether talk of a preemptive attack on Iran's nuclear facilities is a likely scenario or just bravado and journalistic hype remains to be seen, but one thing is for certain, it would not be just another Osirak.

[1] Arnaud de Borchgrave, "Iran in bombsights?" Washington Times, July 5, 2004, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/>.
[2] "108th Congress, 2nd Session, H.CON.RES.398, Concurrent Resolution," May 6, 2004, <http://thomas.loc.gov/>.
[3] "Israel's plans for Iran strikes," Jane's, July 16, 2004, <http://www.janes.com/>.
[4] de Borchgrave, "Iran in bombsights?"
[5] "Mossad head: Nuclear Iran is worst-ever threat to Israel," Haaretz, November 17, 2003, <http://www.haaretzdaily.com/>.
[6] "Shalom: there is no intention to attack nuclear facilities in Iran," Maariv, November 11, 2003, <http://www.maariv.co.il/>.
[7] Ross Dunn, "Israel threatens strikes on Iranian nuclear targets," The Scotsman, November 23, 2003, <http://www.news.scotsman.com/>.
[8] "Israel ready to launch preemptive strike on nuclear sites in Iran," AFP, 11 October 2003, <http://www.iranexpert.com/>.
[9] "Iran Signs Additional Protocol on Nuclear Safeguards," IAEA, December 18, 2003, <http://www.iaea.org/>.
[10] "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran - Resolution adopted by the Board on 18 June 2004," IAEA, June 18, 2004, <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-49.pdf/>.
[11] "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran-Report by the Director General," IAEA, June 1, 2004, <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-34.pdf/>.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Louis Charbonneau, "ElBaradei wary of taking Iran to Security Council," Reuters, July 8, 2004, <http://www.iranexpert.com/>.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid.
[16] "Sanctions against Iran "unacceptable" Russian minister," AFP, November 17, 2003, <http://www.iranexpert.com/>; de Borchgrave, "Iran in bombsights?".
[17] Marshal Breit, "Iran's Programs to Produce Plutonium and Enriched Uranium - Carnegie Fact Sheet," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 1, 2004, <http://www.ceip.org/>.
[18] Rasha Saad, "Heating Up," Al-Ahram Weekly, July 1, 2004, <http://www.iranexpert.com/>.
[19] "Group: Iran's Nuke Program Growing," The Associated Press, 15 August 2002; in New York Times, <http://www.nytimes.com/>.
[20] "Natanz," Global Security, <http://globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/natanz.htm>.
[21] Breit, "Iran's Programs to Produce Plutonium and Enriched Uranium - Carnegie Fact Sheet."
[22] "Natanz," Global Security.
[23] "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran-Report by the Director General," IAEA, November 10, 2003, <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-75.pdf/>.
[24] Breit, "Iran's Programs to Produce Plutonium and Enriched Uranium - Carnegie Fact Sheet."
[25] Ibid.
[26] Yiftah Shapir, "Iranian Missiles: The Nature of the Threat," Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies, July 9, 2003, <http://www.tau.ac.il./jcss/>.
[27] "S-300P," Missile Threat, <http://missilethreat.com/systems/s-300p.html/>.
[28] Imad Khadduri, Iraq's Nuclear Mirage, Memoirs and Delusions (Toronto: Springhead Publishers, 2003), p. 82.
[29] "Crossfire transcript," CNN, February 7, 2003, <http://www.cnn.com/>.
[30] "Security Council Resolutions Concerning Iraq," U.S. Department of State, November 8, 2002, <http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/01fs/14906.htm>.
[31] "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran-Report by the Director General," IAEA, November 10, 2003.
[32] Ibid.
[33] "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran-Report by the Director General," IAEA, February 24, 2004, <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2004/gov2004-11_derestrict.pdf/>.
[34] William Broad, "Uranium Traveled to Iran Via Russia, Inspectors Find," New York Times, February 28, 2004, <http://www.nytimes.com/>.
[35] "Iran warns against an invasion by any country," Associated Press, July 5, 2004, <http://www.iranexpert.com/>.
[36] Miranda Eeles, "Iran warns against Israeli strike," BBC, December 22, 2003, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/>.
[37] "Iran Missile Overview and Capabilities," Nuclear Threat Initiative, <http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/Missile/3367.html/>.
[38] "Iran demonstrates military capabilities, Shahab-3 missile," Tehran Vision of the Islamic Republic Network 1, September 22, 2003, in FBIS Document IAP20030922000056.
[39] "SS-1C 'Scud B'." Missile Systems of the World (AMI international, 1999), p. 528.
[40] "Iraq's missiles remain a threat, despite advances in U.S. technology," Associated Press, October 21, 2002, <http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2002-10-21-iraq-missiles_x.htm>.
[41] "Defense Official: Arrow System Provides 'Full Protection' Against Iran's Shahab-3," IDF Radio (Tel Aviv), July 8, 2003; in FBIS document GMP20030708000028.
[42] "Iran: Weapons of Mass Destruction Capabilities and Programs," CNS, 2004, <http://cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/iran.htm/>; "Iran Missile Capabilities Overview," Nuclear Threat Initiative.
[43] "SCUD B Shahab-1," Federation of American Scientists, <http://fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/missile/shahab-1.htm/>.
[44] "Shihab-2," Federation of American Scientists, <http://fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/missile/shahab-2.htm/>.
[45] "Shahab-3/Zelzal-3," Federation of American Scientists, <http://fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/missile/shahab-3.htm/>.
[46] "The Patriot Flawed?" CBS, June 27, 2004, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/02/19/60minutes/main601241.shtml/>.
[47] Ibid.
[48] Amos Harel, "Arrow anti-missile defense system successfully tested in U.S." Haaretz, July 30, 2004, <http://haaretzdaily.com/>.
[49] "Syria Condemns the Heinous Attacks and Calls on the Iraqi People to Hold on to Their National Unity," Teshreen, March 3, 2004, <http://www.teshreen.com/>; "Bloody Explosion in Karbala and Baghdad Aimed at Shi'a Ashura Ceremonies," Alquds, March 3, 2004, <http://www.alquds.co.uk/>; "Press Horror at Iraqi Massacres," BBC, March 3, 2004, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/>.
[50] Javed Ali, "Chemical Weapons and the Iran-Iraq War: A Case Study in Noncompliance," Nonproliferation Review (Spring 2001), <http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/npr/vol08/81/81ali.pdf/>.
[51] Graham E. Fuller, "Islamist Politics in Iraq after Saddam Hussein," United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 108 (August 2003), <http://www.usip.org/>.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Julian Borger, "US intelligence fears Iran duped hawks into Iraq war," Guardian, May 25, 2004, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/>.
[54] Ibid.
[55] "Who is Muqtada al-Sadr?" CNN, April 6, 2004, <http://www.cnn.com/>.
[56] Graham E. Fuller, "Islamist Politics in Iraq after Saddam Hussein."
[57] "Lebanon War ('Peace for the Galilee')," Israeli Air Force Official Website, <http://www.iaf.org.il/>.
[58] "Israeli Air Force," Aeroflight, <http://www.aeroflight.co.uk/>.
[59] Thomas L. Friedman, From Beirut to Jerusalem (New York: Anchor Books, 1990), p. 157-158.
[60] "Bush: U.S. probes possible Iran links to 9/11," CNN, July 20, 2004, <http://www.cnn.com/>.
[61] "US exploring Iranian 9/11 role," BBC, July 19, 2004, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/>.

Iran prepares for US, Israeli strikes on nuclear facilities

The US and its allies are increasingly concerned about Iran`s nuclear program, which Tehran says only serves civilian purposes. If the EU powers and the IAEA fail to secure satisfactory guarantees from Iran, some analysts predict that either the US or Israel may attempt to destroy Iranian nuclear installations through military means.

by Haytham Mouzahem for ISN Security Watch

ISN, Switzerland,
24 August 2004

Iran’s nuclear program was begun in the 1970s under Shah Reza Pahlavi with technical assistance from West Germany, but was interrupted by the 1979 Islamic revolution. The Islamic regime revived it in 1984 during the eight-year war with Iraq, in order to confront Iraq`s chemical and potential nuclear threats. Tehran, having failed to convince France and Germany to build its civilian nuclear reactor in Bushehr, signed a deal with Russia in 1992 to rebuild this light water reactor and to provide the enriched uranium it uses. Israel has reportedly been urging the US and the EU since 1991 to exert pressure on Iran to give up its nuclear program. Israel successfully lobbied Bill Clinton`s administration to impose sanctions on Iran, and to put pressure on Moscow to give up its nuclear deal with Tehran. US pressure caused Russia to delay the delivery of fuel rods to the Bushehr reactor, resulting in a slowdown of the Iranian program. Russia, which asserts that the Bushehr reactor is only intended for power generation under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), pursued its cooperation with Iran, but added a new condition to satisfy US and Israeli demands: a pledge that Tehran would return all spent fuel rods to Russia, the original supplier. The inauguration of the reactor has been delayed several times, and was recently postponed from 2005 to August 2006.

Enriched uranium raises suspicions

Observers of Iran`s nuclear program had focused on the Bushehr light water reactor until December 2002, when it was discovered that Iran was constructing two secret nuclear fuel cycle facilities at Natanz and Arak. Natanz is believed to be a uranium enrichment plant, and Arak is thought to be a heavy-water reactor. Iran denied that these facilities serve any military purpose and has agreed to IAEA inspections. In February 2003, the IAEA found blueprints for P2 gas centrifuges that are used to produce plutonium, in addition to the hundreds of P1 centrifuges that Iran already acknowledged possessing. In August of the same year, IAEA inspectors found at Natanz traces of highly-enriched uranium, the non-military value of which is questionable. Iran, which was named in the infamous "Axis of Evil" speech made by US President George Bush in January 2002 and is worried about the serious US allegations, has been willing to resolve these issues diplomatically. Therefore, Tehran agreed with the three major European powers (France, Germany, and Britain) to suspend uranium enrichment and cooperate with IAEA inquiries into its nuclear activities in exchange for pledges by the EU powers to deliver the technology for peaceful nuclear programs once all open questions have been answered. The three major EU states also vowed to help to close the Iranian dossier at the IAEA. Nevertheless, the IAEA board convened in June 2004 and adopted a tough resolution rebuking Iran for failing to come clean about its nuclear program. The resolution, written by the three European countries with help from the US, demanded that the IAEA investigation of Iran be stepped up, and that Tehran do more to help it complete the probe within a few months.

Keeping pressure on Tehran

Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi criticized the resolution, and asserted that his country would met its commitments to the UN nuclear watchdog. "Iran has not violated any of its commitments to international treaties in its nuclear program," Kharrazi said. He announced that Iran had resumed building nuclear centrifuges in retaliation for the Europeans` failure to shield Iran from IAEA charges of possible violations of nuclear nonproliferation rules. Washington has pressed Iran to give up its nuclear ambitions. Bush said in August: "The foreign ministers of Germany, France, and Great Britain have gone in a group to send a message on behalf of the free world that Iran must comply with the demands of the free world". He added: "And my attitude is, we`ve got to continue to keep pressure on the (Iranian) government, and help others keep pressure on the government." National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice said the US administration saw a new international willingness to act against Iran`s nuclear program. She added that the world was "worried and suspicious" over the Iranians intentions and was determined not to let Tehran produce a nuclear weapon. Rice asserted that the US would act alone to end that program if it could not win international support. Undersecretary of State John Bolton said that the administration was working with European and other nations to seek a peaceful end to Iran`s nuclear program that poses a "grave threat" in the Middle East and beyond. He said there was a delay in submitting the Iranian file to the UN, where the Security Council has the power to impose economic and other sanctions on Iran. "If we permit Iran`s deception to go on much longer it will be far too late. [...] This regime has to be isolated for its bad behavior," Bolton added. In return, Iranian President Muhammad Khatami said that his country was ready to pay the price for pursuing its peaceful nuclear program, including enriching uranium, and stressed that any deal with Europe must recognize Iran`s right to acquire advanced nuclear technology. He also said that Iran was "ready to give any guarantees to ensure that its nuclear program would not be diverted toward nuclear weapons".

Radical measures threatened

Israel has also kept pressure on Iran and accused it of building a nuclear weapons program under the cover of civilian efforts, and has threatened to attack Iranian facilities in a preemptive strike, as it did in 1981, when Israeli aircraft bombed Iraq`s Osirak reactor. Israeli Army Chief of Staff General Moshe Ya`alon said Israel was concerned about intelligence assessments that Tehran could build an atomic bomb by 2007. "Political pressure certainly has potential, just as it worked on Libya. And this must be exhausted first of all, in my view," he said. Senior Israeli commanders have said that Tel Aviv would not allow Iran to build a nuclear bomb, and that the Israeli Air Force was only awaiting a political decision to attack Iran`s facilities. Iran, having learnt from the Iraqi lesson, warned Israel and the US that it would retaliate against any preemptive strike on its facilities. The deputy chief of the elite Revolutionary Guards, Brigadier-General Mohammad Baqer Zolqadr, asserted that Iran would destroy Israel`s Dimona nuclear reactor if the Jewish state were to attack its nuclear facilities. "If Israel fires a missile into the Bushehr nuclear power plant, it has to say goodbye forever to its Dimona nuclear facility, where it produces and stockpiles nuclear weapons," he said in a statement. The head of the Revolutionary Guards` political bureau, Yadollah Javani, said that Iran would use its Shahab-3 missile. "All the territory under the control of the Zionist regime [Israel], including its nuclear facilities, are within the range of Iran`s advanced missiles," Javani said in a separate statement. Iran announced in August 2004 that it had successfully test-fired a new version of the Shahab-3, which has a range of 1`296 kilometers. Israel is about 965km away from Iran.

Preemption is no US prerogative

Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani has hinted that some Iranian generals believe that if they sense an imminent US threat, they should strike first against US troops in neighboring Iraq and Afghanistan. Asked in an Al-Jazeera interview aired late on Wednesday how Iran would respond should the US attack its nuclear facilities, Shamkhani said: "We will not sit to wait for what others will do to us. There are differences of opinion among military commanders (in Iran). Some commanders believe preventive operations is not a model created by Americans ... or is not limited to Americans. Any nation, if it feels threatened, may resort to that." "It`s certain to us that Israel won`t carry out any military action without a green light from America. So, you can`t separate the two. [:] Americans are a hostage to their own presence", Shamkhani added. So, you can`t separate the two. Americans are a hostage to their own presence. Some recent media reports have indicated that Israel or the US intend to strike at the Iranian nuclear plant in Bushehr and other facilities around the country before fuel rods are delivered from Russia next year, a timetable that might benefit Bush at the US presidential elections. Recently, London`s Sunday Times quoted an Israeli defense source as claiming: "Israel will on no account permit Iranian reactors - especially the one being built in Bushehr with Russian help - to go critical." The Israeli press has reported that 100 F-16I advanced jet fighters were recently delivered from the US to Israel, mentioning specifically that they were able to fly to Iran and back, and that they were capable of carrying "special weapons."

November surprise for US voters?

These threats were preceded by reports that neoconservatives in the US were planning to exploit a potential Bush election victory in November 2004 to seriously press for regime change in Iran. US media commentary on Iran has been hostile. Writing in The Washington Post conservative intellectual Charles Krauthammer said: "Two years ago there were five countries supporting terrorism and pursuing these weapons - two junior-leaguers, Libya and Syria, and the axis-of-evil varsity: Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. The Bush administration has eliminated two: Iraq, by direct military means, and Libya, by example and intimidation. Syria is weak and deterred by Israel. North Korea, having gone nuclear, is untouchable. That leaves Iran. What to do? There are only two things that will stop the Iranian nuclear program: revolution from below or an attack on its nuclear facilities." Some experts refuse to rule out a full-scale attack on Iran`s nuclear facilities at a convenient time just before the November elections. However, experts say that a military raid would stand an extremely low chance of success in deterring the Iranian nuclear program. Jon Wolfstahl, deputy director of the non-proliferation program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, said: "An air strike would only slow down Iran`s program. In the absence of perfect intelligence, [Iranian leaders] would be likely to restart the [nuclear] program in short order." Experts rule out the notion of invading Iran, because the Iranian military is larger and better equipped than the Iraqi army, and because unlike Iraq, Iran`s air defense system and other military targets have not been subject to 12 years of aerial bombardment. But a bombardment of Iran`s nuclear sites is a possibility; the risk involved would depend on the quality of the intelligence on the locations of Iran`s nuclear facilities - namely on the question of whether there are other, unknown sites.

Drastic action could have drastic results

Israel may indeed have a plan to destroy Iran`s nuclear facilities in the event that they go "critical", but such an operation remains improbable for many reasons. First, there is no real guarantee that a strike would do serious damage to the Iranian facilities, since Iran has developed robust defensive capabilities in recent years. Second, the Israeli Air Force faces serious logistical and geopolitical obstacles in striking against Iran. If Israeli bombers were forced to pass through Turkey in order to reach Iran, the (nominally) Islamist Turkish government would almost certainly refuse them permission to attack a neighboring Muslim country. Third, the military strike could elicit a ferocious retaliation from Tehran, which might use its Shahab-3 missiles to target Israeli facilities and cities, and from Lebanon`s Iranian-sponsored Hezbollah militia, whose missile arsenal can reach the cities of northern Israel. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran`s supreme leader, recently warned that any aggression against Iranian "scientific" establishments would prompt the Islamic Republic to strike at the "enemy`s" interests around the globe. A unilateral Israeli preemptive strike