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THOMAS K. KIMMEL & PEARL HARBOR

*Book Review by Thomas Kimmel* *"All Signs Pointed to Pearl Harbor"* (See E. Canfield, pp. 42-46, December 2004, Naval History) _________________________________________________ Michael Gannon Historians and other writers on Pearl Harbor have turned the Martin-Bellinger joint estimate of 31 March (not August) 1941 into an urban legend, ascribing to it statements that the estimate never made. Gordon Prange wrote that the estimate warned that a Japanese air attack on Oahu would come from the "north" or "northwest," Paolo Coletta wrote the "south," and Michael Slackman wrote the "north." But the estimate says none of these things, either geographically, nautically, or numerically. Norman Polmar wrote that the estimate recommended "limited air searches to [the] most likely direction of attack." But Martin-Bellinger does not say anything about a most likely direction. Now Eugene Canfield states that the estimate warned that Japanese aircraft carriers "would cross the Pacific in the northern areas away from shipping lanes." I searched in vain for any statement remotely resembling that in the document. My request is, will someone please read the Marin-Bellinger estimate. In its type-written form it is only six and a half pages. Naval History Staff, I solicit your help. Professor Gannon, Reopen the Kimmel Case, Proceedings, March 1994, attached, should have put a stake in the heart of the myth that Admiral Kimmel knew of and ignored advice regarding the direction and extent to which he should have ordered long-range air reconnaissance prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, but apparently he cannot do it alone as again the myth appears as fact in the current edition of Naval History. Naval History, December 2004, "All Signs Pointed to Pearl Harbor," by Eugene B. Canfield, page 46, states that, "After diligent study, Rear Admiral Patrick Bellinger and Major General Frederick Martin submitted a report to Washington in August 1941, predicting a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor [and that Japanese carriers] would cross the Pacific in the northern areas. . . .For whatever reason this report was ignored." The Martin-Bellinger Joint Estimate (see 1PHA379-282, or 22PHA349-354, or 33PHA1182-1186) was dated March 31, 1941 and says absolutely nothing about the Japanese force crossing the Pacific in the northern areas, or approaching Pearl Harbor from the north, or from any other direction--see the attached Martin-Bellinger Joint Estimate. Presumably Mr. Canfield is referring to the Study of the Air Situation in Hawaii, dated 20 August 1941, submitted by Major General Martin, containing the Farthing Report--see 14PHA1019-1034. But again, the Farthing Report says nothing about the Japanese force crossing the Pacific in the northern areas, or about approaching Pearl Harbor from the north, other than to say that the most dangerous sector is the entire western hemisphere from OOO degrees to 180 degrees of the compass rose, and the next most dangerous sector is from 180 degrees to 090 degrees. Indeed the term north, or northern does not appear in either document. It is again unfortunate that it appears in such a misleading way in a Naval History article. The notion that Port Arthur pointed the way to Pearl Harbor is also a myth. Mr. Canfield asserts that Port Arthur pointed to Pearl Harbor, without a thought to the fact that there were significant differences in the two situations. Admiral Pye testified to the Army Pearl Harbor Board that there were several differences between the Port Arthur and Pearl Harbor situations (27PHA549): "In the first place, even at Port Arthur, the Japanese had broken off diplomatic relations with the Russians, February 6, two days before the attack at Port Arthur, and, in the letter breaking off those diplomatic relations, they informed the Russian Government that they reserved the right to take such independent action as they might deem necessary, or words to that effect. In other words, adequate notice was given, both of the facts that the negotiations were at an end, and that the Japanese Government intended to take independent action. "The second great difference was, that the Japanese, in order to obtain their objective, had to land in Korea, or in the vicinity of Port Arthur. The only forces which could oppose these landings effectively were the Russian ships in Port Arthur and at Chinnampo. Therefore, the attack on the fleet was a necessary and decisive tactical victory, which led to a favorable strategic situation; whereas the attack on the United States Fleet at Pearl Harbor, although a tactical victory was the worst thing that they could do, from the point of the long or broad strategic point of view, because it aroused the United States in a way in which no other action could have done. . . . "It was also different in this respect, that under the conditions existing in the Philippines and in the Australian and New Zealand areas, in regard to fuel oil, it would have been impossible for the United States Fleet to operate in the vicinity of the Philippines Islands in such a way as to have assisted in its defense." Finally, how is it possible to write an article about how All Signs Pointed to Pearl Harbor without mentioning MAGIC--the secretly decoded Japanese diplomatic and spy communications--which gave indications of the time, place, reason and deceit plan to cover the Pearl Harbor attack? Regards, Tom Kimmel 321.783-8262 Cocoa Beach, FL 315.569-4442 Cell TKIMMEL@CFL.RR.COM The Martin-Bellinger joint estimate appears in three places in the JCC hearings record; 1PHA379-382; 22PHA349-354; 33PHA1182-1186. MARCH 31, 1941. (Confidential) Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force, Commander Patrol Wing Two, Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H. Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, Fort Shafter, T. H. Addendum I to Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan No. A‑1‑41. Joint estimate covering Joint Army and Navy air action in the event of sudden hostile action, against Oahu or Fleet Units in the Hawaiian area. I. Summary of the Situation. (a) Relations between the United States and Orange are strained, uncertain, and varying. [556‑e] (b) In the past Orange has never preceded hostile actions by a declaration of war. (c) A successful, sudden raid, against our ships and Naval installations on Oahu might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the Western Pacific for a long period. (d) A strong part of our fleet is now constantly at sea in the operating areas organized to take prompt offensive action against any surface or submarine force which initiates hostile action. (e) It appears possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our intelligence service. 350 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK II. Survey of Opposing Strengths. (a) Orange might send into this area one or more submarines and/or one or more fast raiding forces composed of carriers supported by fast cruisers. For such action she is known to have eight carriers, seven of which are reported to be capable of 25 knots or over and four of which are rated at 30 knots or better. Two of the carriers are converted capital ships, armored and armed with 10‑8" guns each and reported to have heavy AA batteries. Two others are small (7000 treaty tons) and limited to 25 knots. Exact information on numbers; and characteristics of the aircraft carried by these ships is not available. However the best estimate at present available is that the small carriers can accommodate from 20 to 30 planes and the large ones about 60. Probably the best assumption is that carrier complements are normally about equally divided between fighter and bomber types. Lacking any information as to range and armament of planes we must assume that they are at least the equal of our similar types. There probably exist at least 12 eight inch gun and at least 12 six inch gun fast modern cruisers which would be suitable supports. Jane's Fighting Ships (1939) shows over forty submarines which are easily capable of projection into this area. An Orange surface raiding force would be far removed from their base and would almost surely be inferior in gun power to our surface forces operating at sea in the Hawaiian area. (b) The most difficult situation for us to meet would be when several of the above elements were present and closely coordinated their actions. The shore based air force available to us is a constantly varying quantity which is being periodically augmented by reinforcements from the mainland and which also varies as fleet units are shifted. Under existing conditions about one‑half of the planes present can be maintained in a condition of material readiness for flight. The aircraft at present available in Hawaii are inadequate to maintain, for any extended period, from bases on Oahu, a patrol extensive enough to insure that an air attack from an Orange carrier cannot arrive over Oahu as a complete surprise. The projected outlying bases are not yet in condition to support sustained operations. Patrol planes are of particular value for long range scouting at sea and are the type now available in this area best suited for this work. If present planes are used to bomb well defended ship objectives, the number available for future use will probably be seriously depleted. In view of the continuing need for long range overseas scouting in this area the missions of those planes for operations as contemplated in this estimate should be scouting. Certain aircraft of the Utility Wing, although not designed for combatant work, can be [556‑g] used to advantage in augmenting the scouting of patrol planes. Other types of aircraft, in general, can perform functions that accord with their type. III. Possible Enemy Action. (a) A declaration of war might be preceded by. 1. A surprise submarine attack on ships the operating area. 2. A surprise attack on Oahu including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor. 3. A combination of these two. (b) It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of three hundred miles. (c) A single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more submarines or more planes awaiting to attack after defending aircraft have been drawn away by the original thrust. (d) Any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a considerable undiscovered surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier. (e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it might find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to start, also it might be successful as a diversion to draw attention away from a second attacking force. The major disadvantage would be that we could have all day to find and attack the carrier. A dusk attack would have the advantage that the carrier could use the night for escape and might not be located the [556‑h] next day near enough for us to make a successful air attack. The PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 351 disadvantage would be that it would spend the day of the attack approaching the islands and might be observed. Under the existing conditions this might not be a serious disadvantage for until an overt act has been committed we probably will take no offensive action and the only thing that would be most would be complete surprise. Midday attacks have all the disadvantages and none of the advantages of the above. After hostilities have commenced, a night attack would offer certain advantages but as an initial crippling blow a dawn or dusk attack would probably be no more hazardous and would have a better chance for accomplishing a large success. Submarine attacks could be coordinated with any air attack. IV. Action open to us: (a) Run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360 degrees to reduce the probabilities of surface or air surprise. This would be desirable but can only be effectively maintained with present personnel and material for a very short period and as a practicable measure cannot, therefore, be undertaken unless other intelligence indicates that a surface raid is probable within rather narrow time limits. (b) In the, event of any form of surprise attack either on ships in the operating areas or on the islands 1. Immediate search of all sea areas within reach to determine the location of hostile surface craft and whether or not more than one group is present. 2. Immediate arming and preparation of the maximum possible bombing force and its despatch for attack when information is available. [556i] (c) In the event of an air attack on Oahu, in addition to (b) above: 1. The immediate despatch of all aircraft suitable for aerial combat to intercept the attackers. 2. The prompt identification of the attackers as either carrier or long range shore based aircraft. 3. The prompt dispatch of fast aircraft to follow carrier type raiders back to their carrier. (d) In event of a submarine attack on ships in the operating area in addition to (b) above: 1. Hold pursuit and fighter aircraft in condition of immediate readiness to counter a possible air raid until search proves that none is imminent. 2. Dispatch armed shore based fleet aircraft to relieve planes in the air over the attack area. 3. Establish a station patrol by patrol planes two hundred twenty mile radius from scene of attack at one hour before daylight of nest succeeding daylight period. (4) None of the above actions can be initiated by our forces until an attack is known to be imminent or has occurred. On the other hand, when an attack develops time will probably be vital and our actions must start with a minimum of delay. It therefore appears that task forces should be organized now, missions assigned, conditions of readiness defined and detailed plans prepared so that coordinated immediate action can be taken promptly by all elements when one of the visualized emergencies arises. To provide most effectively for the necessary immediate action, the following joint task units will be required. 1. Search Unit. 2. Attack Unit. 3. Air Combat Unit. [556j] Carrier scouts, army reconnaissance and patrol planes can be employed with very widely varying effectiveness, either for search or attack. Under varying conditions some shifts of units between the search and attack groups may be desirable. Also, the accomplishment of these two tasks must be closely coordinated and therefore these two groups should be controlled by the same task group commander. V. Decisions: 1. This force will locate and attack forces initiating hostile actions against Oahu or fleet units in order to prevent or minimize damage to our forces from a surprise attack and to obtain information upon which to base coordinated retaliatory measures. 352 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK 2. Subsidiary decisions. In order to be in all respects prepared to promptly execute the above decision. (a) Establish a task organization as follows by the issue of a joint air operation plan: 1. Search and Attack Group (Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing Two)) The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness: Patrol squadrons. Shore‑based VO‑VS units. Shore‑based carrier VB and VT squadrons. Shore‑based carrier VS planes not assigned to the air combat group. Shore‑based Marine VS and VB squadrons. Army bombardment squadrons. Army reconnaissance squadrons. Navy Utility squadrons. [556k] 2. Air Combat Group (Commander Hawaiian Air Force) The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness: Army pursuit squadrons. Shore‑based carrier VF squadrons. Shore‑based Marine VF squadrons. One division of shore‑based carrier VS planes. (Primarily for trailing aircraft) (b) Assign missions to the above groups as follows: 1. Search and Attack Group. Locate, report and track all hostile surface units in position to take or threaten hostile action. Destroy hostile ships by air attack. Priority of targets: (1) carriers (2) large supporting ships. If choice of location is presented priority should be given to: (1) carrier involved in attack (2) vessels beyond teach of surface vessel interception. 2. Air Combat Group. Intercept and destroy hostile aircraft. Identify and report type of attacking aircraft. Trail attacking carrier type planes to carrier and report location to commander search and attack group. As a secondary mission support search and attack group upon request. (c) Provide a means for quickly starting all required action under this plan when (a) An air attack occurs on Oahu. (b) Information is received from any source that indicates an attack is probable. (c) Information is received that an attack has been made on fleet units. (d) Define conditions of readiness for use with this plan as follows: [556‑l] Conditions of readiness shall be prescribed by a combination of a letter and number from the tables below. The letter indicating the part of a unit in a condition of material readiness for its assigned task and the number indicating the degree of readiness prescribed for that part. Material Readiness: A. All assigned operating aircraft available and ready for a task. B. One‑half of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task. C. Approximately one‑quarter of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task. D. Approximately one‑eighth of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task. E. All aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the purposes of this plan. Degree of Readiness: 1. For pursuit and VF types—four minutes. Types other than fighters—fifteen minutes: 2. All types—30 minutes. 3. All types—one hour. 4. All types—two hours. 5. All types—four hours. The armament and fuel load for each type under the above conditions of readiness are dependent upon the tasks assigned in contributory plans and orders and will be prescribed therein. (e) Establish a procedure whereby the conditions of readiness to be maintained by each unit is at all times prescribed by the Senior Officers Present of PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION 353 the Army and Navy as a result of all information currently [556‑m] available to them. In using the above conditions it should be noted that: Condition A‑1 requires a preparation period of reduced operations and can be maintained for only a short time as it is an all hands condition. Conditions B‑1 and B‑2 require watch and watch for all personnel and personnel fitness for air action will decrease rapidly if they are maintained too long. Any Condition 1, 2, or 3 will curtail essential expansion training work. Conditions C, or D, 4 or 5 can be maintained without unduly curtailing normal training work. (f) In order to perfect fundamental communications by use and to insure that prospective Task Group Commanders at all times know the forces immediately available to them for use, under the plan above, in case of a sudden emergency, provide, for daily dispatch readiness reports as of the end of normal daily flying from all units to their prospective task force commander. These reports to state: (a) Number of planes in the unit by functional types such as bomber, fighter, etc. (b) Number of each type in commission for flight and their degree of readiness as defined above. (g) After the joint air operations plan under subsidiary decision (a) above has been issued, the task group commanders designated therein will prepare detailed contributory plans for their groups to cover the various probable situations requiring quick action in order that the desired immediate action in an emergency can be initiated with no further written orders. To assist in this work the following temporary details will be made: (a) By Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing Two): an officer experienced in [556‑n] VF and VS operations and planning to assist the Commander of Air Combat Group. (b) By the Commander Hawaiian Air Force: an officer experienced in Army bombardment and reconnaissance operations and planning to assist the Commander of the Search and Attack Group. F. L. MARTIN, Major General, U. S. Army, Commanding Hawaiian Air Force. P. N. L. BELLINGER, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force, (Commander Patrol Wing Two). Authenticated: J. W. BAYS, Lieutenant, U. S. Navy. C‑A16‑3/A4‑3(5)/ND14 (0348) (Confidential) BASE DEFENSE AIR FORCE, PATROL WING TWO, FLEET AIR DETACHMENT, NAVAL AIR STATION, Pearl Harbor, T. H., April 9, 1941. Addendum II to Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan No. A‑1‑41. Conditions of readiness and readiness reports: 1. Conditions of readiness will be prescribed by a combination of a letter and a number from the tables below. The letter indicating the part of a unit in a condition of material readiness for its assigned task and the number indicating the degree of operational readiness prescribed for that part. Material Readiness A. All assigned operating aircraft available and ready for a task. B. One‑half of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task. C. Approximately one‑quarter of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task. [556‑o] D. Approximately one‑eighth of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task. E. All aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the purposes of this plan. Degree of operational readiness: 354 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK All times listed in this table are the maximums allowed for the first plane of a unit to be in the air armed and proceeding with the assigned task. 1. For pursuit and VF types—four minutes. Types other than fighters—fifteen minutes. 2. All types—30 minutes. 3. All types—one hour. 4. All types—two hours. 5. All types—four hours. 2. The armament and fuel load for each type under the above conditions of readiness are dependent upon the task assigned in contributory plans and orders and will be prescribed in these. 3. Readiness Reports (a) A despatch readiness report, as of 1500 each day shall be made by each unit assigned to a task group by this plan as follows: (1) Units of "Search and Attack Group" to the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing Two). (2) Units of the "Air Combat Group" to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Force via Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force. (b) These reports shall state: (1) The number of operating planes in the unit by functional types as bomber, fighter, etc. (2) The number of each type in material readiness [556p] for flight and their degree of operational readiness as defined above. (c) The officer detailing VS planes to the Air Combat Unit (paragraph 4 of N. B. D. A. F. plan No. A‑1‑41) shall inform the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force and Commander General Hawaiian Air Force by despatch of the detail and any changes therein. (PROCEEDINGS OF THE ROBERTS COMMISSION.) Reopen the Kimmel Case By Michael Gannon Naval Institute of Proceedings/December 1994 The allegation that Admiral Husband E. Kimmel knew of and ignored advice regarding the direction and extent to which he should have ordered long-range air reconnaissance prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor is false—and grounds to set it right exist. Of all the alleged errors committed by Admiral Husband E. Kimmel at Pearl Harbor before and on 7 December 1941,his decision not to institute long-range 360° aerial reconnaissance over the approaches to Oahu after the "war warning" of 27 November has attracted the most attention. Apparently, this fault more than any other caused Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Ernest J. King, in his 1944 endorsement of the Naval Court Of Inquiry—which had exonerated the former Commander-in-Chief of U.S. and Pacific Fleets from the finding of willful neglect pronounced by the Roberts Commission in 1942—to charge him anew with "dereliction."[i] And this, according to Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal, in his own endorsement of the Navy Court, was Kimmel's "most grievous failure."[ii] Although the responsibility to protect the Pacific Fleet at its moorings was originally the Army's, a written agreement signed on 11 April 1941 by Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and his naval opposite number, Rear Admiral [p. 52] Claude C. Bloch, Commandant, 14th Naval District, shifted responsibility for distant reconnaissance to the Navy. The Army Air Forces would conduct defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu, and Bloch would make the decision when and if to institute long- range patrols. Of lasting interest to students of Pearl Harbor, on 31 March 1941 the air-defense officers of the two services in Oahu—Major General Frederick L. Martin for the Army and Rear Admiral Patrick N. L. Bellinger for the Navy— had signed off on a report cannily predicting that a surprise air attack on Oahu would likely be launched at dawn, prior to a declaration of war, and from a distance inside 300 nautical miles. Martin was Commanding Officer, Hawaiian Air Force; Bellinger, among various other offices, was Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force and Commander, Patrol Wing Two. Their prospectus could well be stapled to a dispatch from the Office of Naval Intelligence in Washington the next day, 1 April, advising that “Axis Powers often begin activities in a particular field on Saturdays and Sundays or on national holidays of the country concerned. . . .”[iii] As the Martin-Bellinger Joint Estimate emphasized, however, “The aircraft at present available in Hawaii are inadequate to maintain, for any extended period, from bases on Oahu, a patrol extensive enough to ensure that an air attack from an Orange [Japanese] carrier cannot arrive over Oahu as a complete surprise. . . .” Again, the Martin-Bellinger report stated that, “In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using. . . ." Only within "narrow time limits"—a matter of days—could the in-commission PBY-3 and PBY-5 patrol bombers fly seaward through 360° to a distance (if possible) of the 800 nautical miles required to prevent a carrier from launching an attack without prior detection.[iv] Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, Director of War Plans at Main Navy, concurred in that assessment. For a complete sweep on a 360° arc to the maximum range of the scout planes, 84 aircraft would he required on a single flight of 16 hours. Since the same planes and crews could not make such a flight every day, the Navy required a fleet of 250 operational aircraft if it hoped to conduct effective reconnaissance over a protracted period. Admiral Bloch, Bellinger's superior, had only 49 patrol aircraft for this purpose in the first week of December (100)new PBY-5 Catalinas promised Kimmel had never arrived), most of which were being used for training in anticipation of offensive combat assignments stipulated in War Plan Pac-46, which included, within 13 days after the start of war, a raid by surface and air striking forces against Japanese bases in the Marshall Islands. For those planes spare parts were extremely scarce—many of the Catalinas on hand were grounded by cracked engine nose sections—experienced aviation machinist mates were also in short supply, and there were no spare crews. In sum, extended reconnaissance would have incapacitated many of the PBYs after just a few days of flight. Six long-range Army B-17D bombers, the only ones in operating condition on the island, were being used to train crews for the Philippine Air Force, but they were available in an emergency.[v] The Army also made available 20 short-legged B-18 medium bombers, But they were useful only for 20-miles-out inshore patrol. When there, General Martin’s chief of staff, Lieutenant Colonel James A. Mollison, “complained bitterly” that the B-18 was “a very bad airplane for that purpose,” since, with its poor visibility, “it is pretty hard to pick up anything in the water.”[vi] At the hearings of 1945-1946 before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, Rear Admiral Charles H. McMorris, Kimmel’s war plans officer, testified that, after receipt of the 27 November warning, Kimmel’s staff carefully considered the availability of flyable patrol planes, the status of training, the patrol wings’ responsibility for supplying trained personnel for new squadrons, the tasks assigned the wings in WPPac-46, and the fact that, given aircraft shortages and maintenance limitations, seaward patrols would be "largely token searches."[vii] The question was one on which Kimmel and his staff had gone up and down the scale many times. The conclusion, McMorris stated, was that "training would suffer heavily and that if we were called upon to conduct a war, that we would find a large proportion of our planes needing engine overhaul at the time we most required their services."[viii] Exhaustion of crews was another consideration. Kimmel and Bloch therefore decided to concentrate on expansion training until more aircraft, or more information, became available. The Navy Court in 1944 judged: "The omission of this reconnaissance was not due to oversight or neglect. It was the result of a military decision, reached after much deliberation and consultation with experienced officers, and after weighing the information at hand and all the factors involved. . . ."[ix] Vice Admiral William F. Halsey, senior Naval Air Force commander, Hawaiian area, stated after the war: "Any admiral worth his stars would have made the same choice."[x] On 7 December, air patrols from the at-sea carriers Enterprise (CV-6) and Lexington (CV-2), heading task forces from Wake and toward Midway, respectively, were patrolling far to the west and west-northwest of Oahu. As the forces proceeded, morning and afternoon squadrons covered a 400-nautical-mile strand of ocean along their paths. Patrol wings on Oahu were active as well. At 0800, five minutes after the Japanese attack began, three dawn patrol planes took off on a regular short-range security search of the fleet operating area between the north and northwest sectors.[xi] Patrol Wing 1 was preparing to send out two more search planes to the northwest, when they were destroyed by Japanese aircraft; it then diverted two planes of the earlier flight to cover a westerly sector. The lone plane on north-northwest search, about 450 nautical miles away, failed to sight the Japanese aircraft on their flights in or out. The Pearl Harbor attack came from due north. In his second endorsement to the Navy Court, Admiral King argued that Kimmel should have conducted long-range searches at least "in the more dangerous sectors."[xii] Which these were he did not say. But, in King's support, certain historians readily told us. Gordon W. Prange, in Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History (1986), spoke authoritatively: "... A 360° search was not needed. Carefully reasoned estimates, such as the Martin-Bellinger and Farthing reports, existed postulating that the most dangerous sectors were the north and northwest. These could have been covered adequately if not ideally."[xiii] Prange went on to state that, "... The evaluation of the north as being indeed the most dangerous sector was too well documented for serious questioning.”[xiv] That Kimmel had ignored clear and precise warnings about the north and northwest sectors constituted Prange's most damaging charge against him, made in a chapter titled, after Forrestal, "His Most Grievous Failure." A New York Times review (5 January 1986) by Pacific War historian Ronald H. Spector picked up and repeated the Prange charge. Two years later, on 5 January 1988, as Director of Naval History in the Department of the Navy, Spector wrote to Secretary of the Navy James H. Webb, Jr., via Admiral C. A. H. Trost, then-Chief of Naval Operations, recommending that Kimmel not be promoted to full admiral posthumously on the retired list, as Kimmel's two surviving sons were petitioning. Spector added that, as for "my personal views of Admiral Kimmel's conduct," stated in his Times piece and in a book chapter, both of which he enclosed, "I see no reason to alter them at this time."[xv] Admiral Trost concurred with his recommendation.[xvi] Spector’ s statements in the Times included the following: "... As the Prange book points out, two of Kimmel's principal air chiefs, Comdr. (later Admiral) Arthur C. Davis and Rear Adm. Patrick Bellinger, both told the joint Congressional committee investigating Pearl Harbor after the end of the war they had believed ‘the greatest possibility of a successful air attack lay in an attack coming in from a sector of the north because of the prevailing wind conditions.' There is also the written evidence of an official report on Hawaiian air defenses, completed in March 1941 [Martin-Bellinger], which, as the Prange book points out, predicted that an air attack was most likely to come from the north or northwest."[xvii] Three observations are warranted at this point. First, Admiral Davis never made such a statement at the joint congressional hearings. He did not even appear before those hearings. Nor did he make such a statement before any other official investigating body on the Pearl Harbor attack. Second, as for the so-called Farthing Report mentioned by Prange: Farthing was Air Forces Colonel William E. Farthing, commander of the Fifth Bombardment Group at Hickam Field, Hawaii, who drafted for General Martin's signature, on 20 August 1941, a "Plan for the Employment of Long-Range Bombardment Aviation in the Defense of Oahu." In it, besides stating that the only effective search would be 100% coverage through 360° to a radius of 833 nautical miles, he proposed that the enemy’s "most probable avenue of approach is the hemisphere from 0°, counterclockwise to 180 degrees around Oahu;"—-the western half of the compass rose (!), which was no more exact a prediction than saying that a German invasion of France would come from the east-—"the next most probable, the quadrant 180 degrees counter-clockwise to 90 degrees [south around to east]; the least probable, 90° to 0 degrees (due east on around back to north]."[xviii] Third, the Martin-Bellinger Joint Estimate: At the end of the war, Bellinger did in fact testify in the hearings that the northwest and north sectors were considered the "most vital," since the prevailing winds at Oahu were from the northeast, and thus enemy carriers could recover their aircraft while retiring from the area.[xix] But no record or witness states that Bellinger said this to Kimmel at the time. In history nothing substitutes for examination of the actual documents. Contrary to the statements of Prange and Spector, the Martin-Bellinger report of March 1941 that represented what Bellinger thought at the time, the same estimate that he submitted to Kimmei and that Kimmel approved as governing doctrine, nowhere states that the most dangerous sectors were the north and northwest. The words "north" and "northwest" do not appear in the text, nor do any equivalent nautical or numerical terms.[xx] Through inadvertence, and obviously not intended by either party, the misrepresentation of this document by Prange and the then-Director of Naval History has had the effect, through Prange, of reinforcing Kimmel's image as the principal Navy scapegoat for Pearl Harbor, and through the Director, of substantiating a reason for denying Kimmel retroactive remedial justice, as sought by his two sons. During his testimony before the Joint Congressional Committee on 31 January 1946, Bellinger stated sagely: "Hindsight is one thing and foresight is another. This situation at Pearl Harbor was another."[xxi] But that self-expressed caution did not prevent him, on the same day, from answering Representative Frank B. Keefe (R-WI) with the lucidity of hindsight: Mr. Keefe: I understand your testimony also to be--and you may correct me if I am in error-—that as an airman familiar with the situation in Hawaii you were in agreement with Admiral Davis that the greatest possibility of a successful air attack lay in an attack coming in from the sector to the north because of the prevailing wind conditions; is that right? Admiral Bellinger: That is practically correct; yes, sir."[xxii] That this was not what he advised Admiral Kimmel at the time in the Martin-Bellinger Report becomes clear minutes later. Keefe uses an opinion alleged to be Admiral Davis’, though the latter never expressed it in his testimony. But Bellinger probably had no way of knowing if he had or had not. On the next page of the Keefe-Bellinger exchange, the dialogue dwelt on the prevailing wind conditions in the north and on how those winds favored a northern attack, since, as Keefe put it: Mr. Keefe: So the best opportunity to get away is when the carriers are headed out away from Oahu and the planes can be recaptured by the carrier heading right into the wind? Admiral Bellinger: Yes, sir. Mr. Keefe: That is, as I understood, your plan set out in the Martin-Bellinger Report. You set that out, did you not? Admiral Bellinger: No, sir, that is not in that report.[xxiii] Foresight caught up with hindsight only one page away. Kimmel, too, had to correct the Joint Committee when asked about Martin-Bellinger: The Vice Chairman: Yes—that rather emphasized the northern direction? Admiral Kimmel: No, it never emphasized the northern direction. It emphasized an attack on Hawaii.[xxiv] Commander Davis did not give his testimony in the congressional hearings, as Prange and Specter contend, but in the inquiry (conducted by Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U.S. Navy [Retired]) in 1944. Nor did Davis state there, as alleged, that he predicted an attack from "a sector of the north." His actual response was as follows: Question: A considerable arc to the north and west and another 10 the south and west were the most important; is that true? Answer: Yes, sir, that is true, but it doesn't naturally follow that they would be certainly sufficient.[xxv] So the south and west were of equal concern to Davis, but, to use current parlance, in 1941 Davis was out of the loop. As he acknowledged to the Hart Inquiry: "My duty as Fleet Aviation Officer was primarily, if not almost entirely, concerned with technical training and logistics matters. . . . I, myself, had little to do with considerations of attack posibilities, and I do not recall ever being directly consulted on such matters by the Commander-in-Chief [Kimmel].”[xxvi] What sectors, if any, might Kimmel have thought were the most dangerous? He gave his answer at the hearings: A search of all sectors of approach to an inland base is the only type of search that deserves the name. The selection of one sector around an island for concentration of distant search affords no real protection. After a while it may furnish some insurance that the enemy, having knowledge of the search plan, will choose some otter sector within which to make his approach. The search concentrated on the so-called "dangerous sector" then ceases to offer much prospect of detecting the enemy.[xxvii] In support of this reasoning, Kimmel's relief as CinC-Pac, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, wrote a month after the attack, on 7 January 1942: "It cannot be assumed that any direction of approach may safely be left unguarded. . . . Neglect of any sector is apt soon to be known."[xxviii] As for the northern "vacant sea," Kimmel admitted at the hearings he had been greatly surprised that the Japanese chose such a route. Besides his doubts about the steaming range of their carriers and about their professional ability to plan and execute an attack of that force and daring, Kimmel thought that the rough northern seas at that time of year would deter any expedition of 3,500 miles along those latitudes. (As it happened, throughout most of the voyage the Japanese fleet encountered unusually smooth seas.) Pearl Harbor had been "attacked" successfully from the northwest sector during Fleet Problem XIX in 1938, but if Kimmel had relied on that example and sent all his scout planes to the northwest, the patrols would have missed the Mitsubishis, Nakajimas, and Aichis that roared down from due north. In thinking through possible attack scenarios Kimmel had the advice of two knowledgeable staff members—Admiral Halsey, who thought right up to 7 December that any attack on Oahu would come from the Marshalls to the southwest, and Fleet Intelligence Officer Lieutenant Commander Edwin T. Layton, who shared the same opinion. All three men were proved wrong—but not negligently so. Of course, any commander who has been surprised in war would have acted differently if he had known beforehand what he learned only in retrospect. Had Kimmel known that a Japanese carrier fleet was steaming into his immediate north quarter, he surely would have shelved WPPac-46 and dispatched all his available patrol planes in that direction. At the hearings, Kimmel insisted that he would have set the war plan aside and gone to full reconnaissance if he had but received from Washington a copy of the decrypted "bomb plot" message that revealed how Japanese agents, at the request of their naval ministry, had, in Kimmel's words, "carved up" Pearl Harbor to show the precise berthings of the fleet.[xxix] On 6 November 1944 Admiral King appended a second endorsement to the findings of the Navy Court of Inquiry that effectively reversed those findings where Kimmel was concerned. In it, among other areas of command negligence that King stated he detected, he cited Kimmel's failure to make an attempt at long-range patrolling at least in the "certain sectors more dangerous than others," without explaining which those were, except to say by way of example that Kimmel's immediate predecessor, Admiral James 0. Richardson, had patrolled the southwest![xxx] Almost exactly one month later, on the dismal anniversary day of 7 December, King received Kimmel at his office. In a lengthy aide-mémoire, Kimmel recorded their conversation afterward.[xxxi] At that date Kimmel had not yet seen the findings of the Navy Court. He would not be apprised of them, or of his exculpation—and then only in a sanitized version to protect Magic-Purple intelligence—until 29 August 1945. According to the aide-mémoire, King presented against him the one charge that apparently stood out above all others in his mind, since it was the only one discussed in the interview, as recorded by Kimmel in the third person: "King, however, found that Admiral Kimmel had made an error of judgment in not instituting a patrol off Pearl Harbor prior to 7 December 1941 to the limit that the planes available made it possible." Kimmel wondered if the testimony and the findings of the court were not to the contrary, and several paragraphs later in the memo he expressed his stupefaction in capital letters: "KING SAID THAT HE HAD NOT READ THE TESTIMONY GIVEN BEFORE THE COURT." (Nor had King written his own endorsement. It came from Vice Admiral Richard S. Edwards, his deputy chief of staff.[xxxii] Furthermore, in 1962 Admiral Harold R.Stark revealed that King had told him, "... He has signed the NCI endorsement without reading it.")[xxxiii] In his memorandum of 5 January 1988 to Admiral Trost and Secretary Webb, recommending against the Kimmel sons' petition, Naval History Director Spector made prominent mention of King's endorsement. So, too, did Trost, in transmitting the memo to Webb. Obviously, King's opinion still counted for much, and, as indicated in the interview with Kimmel, the air-search problem seems to have been uppermost in the Fleet Admiral's mind; so, too, in the mind of the new Secretary, Forrestal, whom King brought along to concur in his endorsement,[xxxiv] and who judged that Kimmel's "most grievous failure was his failure to conduct long-range air reconnaissance in the most dangerous sectors from Oahu during the week preceding the attack.”[xxxv] This is not to say that Spector’s memo to Secretary Webb omitted mention of other alleged missions or negligences for which either Kimmel or General Short, or both, have been blamed. He summed them up in this quotation from Prange's Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History: . . . The commanders on Oahu were not alert on December 7, 1941—not when a Japanese task force could approach undiscovered to within 200 miles of Oahu; not when twenty-five enemy submarines surrounded the island; not when Japanese patrol planes could hover unchallenged over Lahaina and Pearl Harbor; not when the antiaircraft batteries were unready; not when most of the ammunition was locked up in magazines; not when U.S. fighters and bombers were bunched together at Wheeler and Hickam fields like coveys of quail; not when a U.S. destroyer could sink a Japanese submarine in the operating areawithout the Hawaiian Department being notified of the event. . . .[xxxvi] No attempt has been made in this brief analysis to answer all the charges made against Kimmel and Short. The attempt here is focused more narrowly on distant reconnaissance. On that one point alone, Kimmel has been judged unfairly. Such would also be the opinion of Admiral Bellinger, who addressed the air-search problem before the Hart Inquiry in 1944: . . . Considering shortages and deficiencies, other necessary deployment of forces, such as expansion training and development of facilities, and lacking unity of command, little if any more in the way of readiness could be expected. It is believed that Admiral Kimmel saw this picture very realistically and I know of no man who, under the circumstances, could have done more.[xxxvii] The thousands who read Prange's book and Specter's review of it no doubt concluded that Admiral Kimmel must have been something of a dolt not to have heeded so clear and accurate a warning as Martui-Bellinger was alleged to contain; and not to have patrolled in the limited "more dangerous sectors," where the available aircraft allowed him to do so. It is regrettable that it has taken eight years since the date of Prange's "verdict of history" to correct the misrepresentation of Martin-Bellinger and to remove that one particular stone of obloquy from the Admiral's chest. Like all historical conclusions, and all human enterprises for that matter, "verdicts of history" suffer from the defects of incompleteness or error. They are not reached by some final, objective working out of mathematical formulae. They are not judgments beyond which all further argument or dissent is futile. And we should not stand by, panting, for history to churn out its so-called verdicts at indeterminately appointed times. In a quip about the phrase, "in the long run," G. K. Chesterton said, "in the long run we'll all be dead." Therefore, it might behoove us to be cautious in accepting as the last word the closing sentence of then-Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Frank B. Kelso II's recent denial of the Kimmel family petition, dated 1 July 1993: "It is in the best interests of both the U.S Navy and the Kimmel family that this matter be left to the verdict of history."[xxxviii] The preceding indicates how reliable the "verdict" was on Kimmel and Martin-Bellinger. We should never forget that history has a dynamic property that cannot be braked or hushed, particularly where a truth or a question of justice is concerned. And so we might be equally cautious in accepting the closing advice in Naval History Director Specter's memo to Admiral Trost and Secretary Webb, which reads: “Set it at rest."[xxxix] Should we not say instead, "Set it right," if an error of record has been used officially against a Navy veteran? And do it now?[xl] When presented with a draft of this article, and after a careful study of its contents, former CNO Admiral Trost wrote to Secretary of the Navy John H. Dalton, under the date 4 October 1994, withdrawing his memorandum to Secretary Webb, dated 19 January 1988, and asking that the case of Admiral Kimmel be reopened. "I believe such action is owed to the Admiral," he wrote, "to his sons, and to the Navy. No mistake should be allowed to stand in this sensitive matter, and I personally disavow my unwitting support of one."[xli] ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Dr. Gannon is Distinguished Service Professor of History at the University of Florida. He is the author of Operation Drumbeat (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1990), about German U-Boat warfare off the U.S. Coast in 1942, and of the new World War II novel, Secret Mission (New York: HarperCollins, 1994). [i] Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of Pearl Harbor Attack, Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, 39 vols. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1946) [hereafter cited as PHA], Part 39, p. 338. Kimmel’s full title was Commander-in-Chief of United States and Pacific Fleets. [ii] Ibid., p.368. [iii] PHA, Part 4, p.1896. [iv] Ibid., Part 33, pp. 1183-1184. Cf. Part 8, pp. 3454-3455 The Martin—Bellinger estimate was prepared “practically in toto” by Patrol Wing Two; Part 26, p. 140 Range of the PBY’s was 700 miles, of the PBY-5s, 800. [v] Kimmel told the Joint Committee that 250 aircraft would be required for distant reconnaissance (Ibid., Part 6, p. 2533); Bellinger said “approximately 200” (Part 26, p. 124). On the number of flyable patrol bombers available to him at Oahu on 6-7 December, Bloch testified, “. . . There were 72 patrol bombers available and two squadrons of 24 were at Midway, leaving 48, and 12 under overhaul, leaving 50. I meant 36;” Part22, p.487. Kimmel testified that 49 Navy patrol planes were in flyable condition (Part 6, p. 2532); Bellinger also said 49 (Part 22, p. 558). On the operational B-17s see Part 27, p. 419; Part 12, p.323; Part 7, p. 3203. [vi] Ibid., Part 27, p. 423. [vii] Ibid., Part 32, p. 570f. [viii] Ibid. Kimmel stated before the Joint Committee: “I had been ordered, not once but twice, to be prepared to carry out the raids on the Marshalls under WPL-46, which meant the extended use of the fleet patrol planes from advanced bases in war operations;” Part 6, p. 2534. It should be stated, for balance, that McMorris did not believe that there was any chance of a surprise Japanese air attack on Pearl Harbor. For Kimmel’s combat authorization under WPPac-46 both at the commencement of war and at M180—180 days after the start of hostilities—see Part 9, pp. 4279-4282. Cf. Edward S. Miller, War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1991), pp. 294-312. [ix] Ibid., Part 39, pp. 308-309. [x] FADM William F. Halsey and LCDR J. Bryan III, Admiral Halsey’s Story (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1947), p. 71. [xi] PHA, Part 8, pp. 3471, 3508-3509. It is interesting that at the lower, operational level, the patrol wings thought that the northwest sector was the most vulnerable. In the hearings, Bellinger’s Operations Officer, LCDR Logan C. Ramsey, stated that, “. . . We had decided the northwest sector was the most likely line of approach, and in our drills the squadron in the highest degree of readiness was always ordered to take up that sector from 315 to 00.” Part 32, p. 452. [xii] Ibid., Part 39, p. 344. [xiii] Gordon W. Prange, with Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine Dillon, Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1986) p. 441. [xiv] Ibid., p. 449. [xv] Kimmel Family Papers [hereafter cited KFP], Memorandum (copy), Ronald H. Spector to Secretary of the Navy via Chief of Naval Operations, 5 January 1988, p. 2. [xvi] KFP, First Endorsement on DIRNAVHIST MEMO OF 5 JANUARY 1988, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS TO SECRETARY OF THE NAVY (COPY). [xvii] Ronald H. Spector, “Someone Had Blundered, but Who?” New York Times Book Review, 5 January 1986, p. 10. [xviii] PHA, Part 14, p. 1028. [xix] Ibid., Part 8, pp. 3453, 3504. [xx] The Martin-Bellinger estimate appears in three places in the hearings record; Ibid., Part 1, pp. 379-382; Part 22, pp. 349-354; Part 33, pp. 1182-1186. [xxi] Ibid., Part 8, p. 3489. [xxii] Ibid., Part 8, p. 3504. Prange put Keefe’s words in the mouth of Bellinger: Pearl Harbor, p. 438. [xxiii] PHA, Part 8, p. 3505. [xxiv] Ibid., Part 6, p. 2661. [xxv] Ibid., Part 26, p. 109. [xxvi] Ibid., Part 26, p. 104. [xxvii] Ibid., Part 6, p. 2533. [xxviii] FADM Nimitz to Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet [FADM King], 7 January 1942, quoted in Ibid., Part 6, p. 2533. [xxix] Ibid., Part 6, p. 2543. [xxx] Ibid., Part 39, p. 338. [xxxi] KFP, “Memorandum of Interview with Admiral King in Washington on Thursday, 7 December 1944,” signed Husband E. Kimmel, 6 pp. n.d. [xxxii] B. Mitchell Simpson, III, Admiral Harold R. Stark: Architect of Victory 1939-1945 (Columbia University of South Carolina Press, 1989), p. 265. [xxxiii] Prange, Pearl Harbor, p. 230. Perhaps King read the court testimony in the post war years, since in 1948 he wrote to the Secretary of the Navy softening the language of his endorsement—Kimmel’s were “errors of judgment,” he wrote, “as distinguished from culpable inefficiency”—though without retracting the word “dereliction.” KFP (copy), King to John L. Sullivan, 14 July 1948. [xxxiv] Simpson, Harold R. Stark, p. 265. [xxxv] Fourth Endorsement to Record of Proceedings of Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry, PHA, Part 39, p. 368. [xxxvi] KFP, Spector to Secretary of the Navy, p. 2; Prange, Pearl Harbor, p. 462. [xxxvii] PHA, Part 26, p. 140. [xxxviii] KFP, ADM Frank B. Kelso, US Navy, to Edward R. Kimmel, 1 July 1993. [xxxix] KFP, Spector to Secretary of the Navy, p. 3. [xl] The misrepresentation of Martin-Bellinger is passing into the literature. An example is Michael Slackman, Target: Pearl Harbor (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press and Arizona Memorial Museum Association, 1990) p. 56, where it is alleged that Martin and Bellinger “stated in their plan that the most likely method of attack was a surprise air raid by plans launched from carriers north of Oahu.” [xli] ADM Carlisle A. H. Trost, USN (ret.), to the Honorable John H. Dalton, Secretary of the Navy, Potomac, Maryland, 4 October 1994; copy with the author. Tom Kimmel A noted Pearl Harbor scholar, former FBI agent, and the eldest grandson of Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, Tom Kimmel comes from a long line of distinguished scholars and servants to the United States Government and from a family that has dedicated itself, and given generously, to protecting the freedom and way of life that the 9/11 attacks threaten. A 1966 graduate of the US Naval Academy, and a Lt. Commander in the U. S. Naval Reserve, Tom went on to serve his country as an agent for the Federal Bureau of Investigation for more than 25 years. Tom, the eldest grandson of Admiral Kimmel, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor when the Japanese attacked on December 7, 1941, is the sixth member of his family to graduate from the Naval Academy and the ninth to graduate from a service academy. In fact, Tom’s great-grandfather, Admiral Kimmel's father, an 1857 West Point graduate, fought for both the North and the South in the Civil War. Tom served on the USS Taussig (DD 746), the USS Bordelon (DD 881), and the USS Manitowoc (LST 1180) from 1966-1971 during the Vietnam War and attended John Marshall Law School prior to joining the FBI in 1973. Tom worked organized crime, La Cosa Nostra, in Cleveland, served on the House Appropriations Committee Surveys and Investigations Staff at CIA Headquarters, headed the FBI in East Texas, headed the Organized Crime/LCN and Labor Racketeering Unit at FBI Headquarters and the National Drug Intelligence Center in Johnstown, PA, and served on the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency. Tom was also the Assistant Agent in Charge of the Philadelphia FBI Division where he headed the Foreign Counterintelligence and Terrorism Programs in the Philadelphia Division during the 1^st attack on the World Trade Center in 1993 (See “The Continuing Threat of Espionage,” Mid-Atlantic Monthly, 8/92). Upon retiring from the FBI, Tom served as a consultant to the Bureau addressing major spy scandals in the FBI and CIA (See New York Sunday Times, 4/22/01, page 1, available upon request; The Bureau and the Mole, David Vise, p. 97; The Secret History of the CIA, Joe Trento, pp. 468-471; SPY, The Inside Story of How the FBI’s Robert Hanssen Betrayed America, David Wise, pp.178-182; WEDGE, From Pearl Harbor to 9/11, How the Secret War Between the FBI and CIA Has Endangered National Security, Mark Riebling, pp.463-465). Since retiring, Tom has testified before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the Department of Justice Inspector General, the Blue Ribbon Commission of William Webster, and many other investigating entities. Tom also appeared twice on 60 Minutes with Leslie Stahl as part of CIA Officer Brian Kelley’s story (2/2/03 and 8/24/03). Speech Titles: 1. The Story within the Pearl Harbor Story, and 2. The Pearl Harbor and the 9/11 Attacks Compared. Travels From: Virginia and Florida *Approximate Fees: Expenses. The net proceeds of honorarium* always go to charity. Writings (available FREE upon e-mail request to Tom):** 1. Admiral Kimmel's Story and 2. Facts about Pearl Harbor by Husband E. Kimmel; 3. Military History Quarterly (Winter 2002), "Unfairly Shouldering the Blame," by Thomas K. Kimmel, Jr.; 4. "MAGIC and the Proximate Cause for the Disaster at Pearl Harbor," by Thomas K. Kimmel, Jr., World War II Chronicles, 2001; 5. National Press Club, press conference, press kit, 11/6/03; 6. Naval History Magazine, “Kimmel Case Dubbed ‘Totally Political’,” by Fred Schultz, 2/04; and 7. Wall Street Journal and New York Times letters, 4/2&20/04, by Tom Kimmel.. References: 1. 3/14/03, Accuracy in Media, Washington, DC, Notra Turlock, “You made a great and very convincing presentation [see AIM reports 6/5/03, 12/4/03, and 12/23/03].” 2. 4/15/03, FBIAA, Melbourne, FL, “Outstanding PowerPoint presentation.” 3. 4/25/03, General Huck Long, “Your presentation to our Combat Infantryman Fraternity was absolutely superb! While it was very interesting, of more importance, it is extremely persuasive.” 4. 11/6/03, National Press Club, Washington, DC, see Naval History Magazine, 2/04. 5. 11/19/03, Chiefs of Police Association, Chief Scragg, “I cannot thank you enough. The hour just flew by.” 6. 12/6/03, USS Arizona Reunion, Tucson, AZ, Ruth Campbell, organizer, “You were great. The members have requested that we get you back again next year . . . to make you the headliner and allow all the time you want. If I had only known, I would not have paid for an expensive act—but next time will be different.” Addresses: 2815 South Atlantic Avenue, Unit 403, Cocoa Beach, FL 32931; 8400 Martingale Drive, McLean, VA 22102-1309 E-mail: TKIMMEL@CFL.RR.COM Telephone #s: 321.783-8262 Cocoa Beach, FL; 703.448-1653 McLean, VA; 315.569-4442 CELL Resolution Request in Support of Rear Admiral Kimmel Dear Advocate, I seek your organization’s support. I am a former naval officer, a retired FBI agent, and the eldest grandson of Admiral Kimmel, the Commander of the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor when attacked December 7, 1941. The United States Congress, in Section 547 of the Defense Authorization Act for 2001, recited that the Pearl Harbor Commanders had performed their duties competently and professionally and requested that the President of the United States advance Rear Admiral Kimmel to his highest temporary rank held during World War II, admiral, as provided by the Officer Personnel Act of 1947, from which he alone, among flag officers, has been punitively excluded by the Navy. In 1989 then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney counseled that to advance their cause the Kimmel family should obtain resolutions of endorsement from appropriate persons and organizations supporting the advancement of Rear Admiral Kimmel on the retired list to admiral. Accordingly, since then we have obtained such written endorsements from: The United States Congress; The Pearl Harbor Survivors Association; The Naval Academy Alumni Association; The Veterans of Foreign Wars; The Admiral Nimitz Foundation; The Pearl Harbor Commemorative Committee; Six former Chiefs of Naval Operations; Two former Chairmen of the Joints Chiefs of Staff; One former Director of Central Intelligence; 10. Thirty-three four star admirals (seven included above); and 11. Many others. Additionally, it is clear that World War II Admirals Halsey, Nimitz, Spruance, Kinkaid, Burke, Bellinger, Holloway, Richardson, Standley, Theobald, and a host of others would have supported such advancement. I have attached a sample resolution for consideration of adoption by your organization. Thank you for your consideration. For more information please contact me. Sincerely, Tom Kimmel 321.783-8262 Cocoa Beach, FL 315.569-4442 Cell TKIMMEL@CFL.RR.COM Sample Resolution *Whereas, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and General Walter C. Short were the Commanders of record for the Navy and Army forces at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii on December 7, 1941 when the Japanese Imperial Navy launched its attack; and Whereas, following the attack President Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed a Commission, Chaired by Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts, to determine whether there had been any derelictions or errors of judgment by army or navy personnel in connection with the attack; and Whereas, the Roberts Commission conducted a 36-day investigation and reported that Admiral Kimmel and General Short had been guilty of dereliction of duty and were solely responsible for the success of the attack; and, Whereas, these findings were broadcast to all the world 47 days after the attack and ruined the reputations and honor of these two officers; and, Whereas, since that time there have been eight investigations of the circumstances leading up to the attack which concluded there had been no derelictions of duty by these two officers and that they were not solely responsible for the success of the attack; and Whereas, the Congress of the United States in the year 2000, when it enacted the Defense Authorization Act for 2001, included provisions which recited that these two officers had performed their duties competently and professionally and requested that the President of the United States nominate them posthumously to their highest World War II ranks of admiral and lieutenant general on the list of retired officers of their respective services ; and Whereas, the President has not yet honored the Congressional request that he posthumously nominate these officers to the highest ranks in which they served in World War II; Now, Therefore, be it Resolved by* Name of Organization that it urges the President of the United States to restore the honor and reputations of Admiral Husband Kimmel and Lieutenant General Walter C. Short by nominating them posthumously for retirement at the highest ranks in which they served in World War II, admiral and lieutenant general, of their respective services. Unanimously Adopted, date, at location [Signature] Secretary or President or some authenticating officer

Resolution Request in Support of Rear Admiral Kimmel