On December 7, 1941, an Imperial Japanese carrier task force launched a brilliantly successful air attack on the U.S. Navy’s Pacific Fleet, then berthed at Pearl Harbor in the Hawaiian Islands.

Over 3,000 people, military and civilian, were killed or wounded and the physical damage to the fleet was tremendous.

Before the fires were out and the dead buried, a controversy began to boil and bubble and it has continued to smoke and flame like one of those vast underground coal mine fires that have plagued parts of the United States for years.

As a direct result of the attack, the United Sates was at war in the Pacific and the military commanders at Pearl Harbor were forced to retire from the service in disgrace.

At the time, senior naval officers believed, as many do now, that Admiral Husband Kimmel and General Walter Short were scapegoats for the Roosevelt Administration’s reputation.

Kimmel and Short: Not Guilty, Not Legally Charged, But Punished Nonetheless?

By Thomas K. Kimmel, Jr.

Frederic L. Borch III, a colonel in the Judge Advocate General’s Corps, asked the question, Were Admiral Kimmel and General Short “GUILTY AS CHARGED?” (MHQ, Volume 13, Number 2, Winter 2001, pages 54-63). Congress answered the question last year by declaring that Kimmel and Short performed their duties “competently and professionally,” and by recommending that they not be further punished, and that the President restore their ranks[1]. 

Colonel Borch disagreed with the Congress, and said that Kimmel and Short were guilty as charged, got what they deserved, and should be further punished.

It must first be remembered that, Admiral Kimmel was never charged with dereliction of duty or errors of judgment (or anything else) by any instrumentality or agency of his government, which afforded him the opportunity of defending his name[2].

1) The Congress, 2) the five greatest admirals of World War II, 3) five of the highest-ranking admirals of today, and 4) President Roosevelt’s official naval historian, Samuel Eliot Morison, all disagree with Colonel Borch’s answer.

Unlike Colonel Borch, the five greatest admirals of World War II, Halsey, King, Kinkaid, Nimitz, and Spruance have made it clear that they do not, did not, or would not, want Kimmel further punished. Here is what the greatest admirals of World War II said about Kimmel on that subject:

Halsey said:

“[Concerning Kimmel’s decision to save his aircraft for future combat and not to engage in token long-range reconnaissance without more threat information than was contained in the Nov 27th War Warning Message] Any Admiral worth his stars would have made the same choice.[3]” 

King said:

“ . . .the evidence adduced [against Kimmel] warrants neither trial by general court-martial nor punishment in any form. . . .[4]”

Kinkaid said:

“I always thought [Kimmel] was very unjustly treated...the proceedings [of the Roberts Commission] that went into the matters out there were entirely illegal...[Kimmel was made a scapegoat] That’s what it was, undoubtedly. Nothing else.[5]”

Nimitz said:

“Knox was wrong in blaming Kimmel. . . . ‘It could have happened to anyone’;[6]”  and

“Admiral Kimmel had been given no information which would justify interrupting a very urgent training schedule.[7]”

Spruance said:

“I have always felt that Kimmel [was] held responsible for Pearl Harbor in order that the American people might have no reason to lose confidence in their Government in Washington. This was probably justifiable under the circumstances at that time, but it does not justify forever damning [this] fine officer.[8]”

Unlike Colonel Borch, five of the highest-ranking admirals of today, to include four Chiefs of Naval Operations, and two heads of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admirals Crowe, Holloway, Moorer, Trost,  and Zumwalt  do not want Kimmel, or Short, further punished and have expressly supported remedial action in language now elevated to law.

Unlike Colonel Borch, Roosevelt appointed naval historian, Samuel Eliot Morison, expressly did not want Kimmel further punished, and actively supported Kimmel’s rehabilitation. Morison said this about Kimmel:

“[Kimmel and Short are] no more blamable than a number of people in Washington—Turner and Gerow, Marshall, Miles, [and] Wilkinson. If I were pushed to name one person as being more careless or stupid than all the rest it would be Kelly Turner . . .If you and your friends are getting up any sort of petition to have Admiral Kimmel’s status restored or record changed, you can count on me to sign it.[9]”

Admiral Morison credited Roberta Wholstetter, author of Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision, with changing his mind in support of Admiral Kimmel.[10]

There is, however, a more important reason for President Bush to embrace Congress’ remedial-justice legislation. Our nation in general, and the military in particular, need to have an understanding of the true causes of that disaster if in the future we are to avoid repeating them. Our national civilian leadership needs to understand what went wrong so that national political and military initiatives in evolving situations of importance can be timely and appropriate. The USS Cole attack appears to be the most recent example of Pearl-Harbor lessons not learned.

The Facts

There is a veritable who’s who of military history that supports Admiral Kimmel[11], but what is important are the facts.  Admiral Harry E. Yarnell, former Commander-in-Chief Asiatic Fleet, summed up the facts this way,

“The most disgraceful feature of the whole affair was the evident determination on the part of Washington to fasten the blame on the Hawaiian commanders. The incomplete and one-sided Roberts report, the circumstances of the retirements of Kimmel and Short, the attempts of the War and Navy Departments to deny access to the intercepted messages by the Naval Court of Inquiry and the Army Board of Investigation, the appointment of secret one-man boards to continue investigations, and finally the inability of the Joint Congressional Committee to secure access to pertinent files, constitute a blot on our national history.[12]”

Let’s look at the facts in some detail.

Ten Tribunals—Only One Accords Kimmel Due Process

There were nine tribunals while Admiral Kimmel and General Short were alive. Most importantly, of all the tribunals conducted only one accorded Admiral Kimmel the right to call and to cross-examine witnesses—the most fundamental of due process rights. The Naval Court of Inquiry was the only tribunal that accorded Admiral Kimmel the right to call and to cross-examine witnesses. The Naval Court of Inquiry completely exonerated Admiral Kimmel of dereliction of duty charges, approved of his ship dispositions in view of the information he had, and found that he committed no errors of judgment, while severely criticizing his boss, Admiral Stark, for not keeping Kimmel properly informed.  The Naval Court of Inquiry was also the only tribunal to make findings whose members all had the professional competence to judge Admiral Kimmel’s naval performance, as all three judging admirals had held high commands at sea.

The importance of restating the uniqueness of the Naval Court of Inquiry was underscored at the tenth tribunal in 1995.  The General Counsel of the Navy, in the presence of, but without the needed objection of, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, incorrectly told Senator Thurmond that:

“What I’d like to do is state the official  [emphasis added] position of the [Navy] Department today [April 27, 1995] and that position is the following . . .Admiral Kimmel enjoyed due process before the [Joint Congressional] Committee . . . he had the right to call and question witnesses.[13]”

This was incorrect. Admiral Kimmel did not have the right to call, or to question witnesses before the Joint Congressional Committee. If the General Counsel of the Navy, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Deputy Secretary of Defense did not know this at a hearing to specifically address the issue of fairness to Admiral Kimmel, it bares repeating here.

Colonel Borch was the Army’s representative to the 1995 investigation. Unfortunately, he was not present, to my knowledge, when the General Counsel of the Navy made his regrettable remarks, which remain uncorrected on the official record today, virtually ensuring future error prejudicial to Admiral Kimmel, and to General Short.

Why Not Name Those Responsible?

Like the Dorn Report, Colonel Borch charged unnamed others with responsibility without considering that the unnamed others might be more responsible—a conclusion made by President Roosevelt’s appointed historian. Also not considered was the effect that the errors of others might have had on errors Colonel Borch attributed to Admiral Kimmel and General Short.  After fifty-four years, the Dorn Report, for the first time, recognized that Kimmel and Short were not solely responsible for the defeat, but refused to name who else was. Admiral Spruance thought that this was the real reason that Kimmel and Short were singled out for blame in the first place, so that others equally and more responsible would not have to be named[14].

Command Accountability and Responsibility Are Not Synonyms for Blame

The Dorn Report said that, “A commander has plenary [absolute] responsibility for the welfare of the people under his command . . .[15]”

But the APHB found an exception, and said in its Top Secret Report that,

“ . . . where information has a vital bearing upon actions to be taken by field commanders, and this information cannot be disclosed by the War Department to its field commanders, it is incumbent upon the War Department then to assume the responsibility for specific directions to the theater commanders. This is an exception [emphasis added] to the admirable policy of the War Department of decentralized and complete responsibility upon the competent field commanders.

“Short got neither form of assistance from the War Department.[16]”

By arguing in the absurd and blindly applying absolute responsibility to the field commander, it must then follow that the twelve commanders of the twelve ships sunk[17] at Pearl Harbor must each somehow be blamed for the loss of his ship.  In the case of the USS Cole, neither the Cole’s skipper nor the Commander in Chief Central Command was blamed—so much for plenary responsibility.

Of course, commanding officers are responsible and accountable, but that obscures the important questions, Who is to blame?, and,  Who should be punished?  In a recent decision on the analogous case of the USS Indianapolis, the Navy reversed its adverse finding of blame upon the accountable—but blameless and  scapegoated—skipper, and posthumously exonerated him[18].

What did they know?  When did they know it?  What did they do about it?

Colonel Borch confined “they” to Kimmel and  Short ,  just like the Washington High Command did, and continues to do.  Let’s expand “they” to include the rest of the appropriate leadership—especially the Washington high command.  Here is a partial list of vital information known by the high command in Washington; by the British High Command; and by General MacArthur and Admiral Hart in the Philippines; but not by Kimmel or Short in Hawaii:

1. the ultimatum-delivery message;
2. the ultimatum-response message;
3. the 147 ships-in-harbor messages;
4.  the bomb-plot message;
5.  the deadline messages;
6.  the fourteen-part messages;
7.  the time-of-delivery messages;
8.  the deceit-plan messages;
9.  a specific War Warning;
10.  a specific order to attack; and
11.  a notice of attack on the United States.

MacArthur’s losses at Clark Field in the Philippines some nine hours after the attack at Pearl Harbor are well known. This in no way is meant to criticize MacArthur, but rather to point out the disparity of his treatment compared with the treatment of the Hawaiian commanders.

MAGIC Contained Both Diplomatic and Military Intelligence

The importance of MAGIC was explained by the head of Army intelligence, General Miles, and the JCC Chief Assistant Counsel Gesell as,

". . . the most reliable and authentic information which the War Department was receiving as to Japanese intentions and activities[19]. . . .and that some of these messages. . .were not of a diplomatic nature, they were of a military nature[20]."

The importance of MAGIC was also explained by the APHB in its Top Secret Report, which said that,

“Information from informers and other means [MAGIC] as to the activities of our potential enemy and their intentions in the negotiations between the United States and Japan was in possession of the State, War and Navy Departments in November and December of 1941. Such agencies had a reasonably complete disclosure of the Japanese plans and intentions, and were in a position to know what were the Japanese potential moves that were scheduled by them against the Untied States. Therefore, Washington was in possession of essential facts as to the enemy’s intentions.[21]”

“This information showed clearly that war was inevitable and late in November absolutely imminent. It clearly demonstrated the necessity of resorting to every trading act possible to defer the ultimate day of breach of relations to give the Army and Navy time to prepare for the eventualities of war.”

None of this intelligence was sent to Kimmel or Short.

Colonel Borch said that, " . . . the MAGIC messages would have provided no useful tactical information to Kimmel and Short."

MAGIC provided:

1.      the bomb-plot message;

2.      the 147 ships-in-harbor messages (68 applied to Pearl Harbor--one of which, left un-decoded before the attack, said there was still “considerable opportunity to take advantage for a surprise attack”[22] on Pearl Harbor);

3.      the deadline messages;

4.      the fourteen-part messages;

5.      the time-of-delivery messages; 

6.      the deceit-plan messages;

7.      the ultimatum-delivery message (which gave the War Department in Washington its only {repeat only}, notification[23] that Hull had submitted a diplomatic note to Japan on November 26, 1941); and

8.      the ultimatum-response message (which notified the War Department in Washington that Japan considered that note to be a humiliating proposal).

In short MAGIC provided indications of the time of the attack, indications of the place of the attack, indications of the planned deceit to cover the attack, and indications of the motivation of the attack, all of which is tactical information. I leave it to the reader to judge the potential usefulness of such information to Kimmel and Short.

Admiral Kimmel and General Short knew none of the preceding information. CINCPAC Kimmel had formally asked for all vital information, had been assured that he would have it, appeared to be receiving it (because he did receive some useless MAGIC messages[24]), and estimated the situation on that basis. Kimmel and Short were deprived of the most important information, and affirmatively misled[25].

Col. Alfred McCormack, the New York lawyer recruited by Secretary of War Stimson after the attack to straighten out perceived shortcomings in MAGIC distribution reported that, “When the sudden attack on Pearl Harbor occurred, it became apparent that the event had been clearly foreshadowed in the Japanese traffic of 1941.[26]”

Fleet Admiral Halsey said that,

“Had we known of Japan’s minute and continued interest in the exact location and movement of our ships in Pearl Harbor, as indicated in the ‘MAGIC Messages,’ it is only logical that we would have concentrated our thoughts on meeting the practical certainty of an attack on Pearl Harbor. I am sure I would have protested the movement of my Task Force to Wake Island in late November and early December. I am also sure no protest would have been necessary; because if Kimmel had possessed this intelligence, he would not have ordered that movement.[27]”

The Proximate Cause For the Disaster

Army Major Henry Clausen, head of the Clausen Investigation, said that, “The proximate cause for the disaster at Pearl Harbor was an unworkable system of military intelligence . . ..[28]"

If so, who was responsible for making the system of military intelligence unworkable?

On February 18, 1941, seventeen days after he took command of the Pacific Fleet, Kimmel wrote to Stark as follows:

“I have recently been told by an officer fresh from Washington that ONI [Intelligence] considers it the function of Operations to furnish the Commander-in-Chief with information of a secret nature. I have heard also that Operations considers the responsibility for furnishing the same type of information to be that of ONI [Intelligence]. I do not know that we have missed anything, but if there is any doubt as to whose responsibility it is to keep the Commander-in-Chief fully informed with pertinent reports on subjects that should be of interest to the Fleet, will you kindly fix that responsibility so that there will be no misunderstanding?[29]”

Stark replied to Kimmel on March 22, 1941 as follows:

“With reference to your postscript on the subject of . . .responsibility for the furnishing of secret information to OincUS [Officer-in-Charge United States Fleet Kimmel]. [then Director of Naval Intelligence] Kirk informs me that ONI [Intelligence] is fully aware of its responsibility in keeping you adequately informed.[30]"

Kimmel wrote to Stark on May 26, 1941 as follows:

“The Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet is in a very difficult position. He is far removed from the seat of government…He is. . .not informed as to the policy. . .reflected in current events. . . .[accordingly] It is suggested that it be made a cardinal principle that the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet be immediately informed of all important developments as they occur and by the quickest secure means available.[31]”

A month before the attack, Admiral Frank E. Beatty, Knox’s aide, asked Admiral Turner, Director of Naval War Plans, “Is Admiral Kimmel getting these ‘MAGIC messages?’  Turner replied, “Beatty, of course, he is. He has the same ‘magic’ setup we have here.[32]”

At the Joint Congressional Committee Investigation, General Counsel Mitchell questioned Admiral Stark as follows:

“Mr. Mitchell. Who was it that told you that they had a system out in Honolulu or Pearl Harbor of decoding and decrypting Jap messages?

“Admiral Stark. Admiral Turner.[33]”

Congressman Murphy questioned Admiral Turner as follows:

“Mr. Murphy. Did you ever tell Admiral Stark that Admiral Kimmel was getting that information [MAGIC]?

“Admiral Turner. Yes, sir, on three occasions . . .I asked Admiral Noyes [Chief of Naval Communications] about it and so reported to Admiral Stark.[34]”

The Naval Court of Inquiry questioned Admiral Noyes as follows:

“64. Q. Did you [Noyes] ever inform the Chief of War Plans Division, [then] Captain Turner, that the Commander of the Pacific Fleet was decrypting intelligence information of a character similar to that which you were receiving in the Navy Department [MAGIC]?

“Admiral Noyes. “No.[35]”

At the Joint Congressional Committee Investigation, Senator Ferguson questioned General Marshall as follows:

“Senator Ferguson. Were you aware that information and enemy intelligence was being withheld from G-2 in Hawaii?

“General Marshall. I was not aware of that, sir.[36]”

Other than to explain the significance of the information contained in MAGIC, what more need be said? Perhaps this:  Director of Naval Intelligence Wilkinson reported to the Roberts Commission in January 1942 that Kimmel received the same information that they did in Washington[37]. In the words of British historian John Costello, this    " . . .was so misleading as to be a deliberate lie.[38]" Chief of Naval War Plans Turner and Chief of Naval Operations Stark acquiesced to Wilkinson’s misstatement[39]. Marshall provided similar misleading information to the Clausen Investigation[40].

Admiral Yarnell said that,

“Stark and Marshall could have raised their reputations greatly by candidly admitting that their failure to send vital information to Pearl Harbor was the cause of the disaster. Yet they tried to defend themselves by failures of memory and the absurd stand that Short and Kimmel had all the information that was necessary.[41]”

Colonel Borch said that, “ . . . no punitive action of any kind was taken against [Kimmel or Short]. . . . they never suffered any serious punishment.”

In 1942 the Roberts Commission proclaimed Kimmel and Short  “solely responsible” for the success of the attack on Pearl Harbor through “dereliction of duty,” which is a crime today. This proclamation remained unchallenged for years. The Navy Department did not rescind its “solely responsible” allegation against Kimmel until 1995, twenty-eight years after Kimmel deceased. The Navy Department has never rescinded its “dereliction” allegation against Kimmel, even though the Joint Congressional Committee investigation put that allegation to rest in 1946 for both Kimmel and Short. The Army Department has not rescinded its “solely responsible,” or its “dereliction” allegation against Short, fifty-two years after he deceased.

Faced with similar stress, Captain Charles B. McVay, skipper of the Indianapolis, committed suicide in 1968.

Admiral Kimmel and General Short dedicated their lives to duty, honor, and country. Both had long exemplary careers. Each proved on numerous occasions a willingness to die for his Country—but not to be humiliated by it.  The Officer Personnel Act of 1947 allowed for a qualified officer to retire at his highest rank held in World War II. Only two such situated officers were not allowed to so retire—Kimmel and Short.

To conscientious men of integrity, such humiliation was severe punishment indeed.

Colonel Borch said that, “[Kimmel and Short] were not, despite what some claim, forced to retire at reduced ranks. That is absolutely untrue. More important, no evidence has ever been found to support that claim.”

The idea that Kimmel and Short wanted to retire under the circumstances is facially absurd. The fact that they did is testament only to their loyalty to the Country and to the war effort. They were forced to retire as a matter of fact, if not as a matter of law. Clearly the Administration wanted them to retire, in spite of their pleas for reassignment.

In Kimmel’s case the Navy did more than retire him against his wishes, they tried to force him to leave his retirement employment at the Harris Engineering Company, by threatening the company with loss of Navy business if Kimmel continued employment there[42]. Admiral Kimmel deliberately did not show the letter containing this information to his sons, or grandsons[43]—four of whom served in the Navy, and four of whom are service academy graduates[44].

[1] On May 18, 2000 the House voted 353 Yeas to 63 Nays in favor of The Defense Authorization Act of FY 2001. None of the 63 Nays involved the remedial-justice provision for Rear Admiral Kimmel and General Short. The Senate adopted the House language on June 8, 2000. Senate sponsors of the remedial-justice provision included Senators Joseph R. Biden, Jr. (D-DE), Thad Chochran (R-MS),

Pete V. Domenici (R-NM), Richard J. Durbin (D-IL), Jesse Helms (R-NC), Ernest F. Hollings (D-SC), Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA), John F. Kerry (D-MA), Frank H.  Murkowski (R-AK), Harry Reid (D-NV), William V. Roth, Jr (R-DE), Strom Thurmond (R-SC), and George V. Voinovich (R-OH). Final passage of the Act occurred May 16, 2000. The Act is also known as the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, it became Public Law No. 106-398 on October 30, 2000. The Admiral Kimmel and General Short provision of the Act, Section 546 (b), awaits Presidential action.

[2] Admiral Kimmel’s Story, Husband E. Kimmel, 1955, Forward by Charles E. Rugg and Edward B. Hanify, page v.

[3] Admiral Halsey’s Story, 1947, page 71.

[4] King letter to SECNAV Sullivan July 14, 1948.

[5] Columbia University Oral History, 1961, p.77

[6] Nimitz, E. B. Potter, p.13.

[7] SEAPOWER, Nimitz/Potter, p.650.

[8] Admiral Spruance letter to Samuel Eliot Morison, November 29, 1961.

[9] Morison letter to Admiral Shafroth 1961, author’s file 1265.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Over the years many of the greatest names in naval history have called for remedial justice for Rear Admiral Kimmel, to include Admirals Halsey, Nimitz, Spruance, Kinkaid, Standley, and Burke; and historian Samuel Eliot Morison, to name a few.

[12] See Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace, Harry Elmer Barnes, 1953, page 407; Admiral Kimmel’s Story, Husband E. Kimmel, 1955, page 170.

[13] Transcript of “REMARKS AT MEETING OF THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND MEMBERS OF THE KIMMEL FAMILY DEALING WITH THE POSTHUMOUS RESTORATION OF THE RANK OF ADMIRAL FOR REAR ADMIRAL HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, UNITED STATES NAVY APRIL 27, 1995 WASHINGTON, D.C.,” page 9.

[14] Admiral Spruance letter to Samuel Eliot Morison, November 29, 1961.

[15] Under Secretary of Defense Edwin Dorn, Memorandum for the Deputy Secretary of Defense, captioned “Advancement of Rear Admiral Kimmel and General Short,” dated December 15, 1995, page 4, also known as the Dorn Report.

[16] 39PHA221

[17] PEARL HARBOR: Why, How, Fleet Salvage and Final Appraisal, Vice Admiral Homer N.  Wallin, USN, Naval Historical Division, 1968, p. xiv.  Ships sunk were: 1. USS Shaw, 2. Floating Drydock Number Two, 3. The tug Sotoyomo,   4. USS Cassin,   5. USS Nevada,  6. USS California,  7.  USS  West Virginia, 8. USS Oglala, 9. USS Plunger, 10.  USS Oklahoma, 11.  USS  Utah, and 12. USS Arizona.

[18] USS Indianapolis Skipper Cleared By Janis L. Magin, Associated Press, Saturday, July 14, 2001; Washington Post, Page A22. HONOLULU -- The Navy has exonerated the late captain of the USS Indianapolis, decades after he was court-martialed for failing to evade the Japanese submarine that sank it in the worst sea disaster in U.S. naval history. Capt. Charles Butler McVay III committed suicide 33 years ago, but his son, Kimo Wilder McVay, fought for years to clear his father's record. The son died two weeks ago. A directive from Navy Secretary Gordon R. England orders a document exonerating the elder McVay to be placed in his file, a Navy spokesman said Thursday. The order follows a congressional resolution signed into law last fall by President Clinton that changes McVay's record to show he is exonerated and awarding the ship and crew a Navy Unit Commendation. The heavy cruiser sank after being torpedoed by a Japanese submarine in July 1945, near the close of World War II. The ship had just delivered atomic bomb parts at the island of Tinian. Only 315 of the 1,196 men aboard survived the attack and five-day ordeal adrift at sea. Many died from dehydration, drowning or shark attacks because the ship's radio was knocked out and the sinking went unnoticed for four days and five nights. McVay was convicted in February 1946 of "suffering a vessel to be hazarded through negligence," but he remained on active duty until mandatory retirement in June 1949. He used his Navy pistol to commit suicide in November 1968 at his Litchfield, Conn., home.

[19] 2PHA792

[20] 2PHA793

[21] 39PHA221

[22] 12PHA269, #253, PA-K2 code, dated December 6, 1941.

[23] 4PHA2039

[24] 14PHA1397-1399

[25] Admiral Kimmel’s Story, page 83.

[26]. See SRH-116, “Origin, Function and Problems of the Special Branch, MIS,” memorandum for Col. Carter W. Clarke from Col. Alfred McCormack, 15 April 1943, page 5., declassified February 27, 1981.

[27] The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor,  Admiral Robert A. Theobald, 1954, Forward by Fleet Admiral Halsey, page vii, viii.

[28] Final Judgment, Henry Clausen and Bruce Lee, 1992, page 300. They then go on to disparage Kimmel and Short by singling them out for the highest culpability ratings--10.  If the proximate cause is the dominant cause, the controlling cause, the cause that without which the bad result does not occur, and if "the proximate cause for the disaster at Pearl Harbor was an unworkable system of military intelligence," then how can Kimmel and Short, who had no responsibility for the "system of military intelligence (Indeed, barely knew that it existed)," workable or not, be culpable under this theory? It would seem logical that if "the proximate cause for the disaster at Pearl Harbor was an unworkable system of military intelligence," then those responsible for making the system unworkable should be culpable.

[29]16PHA2229)

[30] Stark letter to Kimmel, March 22, 1941, 16PHA2160

[31] Kimmel to Stark letter, dated May 26, 1941, hand delivered by Kimmel to Stark June 1941 in Washington, 16PHA2238, 6PHA2539,40.

[32] US News & World Report, May 28, 1954, p50.

[33] 5PHA2176

[34] 4PHA2019

[35] 33PHA897

[36] 3PHA1210

[37] 24PHA1361

[38] See Days Of Infamy, John Costello, page 253.

[39] 24PHA1361

[40] 3PHA1211

[41] Admiral Yarnell letter to Charles Rugg, July 5, 1946.

[42] Charles Rugg, letter to Admiral Yarnell, December 9, 1946 (This letter was not discovered by Admiral Kimmel’s two surviving sons until 1988.  Admiral Kimmel deceased in 1968.).

[43]Captain Thomas K. Kimmel, USN (deceased, 1997) letter to Captain Edward L. Beach, USN (ret.), dated June 9, 1990.

[44]The Kimmel Family has nine service academy graduates—6 Naval Academy, 2 West Point, and 1 Air Force Academy. Admiral Kimmel’s son Manning was killed in action as commanding officer of the submarine Robalo SS273.

OPPOSING VIEWS

Pearl Harbor Responsibilities

Who was responsible for the lack of defense readiness on the island of Oahu that tragic Sunday morning in 1941? As the American people come to grips with another tragic "day of infamy," and the debate rages once again over a failure of U.S. intelligence and lack of preparedness, that question has taken on additional import.

Nearly sixty years after Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, Congress effectively exonerated the senior U.S. Navy and Army commanders in Hawaii at the time. Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and General Walter C. Short, by describing their performance of duty as "competently and professionally" executed. In an article in the Winter 2001 issue of MHQ, Frederic Borch disagreed with the lawmakers and accepted the official  consensus found in the ten Pearl Harbor investigations conducted between 1941 and 1996. The general understanding among most of these probes was that some degree of blame should be assigned to Kimmel and Short.

Almost immediately after its publication, Borch's article drew thoughtful and instructive criticism from the admiral's grandson, Thomas K. Kimmel, Jr. Given the importance of this debate, we decided to forego the usual letter to the editor and author's response in favor of a more lengthy and informative arrangement by asking Kimmel to write a concise challenge essay and requesting a rebuttal from Borch. We are delighted to offer the results of these two gentlemen's labors and hope our readers agree that their arguments add interesting dimensions to the concept of command and responsibility.

Unfairly Shouldering the Blame

by Thomas K. Kimmel, Jr.

For sixty years the reputations of two honorable men—Rear Adm. Husband E. Kimmel, former commander of the Pacific Fleet, and Maj. Gen. Walter C. Short, former commander of the U.S. Army Hawaiian Department—have lain in humiliating ruin in the wake of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The Officer Personnel Act of 1947 allowed for a qualified military officer to retire at his highest rank held in World War II. Only two such officers were not allowed to so retire—Kimmel and Short. Finally, in October 1999 Congress approved and President Bill Clinton signed a requestfor the posthumous reinstatement of Kimmel and Short to their highest-held World War II ranks, four-star and three-star rank, respectively, and stated that these two officers had performed their duties "competently and professionally."

Assuming that President George W. Bush chooses to honor Congress' request, justice will have been accomplished at long last. I will herein describe the case for advancement of these two commanders, and in so doing, respond to the MHQ article "Guilty as Charged?" (Volume 13, Number 2), which argued that the commanders were indeed responsible for the disaster at Pearl Harbor.

The author of the article, Colonel Frederic L. Borch III, served as the army's representative during the most recent review of the matter, a probe headed by Department of Defense Undersecretary Edwin S. Dorn in 1995. His report, known as the Dorn Report, was the first by a government tribunal to acknowledge that responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster should not fall solely on the shoulders of Admiral Kimmel and General Short, but rather should be broadly shared. The report, however, concluded that the two officers should not be advanced in rank to full admiral and lieutenant general. Borch maintains that, as the senior officers in charge, Kimmel and Short did not perform their duties and made serious errors in judgment and therefore must "shoulder much of the blame for what happened."

Many eminent naval experts disagree with his assessment. The five greatest admirals of World War II, five modern-day admirals, and President Franklin D. Roosevelt's official naval historian, Samuel Eliot Morison, all agree that Kimmel was treated unfairly. World War II Admirals William "Bull" Halsey, Ernest King, Thomas Kinkaid, Chester Nimitz, and Raymond Spruance made it clear that they believed that Kimmel was singled out as a scapegoat and unjustly punished. Later naval leaders—including four chiefs of Naval Operations, two heads of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Admirals William Crowe, James Holloway, Thomas Moorer, Carlisle Trost, and Elmo Zumwalt—have agreed. All expressly supported remedial action for the two officers in language now elevated to law.

But more important than the veritable who's who of naval history supporting Kimmel are the facts. Let us examine them in more detail, keeping in mind that Admiral Kimmel was never charged with dereliction of duty or errors of judgment (or anything else) by a court or government agency that afforded him the opportunity to defend his name.

Ten U.S. tribunals have examined the Pearl Harbor disaster. Nine of them, including a 1946 hearing before a joint congressional committee, were held while Kimmel and Short were alive. But most important, only one, the 1944 Naval Court of Inquiry, accorded the admiral the right to call and to cross-examine witnesses—the most fundamental of due-process rights. That tribunal unanimously and completely exonerated Admiral Kimmel of dereliction of duty charges, approved of his force dispositions in view of the information he had, and found that he committed no errors of judgment, while severely criticizing his superior, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Harold Stark, for not keeping Kimmel properly informed. The Naval Court of Inquiry was also the only tribunal whose members all had the professional competence to judge Kimmel's naval performance, as all three judging admirals had held high commands at sea.

The importance of restating the uniqueness of the Naval Court of Inquiry was underscored at the tenth tribunal in 1995. The navy's general counsel, in the presence of but without objection from the Secretary of the Navy and the Deputy Secretary of Defense, stated that "...the official position of the [Navy] Department today [is that]... Admiral  Kimmel  enjoyed  due process before the [joint congressional] Committee... he had the right to call and question witnesses."

This was absolutely incorrect. Kimmel did not have the right to call or to question witnesses before the joint congressional panel. If the general counsel of the Navy, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Deputy Secretary of Defense did not know this important fact at a hearing to specifically address the issue of fairness to the admiral, it bears repeating here. Unfortunately, Colonel Borch was not present, to my knowledge, when the general counsel made his regrettable remarks, which remain uncorrected in the official record, virtually ensuring future prejudicial error to Kimmel, as well as to Short.

This leaves us with the question: Why not name those responsible? The Dorn Report, for the first time, recognized that Kimmel and Short were not solely responsible for the defeat at Pearl Harbor. Although the report charged other, unnamed persons with responsibility, it did not name them. It also did not consider that they might be more blamable than Kimmel and Short or the effect that their errors might have had on errors attributed to Admiral Kimmel and General Short. Admiral Spruance believed that the real reason why Kimmel and Short were singled out for blame in the first place was so that others equally and more responsible would not have to be named. The Battle of Midway commander said: "I have always felt that Kimmel [was] held responsible for Pearl Harbor in order that the American people might have no reason to lose confidence in their Government in Washington. This was probably justifiable under the circumstances at that time, but it does not justify forever damning [this] fine officer."

Command accountability and responsibility, it is important to remember, are not synonymous with blame. The Dorn Report stated that "A commander has plenary responsibility for the welfare of the people under his command...." But the Army Pearl Harbor Board found an exception and said in its top-secret report:

. . .where information has a vital bearing upon actions to be taken by field commanders, and this information cannot be disclosed by the War Department to its field commanders, it is incumbent upon the War Department then to assume the responsibility for specific directions to the theater commanders. This is an exception to the admirable policy of the War Department of decentralized and complete responsibility upon the competent field commanders.... Short got neither form of assistance from the War Department.

Arguing in the abstract and blindly applying absolute responsibility to the field commander, it must then follow that the twelve commanders of the ships sunk at Pearl Harbor must each somehow be blamed for the loss of his ship. In the recent case of USS Cole, neither the ship's skipper nor the commander in chief Central Command was blamed. So much for ‘plenary responsibility’.

Of course, commanding officers are responsible and accountable, but these points obscure the important questions: Who is to blame? Who should be punished? An analogous case is that of the captain of USS Indianapolis, which was sunk by a Japanese torpedo in July 1945. In a recent decision the navy reversed its adverse finding of blame against the accountable—but blameless and scapegoated—captain and posthumously exonerated him.

What did they know? When did they know it? What did they do about it? In asking these questions about Pearl Harbor, the high command in Washington confined and continues to confine "they" to Kimmel and Short. Let us expand "they" to include the rest of the appropriate leadership—especially the Washington high command.

The U.S. government and military possessed solid intelligence about Japanese plans before December 7,1941. According to the Army Pearl Harbor Board:

Information from informers and other means as to the activities of our potential enemy and their intentions in the negotiations between the United States and Japan was in possession of the State, War and Navy Departments in November and December of 1941. Such agencies had a reasonably complete disclosure of the Japanese plans and intentions, and were in a position to know what were the Japanese potential moves that were scheduled by them against the Untied States. Therefore, Washington was in possession of essential facts as to the enemy's intentions....This information showed clearly that war was inevitable and late in November absolutely imminent. It clearly demonstrated the necessity of resorting to every trading act possible to defer the ultimate day of breach of relations to give the Army and Navy time to prepare for the eventualities of war.

Intelligence from "other means" undoubtedly refers to Magic, the code name for secretly deciphered Japanese diplomatic and spy communications. Magic, which also contained military intelligence, was explained by the head of army intelligence and the joint congressional committee chief assistant counsel as "...the most reliable and authentic information which the War Department was receiving as to Japanese intentions and activities...and that some of these messages...were not of a diplomatic nature, they were of a military nature." None of the intelligence from Magic, however, was forwarded to Kimmel or Short.

According to Colonel Borch, "...the Magic messages would have provided no useful tactical information to Kimmel and Short." The decoded Japanese messages, however, included:

• A bomb-plot message

• 147 ships-in-harbor messages (sixty- eight applied to Pearl Harbor—one of which, left undecoded before the attack, said there was still "considerable opportunity to take advantage for a surprise attack" on Pearl Harbor)

• time-of-delivery messages

• deceit-plan messages

• the ultimatum-delivery message, which gave the War Department its only notification that Secretary of State Cordell Hull had submitted a diplomatic note to Japan on November 26,1941

• the ultimatum-response message, which notified the War Department that Japan considered Secretary Hull's proposal to be humiliating.

In short, Magic provided information indicating the time of the attack, the place of the attack, the planned deceit to cover the attack, and the motivation of the attack—all of which is tactical information. The potential usefulness of such information to Kim- mel and Short was enormous. However, the two commanders did not receive any of it. Kimmel had formally asked for all vital information; had been assured that he would have it; appeared to be receiving it, for he did receive some useless Magic messages; and estimated the situation based on it.  Admiral  Kimmel  and  General  Short were deprived of the most important information and positively misled.

Alfred McCormack, a New York lawyer recruited by Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson after the attack to straighten out perceived shortcomings in Magic distribution, reported that "When the sudden attack on Pearl Harbor occurred, it became apparent that the event had been clearly foreshadowed in the Japanese traffic of 1941."

According to Fleet Admiral Halsey, U.S. commanders' foreknowledge of the Magic intelligence would have resulted in different ship deployments:

“Had we known of Japan's minute and continued interest in the exact location and movement of our ships in Pearl Harbor, as indicated in the 'MAGIC Messages,' it is only logical that we would have concentrated our thoughts on meeting the practical certainty of an attack on Pearl Harbor. I am sure I would have protested the movement of my Task Force to Wake Island in late November and early December. I am also sure no protest would have been necessary; because if Kimmel had possessed this intelligence, he would not have ordered that movement.”

Army Major Henry Clausen, who conducted a 1944-45 investigation, concluded that "The proximate cause for the disaster at Pearl Harbor was an unworkable system of military intelligence...." If so, who was responsible for making the system of military intelligence unworkable?

On February 18, 1941, seventeen days after he took command of the Pacific Fleet, Kimmel wrote to Admiral Stark, chief of Naval Operations:

“I have recently been told by an officer fresh from Washington that ONI [the Office of Naval Intelligence] considers it the function of Operations [the Office of Naval War Plans]to furnish the Commander-in-Chief [Kimmel] with information of a secret nature. I have heard also that Operations considers the responsibility for furnishing the same type of information to be that of ONI. I do not know that we have missed anything, but if there is any doubt as to whose responsibility it is to keep the Commander-in-Chief fully informed with pertinent reports on subjects that should be of interest to the Fleet, will you kindly fix that responsibility so that there will be no misunderstanding?"

Stark replied to Kimmel on March 22, 1941: "With reference to your postscript on the subject of...responsibility for the furnishing of secret information to OincUS [officer-in-charge United States Fleet, i.e., Kimmel]. [Chief of Naval Intelligence Alan] Kirk informs me that ONI is fully aware of its responsibility in keeping you adequately informed."

Four days later Kimmel responded to

Admiral Stark:

“The Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet is in a very difficult position. He is far removed from the seat of government.... He is...not informed as to the policy.. .reflected in current events.... [It] is suggested that it be made a cardinal principle that the Commander-in Chief Pacific Fleet be immediately informed of all important developments as they occur and by the quickest secure means available.”

Kimmel clearly wanted "secret information" about the Japanese. The director of the navy's War Plans Division, Admiral Richmond Turner, led others to believe that Kimmel was receiving Magic intelligence. A month before the attack, Admiral Frank Beatty, Secretary of the Navy Franklin Knox's aide, asked Turner, "Is Admiral Kimmel getting these 'MAGIC messages'? Turner replied: "Beatty, of course, he is. He has the same 'magic' setup we have here."

During the joint congressional committee investigation, General Counsel William Mitchell asked Admiral Stark, "Who was it that told you that they had a system out in Honolulu or Pearl Harbor of decoding and decrypting Jap messages?" Stark's reply:  "Admiral Turner."

During the panel's hearings, when Turner was asked if he told Stark that Kimmel was receiving Magic information, he answered: "Yes, sir, on three occasions....I asked Admiral Noyes [chief of Naval Communications] about it and so reported to Admiral Stark." However, when the Naval Court of Inquiry asked Noyes, "Did you ever inform the Chief of War Plans Division, Captain Turner, that the Commander of the Pacific Fleet was decrypting intelligence information of a character similar to that which you were receiving in the Navy Department [Magic]?," his answer was "No."

Even Chief of Staff General George Marshall went on the record with his own denial. During the joint committee hearings he stated that he "was not aware" that intelligence was being withheld from Hawaii's G-2. Instead of denying knowledge of Kimmel not receiving intelligence, Director of Naval Intelligence Theodore Wilkinson reported in January 1942 to a commission headed by Supreme Court Justice Owen Roberts that Kimmel had received the same information that they had in Washington. In the words of British historian John Costello, this " . . .was so misleading as to be a deliberate lie." Turner and Stark acquiesced to Wilkinson's misstatement. Marshall provided similar misleading information to the Clausen investigation.

According to Admiral Harry E. Yarnell, former commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet: "Stark and Marshall could have raised their reputations greatly by candidly admitting that their failure to send vital information to Pearl Harbor was the cause of the disaster. Yet they tried to defend themselves by failures of memory and the absurd stand that Short and Kimmel had all the information that was necessary."

Colonel Borch wrote that "...no punitive action of any kind was taken against [Kimmel or Short].... they never suffered any serious punishment." The Roberts Commission, however, proclaimed Kimmel and Short "solely responsible" for Japan's successful attack on Pearl Harbor through "dereliction of duty," which is a crime today. This proclamation remained unchallenged for years. The Navy Department did not rescind its "solely responsible" allegation against Kimmel until 1995, twenty-eight years after the admiral died. The navy has never rescinded its "dereliction" allegation against Kimmel, even though the joint congressional committee investigation put that allegation to rest for both Kimmel and Short in 1946. The Department of the Army has not rescinded its "solely responsible" or its "dereliction" allegation against Short, who died in 1949.

 Under stress resulting from similar allegations, Captain Charles B. McVay, skipper of

 ill-fated USS Indianapolis, committed suicide in 1968.

Admiral Kimmel and General Short dedicated their lives to duty, honor, and country. Both had long, exemplary careers. Each proved on numerous occasions a willingness to die for his country—but not to be humiliated by it. To these conscientious men of integrity, to be singled out as the only qualified U.S. officers not advanced to their highest held World War II ranks was severe punishment indeed.

It has been claimed that Kimmel and Short were not forced to retire at reduced ranks. The idea that they wanted to retire under the circumstances is absurd. The fact that they did so is a testament only to their loyalty to the country and to the war effort. They were forced to retire as a matter of fact, if not as a matter of law. Clearly the Roosevelt administration wanted them to retire, in spite of their pleas for reassignment. In Kimmel's case the navy did more than retire him against his wishes, it tried to force him to leave his retirement job at the Harris Engineering Company by threatening the company with loss of navy business if Kimmel's employment there continued.

Less than two months after the Pearl Harbor raid, Supreme Court Justice Roberts propagated the myth of Kimmel and Short's culpability when he stated in his report that they were solely responsible for the success of the Japanese attack. This conclusion proved completely contrary to the findings of both the Army Pearl Harbor Board and the Naval Court of Inquiry four years later, and contrary to the joint congressional committee findings five years later.

Fifty-nine years later, Congress passed a law trying to stop perpetuation of the myth. Both officers, Kimmel and Short, deserve posthumous advancement in rank.

THOMAS K. KIMMEL, JR., is the grandson of Admiral Husband E. Kimmel. A graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, he is a lawyer and former FBI agent and consultant.

Justice Was Served

by Frederic L. Borch III

An increasingly loud chorus of politicians, retired naval officers, commentators, historians, and friends have joined the Kimmel and Short families in demanding that Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and General Walter C. Short be posthumously advanced to the four-star and three-star ranks they held on December 7, 1941. Only this official action, they cry, will eradicate the stain that has tarnished their honor and reputations—a stain that resulted when civilian and military leaders in Washington unjustly held them responsible for the greatest single defeat ever suffered by American naval forces.

Those in favor of promoting Kimmel and Short advance a two-part justification. First, they claim that the two commanders were punished in the aftermath of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor—this punishment taking the form of a forced retirement at two-star rank. Second, they argue that the punishment was unfair and unjust because Kimmel and Short did the best they could in defending Hawaii. In fact, claim the Kimmel-Short "defense team," civilian and military leaders in Washington were to blame for the inadequate defense of Oahu because these high-level officials failed to provide the men and materiel necessary to mount a successful defense of Hawaii. More important, they adamantly insist that leaders in Washington withheld highly secret and valuable intelligence from Kimmel and Short—information that would have caused the two commanders to anticipate and successfully defend against the Japanese surprise attack. Since this means that culpability rests with Washington rather than Hawaii, it follows that Kimmel and Short were falsely blamed for the disaster, and this injustice will only be remedied by restoring their higher ranks.

A close look at the historical record, however, shows that those who would absolve Kimmel and Short of responsibility are simply wrong. Their claims to the contrary, posthumous promotion for either man is not warranted for at least four reasons.

First, neither Kimmel nor Short were punished in the aftermath of the Pearl Harbor attack. Consequently, it is wrong to continue to claim that a posthumous advancement in rank is now needed to "undo" a punishment.

Second, Admiral Kimmel and General Short did not do their best. Knowing that war with Japan was imminent and that their commands might be targeted, both men failed to make preparations to defend against such an attack.

Third, Washington was not to blame for the magnitude of the disaster on December 7, 1941. The War and Navy Departments did not withhold intelligence that would have warned Kimmel and Short of an impending Japanese attack—for no such intelligence existed. No U.S. official knew that Japanese aircraft would attack Oahu on December 7. For Kimmel and Short's defenders to claim otherwise is simply false—and a transparent attempt to shift blame to others.

Finally, as the senior sea and land commanders, Kimmel and Short were responsible for everything that did or did not happen in their commands. This so-called principle of command responsibility is the fourth reason that posthumous promotion is inappropriate.

On December 9, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox arrived in Pearl Harbor. He was there not only to find out what had happened, but also to try to understand why. After personally interviewing Kimmel, Short, and their staffs, and seeing firsthand  the  death  and  destruction wrought by the Japanese, Knox concluded that the success of the enemy attack "was due to a lack of a state of readiness." According to Knox, both Kimmel and Short admitted to him that they did not expect an aerial attack, "and had taken no adequate measures to meet one if it came." Knox delivered his final report to President Roosevelt on December 14. Two days later, after consulting with the president, Knox and his army counterpart, Secretary of War Stimson, relieved Kimmel and Short of their commands. Under the law of the time, all four- and three-star rank was temporary; Admiral Kimmel and Lt. Gen. Short had permanent grades of rear admiral and major general, respectively. Consequently, when relieved of their Hawaiian commands, they automatically reverted to their two-star grades.

On December 18,1941, President Roosevelt established a five-member commission, headed by Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts, to determine whether "any derelictions or errors of judgment on the part of United States Army or Navy personnel contributed to such successes as were achieved by the enemy." The Roberts Com mission was further directed to establish who was responsible for any derelictions or errors. After interviewing 127 witnesses and examining a variety of documents, the commission concluded that Kimmel and Short, knowing that hostilities with Japan were imminent, were derelict in their duties in failing "to consult and confer" with each other in preparing their defense of Oahu.

Given the conclusions announced in the Knox and Roberts reports, Kimmel and Short soon realized that new assignments, commensurate with their former positions in Hawaii, were not going to be given to them. Short then decided to submit his retirement papers, and although he hoped his application to retire would be rejected, it was not. When Admiral Kimmel learned that Short had requested retirement, he took this as a signal that he should do so as well. The result was that Maj. Gen. Short retired on February 28, 1942, and Rear Adm. Kimmel retired on March 1, 1942. Neither man was forced into retirement—and there is no evidence to support claims to the contrary. Additionally, both men retired without having been charged with any criminal offense (dereliction of duty was not a court-martial offense in 1941).

While there was some talk of court-martial, both the army and navy decided that criminal trials were inappropriate. The army judge advocate general, for example, concluded that Short's mistakes at Pearl Harbor "were honest ones, not the result of conscious fault and, having in mind all the circumstances, do not constitute a criminal neglect of duty." Finally, neither Kimmel nor Short was ever administratively censured. They were never officially reprimanded. They left active duty with their official records unblemished and retired in 1942 at the highest possible rank and pay grade.

Only in 1947, as a reward to those who served in World War II, did Congress decide to permit those who had served in three-, four-, and five-star grades to retire with those extra stars. At the time, army and navy leaders could have requested that Kimmel and Short be advanced to their higher ranks. The service secretaries, however, decided that their performance on December 7, 1941, did not merit an advancement in rank. While this meant that Kimmel and Short were the only two flag officers not recommended for promotion to their highest wartime ranks, their performance in one of the greatest defeats suffered by American armed forces was a good reason to treat them differently.

When the secretaries of the navy and the army declined to recommend Kimmel and Short for promotion in 1947, this was not a  punishment. On the contrary, it was simply a decision to withhold the privilege of high rank. In sum, Kimmel and Short were not punished in the aftermath of the death and destruction at Pearl Harbor, and promoting them today is not needed to undo or rectify an unjust or unfair punishment.

Admiral Kimmel and General Short simply did not do their best while in command in Hawaii, and their substandard performance is the best reason to refuse to promote them. It is significant that virtually every investigation into the events of December 7, 1941, concluded that Kimmel and Short failed to adequately defend their forces.

From 1941 to '46, there were nine separate Pearl Harbor investigations. All but one—a purely naval inquiry whose conclusions were rejected by Admiral Ernest King, then the chief of Naval Operations—determined that the two senior commanders were either derelict in their duties or  at least made errors in judgment.

Thus the first investigation, conducted by Secretary of the Navy Knox from December 9 to 14, 1941, concluded that the"Japanese air attack...was a complete surprise" because both Kimmel and Short did not believe an attack likely and consequently were unprepared to meet it. Similarly, the second investigation, conducted by a five-member commission headed by Justice Roberts in late December 1941 and early January '42, reached an identical conclusion: Kimmel and Short were derelict in their duties to defend Oahu. The 1946 investigation conducted by a joint committee of Congress—which heard testimony from hundreds of witnesses, including Admiral Kimmel and General Short, and examined thousands of pages of documentary evidence—concluded that the two commanders made "errors of judgment" in preparing to defend Hawaii from attack.

Finally, the most recent official investigation, conducted by the Department of Defense in 1996—an investigation intentionally done outside the Departments of the Army and Navy to ensure that there would be no prejudice or preconceived ideas about what happened at Pearl Harbor— reached the same conclusion: Kimmel and Short committed "errors of judgment." Consequently, they are responsible, in part, for the magnitude of the losses suffered by U.S. forces on December 7.

What were these errors in judgment? First, Kimmel failed to employ torpedo netting in and around Pearl Harbor—nets that could have stopped the Japanese torpedoes that hit Utah, Oklahoma, Nevada, West Virginia, California and other navy vessels. Although his superiors had warned Kimmel that the U.S. fleet was at risk from air-dropped torpedoes, Kimmel concluded that the waters at Pearl were shallow enough to disregard that danger.

Second, neither Kimmel nor Short employed barrage balloons in the airspace over Pearl Harbor—aerial obstacles that could have disrupted the air approaches of enemy attackers. Again, although his superiors in Washington had recommended such a defensive device to Short, it was rejected as impracticable.

Third, Short failed to use his radar assets appropriately. While radio detecting and ranging devices were primitive, Short and his staff knew that the British had used radar in winning the Battle of Britain in1940. Yet, as Short testified in 1946, he considered radar to be for "training" only. These Kimmel-Short missteps, however, pale in significance when compared with two other errors in judgment: Kimmel's failure to do any reconnaissance and a general failure on the part of both Kimmel and Short to integrate—or even coordinate—their defense of the islands.

Although General Short was primarily responsible for the defense of the Hawaiian Islands, Kimmel and Short agreed between themselves that the navy would perform the long-range reconnaissance critical to detecting the approach of an enemy. Short subsequently assumed that the navy was fulfilling its responsibilities. Kimmel, however, would conclude that he did not have enough aircraft to do a complete, 360-degree reconnaissance. Believing that anything less than such a lookout was not worth the effort, Kimmel elected to do no reconnaissance. That was a grievous error in judgment, for it meant that there was no real chance to detect the arrival of 353 Japanese aircraft that Sunday morning. Kimmel failed to understand that he did have sufficient aircraft to do some reconnaissance. He certainly could have combined his thirty-six patrol bombers with Short's twelve B-17s and thirty-two B-18s to do some long-range patrolling. Additionally, Kimmel had three aircraft carriers, nine battleships, twelve heavy cruisers, nine light cruisers, and fifty-three destroyers. These eighty-six ships could have been used, in conjunction with aircraft, to conduct long-range scouting.

For Kimmel, however, it was an all-or-nothing proposition, and he had chosen nothing.  Unfortunately  for  Kimmel's sailors and marines, and Short's soldiers, this lack of reconnaissance virtually ensured that there would be no warning of an approaching attacker. While there is no way to know whether a different choice, such as partial reconnaissance focusing on likely avenues of approach to the west and north, might have discovered the Japanese armada, Kimmel's decision was a critical reason for the huge losses of life and materiel suffered on December 7.

 Finally, Kimmel and Short also failed to integrate—or even coordinate—their command-and-control structure. This lack of a unified defense effort was a serious error in judgment. It meant, for example, that Short believed the navy was conducting long-range reconnaissance even though Kimmel had elected to do none. It meant that Kimmel did not know that the army's greatest fear was sabotage and that, as a result, the army had its ammunition under lock and key. Nor did Kimmel know that Short's aircraft were lined up neatly in rows so that it was difficult for them to get quickly airborne.

 This lack of coordination meant that the army never knew that the destroyer USS Ward had been in a fight with an enemy submarine at 6:40 A.M. Of course, Kimmel never heard about the sinking of the submarine either, because his own command-and-control system was so deficient that it prevented valuable  information  from reaching him and other senior navy leaders in Hawaii. Had Kimmel instilled a sense of urgency and alertness in his command, there is no reason that he and Short could not have learned of Ward's engagement at least an hour before the Japanese planes appeared at 7:55 A.M.

            Similarly, an integrated or coordinated defense might have meant that a report that two young radar operators had detected a large aircraft formation at 7:02 would have been taken more seriously. Certainly this radar sighting, when combined with Ward's sinking of an enemy submarine, would likely have led an integrated or coordinated command structure to recognize that there was a clear and real danger to American forces in Hawaii. Stated differently, a unified or coordinated defense, instilled with a sense of urgency, would most probably have given Kimmel and Short the very tactical warning that they needed to mitigate the effect of the Japanese onslaught.

How could Kimmel and Short have been so unready? How could they have made such errors in judgment? To a great extent, their unprepared ness resulted from two factors. One was simply an inability to appreciate how technology—particularly air power—had altered warfare. Both Kimmel and Short stated publicly in the summer of 1941 that an aerial attack on Hawaii was "a possibility" (Kimmel) and "not...improbable" (Short). Both men had received a written "War Warning" from Washington on November 27, in which they were informed not only that war with Japan was likely, but that "an aggressive move" was expected "within the next few days." While both commanders did believe that war with Japan was coming, neither Kimmel nor Short understood that war might mean an attack against the U.S.Pacific Fleet while in port at Pearl Harbor. As a result, Short prepared a defense against sabotage, while Kimmel prepared for war on the high seas.

This shortsightedness—the failure to envisage that an attack on their commands was possible—infected their subordinates with a "peacetime-in-Hawaii" mentality. Thus,  Kimmel's sailors and marines trained hard during the week, but on weekends the U.S. fleet was tied up neatly at its moorings, with hatches open, boilers cold, and sailors on liberty. The Japanese knew this, and they planned their attack for Sunday morning precisely because they anticipated that Kimmel would have the fleet in port and unready.

This peacetime attitude meant that when USS Ward sank an enemy submarine at the entrance to Pearl Harbor and quickly reported the fight to the naval district watch officer, Kimmel's subordinates were still debating its significance when the first Japanese bombs fell seventy-five minutes later. It was no better in Short's command. Consequently, after mobile radar sites on northern Oahu spotted a large formation of incoming aircraft at 7:02 A.M. and relayed that information to the army watch officer at Fort Shatter, that officer ignored the report because he thought the radar had identified a group of U.S. B-17s flying in from California. Of course, the radar in fact had picked up the attacking Japanese air formations.

Kimmel's own words perhaps best explain why American forces were caught so unready and unprepared. In an interview with the famous correspondent Joseph Harsch on December 6, Harsch asked Kimmel if he thought the Japanese might attack Hawaii. Replied Kimmel: "I don't think they'd be such damned fools." If the senior American naval commander in Hawaii had this view, his subordinates were unlikely to think otherwise. No doubt this explains why Kimmel thought he could schedule a golf game for the morning of December 7, which he would have played had the Japanese not started dropping their bombs at 7:55 A.M.

Those seeking exoneration for Kimmel and Short claim that Washington also withheld much-needed men and materiel from the two commanders—resources required to mount a successful defense. Thus, for example, they claim that a lack of aircraft excuses Kimmel's failure to conduct long-range reconnaissance. The reality, however, is that both Admiral Kimmel and General Short had adequate resources at their disposal. No commander ever gets everything he wants; there are always competing demands for men and materiel. At the time, with U.S. naval forces fighting an undeclared war with U-boats in the Battle of the Atlantic, Kimmel could not be given everything that he requested. But he had eighty-six ships in his command, and he and Short had at least eighty aircraft capable of long-range reconnaissance. They had more than adequate resources to defend their commands.

The more serious allegation is that civilian and military leaders in Washington— President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall, and Chief of Naval Operations Harold R. Stark—withheld valuable  information from Admiral Kimmel and General Short. This information, obtained from deciphered Japanese messages, is supposed to have revealed that the Japanese intended to attack Hawaii on December 7. The reality, however, is that this information simply did not exist. No one in the U.S. government knew that the Japanese carriers were heading for Hawaiian waters. No American official—in Washington  or  anywhere else—knew that an attack on Oahu would occur on December 7.

While it is true that the U.S. Navy had broken, and was regularly deciphering and reading, Japanese diplomatic codes, the information that passed between Tokyo and its embassies and consulates did not contain details of any impending Japanese attack. On the contrary, while the diplomatic messages were exceedingly valuable as an indicator of Japanese strategic intentions, these transmissions did not contain the type of intelligence that might have been gleaned from decoded military and naval radio traffic.

American intelligence, however, had not broken the Japanese military codes—nor had anyone else. Despite their best efforts, American and British code-breakers were able to read Japanese military traffic to only "a very small degree." This is an important distinction, for it means that Magic—the name given by U.S. intelligence to the deciphered diplomatic messages—never revealed the particulars of any Japanese military operations. Most important, Magic never revealed that an attack on Pearl Harbor was imminent.

In any event, even if U.S. intelligence had broken the Japanese military and naval codes, it would have made no difference because there simply never was any radio traffic between Japanese forces that indicated that an attack on Hawaii had been planned or was being executed. And the Japanese made sure that no such messages could be intercepted, since the imperial carriers steaming from Japan toward Hawaii maintained complete radio silence after leaving their home waters on November 26. In short, the claim that Kimmel and Short were deprived of valuable intelligence that might have alerted them of an impending attack is simply false, and an attempt to shift blame from where it belongs.

Finally, the principle of command responsibility makes it both fair and equitable for Kimmel and Short to bear some measure of responsibility for what happened at Pearl Harbor. Officers in command, at all levels and in all branches of the service, are responsible for everything that their units do, or fail to do. In the navy, this means that the skipper of a frigate is responsible for damage to his ship if it runs aground, even though a subordinate's navigational error may be the actual cause of the mishap. For Kimmel and Short, this meant that they were responsible for the safety and security of all U.S. forces in Hawaii.

Knowing that Japan was already at war in Asia, and having been warned that hostilities with enemy forces were imminent, Kimmel and Short were required to use all the resources at their disposal to prepare for battle with Japan—and prepare to defend against any possible attack from that enemy. While it is true that an attack on Oahu seemed highly unlikely, their jobs were to anticipate the unexpected. This they failed to do, and this failure was the proximate cause of the terribly disproportionate losses suffered by America during that December 7 attack. It follows that, as the most senior commanders in Hawaii, they bear command responsibility for the disaster at Pearl Harbor.

In conclusion, Kimmel and Short do not merit posthumous advancement to four-star and three-star rank. They failed to demonstrate the superior judgment expected of commanders of their grade and experience, for they made bad choices in the days, weeks, and months preceding the Japanese surprise attack. While it appears that their errors in judgment did not justify criminal proceedings against them, their mistakes nevertheless cost America much loss of life. In the words of Admiral Trost, who served as chief of Naval Operations during the late 1980s, "there is a vast difference between a degree of fault which does not warrant a punitive action and a level of performance which would warrant bestowal of a privilege." As Kimmel and Short were responsible at Pearl Harbor, and as posthumous advancement would  bestow a privilege upon them, it is wrong to do so.

FREDERIC L. BORCH III is a colonel in the

Judge Advocate General's Corps.

Response to the Bloch critique

By Thomas K. Kimmel, Jr.

Dear MHQ,                                                                  December 12, 2001

Attorney Borch made allegations against Admiral Kimmel and General Short that space did not allow me to address in my MHQ article (see MHQ, Winter 2002, pages 30-37, “Opposing Views: Pearl Harbor Commanders Culpability,” by Thomas K. Kimmel, Jr., and Frederic L. Borch).  I wish to do so now.

Attorney Borch said that,

“From 1941 to '46, there were nine separate Pearl Harbor investigations. All but one—a purely naval inquiry whose conclusions were rejected by Admiral Ernest King, then the chief of Naval Operations—determined that the two senior commanders were either derelict in their duties or at least made errors in judgment.”

The “purely naval inquiry” was the Naval Court of Inquiry (NCI), and the only tribunal in which Admiral Kimmel was permitted to defend himself by calling and by cross-examining witnesses. It was also the only tribunal in which Admiral Kimmel’s performance was judged by admirals with the professional competence to make such judgments, as all three judging admirals had held high commands at sea.  The NCI:

1) completely exonerated Admiral Kimmel of any charge of dereliction of duty;

2) approved of all of his force dispositions in view of information he was given;

3) declared that he committed no errors in judgment;

4) further declared that he did everything possible under the circumstances; and

5) charged his boss, Chief of Naval Operations Harold R. Stark, with “military error”  1

for not keeping Admiral Kimmel properly informed.

In 1948 Admiral King softened his 1944 rejection of the NCI by stressing that the facts did not justify punishment in any form  2  for Admiral Kimmel. Five of the nine investigations made no findings.  Only the hastily called Roberts Commission found Admiral Kimmel and General Short “derelict” in duty--a finding rejected in 1946 by the same Congress that now unanimously calls on the President to advance Admiral Kimmel and General Short on the retired list.

Attorney Borch disagreed with the NCI’s positive findings for Admiral Kimmel, ignored the NCI’s negative findings for Admiral Stark, and charged Admiral Kimmel and General Short with five errors in judgment. Those five alleged errors in judgment are listed and answered as follows: 

First, that, Admiral “Kimmel failed to employ torpedo netting.”

The NCI found that, “The decision not to install [torpedo netting] appears to have been made by the Navy Department [in Washington].” 3

Admiral King, in his endorsement to the record of the NCI, stated: "The decision not to install torpedo [netting] appears to have been made by the Navy Department [in Washington]."

Second, that, “Neither Kimmel nor Short employed barrage balloons.” The NCI found that, “Barrage balloons . . . were . . . considered as means of defense but were rejected . . . because they would interfere with the activity of U. S. Aircraft” 4.  Barrage balloons were also considered and rejected by Admiral Kimmel’s predecessor, Admiral J. O. Richardson, and Admiral Kimmel’s successor, Admiral Chester Nimitz.

Third, that, “[General] Short failed to use his radar assets appropriately.” Radar installations had just been installed and their personnel were under training. The installation of these stations had been delayed due to the inability of the Army and the Interior Department to agree upon the location of these stations. 5

[Fourth], that, “[Admiral] Kimmel failed to do any [apparently, Attorney Borch means long-range] reconnaissance . . . and that “[Admiral Kimmel elected to do no reconnaissance,”. .  and that “For [Admiral] Kimmel [reconnaissance] was an all-or-nothing proposition and he had chosen nothing.”

The NCI found that,

“The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, for definite and sound reasons and after making provision for such reconnaissance in case of emergency, specifically ordered that no routine long-range reconnaissance be undertaken and assumed full responsibility for this action. The omission of this reconnaissance was not due to oversight or neglect. It was the result of a military decision, reached after much deliberation and consultation with experienced officers, and after weighing the information at hand and all the factors involved” 6

“Based on Finding XIII, the [Naval] Court [of Inquiry] is of the opinion that the action of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, in ordering that no routine, long-range reconnaissance be undertaken was sound and that the use of Fleet patrol planes for daily, long-range, all-around reconnaissance was not possible with the inadequate number of Fleet planes available, and was not justified in the absence of any information indicating that an attack was to be expected in the Hawaiian area within narrow limits of time.”7

The patrol planes in Oahu were not uselessly employed prior to the attack. They were not standing idle. There was a definite program for their operation, which was consistent with creating and preserving their material readiness for war. In the week preceding the attack, there was a daily scout by patrol planes on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday, of a sector to the north and northwest of Oahu to a distance of four hundred miles, after which the planes required maintenance and upkeep.8  This was not distant reconnaissance, as such, although the distance covered was greater than that searched at the time of the 1940 alert. In addition, there was the daily dawn patrol out three hundred miles to cover the areas where the fleet operated.

Admiral Kimmel had been ordered, not once but twice, to be prepared to carry out raids-in-force on the Marshall Islands under War Plan-46, which meant the extended use of the fleet patrol planes from advance bases in war operations.

Admiral Kimmel had to decide what was the best use of the patrol planes as a matter of policy for the foreseeable future. Had he directed their use for intensive distant searches from Oahu, he would have faced the peril of having those planes grounded when the fleet needed them and when the war plan was executed.

He had no way of knowing that the war was to start on the 7th of December, as he had been denied MAGIC. He could not decide the matter on the basis of five days or ten days of distant searches.

He did not have the intercepted Japanese diplomatic and spy dispatches, known as MAGIC, pointing to Pearl Harbor as a probable point of attack.

He knew that any distant search he could make on an intensive  basis, straining the planes to the breaking point, would be in its nature partial and ineffective.

He took account of his resources. They were slender.

He took account of his probable future needs and of his orders from the Navy Department.

 He decided that he could not risk having no patrol plane force worthy of the name for the fleet's expected movement into the Marshall Islands.

He considered the nature and extent of the distant reconnaissance he was effectuating with his task forces at sea and the patrol plane sweeps to and from the outlying islands.

He considered the necessity of permitting the essential replacement and material upkeep program for the new patrol planes in Oahu to be continued to get them into war condition.

He considered the need for patrols of the fleet operating areas against the submarine menace and these he carried out.

He considered the need for some reserve of patrol planes for emergency distant searches.

He considered the need for patrol planes in covering fleet movements in and out of the harbor--which might have to be quickly and unexpectedly executed.

He considered the endurance of his patrol plane man power and the absence of any spare crews.

He decided he could not fritter away his patrol plane resources by pushing them to the limit in daily distant searches of one sector around Oahu--which within the predictable future would have to be discontinued when the patrol planes and crews gave out.

The three admirals who composed the NCI (Admiral Orin G. Murfin, former commander in chief, U.S. Asiatic Fleet, Admiral E. C. Kalbfus, former commander battle force, and Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, former commander of the scouting force) scrutinized his decision after extensive testimony. Each of the admirals could view the matter from the point of view of the commander in the field.

They summarized the problem:

“The task assigned the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, was to prepare his Fleet for war. War was known to be imminent-how imminent he did not know. The Fleet planes were being constantly employed in patrolling the operating areas in which the Fleet's preparations for war were being carried on. Diversion of these planes for reconnaissance or other purposes was not justified under existing circumstances and in the light of available information.”

Admiral Halsey said that, “Any Admiral worth his stars would have made the same choice.” 9

Concerning the myth that a most dangerous enemy approach sector existed around Pearl Harbor, Admiral Nimitz put the matter clearly to rest in his official letter on the subject. He said:

“It cannot be assumed that any direction of approach may safely be left unguarded. The fuel problem is no deterrent for the approach was made from the north on 7 December. Increase indifficulty of the logistic problem would not be great if even an approach from the east were attempted. At the same time, as discussed above, neglect of any sector is apt soon to be known.” 10

Attorney Borch said that, “[The] eighty-six ships [in Pearl Harbor] could have been used, in conjunction with aircraft, to conduct long-range scouting.”  The NCI found that,

“Neither surface ships nor submarines properly may be employed to [conduct long-range scouting], even if the necessary number is available. The resulting dispersion of strength not only renders the Fleet incapable of performing its proper function, but exposes the units to destruction in detail. A defensive deployment of surface ships and submarine over an extensive sea area as a means of continuously guarding against a possible attack from an unknown quarter and at an unknown time, is not sound military procedure either in peace or in war.” 11

Finally, [Fifth], that, “Kimmel and Short also failed to integrate—or even coordinate—their command-and-control structure.”  The NCI found that, “Based on Finding V, the Court is of the opinion that the relations between Admiral Husband E Kimmel, USN, and Lieut. General Walter C. Short, U. S. Army, were friendly, cordial and cooperative, that there was no lack of interest, no lack of appreciation of responsibility, and no failure to cooperate on the part of either. And that each was cognizant of the measures being undertaken by the other for the defense of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base to the degree required by the common interest.” 12

Concerning the USS Ward’s fight with an enemy submarine at 6:40 A.M. before the attack, Attorney Borch said that, “Kimmel never heard about the sinking of the submarine,” and that, “Had Kimmel instilled a sense of urgency and alertness in his command, there is no reason that he and Short could not have learned of Ward's engagement at least an hour before the Japanese planes appeared at 7:55 A.M.” Upon receipt of the so-called war warning dispatch of November 27, 1941, Admiral Kimmel issued orders to the fleet to exercise extreme vigilance against submarines in operating areas and to depth bomb all contacts expected to be hostile in the fleet operating areas. 13  Admiral Kimmel’s order directly contradicted Admiral Stark’s order not to bomb submarine contacts, and to let the Japanese fire the first shot. Admiral Kimmel’s order not only instilled a sense of urgency and alertness in his command that allowed his command to fire the first shot of the war, his order was the reason there was a Ward engagement at all. Admiral Kimmel “heard about the sinking of the submarine” between 7:30AM and 7:40AM.14. As there had been three similar reports on November 3^rd, 28^th, and December 2^nd, he was awaiting confirmation when the Japanese attacked.

Sincerely,

Thomas K. Kimmel, Jr.

THOMAS K. KIMMEL, JR., is the grandson of Admiral Husband E. Kimmel. A graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, he is a lawyer and former FBI agent and consultant.

1 39PHA363

2King letter to  SECNAV Sullivan  7/14/48

339PHA338-339

439PHA312

5Facts About Pearl Harbor, by Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, 1962, page 4.

639PHA309

7  39PHA320

832PHA451

9Admiral Halsey’s Story, p.71, 1947

1017PHA2488

1139PHA308

1239PHA319

13  17PHA2496

14  Admiral Kimmel’s Story, p.77.