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TBR News July 9, 2019

Jul 09 2019

The Voice of the White House Washington, D.C. July 8 2019:

“Working in the White House as a junior staffer is an interesting experience.

When I was younger, I worked as a summer-time job in a clinic for people who had moderate to severe mental problems and the current work closely, at times, echos the earlier one.

I am not an intimate of the President but I have encountered him from time to time and I daily see manifestations of his growing psychological problems.

He insults people, uses foul language, is frantic to see his name mentioned on main-line television and pays absolutely no attention to any advice from his staff that runs counter to his strange ideas.

He lies like a rug to everyone, eats like a hog, makes lewd remarks to female staffers and flies into rages if anyone dares to contradict him.

His latest business is to re-institute a universal draft in America.

He wants to do this to remove tens of thousands of unemployed young Americans from the streets so they won’t come together and fight him.

Commentary for July 9: “Trump is having damp panties over the caustic but private remarks by the British Ambassador, about his incompetency, to London. He is screaming like an elderly drag queen who accidentally sat on a hot stove. If he read similar comments made by other Washington-based diplomats, they would carry him out of the White House in a rubber bag.

Without breaching confidences, I can quote from some intercepts now circulating inside the Beltway…

‘Barbaric and unstable….’

‘An obnoxious racist…’

‘Obviously some sort of a rampant tax fraud…’


‘The Spanish Fly in the ointment of world diplomacy…’

And some of these cogent remarks are from diplomats representing alleged allied countries.”


The Table of Contents

  • Trump calls May foolish as diplomatic row escalates
  • Big war in the Arctic: How could it happen?
  • Office of the Secretary of Defense
  • Russian Military moves to Arctic bases
  • Russia launches new nuclear-powered icebreaker in bid to open up Arctic
  • Stationing of US troops in Northern Canada
  • Encyclopedia of American Loons
  • The CIA Confessions: The Crowley Conversations


Trump calls May foolish as diplomatic row escalates

President criticises prime minister after Downing Street backs UK ambassador to US

July 9, 2019

by Peter Walker Political correspondent

The Guardian

Theresa May faces a full-blown diplomatic standoff with the US after Donald Trump condemned Britain’s “stupid” ambassador to Washington over leaked memos critical of the White House, as Downing Street insisted Sir Kim Darroch had its full support.

The escalating crisis began after a Sunday newspaper printed extracts of confidential memos in which Darroch labelled Trump’s administration “inept” and “dysfunctional”. The US president announced on Monday that he would no longer deal with the ambassador.

In a fresh volley of tweets on Tuesday morning, Trump again condemned Darroch, and renewed his criticism of the prime minister over her Brexit negotiations, which he had praised on his state visit to the UK just over a month ago.

“The wacky ambassador that the UK foisted upon the United States is not someone we are thrilled with, a very stupid guy,” Trump wrote.

“He should speak to his country, and prime minister May, about their failed Brexit negotiation, and not be upset with my criticism of how badly it was handled.

“I told her how to do that deal, but she went her own foolish way – was unable to get it done. A disaster! I don’t know the ambassador but have been told he is a pompous fool. Tell him the USA now has the best economy and military anywhere in the world, by far and they are both only getting bigger, better and stronger.”

The deeply personal condemnation, unprecedented in the recent history of relations between the US and UK, came shortly after No 10 stressed that Darroch would continue in his role, brushing off Trump’s criticisms.

“The ambassador remains in post and he continues to carry out his duties with the full support of the prime minister,” May’s spokesman said.

Asked about Trump’s views on the situation, the spokesman said: “The UK government determines who its ambassador is.”

On Tuesday morning, May gave the same message to the weekly meeting of her cabinet, condemning the leak to the Mail on Sunday as “utterly unacceptable”.

Describing May’s words to cabinet, her spokesman said: “The prime minister said that while at the same time the views expressed in the documents are not necessarily the views of ministers or the government, it is hugely important that ambassadors are able to provide honest, unvarnished assessments of the politics in their country. She said it is therefore absolutely right that we continue to give Sir Kim Darroch our full support.”

In his tweets on Monday, Trump said of Darroch: “I do not know the ambassador, but he is not liked or well thought of within the US. We will no longer deal with him.

“The good news for the wonderful United Kingdom is that they will soon have a new prime minister. While I thoroughly enjoyed the magnificent state visit last month, it was the Queen who I was most impressed with!”

In criticism of May, he wrote: “I have been very critical about the way the UK and Prime Minister Theresa May handled Brexit. What a mess she and her representatives have created. I told her how it should be done, but she decided to go another way.”

The words will be a blow to the outgoing prime minister, who has placed great store in seeking to develop close ties with Trump, visiting him in Washington soon after his inauguration and then agreeing to the state visit, and an earlier working visit, both of which were greeted by protests.


Big war in the Arctic: How could it happen?

July 8, 2019

by Mikhail Khodarenok


The Arctic’s ice cover is melting, which presents new economic opportunities for the Arctic states, while also making the competition between them stiffer. Can these opposing interests lead to a large-scale war in the region?

The fight for the resource-rich region now involves not just the Arctic Ocean countries –the US, Russia, Canada, Norway, and Denmark– but powers from other regions as well, such as, for instance, China. Polar research is no longer a purely scientific endeavor, the focus has now shifted towards economic aspects, which in turn has led to a serious political debate between the Arctic states.

Russia’s comeback in the Arctic

In the “wild 1990s”, almost all Russian military units stationed in the Arctic were downsized. There was basically no army presence all along the coastline, from Murmansk to Chukotka. Russia lost control over the vast region.

Now Russia is returning to the Arctic and is using new technological solutions to stake its claim. The Russian Armed Forces are rapidly increasing their military potential and presence in the region. Moscow has the largest ice-breaker fleet in the world. It is building military and navy bases as well as airfields in the region. It is also improving its air support systems and anti-aircraft protection, and is upgrading its radars.

But other Arctic states are doing the same. This begs the question whether conflicting interests in the region could lead to a full-scale war.

Indeed, there are all kinds of disagreements and discord between the Arctic states at this point. And some of them are potentially dangerous.

First, borders between exclusive economic zones in the Arctic Ocean are not defined because of a certain ambiguity in international law, which leads to different interpretations and disagreements.

For example, an exclusive economic zone’s width is not supposed to be over 200 nautical miles (370.4 km) from the so-called baseline. But if a country can prove that some section of the ocean floor is part of its continental shelf, then this country’s exclusive economic zone could be expanded.

This has important practical implications, because the country would then get the right to explore the ocean floor and develop its natural resources, create and use man-made islands, and build different facilities. This could turn into a very lucrative endeavor, since the Arctic region could potentially hold up to a quarter of global oil and gas reserves.

Northeast Passage dispute

The second important problem in the Arctic is the debate about states’ authorities over the Northeast Passage (NEP). The shipping route is becoming increasingly accessible to commercial vessels because of melting ice.

Lately, the US has been getting more vocal about restricting Russia’s presence and promoting the idea of turning the NEP (called the Northern Sea Route in Russia), into an international route, as opposed to part of the Russian national transport infrastructure.

The US also seeks to increase its activity in the Arctic. One of the strategies used by the Americans is deploying a significant number of US Coast Guard units in the region.

Western experts claim that Russia’s position on the NEP/Northern Sea Route is not always convincing, as allegedly it violates international maritime law to some degree and goes against the principle of the peaceful use of the seas and oceans. Moscow argues that Russia has authority over the NEP which passes through its exclusive economic zone and any vessels willing to use this route have to ask for its permission.

This difference could potentially cause serious incidents. Let’s imagine a scenario where, for example, US Navy vessels are going through the NEP claiming that they are using the route based on the freedom of the seas principle. This doctrine allows for free passage through territorial waters if this section is part of an international maritime trade route. But in reality this often causes all kinds of incidents – clashes, attempts to force vessels out, etc.

Military issues

There are also military issues in the Arctic. In the mid-1990s, Russia developed the Northern Strategic Bastion concept, which defined special measures for maintaining combat survivability of strategic missile submarines.

The idea was to create secure zones around ballistic missile-armed submarines, with air and sea support, as well as stationary underwater illumination systems.

If that doctrine had been implemented, it would’ve been challenged by the US and serious pressure from them would have been expected. By the way, nuclear ballistic missile-carrying submarines are usually deployed in neutral waters. This would’ve been a cause for great concern in the US.

But this factor is not as significant as the previous two. These problems have always existed, in the Arctic and everywhere else. Americans are in a similar situation. They have relatively small zones where nuclear ballistic missile submarines are deployed and they guard these areas using all available means and resources. But this is an ongoing thing.

To analyze a potential large-scale war in the Arctic, we have to bear in mind one important factor – any conflict between the existing players in the region poses a risk of turning into a nuclear war.

NATO is clearly interested in the Arctic – in the broadest sense. So, on the one side of the scale we have the US, Norway, Canada, Greenland, and Denmark. On the other side, there is Russia. China now also joins the club, since it has been actively making its way into the Arctic region recently. China is seeking to get a foothold in the Arctic, so that it can one day use the northern routes for commercial shipping – if the climate allows.

Basically, every developed country has its interests in the Arctic – it’s just that not everyone openly admits that. As soon as the Arctic pie is on the table, every one of them will claim their piece.

At this point, commercial shipping in the Arctic Ocean is, for the most part, not economically expedient. Unfortunately, target indicators for goods to be shipped from Russia via the Northern Sea Route have not been met so far. Today, this route is still too risky, and these risks outweigh the advantages of using the Northern Sea Route/NEP and saving time.

Maritime container shipping between China, South-East Asia and Europe that goes through the Suez Canal around Africa has long been established – and perfected. These routes see ships of incredible sizes, and the number of containers shipped is jaw-dropping, too, while the price of shipment is relatively low. The whole thing runs like clockwork. Figuratively speaking, you can buy a ticket, board your ship, and know that you will arrive at your destination on time.

With the NEP, you can buy a ticket, but before you set sail, you might get a message, “Sorry, in the Vilkitsky Strait, a windstorm has driven the pack ice 4 meters thick too close to the shore.”

Everyone wants to make sure that their trip goes as scheduled, and this schedule should be set for years to come.

Arctic Ocean conflict wouldn’t differ from South China Sea or Persian Gulf

However, the situation in the Arctic Ocean may change dramatically, if the ice continues to melt at current rates. The Northwest Passage may become completely free of ice in the next 40-50 years. This route goes across the Arctic Ocean along the Northern shores of North America and the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. It will be the shortest way from Shanghai to New York. If that happens, it will give rise to the same kind of problems that exist today around the NEP. The US is most likely to claim authority over the route, while China is sure to say that such claims violate maritime law and go against the freedom of navigation principle.

In the geopolitical sense, any kind of situation that may unfold in the Arctic Ocean will in general be similar to what we see today in the Persian Gulf or around the [disputed] Spratly Islands in the South China Sea.

However, it should be noted that all Arctic region players are nuclear powers with major military capabilities or are members of military alliances – it means that the whole range of deterrence mechanisms would come into play, should anything happen.

It is very unlikely that nuclear powers would resort to nuclear strikes; they would probably use some other mechanism to settle the issue. And such mechanisms would keep the situation from spiraling to a full-scale war, since this kind of conflict can turn into a nuclear one already at phase two.

Russia, for one, would have only two options if a serious incident happened. Moscow could either hang out the white flag or use nuclear weapons. The fact that the size of the Russian Fleet is nowhere near that of the US Navy will largely define the decision-making process. There is no doubt that Washington understands it very well. In other words, who would risk becoming a target of a nuclear strike, with just some cod and oil at stake?

So there is not going to be a large-scale war. There is definitely not going to be a ‘traditional’ war with an official declaration, introduction of martial law, etc. Wars are a territorial thing, limited by national borders. If a war erupts in the Arctic, it will inevitably spread to the Arctic states’ territories. In other words, any war involving Russia will spill beyond the Arctic.

This will be the logic behind the countries’ actions in the Arctic. However, the number of disputes is sure to grow, but there is no reason to believe that the situation in general will be any different from the disputes in the South China Sea, the Persian Gulf, or from the disagreements over oil and gas in the Eastern Mediterranean, where tensions tend to escalate all the time.

All in all, there is indeed no major difference between the Arctic and other tense regions.  Of course, there are all kinds of horrifying scenarios of things going wrong in the Arctic. We can’t completely rule out the nuclear apocalypse option, but it’s nothing new – we’ve been living in this situation for quite some time.


Office of the Secretary of Defense



The Arctic is at a strategic inflection point as its ice cap is diminishing more rapidly than projected2 and human activity, driven by economic opportunity—ranging from oil, gas, and mineral exploration to fishing, shipping, and tourism—is increasing in response to the growing accessibility. Arctic and non-Arctic nations are establishing their strategies and positions on the future of the Arctic in a variety of international forums. Taken together, these changes present a compelling opportunity for the Department of Defense (DoD) to work collaboratively with allies and partners to promote a balanced approach to improving human and environmental security in the region in accordance with the 2013 National Strategy for the Arctic Region.

Security in the Arctic encompasses a broad spectrum of activities, ranging from resource extraction and trade to activities supporting safe commercial and scientific operations to national defense. Security cooperation activities and other military-to-military forms of engagement establish, shape, and maintain international relations and the partnerships necessary to meet security challenges and reduce the potential for friction. The Department will continue to build cooperative strategic partnerships that promote innovative, affordable security solutions, and burden-sharing in theArctic, and seek to increase opportunities with Arctic partners to enhance regional expertise andcold-weather operational experience.

The Department will continue to train and operate routinely in the region4 as it monitors the changing environment, revisiting assessments and taking appropriate action as conditions change.

This strategy identifies the Department’s desired end-state for the Arctic: a secure and stable region where U.S. national interests are safeguarded, the U.S. homeland is protected, and nations work cooperatively to address challenges. It also articulates two main supporting objectives: Ensure security, support safety, and promote defense cooperation, and prepare to respond to a wide range of challenges and contingencies—operating in conjunction with other nations when possible, and independently if necessary—in order to maintain stability in the region. Finally, it identifies the ways and means the Department intends to use to achieve these objectives as it implements the National  Strategy for the Arctic Region.

1The DoD strategy uses a broad definition of the Arctic, codified in 15 U.S.C. 4111, that includes all U.S. and foreign territory north of the Arctic Circle and all U.S. territory north and west of the boundary formed by the Porcupine, Yukon, and Kuskokwim Rivers; all contiguous seas, including the Arctic Ocean and the Beaufort, Bering, and Chukchi Seas, and the Aleutian islands chain.

2 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) scientists in J.E. Overland and M. Wang (2013), When will the summer Arctic be nearly sea ice free?, Geophys. Res. Lett., 40 doi:10.1002/grl.50316.

3 This strategy is nested under National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 66 / Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 25, Arctic Region Policy, the 2013 National Strategy for the Arctic Region, and the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance. It complements DoD’s Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities (HD&DSCA).

4 For additional information on the Navy’s historic involvement in the Arctic, see The Impact of Climate Change on Naval Operations in the Arctic (Center for Naval Analysis, 2009).


U.S. national security interests in the Arctic are delineated in National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 66/Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 25, Arctic Region Policy. 5 This policy states that national security interests include such matters as missile defense and early warning; deployment of sea and air systems for strategic sealift, strategic deterrence, maritime presence, and maritime security operations; and ensuring freedom of the seas. Preserving freedom of the seas, which includes all of the rights, freedoms, and uses of the seas and adjacent airspace, including freedom of navigation and overflight, in the Arctic supports the nation’s ability to exercise these rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea and airspace throughout the world, including through strategic straits.

The 2013 National Strategy on the Arctic Region frames the whole-of-government approach that provides the overarching context for the Department’s efforts. It lays out three main lines of effort in the Arctic: advance U.S. security interests; pursue responsible Arctic region stewardship; and strengthen international cooperation. The goal of the National Strategy for the Arctic Region is “an Arctic region that is stable and free of conflict, where nations act responsibly in a spirit of trust and cooperation, and where economic and energy resources are developed in a sustainable manner that also respects the fragile environment and the interests and cultures of indigenous peoples.”

The DoD Arctic Strategy outlines how the Department will support the whole-of-government effort to promote security, stewardship, and international cooperation in the Arctic. The Department’s strategic approach to the Arctic reflects the relatively low level of military threat in a region bounded by nation States that have not only publicly committed to working within a common framework of international law and diplomatic engagement,6 but have also demonstrated the ability and commitment to do so. In consideration of enduring national interests in the Arctic and existing strategic guidance, the Department’s end-state for its strategic approach to the Arctic is: a secure and stable region where U.S. national interests are safeguarded, the U.S. homeland is protected, and nations work cooperatively to address challenges.

5 The January 2009 National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-66, dual-titled as Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-25, or NSPD-66/HSPD-25, established the policy of the United States with respect to the Arctic and outlined national security and homeland security interests in the region. Homeland security interests include preventing terrorist attacks and mitigating those criminal or hostile acts that could increase the United States’ vulnerability to terrorism in the Arctic. The Department has a role to play in responding not only to traditional (e.g., military) threats, but also to a range of other potential national security challenges (e.g., smuggling, criminal trafficking, and terrorism as the lead agency or in support of other government agencies6In the Ilulissat Declaration (May 28, 2008), all five Arctic Ocean coastal States (United States, Russian Federation, Canada, Norway, and Denmark on behalf of Greenland) committed themselves to the orderly settlement of overlapping territorial claims through the established framework of the international law as reflected in the U.N. Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC). The Declaration affirmedthat the legal framework provided by the LOSC is sufficient for the management of the Arctic Ocean and that there is no need to develop a new comprehensive international legal regime to govern this Ocean.

6 In the Ilulissat Declaration (May 28, 2008), all five Arctic Ocean coastal States (United States, Russian Federation, Canada, Norway,and Denmark on behalf of Greenland) committed themselves to the orderly settlement of overlapping territorial claims through theestablished framework of the international law as reflected in the U.N. Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC). The Declaration affirmedthat the legal framework provided by the LOSC is sufficient for the management of the Arctic Ocean and that there is no need todevelop a new comprehensive international legal regime to govern this Ocean.


The Department’s two supporting objectives describe what is to be accomplished to achieve its desired end-state. These objectives are bounded by policy guidance, the changing nature of the strategic and physical environment, and the capabilities and limitations of the available instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic). Actions taken to achieve these objectives will be informed by the Department’s global priorities and fiscal constraints. In order to achieve its strategic endstate, the Department’s supporting objectives are:

Ensure security, support safety, and promote defense cooperation .

– Relationships with allies and partners are important enablers of cooperation in meeting security and defense commitments. These relationships also play an important role in conflict prevention, and, if prevention and deterrence fail, in coordinating annternational response to security and defense challenges. Although the Department of

State is the lead for regional diplomacy, DoD has a supporting role enhancing the

region’s capability and capacity for multilateral security collaboration, and responding to ,requests for assistance from interagency and international partners both within and outside the Arctic. This collaborative approach helps prevent conflict and provides the stability needed to facilitate the sustainable economic development envisioned in the

National Strategy for the Arctic Region. The Department of Defense will seek out areas of mutual interest to build strategic relationships and encourage operational-level ,partnerships that promote innovative, affordable security solutions and enhance burdensharing in the Arctic. Science and technology (S&T) can provide non-contentious ,opportunities for cooperation, and DoD will coordinate research initiatives with the

Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee (IARPC).

The Department has an important role supporting other Federal departments and

agencies in safety-related missions in Alaska and in responding to requests from civil

authorities to support them with disaster relief or humanitarian assistance at home or abroad. Although the Department has seldom been tasked to execute these missions in the Arctic, it may be asked to do more in the coming decades.

  • Prepare for a wide range of challenges and contingencies—operating in conjunction ,with other States when possible and independently if necessary—in order to maintain stability in the region.

– Future challenges in the Arctic may span the full range of national security interests.

These challenges and contingencies may take many forms, ranging from the need to support other Federal departments and agencies—or another nation—in responding to a natural or man-made disaster to responding to security concerns that may emerge in the future.

7 Per the 2013 National Strategy for the Arctic Region, U.S. security in the Arctic encompasses a broad spectrum of activities, including national defense.


The Department will pursue comprehensive engagement with allies and partners to protect the homeland and support civil authorities in preparing for increased human activity in the Arctic. Strategic partnerships are the center of gravity in ensuring a peaceful opening of the Arctic and achieving the Department’s desired end-state. Where possible, DoD will seek innovative, low-cost, smallfootprint approaches to achieve these objectives (e.g., by participating in multilateral exercises like the Search and Rescue Exercise (SAREX) hosted by Greenland, COLDRESPONSE hosted by Norway, and Canada’s Operation NANOOK, or through Defense Environmental International Cooperation Program-supported engagements on Arctic issues). The Department will also evolve its infrastructure and capabilities in step with the changing physical environment in order to ensure security, support safety, promote defense cooperation, and prepare to respond to a wide range of challenges and contingencies in the Arctic in the coming decades. The Department will accomplish its objectives through the following ways:

  • Exercise sovereignty and protect the homeland;
  • Engage public and private sector partners to improve domain awareness in the Arctic;
  • Preserve freedom of the seas in the Arctic;
  • Evolve Arctic infrastructure and capabilities consistent with changing conditions;
  • Support existing agreements with allies and partners while pursuing new ones to build confidence with key regional partners;
  • Provide support to civil authorities, as directed;
  • Partner with other departments and agencies and nations to support human and

environmental safety; and

  • Support the development of the Arctic Council and otherinternational institutions that promote regional cooperation and the rule of law.

The Department will apply the four guiding principles from the 2013 National Strategy for the Arctic Region as it pursues these eight ways.9 This means DoD will work with allies, partners, and other interested parties to safeguard peace and stability. It will make decisions using the best available scientific information, and will pursue innovative arrangements as it develops the capability and capacity needed in the Arctic over time. It will also follow established Federal tribal consultation policy. These four principles will underpin all of the Department’s activities as it implements this strategy through the means described in this section.

8 The Arctic Council’s charter states, “The Arctic Council should not deal with matters related to military security.” It could be argued that search and rescue is a (human) security interest, and oil spill response is an (environmental) security interest; thus, the Council has a demonstrated ability to address a range of “soft security” issues.

Protect the Homeland and Exercise Sovereignty

From the U.S. perspective, greater access afforded by the decreasing seasonal ice increases the Arctic’s viability as an avenue of approach to North America for those with hostile intent toward the U.S. homeland, and the Department will remain prepared to detect, deter, prevent, and defeat threats to the homeland. Additionally, DoD will continue to support the exercise of U.S. sovereignty. In the near-term10, this will require some ability to operate in the Arctic, which the Department will maintain and enhance by continuing to conduct exercises and training in the region. In the mid- to far-term, this may require developing further capabilities and capacity to protect U.S. air, land, and maritime borders in the Arctic in accordance with the 2013 National Strategy for the Arctic Region. As directed by the 2011 Unified Command Plan, Commander, U.S. Northern Command (CDRUSNORTHCOM) is responsible for advocating for Arctic capabilities. In execution of this responsibility, CDRUSNORTHCOM will collaborate with relevant Combatant Commands, the Joint Staff, the Military Departments and ServicesServices, and the Defense agencies to identify and prioritize emerging Arctic capability gaps and requirements. These efforts will be informed by the most authoritative scientific information on future Arctic conditions. For purposes of mission and infrastructure vulnerability assessments and adaptation to climate change, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (OUSD(AT&L)) will identify projections of future conditions to be used. The Department of Defense will collaborate with theDepartment of Homeland Security (DHS) to ensure efficient use of resources to avoid duplication of effort in research, development, experimentation, testing, and acquisition. Forums such as the DoD-DHS Capabilities Development Working Group are among the means to facilitate this cooperation.

Engage public and private sector partners to improve all domain awareness in the


Although NSPD-66/HSPD-25 focuses on maritime domain awareness, the Department has responsibilities for awareness across all domains: air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace. Adequate domain awareness is an essential component of protecting maritime commerce, critical infrastructure, and key resources. In the near-term, the Department will work through the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) to maintain air tracking capabilities in the Arctic. As the maritime domain becomes increasingly accessible, the Department will seek to improve its maritime detection and tracking in coordination with DHS and other departments and agencies as well as through public/private partnerships. The Department of the Navy, in its role as DoD Executive Agent for Maritime Domain Awareness, will lead DoD coordination on maritime detection and tracking. Where possible, DoD will also collaborate with international partners to employ, acquire, share, or develop the means required to improve sensing, data collection and fusion, analysis, and information-sharing to enhance domain awareness appropriately in the Arctic. Monitoring regional activity and analyzing emerging trends are key to informing future investments in Arctic capabilities and ensuring they keep pace with increasing human activity in the region over time.

9 Many of DoD’s ways align with what the National Strategy for the Arctic Region terms supporting objectives to its three lines of effort, but DoD’s strategy follows the classical “ways-ends-means” construction.

10 This strategy identifies three timeframes to be used for implementation planning: the near-term (present day-2020); mid-term (2020-2030); and far-term (beyond 2030). These timeframes are approximate due to uncertainty in climate change projections.

In the near- to mid-term, the primary means of improving domain awareness will be continued use of innovative, low-cost solutions for polar Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) needs as well as enhanced international collaboration. DoD will take steps to work with other Federal departments and agencies to improve nautical charts, enhance relevant atmospheric and oceanic models, improve accuracy of estimates of ice extent and thickness, and detect and monitor climate change indicators. In particular, the Department of the Navy will work in partnership with other Federal departments and agencies (e.g., DHS, the Department of Commerce) and international partners to improve hydrographic charting and oceanographic surveys in the Arctic.

The Department will continue to collaborate with other Federal departments and agencies and the State of Alaska to monitor and assess changes in the physical environment to inform the development of Arctic requirements and future capabilities. To that end, the Department will leverage work done by the scientific and academic communities and seek opportunities to contribute to the observation and modeling of the atmosphere, ocean, and sea ice conditions, including acoustics conditions, to enhance military environmental forecasting capabilities. These collaborations will help inform the development and design of future ice-strengthened ship designs, when required.

Preserve freedom of the seas in the Arctic.

The United States has a national interest in preserving all of the rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea and airspace recognized under international law. The Department will preserve the global mobility of United States military and civilian vessels and aircraft throughout the Arctic, including through the exercise of the Freedom of Navigation program to challenge excessive maritime claims asserted by other Arctic States when necessary. The Department will continue to support U.S. accession to the United Nations Convention on the Lawof the Sea (hereafter referred to as the Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC)) because it codifies the rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea and airspace the Department seeks to preserve; provides a means for the peaceful resolution of disputes; and ensures international recognition of resources rights on the extended continental shelf.

Evolve Arctic infrastructure and capabilities consistent with changing  conditions.

The Department will periodically re-evaluate requirements necessary to meet

national security objectives as conditions change and the Combatant Commandersidentify operational requirements for the Arctic in updates to their regional plans.Once operational requirements are defined, solutions for associated supporting infrastructure requirements should seek to leverage existing U.S. Government, commercial, and international facilities to the maximum extent possible in order to mitigate the high cost and extended timelines associated with the development of Arctic infrastructure. If no existing infrastructure is capable of sufficiently supporting the requirement, modifications to existing bases, such as the addition of a new hangar, will be made as part of the military construction or facilities sustainment, restoration, and modernization processes.

Uphold existing agreements with allies and partners while building confidence with key regional partners.

Security cooperation activities and other military-to-military forms of engagement establish, shape, and maintain international relations and the partnerships necessary to meet security challenges and reduce the potential for friction. The 2012 and 2013 Northern Chiefs ,of Defense (CHoDs) meetings and the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable workshops and meetings are examples of means for promoting information-sharing and partnership-building necessary to develop cooperative approaches to common challenges. Therefore, in cooperation with the Department of State, DHS (in particular, the U.S. Coast Guard), and other relevant agencies, the Department will continue to build cooperative strategic partnerships that promote innovative, affordable security solutions and burden-sharing in the Arctic. It will also seek to increase bilateral exchanges, including in science and technology, and take advantage of multilateral training opportunities with Arctic partners to enhance regional expertise and cold-weather operational experience.

Provide Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA) in Alaska and provide Foreign Humanitarian Assistance and Foreign Disaster Relief (FHA/FDR) in other non-U.S. territorial areas of the Arctic.

When directed by the appropriate authority, the Department will be prepared to support civil authorities in response to natural or manmade disasters, or to conduct FHA/FDR operations in cooperation with allies and partners. Partner with other agencies and nations to support human and environmental safety.

Some of the near-term safety-related challenges include meeting international search and rescue obligations and responding to incidents such as oil spills in ice-covered waters, as reflected in the recently concluded Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic and Agreement on Cooperation on

Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic. The Department will leverage existing capabilities to respond to requests for support from civil authorities in coordination with other departments and agencies and nations. Where appropriate, the Department will support other departments and agencies in maintaining human health; promoting healthy, sustainable, and resilient ecosystems; and consulting and coordinating with Alaska Natives on policy and activities affecting them. Finally, the Department will continue to integrate environmental considerations into its planning and operations and to contribute to whole-of-government approaches in support of the second line of effort in the 2013 National Strategy for the Arctic Region

Support the development of the Arctic Council and other international institutions to promote regional cooperation and the rule of law.

The Department recognizes the value of the Arctic Council in efforts to understand the changing Arctic environment and developingcooperative approaches to regional challenges, and supports the Department of State in thecontinued development of the Council. Although the Department of State is the lead fordiplomacy, DoD has a role to play in enhancing the region’s multilateral security cooperationenvironment. Accordingly, DoD will work with allies and partners within the framework ofinternational institutions, ranging from the Arctic Council to the International MaritimeOrganization (IMO), to maintain stability and promote cooperation.

11As expressed by Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM), Commander, U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), and Commander, USNORTHCOM, in a May 2008 memorandum, the United States needs assured access to support U.S. national interests in the Arctic. Although this imperative could be met by regular U.S. Government ships in open water up to the marginal ice zone, only ice-capable ships provide assured sovereign presence throughout the region and throughout the year. Assured access in areas of pack ice could also be met by other means, including submarines and aircraft.


This strategy furthers defense objectives while positioning the United States to take advantage of opportunities in the Arctic during the coming decades in accordance with the 2013 National Strategy for the Arctic Region. It also addresses some of the risks inherent in the trade-offs and tensions among U.S. interests and objectives, including:

  • Projections about future access to and activity in the Arctic may be inaccurate. Significant uncertainty remains about the rate and extent of the effects of climate change, including climate variability, in the Arctic. There is also uncertainty about future economic conditions, and the pace at which human activity will increase in the region. The challenge is to balance the risk of having inadequate capabilities or insufficient capacity when required to operate in the region with the opportunity cost of making premature and/or unnecessary investments. Premature investment may reduce the availability of resources for other pressing priorities, particularly in a time of fiscal austerity.
  • Fiscal constraints may delay or deny needed investment in Arctic capabilities, and may curtail Arctic training and operations.

As the Department downsizes to meet budgetary targets, it will have to prioritize engagements for the resulting smaller force. There is also a risk that desired investments in Arctic capabilities may not compete successfully against other requirements in the Department’s budgetary priorities. Where possible, DoD will mitigate this risk by

  • developing innovative ways to employ existing capabilities in coordination with other
  • departments and agencies and international partners, and by enhancing scientific, research,
  • and development partnerships. CDRUSNORTHCOM plays a key role in mitigating this risk as the Arctic capability advocate within the Department’s planning and programming activities. Commander, U.S. European Command (CDRUSEUCOM) and Commander, U.S.Pacific Command (CDRUSPACOM) also play a role by fostering collaborative working relationships with regional partners.
  • Political rhetoric and press reporting about boundary disputes and competition for resources may inflame regional tensions.
  • Efforts to manage disagreements diplomatically may be hindered if the public narrative becomes one of rivalry and conflict. The Department will mitigate this risk by ensuring its plans, actions, and words are coordinated, and when appropriate, by engaging the press to counter unhelpful narratives with facts. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy will monitor DoD activities, programs, and posture in the region to ensure the Department is sending a clear message to key audiences regarding the Department’s efforts to promote security, safety, and defense cooperation.
  • Being too aggressive in taking steps to address anticipated future security risks may create the conditions of mistrust and miscommunication under which such risks could materialize.

There is some risk that the perception that the Arctic is being militarized may lead to an “arms race” mentality that could lead to a breakdown of existing cooperative approaches to shared challenges. The Department will mitigate this risk by focusing on collaborative security approaches as outlined in the 2013 National Strategy for the Arctic Region, and by supporting other Federal departments and agencies where they have leadership roles. Building trust through transparency about the intent of our military activities and participation in bilateral and multilateral exercises and other engagements that facilitate information-sharing will be a key means of addressing this risk.


The Department will work collaboratively with allies and partners through the ways and means outlined in this strategy to support the development of the Arctic as a secure and stable region where U.S. national interests are safeguarded, the U.S. homeland is protected, and nations work cooperatively to address challenges. Priority will be given to addressing key near-term challenges primarily in key enablers, including: shortfalls in ice and weather reporting and forecasting; limitations in C4ISR due to lack of assets and harsh environmental conditions; and limited domain awareness. The key will be to address needs over time as activity in the Arctic increases, while balancing potential Arctic investments with other national priorities. This approach will help the United States achieve its objectives as outlined in the National Strategy for the Arctic Region while mitigating risks and overcoming challenges presented by the growing geostrategic importance of the Arctic.


Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Friday, November 22, 2013

I am grateful for the opportunity to be here and participate in a very important forum.  Thank you, Minister Nicholson, for your hospitality.  And I recognize as well our friend Peter Mackay for his imagination, and resourcefulness, innovation, leadership, and a driving force behind this institution.  Thank you all who have had a significant role in organizing and ensuring that this forum continues to grow and strengthen and become even more relevant as the years go by, and address, as Minister Nicholson noted, some of the great challenges and issues that face our world today and I fear will be with us for some time.

Over the years, this conference has grown into an important venue for dialogue and discussion on emerging security trends, from cyber defense to the evolving threat of terrorism.  It brings together leaders from around the world, including a U.S. Congressional delegation that has been recognized already, led by Senators John McCain and Tim Kaine.  Their presence and leadership is an important part of why this gathering has become so successful.  I am always reassured when I see members of Congress with me, or at least most of the time – it depends on the forum and the hearings.  I do want to note their presence, and I know they particularly had a quite stimulating day yesterday.  I also know they welcome the opportunity to escape Washington.  We’re glad you’re here.  To my friend John McCain, thanks for his continued leadership and presence, I know what he has meant to keep this thing going.  His being here initially, I think Peter, was of particularly importance.  Thank you to my former colleagues and senior members of Congress who help lead our country.

The growth of this forum, as has been noted, is also a tribute to the vision of Minister Nicholson’s predecessor, Peter Mackay, and to the leadership of Peter van Praagh.  The Halifax Security Forum reflects Canada’s important role as a force for peace and security.  The United States deeply values its alliance with Canada, as we share much more than a 5,000-mile border.  We share a common history, a common history of values, and many common security interests.  We fought side-by-side in Afghanistan under a NATO umbrella, and we worked together to advance peace and security in the Western Hemisphere and around the world.  Earlier today, Minister Nicholson and I signed a defense policy framework that will help guide our future cooperation in the Asia-Pacific.

We also share the common interests of being Arctic nations.  Today, I want to focus my remarks on the forces that are driving dramatic changes in the world and the region’s environment, the long-term security implications of these changes, and how the U.S. Department of Defense is preparing to adapt to these 21st Century Arctic region challenges.

To fully appreciate what’s happening in the Arctic and the world, we should take a step back and consider the many dynamic shifts occurring in every region of the world.  Among them are the growing economic and geopolitical importance of the Asia-Pacific; conflict and instability across the Middle East and North Africa; the unprecedented diffusion of global economic power; new sources of and demand for energy; the rise of China, India, Brazil, and other nations; environmental degradation and devastating natural disasters; and the role of technology in closely linking the world’s people, their aspirations, and their grievances.

History is a recording of the past … it has recorded the rise of great powers, the fall of empires, and technological revolutions that have transformed the way people communicate, travel, trade, fight wars, and meet new threats and opportunities.

But the challenge of global climate change, while not new to history, is new to the modern world.  Climate change does not directly cause conflict, but it can significantly add to the challenges of global instability, hunger, poverty, and conflict.  Food and water shortages, pandemic disease, disputes over refugees and resources, more severe natural disasters – all place additional burdens on economies, societies, and institutions around the world.  Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines is a reminder of humanitarian disaster brought on by nature.  And climatologists warn us of the increased probability of more destructive storms to come.

The Department of Defense has been aware of these challenges for many years, and we are addressing them – including through a review of our energy strategy.  DoD invests in energy efficiency, new technologies, and renewable energy sources at our installations and all of our operations because it makes us a stronger fighting force and helps us carry out our security mission.

Last year, energy efficiency and renewable energy improvements such as tactical solar gear at combat outposts in Afghanistan saved roughly 20 million gallons of fuel – taking 7,000 truckloads worth of fuel off the battlefield.  Over the same period of time, U.S. Air Force innovations and more efficient route planning saved $1.5 billion.  By 2025, private-sector investments on DoD installations will be generating 3,000 megawatts of renewable energy.  That’s enough to power 750,000 homes – 50 percent more power than the Hoover Dam.  And because we know that climate change is taking place, we are assessing our coastal and desert installations to help ensure they will be resilient to its effects.  Planning for climate change and smarter energy investments not only make us a stronger military, they have many additional benefits – saving us money, reducing demand, and helping protect the environment.   These initiatives all support President Obama’s Climate Action Plan, which outlines how the United States will work with the international community in addressing these serious global challenges.  This plan also helps prepare our nation for the effects of climate change and lays out how we will work to reduce carbon emissions.

America’s energy security has also been strengthened through new domestic energy exploration technologies in North America.  Natural gas, in particular, promises cheaper fuel with lower carbon emissions across the continent.

As energy sources evolve, and the global demand for energy increases amid a changing climate, as nations see this and plan for this they will shift their strategic priorities, placing more and more emphasis on new sources of energy from new frontiers, including the Arctic.

Climate change is shifting the landscape in the Arctic more rapidly than anywhere else in the world.  While the Arctic temperature rise is relatively small in absolute terms, its effects are significant – transforming what was a frozen desert into an evolving navigable ocean, giving rise to an unprecedented level of human activity.  Traffic in the Northern Sea Route is reportedly expected to increase tenfold this year compared to last year.

Over the long-term, as global warming accelerates, Arctic ice melt will lead to a sea level rise that will likely threaten coastal populations around the world.  But it also could open up a transpolar sea route, a possibility that has been discussed since the USS Nautilus made its historic submerged crossing of the North Pole many years ago.

As the Arctic changes, it creates new opportunities – and new challenges – that will shape the region for decades to come.  With Arctic sea routes starting to see more activities like tourism and commercial shipping, the risk of accidents increases.  Migrating fish stocks will draw fishermen to new areas, challenging existing management plans.  And while there will be more potential for tapping what may be as much as a quarter of the planet’s undiscovered oil and gas, a flood of interest in energy exploration has the potential to heighten tensions over other issues – even though most projected oil and gas reserves in the region are located within undisputed exclusive economic zones.

Despite potential challenges, these developments create the opportunity for nations to work together through coalitions of common interest, as both Arctic and non-Arctic nations begin to lay out their strategies and positions on the future of the region.

Earlier this year, the United States joined many of these nations, releasing its National Strategy for the Arctic Region – emphasizing responsible Arctic stewardship and strengthening international cooperation.  Secretary of State Kerry visited Sweden earlier this year to attend the ministerial session of the Arctic Council – which Canada now chairs, and which the United States will chair in two years.

The United States’ interests in the Arctic encompass a broad spectrum of activities, these activities include supporting responsible environmental policies and safe commercial and scientific operations.

The United States takes its responsibilities as an Arctic nation very seriously, and the United States military has extensive experience operating in the Arctic.  Alaska is home to more than 22,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines, as well as nearly 5,000 Guardsmen and reservists.  DoD’s Arctic capabilities include ski-equipped C-130s and nuclear submarines, which have all been operating in the polar regions for more than 50 years.  In 2009, the U.S. Navy released an Arctic roadmap, and in 2011, a realignment of combatant commands simplified our command and control arrangements in the Arctic.

Today, I am announcing the Department of Defense’s first Arctic Strategy, this strategy is to help guide our efforts going forward.  This strategy supports President Obama’s national strategy for the region, and reflects America’s desire to work closely with allies and partners to promote a balanced approach to improving human and environmental security in the region.

The Arctic is a region of established nation-states.  Engagement and cooperation with Canada and the other Arctic nations – Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia and Sweden – is a cornerstone of our strategy.  Arctic nations have publicly committed to work within a common framework of international law and diplomatic engagement.

As President Obama has said, “the Arctic region is peaceful, stable, and free of conflict.”  Our goal is to help assure it stays that way.  Ultimately, we envision a secure and stable Arctic, where all nations’ interests are safeguarded, and where all nations work together to address problems and resolve differences.

DoD has focused on eight points to accomplish its objectives.

First, we will remain prepared to detect, deter, prevent and defeat threats to our homeland and we will continue to exercise U.S. sovereignty in and around Alaska.

Second, we will work with both private and public-sector partners, including the state of Alaska, Federal agencies, such as the U.S. Coast Guard, to improve our understanding and awareness of the Arctic environment so that we can operate safely and effectively.  This is the first new frontier of nautical exploration since the days of Ericsson, Columbus, and Magellan, and it provides a clear opportunity to work together to ensure we have accurate observations, maps, and models of the Arctic’s atmospheric, oceanic, and sea ice conditions.

Third, we will help preserve freedom of the seas throughout the region, to ensure that the Arctic Ocean will be as peacefully navigated as other oceans of the world.  These activities will be carried out within existing frameworks of international law, which provide a comprehensive set of rules that govern the rights, the freedoms, and the uses of the world’s oceans and airspace – including the Arctic – as well as mechanisms for peacefully resolving disputes.

Fourth, we will carefully evolve our Arctic infrastructure and capabilities at a pace consistent with changing conditions.  DoD will continually re-evaluate its needs as activities in the Arctic increase, as we balance potential Arctic investments with other national security priorities.  We are beginning to think about and plan for how our Naval fleet and other capabilities and assets will need to adapt to the evolving shifts and requirements in the region.

Fifth, we will continue to comply with our existing agreements with allies and partners, while also pursuing new avenues of cooperation, as we work all of us together to meet shared security challenges.  By taking advantage of multilateral training opportunities with partners in the region, we will enhance our cold-weather operational experience, and strengthen our military-to-military ties with other Arctic nations.  This includes Russia, with whom the United States and Canada share common interests in the Arctic, creating the opportunity to pursue practical cooperation between our militaries and our nations and promote greater transparency.

Sixth, we will be prepared to help respond to man-made and natural disasters in the region.  Our support will extend not only to civil authorities in Alaska and around its coast, but also to cooperation with allies and partners through humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations.

Seventh, we will work with other agencies and nations, as well as Alaska Natives, to protect the environmental integrity of the Arctic.  DoD will use existing capabilities to help address safety-related challenges, including international search-and-rescue missions as well as incident and disaster response.  We will work closely with our Canadian partners on emergency response operations that help save lives.

And eighth, we will support the development of the Arctic Council and other international institutions that promote regional cooperation and the rule of law.  DoD will work with the Department of State as we participate in new initiatives like the Arctic Security Forces Roundtable and the recent meetings of the Northern Chiefs of Defense.  These engagements will help strengthen multilateral security cooperation throughout the region, this will ultimately help reduce the risk of conflict.

All of these approaches are informed by DoD’s global responsibilities and strategic interests, budget limitations, and shifts in both the Arctic environment and the geostrategic landscape.

DoD’s Arctic Strategy is a long-term endeavor – and our efforts to implement it will unfold over years and decades, not days and months.  Even as we grapple at home with near-term challenges, including steep, deep, and abrupt defense budget reductions and continued budget uncertainty, this kind of long-range thinking is vital for our future.  Like always, it requires that we closely align our resources and long-term investments with our national security objectives.  As shifts occur in the strategic landscape, the United States and its allies must be prepared to adjust their defense institutions and capabilities to meet these new challenges.

The effects of climate change and new energy resources are far-reaching and unpredictable … demanding our attention and strategic thinking.  While the opening of the Arctic will create unprecedented challenges, it will also create historic opportunities.  It could open up new avenues for commerce and establish new areas for cooperation between nations in the interests of all the people of the world.   But this won’t happen on its own.

We must wisely manage these 21st century possibilities.  In order to realize the full potential of the Arctic, nations must collaborate and build trust and confidence through transparency, cooperation, and engagement.

It is the responsibility of every Arctic nation – and all nations who have interests there – to work together to build a peaceful and secure region.

Throughout human history, mankind has raced to discover the next frontier.  And time after time, discovery was swiftly followed by conflict.  We cannot erase this history.  But we can assure that history does not repeat itself in the Arctic.

We remember the words of explorer Frederick Cook.  After many attempts to discover the North Pole – and after believing he had found it – he wrote: “It occurred to me … that, after all, the only work worthwhile, the only value of a human being’s efforts, lie in deeds whereby humanity benefits.”

That is why we look to the Arctic – this new frontier – to help make a better world for all mankind.

Thank you.


Russian Military moves to Arctic bases

The Kremlin has formed a strategic military command to protect its interests in the Arctic. It’s part of a broader push from Moscow to establish military superiority at the top of the world. (Severny Flot- Obedinyonnoye Strategicheskoye Komandovaniye, SF-OSK)

The command comprises the Northern Fleet, Arctic warfare brigades, air force and air defense units as well as additional administrative structures.

The Russian Air Force re-opened the Temp airfield on the Kotelny Island, in October 2013  the first in a chain of similar bases all along the northern coast of Russia. The military has initiated deployment of aerospace defense units in the Arctic and construction of an early warning missile radar in Russia’s extreme north

A December 2013 order from Russian President Vladimir Putin to ramp up Russia’s military presence in the Arctic. Putin said Russia was returning to the Arctic and “intensifying the development of this promising region” and that Russia needs to “have all the levers for the protection of its security and national interests. “The new command will comprise the Northern Fleet, Arctic warfare brigades, air force and air defense units as well as additional administrative structures,” the source in Russia’s General Staff said.

The military structure, dubbed the Northern Fleet-Unified Strategic Command, (Северная Объединенная флотом Стратегическая Команда,) is responsible for protecting Russia’s Arctic shipping and fishing, oil and gas fields on the Arctic shelf, and the country’s national borders in the north, the source said. Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the military to boost its presence in the Arctic and complete the development of military infrastructure in the region with all urgent rapidity.

The Russian military has deployed aerospace defense units in the Arctic and construction of an early warning missile radar in Russia’s extreme north, according to the commander of the Aerospace Defense Forces.

.Arctic territories are believed to hold vast untapped reserves of oil and gas. They have increasingly been at the center of disputes between the United States, Russia, Canada, Norway and Denmark as rising temperatures lead to a reduction in sea ice and make energy reserves more accessible. Russia has made claims to several Arctic shelf areas and plans to defend its bid at the United Nations.

As Arctic ice has melted, companies from Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the United States — the five countries that have a border with the Arctic — have been rushing to secure rights to drill for oil and natural gas in places that are now accessible.

Under international law, no country currently owns the North Pole or the region of the Arctic Ocean surrounding it. The five surrounding Arctic countries, the Russian Federation, the United States (via Alaska), Canada, Norway and Denmark (via Greenland), are limited to an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of 200 nautical miles (370 km; 230 mi) adjacent to their coasts. The waters beyond the territorial waters of the coastal states are considered the “high seas” (i.e. international waters). The sea bottom beyond the exclusive economic zones and confirmed extended continental shelf claims are considered to be the “heritage of all mankind” and administered by the UN International Seabed Authority.

Upon ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), a country has a ten-year period to make claims to an extended continental shelf which, if validated, gives it exclusive rights to resources on or below the seabed of that extended shelf area. Norway (ratified the convention in 1996), Russia (ratified in 1997), Canada (ratified in 2003) and Denmark (ratified in 2004) launched projects to provide a basis for seabed claims on extended continental shelves beyond their exclusive economic zones. The United States has signed, but not yet ratified the UNCLOS.

The status of certain portions of the Arctic sea region is in dispute for various reasons. Canada, Denmark, Norway, the Russian Federation and the United States all regard parts of the Arctic seas as “national waters” (territorial waters out to 12 nautical miles (22 km)) or “internal waters”. There also are disputes regarding what passages constitute “international seaways” and rights to passage along them .

As defined by the UNCLOS, states have ten years from the date of ratification to make claims to an extended continental shelf. On this basis the five states fronting the Arctic Ocean – Canada, Denmark, Norway, the Russian Federation, and the U.S. – must make any desired claims by 2013, 2014, 2006, and 2007 respectively. Since the U.S. has yet to ratify the UNCLOS, the date for its submission is undetermined at this time.

Claims to extended continental shelves, if deemed valid, give the claimant state exclusive rights to the sea bottom and resources below the bottom. Valid extended continental shelf claims do not and cannot extend a state’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) since the EEZ is determined solely by drawing a 200-nautical-mile (370 km) line using territorial sea baselines as their starting point. This point is made because press reports often confuse the facts and assert that extended continental shelf claims expand a state’s EEZ thereby giving a state exclusive rights to not only sea bottom and below resources but also to those in the water column. The Arctic chart prepared by Durham University clearly illustrates the extent of the uncontested Exclusive Economic Zones of the five states bordering the Arctic Ocean and also the relatively small expanse of remaining “high seas” or totally international waters at the very North of the planet.

Russia ratified the UNCLOS in 1997 and had through 2007 to make a claim to an extended continental shelf.

The Russian Federation claims a large extended continental shelf as far as the North Pole based on the Lomonosov Ridge within their Arctic sector. Moscow believes the eastern Lomonosov Ridge is an extension of the Siberian continental shelf. The Russian claim does not cross the Russia-US Arctic sector demarcation line, nor does it extend into the Arctic sector of any other Arctic coastal state. Russia also considers its exclusive control over the Northern Sea Route connecting Asia and Europe to be a “core national interest.” The U.S., among others, considers the NSR to be an international shipping lane.

On December 20, 2001, Russia made an official submission into the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (article 76, paragraph 8). In the document it is proposed to establish the outer limits of the continental shelf of Russia beyond the 200-nautical-mile (370 km) Exclusive Economic Zone, but within the Russian Arctic sector. The territory claimed by Russia in the submission is a large portion of the Arctic within its sector, extending to but not beyond the geographic North Pole. One of the arguments was a statement that Lomonosov Ridge, an underwater mountain ridge passing near the Pole, and Mendeleev Ridge on the Russian side of the Pole are extensions of the Eurasian continent. In 2002 the UN Commission neither rejected nor accepted the Russian proposal, recommending additional research.

On August 2, 2007, a Russian expedition called Arktika 2007, composed of six explorers led by Artur Chilingarov, employing MIR submersibles, for the first time in history descended to the seabed at the North Pole. There they planted the Russian flag and took water and soil samples for analysis, continuing a mission to provide additional evidence related to the Russian claim to the mineral riches of the Arctic.[24] This was part of the ongoing 2007 Russian North Pole expedition within the program of the 2007–2008 International Polar Year.

The expedition aimed to establish that the eastern section of seabed passing close to the Pole, known as the Lomonosov Ridge, is in fact an extension of Russia’s landmass. The expedition came as several countries are trying to extend their rights over sections of the Arctic Ocean floor. Both Norway and Denmark are carrying out surveys to this end. Vladimir Putin made a speech on a nuclear icebreaker on May 3, 2007, urging greater efforts to secure Russia’s “strategic, economic, scientific and defense interests” in the Arctic.

In mid-September 2007, Russia’s Natural Resources Ministry issued a statement:

“ Preliminary results of an analysis of the earth crust model examined by the Arktika 2007 expedition, obtained on September 20, have confirmed that the crust structure of the Lomonosov Ridge corresponds to the world analogues of the continental crust, and it is therefore part of the Russian Federation’s adjacent continental shelf. ”

Viktor Posyolov, an official with Russia’s Agency for Management of Mineral Resources:

“With a high degree of likelihood, Russia will be able to increase its continental shelf by 1.2 million square kilometers [460,000 square miles] with potential hydrocarbon reserves of not less than 9,000 to 10,000 billion tonnes of conventional fuel beyond the 200-mile (320 km) [322 kilometer] economic zone in the Arctic Ocean ”

As of October 2013, the United States had not ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and, therefore, has not been eligible to file an official claim to an extended continental shelf with the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf.

In August 2007, an American Coast Guard icebreaker, the USCGC Healy, headed to the Arctic Ocean to map the sea floor off Alaska. Larry Mayer, director of the Center for Coastal and Ocean Mapping at the University of New Hampshire, stated the trip had been planned for months, having nothing to do with the Russians planting their flag. The purpose of the mapping work aboard the Healy is to determine the extent of the continental shelf north of Alaska.

The Arctic holds some 30 percent of the world’s natural gas supply, and 13 percent of the world’s oil. Royal Dutch Shell, the U.S.-based Arctic Oil & Gas Corp. and others. have made urgent representations to Washington about the necessity of their securing Arctic drilling areas and requesting a specific statement from the American government concerning area which would be under American control.

Each of the five nations with Arctic borders is allotted 200 nautical miles of land from their most northern coast.

The Canadian claim also asserts that it owns the Lomonosov Ridge, an underwater mountain range located between Ellesmere Island, Canada’s most northern border, and Russia’s east Siberian coast. In 2007, Russian scientists planted a flag on the ridge to claim it as Russian territory.

Russia created the Northern Fleet-Unified Strategic Command to protect oil and gas fields on the Arctic shelf. Unfortunately for American companies, the Pentagon has fallen behind, having only two of the icebreakers necessary to navigate Arctic waters. According to the Congressional Research Service, Russia has 25, with six powered by nuclear energy.

As Arctic ice receded and the region became strategically important, the American DOD shifted its attention back north. It released a new Arctic strategy outlining American interests in the region.

The new strategy calls for the Pentagon to take actions to ensure that American troops could repel an attack against the homeland from a foe based in the Arctic.

The Pentagon believes the Arctic is becoming contested territory, and the DOD would act to protect American interests.


Russia launches new nuclear-powered icebreaker in bid to open up Arctic

Russia is overhauling ports as it readies for more traffic via Northern Sea Route due to warmer climate cycles

May 26, 2019


Russia launched a nuclear-powered icebreaker on Saturday, part of an ambitious programme to renew and expand its fleet of the vessels in order to improve its ability to tap the Arctic’s commercial potential.

The ship, dubbed the Ural and which was floated out from a dockyard in St Petersburg, is one of a trio that when completed will be the largest and most powerful icebreakers in the world.

Russia is building new infrastructure and overhauling its ports as, amid warmer climate cycles, it readies for more traffic via what it calls the Northern Sea Route (NSR) which it envisages being navigable year-round.

The Ural is due to be handed over to Russia’s state-owned nuclear energy corporation Rosatom in 2022 after the two other icebreakers in the same series, Arktika (Arctic) and Sibir (Siberia), enter service

The Ural together with its sisters are central to our strategic project of opening the NSR to all-year activity,” Alexey Likhachev, Rosatom’s chief executive, was quoted saying.

President Vladimir Putin said in April Russia was stepping up construction of icebreakers with the aim of significantly boosting freight traffic along its Arctic coast.

The drive is part of a push to strengthen Moscow’s hand in the High North as it vies for dominance with traditional rivals Canada, the US and Norway, as well as newcomer China.

By 2035, Putin said Russia’s Arctic fleet would operate at least 13 heavy-duty icebreakers, nine of which would be powered by nuclear reactors.

The Arctic holds oil and gas reserves equivalent to 412 billion barrels of oil, about 22% of the world’s undiscovered oil and gas, the US Geological Survey estimates.

Moscow hopes the route which runs from Murmansk to the Bering Strait near Alaska could take off as it cuts sea transport times from Asia to Europe.

Designed to be crewed by 75 people, the Ural will be able to slice through ice up to three metres thick.


Stationing of US troops in Northern Canada

Canadian Prime Minister, Stephen Harper 2006-2015 a Canadian conservative, had tenetively approved the housing of American troops* on specific Canadian territory bordering on the Arctic. His replacement with Justin Trudeau in November of 2015 essentially negated this arraingement

*4th Infantry Brigade Combat Team (Airborne) (4th IBCT(A)) “Spartan” (under United States Army Alaska and located at Fort Richardson, Alaska)

US Army 4th Bde-25th ID Flash.png Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC)

US Army 1st Sq-40th Cav Reg Flash.png 1st Squadron, 40th Cavalry Regiment “Denali”

US Army 1st Bn-501st Inf Reg Flash.svg 1st Battalion (Airborne), 501st Infantry Regiment “1st Geronimo Battalion”

US Army 3rd Bn-509th Inf Reg Flash.png 3rd Battalion (Airborne), 509th Infantry Regiment “3rd Geronimo Battalion”

US Army 2nd Bn-377th Arty Reg Flash.png 2nd Battalion (Airborne), 377th Field Artillery Regiment (2-377th FAR) “Spartan Steel”

US Army 6th Bde Eng Bn Flash.png 6th Brigade Engineer Battalion (6th BEB) “Oak”

US Army 725th Bde Support Bn Flash.png 725th Brigade Support Battalion (725th BSB) “Centurion”


Encyclopedia of American Loons

Sarah Pope

A.k.a. The healthy home economist

Sarah Pope is a Weston-Price Foundation board member with training in economics and financial management, who offers dangerous health advice and insane conspiracy theories under the description “the healthy home economist”. Pope is an antivaxxer, and recommends that parents avoid all vaccines in favor of homeoprophylaxis and immune boosting diets (it is hard to exaggerate how stupid this is) and that they also avoid the newborn vitamin K shot. Moreover, she is on record telling parents to lie to their pediatricians about giving babies raw milk, since pediatricians have a tendency to be sensible and take a reality-based view on such things and may therefore not support the choice, which goes against Pope’s religious view of the benevolence of all things natural (where “natural” is somewhat nebulously defined to include e.g. raw milk).

She has also argued against anti-D immunoglobulin for the prevention of hemolytic disease of the fetus and newborn. The condition is caused by a mismatch in mother-fetal blood type, and the treatment is a safe medical therapy that has saved countless lives (Pope acknowledges a “small risk” – thousands and thousands of dead babies pale in comparison to what really matters for Pope, namely the spiritual purity of your bodily fluids). To make her case, Pope relies on fear-mongering and links to conspiracy websites like whale.to (oh yes, she does). There is a good discussion of her article on the issue and some rather strikingly basic errors here (including things like Pope’s claims that the “shot does work, but only if the immunoglobulin is administered within 72 hours of the trauma that caused the blood mixing in the first place” and “[t]he Rh antibodies from the RhoGam shot hang around in the mother’s bloodstream for up to 12 weeks following the shot” – choose whichever claim sounds scarier; yes, they blatantly contradict each other.) As you’d expect, Pope appeals to Big Pharma conspiracies to explain why doctors and science are wrong on issues like this, as well as outright lying (“anti-D is never given during pregnancy in Europe, only after delivery,” says Pope, since it seems to serve her argument if the claim had any basis in reality, which it doesn’t). Instead of the evils of science and reality, Pope recommends being natural and use semi-randomly selected nutritional supplements to help “tone the uterus”. To ensure that she touches all bases, she aslo manages to end up blaming fluoride.

As an antivaxxer, Pope has promoted pretty much every antivaccine gambit, piece of misinformation and pseudoscience in the antivaccine playbook, including herd immunity denialism, claiming that vaccines cause autism, that vaccines don’t work, the idiotic aborted fetal tissue nonsense (in “How to Resist Pediatrician Pro Vaccination Tactics”; links in the foregoing will, as usual, take you to succinct explanations for why the claims are nonsense). Indeed, Pope is so much the image of a loony antivaxxer that she even got to serve as model antivaxxer for the Daily Show antivaxxer parody (she didn’t respond particularly intelligently to that. Pope has also for instance pushed the myth that vaccines still contain thimerosal, a “neurotoxin”. Thimerosal is not a neurotoxin, and was nevertheless removed from vaccines in 2001, despite being completely safe, due to antivaccine fearmongering trying to link it to autism. Of course, removing it from vaccines did not affect the rate of autism, since vaccines never caused autism; some among the crazier fringes of the anti-vaccine movement accordingly try to claim that everything is a conspiracy and that thimerosal is still present in the vaccine. Like Pope: “Studies performed by Health Advocacy in the Public Interest (HAPI) in 2004 found that despite vaccine manufacturers’ claims that thimerosal was no longer being used … All vaccine vials tested by HAPI that were labeled ‘mercury free’ did, in fact, contain this neurotoxin.” HAPI is an anti-vaccine group. Their study consisted of sending 4 samples of anti-D to Doctor’s Data, a crank lab famous for giving any crackpot sending anything there precisely the results they want to obtain. Pope also pushes the aluminum scare, of course.

And as for the fact that children die from vaccine preventable diseases? Well, her children didn’t, therefore vaccines are unnecessary.

Diagnosis: Yes, she does a good job as an unintentional parody of the antivaccine movement, but there is nothing funny about it. A truly terrible person. Whatever you do, do not take health advice from this person.



The CIA Confessions: The Crowley Conversations

July 9, 2019

by Dr. Peter Janney

On October 8th, 2000, Robert Trumbull Crowley, once a leader of the CIA’s Clandestine Operations Division, died in a Washington hospital of heart failure and the end effects of Alzheimer’s Disease. Before the late Assistant Director Crowley was cold, Joseph Trento, a writer of light-weight books on the CIA, descended on Crowley’s widow at her town house on Cathedral Hill Drive in Washington and hauled away over fifty boxes of Crowley’s CIA files.

Once Trento had his new find secure in his house in Front Royal, Virginia, he called a well-known Washington fix lawyer with the news of his success in securing what the CIA had always considered to be a potential major embarrassment.

Three months before, on July 20th of that year, retired Marine Corps colonel William R. Corson, and an associate of Crowley, died of emphysema and lung cancer at a hospital in Bethesda, Md.

After Corson’s death, Trento and the well-known Washington fix-lawyer went to Corson’s bank, got into his safe deposit box and removed a manuscript entitled ‘Zipper.’ This manuscript, which dealt with Crowley’s involvement in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, vanished into a CIA burn-bag and the matter was considered to be closed forever.

The small group of CIA officials gathered at Trento’s house to search through the Crowley papers, looking for documents that must not become public. A few were found but, to their consternation, a significant number of files Crowley was known to have had in his possession had simply vanished.

When published material concerning the CIA’s actions against Kennedy became public in 2002, it was discovered to the CIA’s horror, that the missing documents had been sent by an increasingly erratic Crowley to another person and these missing papers included devastating material on the CIA’s activities in South East Asia to include drug running, money laundering and the maintenance of the notorious ‘Regional Interrogation Centers’ in Viet Nam and, worse still, the Zipper files proving the CIA’s active organization of the assassination of President John Kennedy..

A massive, preemptive disinformation campaign was readied, using government-friendly bloggers, CIA-paid “historians” and others, in the event that anything from this file ever surfaced. The best-laid plans often go astray and in this case, one of the compliant historians, a former government librarian who fancied himself a serious writer, began to tell his friends about the CIA plan to kill Kennedy and eventually, word of this began to leak out into the outside world.

The originals had vanished and an extensive search was conducted by the FBI and CIA operatives but without success. Crowley’s survivors, his aged wife and son, were interviewed extensively by the FBI and instructed to minimize any discussion of highly damaging CIA files that Crowley had, illegally, removed from Langley when he retired. Crowley had been a close friend of James Jesus Angleton, the CIA’s notorious head of Counterintelligence. When Angleton was sacked by DCI William Colby in December of 1974, Crowley and Angleton conspired to secretly remove Angleton’s most sensitive secret files out of the agency. Crowley did the same thing right before his own retirement, secretly removing thousands of pages of classified information that covered his entire agency career.

Known as “The Crow” within the agency, Robert T. Crowley joined the CIA at its inception and spent his entire career in the Directorate of Plans, also know as the “Department of Dirty Tricks. ”

Crowley was one of the tallest man ever to work at the CIA. Born in 1924 and raised in Chicago, Crowley grew to six and a half feet when he entered the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in N.Y. as a cadet in 1943 in the class of 1946. He never graduated, having enlisted in the Army, serving in the Pacific during World War II. He retired from the Army Reserve in 1986 as a lieutenant colonel. According to a book he authored with his friend and colleague, William Corson, Crowley’s career included service in Military Intelligence and Naval Intelligence, before joining the CIA at its inception in 1947. His entire career at the agency was spent within the Directorate of Plans in covert operations. Before his retirement, Bob Crowley became assistant deputy director for operations, the second-in-command in the Clandestine Directorate of Operations.

Bob Crowley first contacted Gregory Douglas in 1993 when he found out from John Costello that Douglas was about to publish his first book on Heinrich Mueller, the former head of the Gestapo who had become a secret, long-time asset to the CIA. Crowley contacted Douglas and they began a series of long and often very informative telephone conversations that lasted for four years. In 1996, Crowley told Douglas that he believed him to be the person that should ultimately tell Crowley’s story but only after Crowley’s death. Douglas, for his part, became so entranced with some of the material that Crowley began to share with him that he secretly began to record their conversations, later transcribing them word for word, planning to incorporate some, or all, of the material in later publication.


Conversation No. 71

Date: Friday, February 28, 1997

Commenced:  9:50 AM CST

Concluded: 10:12  AM CST


RTC: Top of the morning to you, Gregory. How are you today?

GD: Functioning, Robert. And with you?

RTC: The usual. Listen, Gregory, I had a phone call yesterday from someone at the Agency about you. I am afraid I became annoyed with this creature and said harsh things to them.

GD: Anyone I know?

RTC: I doubt it. Aside from a few broken down academics, a blank face. Someone named Hayden Peake. Have you ever heard of him?

GD: No. Is he someone important?

RTC: No, except in his own mind. He’s one of our librarians. He whined to me that you were pure evil and I shouldn’t talk to you. He’s a friend of Critchfield who is frantically trying to shut off your comments about Mueller’s survival and, worse, work for us after the war. I don’t know whether Peake got put up to this by Jim or by Kimmel. Maybe both. At any rate, when he told me that he had proof that Mueller died in ’45, I told him he was fuller of shit than a Christmas turkey and that I knew personally, and could prove, that Mueller not only worked for the Swiss after the war but for Jim after ’48. I told him that I personally had met Mueller in the late ‘40s, here in D.C and that whatever his so-called proof consisted of he could shove it up his ass. For a denizen of P Street here, he might have enjoyed that exercise.

GD: P Street?

RTC: That’s a street much beloved by many of our leading lights here, Gregory. Leather bars, whipping salons, way-stations for muscular young servicemen wanting to make a few dollars on the side, or on their backs. You know what I mean. I asked Bill about this asshole and he did some checking and mentioned an establishment called the Fireplace. You know, the Company used to be an inspiring place to work when we got started. Hell, if the D.C. police ever raided the P Street places, half the senior people at Langley would be in custody, along, of course, with a number of top military people and not to mention certain key Congressmen. The other half of our new leadership would be in synagogues. Jews and fairies, Gregory. It’s sad. At any rate, I have had it up to here with these people.

GD: What does this Peake person do?

RTC: I said he was a librarian.

GD: Wolfe is a librarian.

RTC: A pair of scumbags, Gregory. Peake thinks he’s a great historical writer and Wolfe has dreams of glory as a fake PhD. And they all loathe and despise you. Why? Because, Gregory, you are a much better writer, and certainly a researcher, than either of them and for some unknown reason, they think their useless opinions impress me. I know you and they don’t. Kimmel is probably behind some of this and he does the same thing. You see, as I said once before, if the Jews get it into their slimy heads that the evil chief of the Gestapo worked for our CIA, they would leave shit all over the sidewalks in D.C. I know for a fact they are screeching, like the rest of the old faggots, to the Army to keep Mueller’s files closed from the likes of you. You see, you are not part of the game, Gregory. The game? They all run around in circles, bent over with their trousers down around their ankles and their noses stuck up the asshole of the one in front. A bunch of incompetent idiots. They can squeal like little pigs to each other but by God, I won’t have them squealing to me and I told Peake, and I will call up Tom with the same message which is to stop bothering me with their envy or I will be forced to take some action against them.

GD: A machinegun?

RTC: No, worse. I know enough about these whiners to destroy them and if they want some fun and games, they can just continue their feeble trashing attempts. And I am now determined to go through my files and send you a number of them. That way, if anything happens to me, you will have lots of ammunition for your gun.

GD: Oh, I doubt if they’ll shoot you.

RTC: Shoot me? No, I mean if God calls me. That’s what I mean. I am not as well as I could be, Gregory, and one day, I won’t be around. I would like to think you are provided for. I know why they are yammering at me and why odious little shits like Wolfe and bombastic frauds like Kimmel and pubcrawlers like old Peake keep whining at me. They know I am someone who knows too much and they are terrified that I am getting senile and am talking to you.

GD: Well, you’re talking to me but I doubt if you’re senile, Robert.

RTC: Well, thank you for the consideration but I am getting a little forgetful at times and it’s harder to get around these days. No, I’m not ga-ga yet but if I get any more calls from the rat brigade members, they’ll find out how senile I am. If I chose to do so, there would be bodies heaped up chest high on the Mall. Ah, well, Gregory, a bit of my Irish temper clears the air.

GD: I heard from someone that you were a terrifying person, Robert, but I never saw it.

RTC: You did once. That was when Bill wanted to get your son a job at the CIA to try to stop your publishing things they didn’t like. You remember that?

GD: Oh yes. You were not nasty to me, though.

RTC: I said terrible things to Bill and I thought he would cry when I was done. My God, all the weird stories floating around about you. Fifteen different names, robbing banks, selling nuns to Arabs, faking official documents on an old Remington, anti-Semitism, loving the Nazis and on and on. No, Jim is absolutely livid I put him in touch with you. Jim is a shit and I understand he wrote you compromising letters that he wants back. Is that true?

GD: Oh, yes, quite true. Ink-signed. In the original envelopes as well.

RTC: A word of advice here, Gregory. Put them in a very safe place. And not in a safe deposit box either. Our people can get into those with ease. No, some really safe place. Jim wants to lay his hands on these so bad he can taste them. They don’t know what to do with you, Gregory. They can’t con you because you are way smarter than they are and, to be honest, they are all dumb as posts.

GD: And how about Trento?

RTC: Oh, God, another one. They won’t attack you to your face because not only are they third class assholes but they are also cowards and you have a reputation for ferocity equaled only by a very hungry lion. No, they sneak around, like that turd from Justice that Kimmel got to yammer at me about you. I gave you his number just after he called me. You did call him back as I recall.

GD: Oh yes, I did. He was shocked that you gave me his number and I had a conversation with him.

RTC: Now you mustn’t threaten a Justice Department man, Gregory. What did you say to him?

GD: Only that I would credit him with the writing of some awful article. I say that to many people and since I have done this from time to time, they usually get the message.

RTC: The all remind me of a bunch of old women. Just like old aunties  chattering and gossiping about everyone else. Chatter, chatter and shit. People wear bullet proof vests on their backs here inside the Beltway because the standard game is to stab everyone in the back. Starting with your friends and moving outwards.

GD: And upwards?

RTC: I think the brass keeps some of these yammering turds around for the same reason that a whore keeps a pimp around. She wants someone she can look down on. Not like it used to be, Gregory. We were men then, not old gossiping queers. Oh yes, and bitter, treacherous old Jews like Wolfe and his friends. I don’t know what is worse, a treacherous and plotting Jew or a spiteful old queer. Ah well, let us go on to other things less annoying. How is the next Mueller book coming along? Did you get the file on Diem and his brother?

GD: I did. I don’t know where I can fit it in but perhaps a footnote on officially sanctioned assassinations.

RTC: And JFK has become a blessed saint in heaven. He ordered the Diems offed just like Nixon and Kissinger ordered Allende done in. Pious frauds, one and all. Now that’s what I mean by my being able to do terrible damage to them and their precious jobs. I was in the Army during the war and I would like to think that I and my friends were able to help this country, even if just a little but I found it was easier to cope with the professionals from the KGB rather than the rank amateurs we have now. Peake once wanted me to ghost write a paper on the KGB and I told him I would not. If I write something now, based on my experience and knowledge, I am not going to let some pseudo-academic try to take credit for it.

GD: Oh, the academic world is just the same. More backstabbing, gossip, innuendo and pure malice than you could imagine. And these academic papers are worthless for anything but to use as toilet paper. Bad, stilted writing and full of official lies which most of them write to impress their grandchildren and awed middle-class morons with. Robert, in my research, I have learned to totally discount any of these academic papers.

RTC: Oh yes, Peake told me breathlessly….

GD: Some sailor giving him a run for his money.

RTC: (Laughter) No, but I have been told that the great David Irving says you are a fraud. My God, what a compliment.

GD: Irving is the fraud and writes at a high school level. Historian? Gas bag. I had dealings with him once and I would never let something like that in my house other than to fix the plumbing. Or around my children, either. Peake actually used Irving as a prop?

RTC: The blind leading the blind. I’ve never read any of Irving’s material but they do tell me that he’s a lightweight.

GD: A legend in his own mind. It is said his ma was Jewish but I don’t think that’s been proven. Lower middle class oaf with delusions of grandeur and reference.

RTC: Ah, my, what a wonderful morning, full of the milk of human kindness.

GD: I think the milk has gone bad, Robert.

RTC: It’s too bad you weren’t around in the early days, I mean actually old enough to work for me. We would have gotten along wonderfully well. I would have had to warn you to be a little restrained in some areas but I think we could have worked well together.

GD: Well, I do respect you Robert, which is more than I can say for the rest of the zoo creatures I’ve encountered since I started tilting at D.C. shithouses. Oh and yes, do you know how many fairies you can get on a bar stool?

RTC: I assume this is a joke.

GD: Why of course, Robert, always the jester. If you turn it upside down, you can seat four comfortably.

RTC: (Prolonged laughter) Well, now I’m back in a good mood.

GD: Don’t pass this on to your callers. You might hurt their feelings.


(Concluded at 10:12 AM CST)









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