TBR News October 10, 2017

The Voice of the White House

Washington, D.C., October 10, 2017: High-precision gravimetry from satellites in low-noise flight has determined Greenland is losing more than 300 billion tons of ice per year, in accordance with loss estimates from ground measurement. The rate of ice loss is accelerating, having grown from 137 gigatons in 2002–2003.

Ice shelves float on the surface of the sea and, if they melt, to first order they do not change sea level.

If small glaciers and polar ice caps on the margins of Greenland and the Antarctic Peninsula melt, the projected rise in sea level will be around 0.5 m. Melting of the entire Greenland ice sheet would produce 7.2 m of sea-level rise, and total melting of the Antarctic ice sheet would produce 61.1 m of sea level rise. The collapse of the grounded interior reservoir of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet would raise sea level by 5–6 m.

Since 1992, a number of satellites have been recording the change in sea level; they display an acceleration in the rate of sea level change, but they have not been operating for long enough to work out whether this is a real signal, or just an artefact of short-term variation. It appears, however, that the melting of glaciers is an accelerating process and one that is not made a public issue. The reason for this is that such rising of the sea levels would totally disrupt the societal infrastructure in coastal areas, a disruption no government would wish to cope with. The watchword here is ‘Not on my watch, dude.’”

 

 

Table of Contents

• Russia threatens to brand U.S.-sponsored Radio Liberty ‘foreign agent’
• Deloitte hack hit server containing emails from across US government
• U.S.-Turkey tensions boil over after arrest of consulate employee
• Why the US Lost the Vietnam War
• The Forward Base Falcon Disaster

 

Russia threatens to brand U.S.-sponsored Radio Liberty ‘foreign agent’

October 9, 2017

Reuters

MOSCOW (Reuters) – U.S. government-sponsored Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) said on Monday Moscow had threatened to brand their Russian language service projects as “foreign agents” in retaliation for what Moscow calls U.S. pressure on a Kremlin-backed TV station.

Russian officials have accused Washington of putting unwarranted pressure on the U.S. operations of RT, a Kremlin-funded broadcaster accused by some in Washington of interfering in domestic U.S. politics, which it denies..

Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said on Sunday Moscow could apply “similar measures” to American journalists and media in Russia. She did not identify any specific U.S. media outlets that would be targeted.

Current Time, which is produced by RFE/RL in cooperation with the Voice of America and mainly targets audiences in Russia and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, said it had received a warning from the Russian Ministry of Justice, threatening to put restrictions on the network.

Two other RFE/RL Russian-language projects, Radio Liberty and Idel. Realias, received the same letters, it said.

“According to Russia’s competent bodies, your organization’s activity falls under the criteria set out in the federal law… for non-commercial organizations – foreign agents. Your organization’s activity may be restricted…,” said the letter, seen by Reuters.

A justice ministry official confirmed to Reuters that such a letter had been sent, adding: “The principle of reciprocity will further be applied depending on the measures applied to Russian media by the United States.”

Responding to the letter, the channel director of Current Time TV, Daisy Sindelar, said in a statement: “We are a journalistic organization, and we trust we will be able to continue our work.”

 

 

Deloitte hack hit server containing emails from across US government

Exclusive: Cyber-attack was far more widespread than firm admits, say sources, with data from as many as 350 clients in compromised system

October 10, 2017

by Nick Hopkins

The Guardian

The hack into the accountancy giant Deloitte compromised a server that contained the emails of an estimated 350 clients, including four US government departments, the United Nations and some of the world’s biggest multinationals, the Guardian has been told.

Sources with knowledge of the hack say the incident was potentially more widespread than Deloitte has been prepared to acknowledge and that the company cannot be 100% sure what was taken.

Deloitte said it believed the hack had only “impacted” six clients, and that it was confident it knew where the hackers had been. It said it believed the attack on its systems, which began a year ago, was now over.

However, sources who have spoken to the Guardian, on condition of anonymity, say the company red-flagged, and has been reviewing, a cache of emails and attachments that may have been compromised from a host of other entities.

The Guardian has established that a host of clients had material that was made vulnerable by the hack, including:

• The US departments of state, energy, homeland security and defence.
• The US Postal Service.
• The National Institutes of Health.
• “Fannie Mae” and “Freddie Mac”, the housing giants that fund and guarantee mortgages in the US.

Football’s world governing body, Fifa, had emails in the server that was breached, along with four global banks, three airlines, two multinational car manufacturers, energy giants and big pharmaceutical companies.

The Guardian has been given the names of more than 30 blue-chip businesses whose data was vulnerable to attack, with sources saying the list “is far from exhaustive”.

Deloitte did not deny any of these clients had information in the system that was the target of the hack, but it said none of the companies or government departments had been “impacted”. It said “the number of email messages targeted by the attacker was a small fraction of those stored on the platform”.

This assurance has been contested by sources that spoke to the Guardian. They said Deloitte’s public position belied concern within the company about exactly what had happened and why.

The Guardian first revealed the existence of the hack on 25 September.

Since then, the Guardian has been provided with further details of the attack, which seems to have started in autumn last year at a time Deloitte was migrating and updating its email from an in-house system to Microsoft’s cloud-based Office 365 service.

The work was being undertaken at Deloitte’s Hermitage office in Nashville, Tennessee.

The hackers got into the system using an administrator’s account that, theoretically, gave them access to the entire email database, which included Deloitte’s US staff and their correspondence with clients.

Deloitte realised it had a substantial problem in spring this year, when it retained the Washington-based law firm, Hogan Lovells, on “special assignment” to review and advise about what it called “a possible cybersecurity incident”.

In addition to emails, the Guardian understands the hackers had potential access to usernames, passwords, IP addresses, architectural diagrams for businesses and health information.

It is also thought that some emails had attachments with sensitive security and design details.

Deloitte has insisted its internal inquiry, codenamed Windham, found that only six clients had information that had been compromised. The review had also been able to establish “precisely what information was at risk”, the company said.

However, that analysis has been contested by informed sources that have spoken to the Guardian. They say the investigation has not been able to establish definitively when the hackers got in and where they went; nor can they be completely sure that the electronic trail they left is complete.

“The hackers had free rein in the network for a long time and nobody knows the amount of the data taken,” said one source.

“A large amount of data was extracted, not the small amount reported. The hacker accessed the entire email database.”

Another source added: “There is an ongoing effort to determine the damage. There is a team looking at records that have been tagged for further analysis. It is all deeply embarrassing.”

The Guardian has been told Deloitte did not at the time have multi-factor authentication as standard on the server that was breached. A cybersecurity specialist told the Guardian this was “astonishing”.

The expert said the migration to the new email system would have “utterly complicated the kind of forensic investigation required to see what had happened”.

“A hacker has got into Deloitte’s email system and been undetected for months, and only six clients have been compromised? That does not sound right. If the hackers had been in there that long, they would have covered their tracks.”

When the Guardian put all these points to Deloitte, it declined to answer specific questions, but a spokesman said: “We dispute in the strongest terms that Deloitte is ‘downplaying’ the breach. We take any attack on our systems very seriously.

“We are confident that we know what information was targeted and what the hacker actually did. Very few clients were impacted, although we want to stress that even when one client is impacted, that is one client too many.

“We have concluded that the attacker is no longer in Deloitte’s systems and haven’t seen any signs of any subsequent activities.

“Our review determined what the hacker actually did. The attacker accessed data from an email platform. The review of that platform is complete.”

In recent months, Deloitte has introduced multi-factor authentication and encryption software to try to stop further hacks.

Dmitri Sirota, co-founder and CEO of the cybersecurity firm BigID, warned that many companies had failed to use such methods because they were inconvenient and complex.

“Privileged accounts are like keys that unlock everything, from the castle to the treasury. They provide unfettered access to all systems, which is why they are so valuable.

“Organisations are monitoring databases, not the data in it. It’s hard to detect changes, prevent incidents or compare your data to notice breached information unless you have an inventory of what you have.”

 

 

U.S.-Turkey tensions boil over after arrest of consulate employee

October 9, 2017

by Karen DeYoung and Kareem Fahim

The Washington Post

When they met last month in New York, President Trump hailed what he called his “personal relationship” with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and said the United States and Turkey were “as close as we have ever been.”

Erdogan called Trump “my dear friend Donald.”

Close observers of Ankara and Washington would have been ­forgiven for rolling their eyes. For the past several years, the ties between them have repeatedly frayed to near the breaking point, only to be temporarily patched. On Sunday, they snapped.

Following the arrest last week of Metin Topuz, a Turkish employee of the U.S. Consulate in Istanbul, the United States announced that it was immediately suspending the issuance of non-immigrant visas in Turkey. Ankara quickly responded with identical restrictions, suddenly upending the plans of countless Turkish and American tourists, students, busi­ness­peo­ple and others who did not already possess the necessary travel documents.

While the Turkish government provided no information about the Topuz arrest, the Daily Sabah, a pro-government paper, said in a Monday editorial that he was accused of “facilitating the escape” from Turkey of “known Gulenists” — followers of a U.S.-based Turkish cleric, Fethullah Gulen, whom Turkey accuses of being behind a July 2016 coup attempt.

That report and others provoked John Bass, the outgoing U.S. ambassador to Turkey, to post a 4½ -minute video on the embassy site to “explain” the visa suspension decision. Topuz, who worked in an office coordinating with Turkish law enforcement and ­“ensuring the security of American and Turkish citizens,” was the second such U.S. diplomatic employee arrested this year, Bass said, raising questions “about whether the goal of some officials is to disrupt the long-standing ­cooperation between Turkey and the United States.”

Without guarantees of Turkey’s respect for “the principles of rule of law that all modern democracies follow,” he said, the United States could not be sure its facilities were safe. He expressed hope the suspension of new visas at U.S. facilities in Turkey would not last long but offered no prediction.

Turkish prosecutors also said Monday in a vaguely worded statement that they had summoned yet another consulate staffer to testify. The statement mentioned that the staffer’s wife and son had been detained on Gulen-related allegations but did not say what charges, if any, the staffer faced.

Other than Bass’s video, neither the State Department nor the White House made any comment Monday on the Turkey situation. Erdogan, traveling in Ukraine, called it “saddening.”

But the administration’s sharp action appeared to mark a turning point in what Soner Cagaptay, a Turkish American political scientist at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy Policy and author of a book on Erdogan, “The New Sultan,” called the long-standing idea “that the U.S. would cut some slack for Erdogan and look the other way” in the belief that its relationship with Turkey was bigger than the Turkish president.

The latest argument has exposed divides that began in the Obama administration and have become steadily deeper, despite Ankara’s initial optimism that Trump would be more to its liking.

President Barack Obama, Erdogan’s government had charged, was weak in executing their joint policy of supporting opposition forces fighting to oust Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and dragged his feet on Turkey’s request for Gulen’s extradition. Under Obama, Turkey believed, the United States was too supportive of Syrian Kurdish guerrillas fighting the Islamic State in that country.

“We have positive opinions of the new administration,” Prime Minister Binali Yildirim said in March, after Trump and Erdogan spoke by telephone during the U.S. president’s early weeks in office.

During the phone call, Trump was noncommittal when Erdogan warned the United States not to directly arm the Syrian Kurds, despite American military plans to use the fighters as its main ground force in a major offensive to clear the Islamic State from northern Syria, including the de facto militant capital of Raqqa. Turkey, Erdogan said, saw the Kurdish force as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, the separatist group in Turkey that both countries have designated as a terrorist organization.

By the time Erdogan visited Trump in Washington in May, the decision had already gone against him. There was talk that Turkey would retaliate by throwing U.S. forces out of its Incirlik Air Base, a central hub for U.S. attack aircraft operating against the Islamic State. Turkey, which had already sent forces into northern Syria to block Kurdish expansion close to its border, also threatened to block the U.S.-backed advance into Raqqa.

Neither of those things happened. But the relationship, already unraveling, was reaching a crisis point.

Turkish officials have also tried to win the release of Reza Zarrab, a Turkish Iranian gold trader facing U.S. charges of evading sanctions on Iran. Last month, U.S. federal prosecutors also indicted a former Turkish economy minister for allegedly conspiring with Zarrab.

Charges have also been brought in absentia against 15 Erdogan bodyguards who are accused of beating protesters outside the Turkish ambassador’s residence in Washington during the presidential visit in May.

Despite near-constant Turkish appeals, the administration has reported no progress in adjudicating its request to extradite Gulen, a permanent U.S. resident who lives in Pennsylvania. The Justice Department has not yet judged as sufficient evidence presented by Turkey describing a massive anti-government conspiracy. Since the attempted coup, tens of thousands of Gulen followers and ordinary critics of the government have been arrested.

That sweep has also ensnared a number of U.S. and European citizens, whose release Erdogan recently tied to progress on Gulen’s extradition.

In what was read in the United States as a gratuitous slap, Erdogan this month hosted Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro on an official visit, just as the Trump administration called for other countries to reduce their ties with Maduro’s repressive government. Erdogan has also tightened links with both Iran and Russia.

As relations between the NATO allies worsen, their long-standing military ties — vital to the U.S.-led effort to eliminate the Islamic State from the region — have come under threat.

About 2,700 U.S. troops and civilians are based in Turkey, mostly at Incirlik, the air base near the Syrian border. The base also houses dozens of tactical nuclear weapons, said Kingston Reif of the Washington-based Arms Control Association. While instability is unlikely to threaten the weapons’ safety, he said, further political pressure from Ankara could restrict the Pentagon’s ability to deploy the F-15 and F-16 fighters capable of delivering them.

Retired Adm. James Stavridis, who commanded NATO under Obama, described Incirlik as “beyond valuable” and urged that the United States “do everything we can to ensure we have a balanced, sensible and strategic relationship” with Turkey.

But Bulent Aliriza of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, described the U.S.-Turkey relationship as one “born out of the mutual needs of the Cold War.” For years, he said, “the two sides have been making ad hoc efforts” to preserve a relationship whose reason for being has disappeared.

Now, he said, the “chickens are coming home to roost,” and “it’s difficult to see how to get back on an even keel.”

Fahim reported from Istanbul. Carol Morello and Alex Horton in Washington contributed to this report.

 

Why the US Lost the Vietnam War

The U.S was not simply outfought.  It was out-thought.

October 9, 2017

by Robert Freeman

Common Dreams

For all of the self-satisfied voyeurism surrounding the Vietnam War, it’s hard to find a concrete idea about why the U.S. lost.  For more than a decade, the U.S. had declared that it would not let Vietnam fall to the communists.  Yet, Vietnam fell to the communists.  Why?

The absence of a clear explanation is not an accident.  None of the institutions that led the U.S. into the War or prosecuted the War want to be tarred with having lost the War.   They would rather its loss be left ambiguous, murky.  Or worse, blamed on others.

But in fact, there are very specific, concrete reasons why the U.S. lost the War.  If we are to ever reach a true peace about the War—and certainly, if we are to ever stop repeating its mistakes and continuing to lose newer wars—it is essential that we understand why the U.S. lost.

Failings occurred in state policy, intelligence, and, of course, the military.  The easiest thing to explain are the policy, or political factors.  In earlier pieces, here and here, these were dealt with these in depth.

Briefly summarizing, they began when, in 1946, Truman refused Ho Chi Minh’s request for help in evicting the French colonial occupiers.  He helped the French, instead.  This all but assured that the U.S. would never “win the hearts and minds” of the Vietnamese people.

The errors continued when, in 1955, Eisenhower set up a “South” Vietnam in order to evade the national elections that had been agreed to in settling the French defeat.  Eisenhower stated bluntly, “Our guys would have lost.”

Still more mistakes were to come.  Eisenhower foisted an alien ruler on his new country, a wealthy, Catholic, urban, mandarin from New Jersey, Ngo Diem.  The Vietnamese were poor, Buddhist, rural peasants.   Then, U.S. stood by as Diem took people’s land and gave it to his wealthy friends.  Ho Chi Minh took land from the French and distributed it to the people.

All of these moves only served to harden the Vietnamese people’s conviction that “South” Vietnam and its government were simply puppets for a different Western colonial occupier.  No such lackey regime could ever achieve political legitimacy.  And without political legitimacy, there could never be a long-term solution to the War.

Compounding the political failings were the failures of intelligence.  The most obvious of these was the confusion of nationalism with communism.  Vietnam was first and foremost a struggle for national independence.  The Vietnamese wanted the foriegn occupiers out of their country. The Americans should have understood this.  They had once fought a war of national independence to get the foreign occupiers out of their country.

But the U.S. was fixated on anti-communism and Ho was a communist.  The U.S. believed it had “lost” China in 1949.  It had only fought Korea to a draw in 1953.  Eisenhower ominously had the “dominoes” falling through Cambodia, Thailand, Burma, all the way to India.

By perceiving all events through anti-communist lenses, U.S. leaders were unable to modify their strategies and tactics to accommodate the demand for local self-determination.  The tragedy is that in 1961 the CIA repudiated the domino theory, but it was impossible to reverse the policy momentum that its simplistic imagery had spawned.

An equally important intelligence failing was the confusion of partisan with insurgency warfare.

The U.S. concept of the War was that it was “partisan”—that it was being fought by outside invaders from the North. In fact, from the beginning, the War was an “insurgency,” fought from within the South itself, against U.S. imposed regimes.  The insurgents were the Viet Cong.

This misunderstanding totally undermined U.S. efforts since the strategy needed to fight one war was completely different from the strategy needed to fight the other.  The more the political situation deteriorated in the South, the more the U.S. bombed the North. The greater the Viet Cong hold on the rural population in the South, the more the U.S. bombed the North.

This backfired because it drove the North to enter the war in the South precisely to expel the foreign occupiers who were using the South as the staging ground for bombing the North.  That was the beginning of the end.

It cannot go without being said that intelligence reports going to Washington were worse than useless.  They were profoundly damaging.  Everything from battle reports and field-level body counts to situation assessments and reviews of strategic progress were routinely lied about.

This made it impossible to devise appropriate strategies or even perform meaningful assessments of the War’s progress.  The reason lay in the incentive structure of the military.

Military officers were rewarded for successful performance of duties, not for failing performance. So, they had a built-in incentive to embellish their reports.  Low level lies were routinely rolled up into higher-level lies, all the way up the chain of command.

Also, loyalty within the officer corps ensured that contrary voices were forced out of the service.

So, the entire hierarchy of military reporting created false reports of progress. Once begun, it proved impossible to stop.  The “light at the end of the tunnel” never seemed to go out.

But it never came any closer, either.  The lying was so entrenched it was impossible to even discover until it was too late.  And when it was discovered the liars tried to impugn the truthtellers by questioning their patriotism.

If political and intelligence failings contributed to the U.S. defeat, military failures were central to it.  Vietnam was, after all, a war.

One of the most spectacular failures was the air war.  “Rolling Thunder” was the name given the U.S. campaign of bombing the North.  The idea was to interdict supplies from the North from reaching the insurgency in the South.  But interdiction failed.  The reasons are clear and were known at the time.

First, the level of economic development of the North was very low, meaning there were few concentrations of useful targets to bomb. Second, when the air campaign began, the North dispersed even these targets throughout the countryside to protect them from bombing. Third, targets that were damaged were quickly rebuilt. Bridges over rivers were sometimes rebuilt nightly.

Fourth, and most importantly—and this cycles back on the intelligence failing mentioned above—since the War was primarily an “insurgency war,” fought by Vietnamese from within the South itself, against the South’s own government, the vast majority of the War’s material requirements were provided locally.

In 1965, the CIA reported that 31% of the weapons captured from the Viet Cong were of American manufacture!  And at the height of the bombing in 1967, the CIA estimated that even if bombing intensity were doubled, it would still only interdict 20% of the supplies flowing south.

In other words, bombing would have had to be increased ten-fold to completely shut off supplies from the North. This was not politically, economically, or even militarily possible.  Thus, it was not even conceptually possible to defeat fighting in the South by bombing the North.  The military was unphased.

Air Force general Curtis LeMay famously quipped, “We should bomb them back into the Stone Age.”  And he tried.  The U.S. dropped three times more tons of bombs on Vietnam than were dropped by all sides on all theaters of all World War II combined.  Clearly, it didn’t work.

Finally, the fundamental U.S. military strategy in the War was fatally flawed.

From the beginning of the escalation, in 1965, the U.S. military chose a strategy of attrition. Attrition means progressively destroying the other side’s forces until they can no longer fight. For attrition to work, three conditions must apply.

First, you must be able to control the timing and terms of engagement. Otherwise, you cannot ensure progressive destruction of the enemy’s forces.  Second, the enemy’s losses must exceed his replacement rate. Otherwise, he can simply replace lost troops faster than they are being destroyed. And third, your own losses, while they may be far lower than those of the enemy, must still be tolerable within your own war-making context.

Amazingly, none of these conditions applied.  Even more amazing, even though they didn’t apply and the U.S. military knew at the time that they didn’t apply, the military never changed its fundamental strategy until it was too late.

In almost 90% of the cases, firefights were engaged at the timing and in locations chosen by the enemy. Intelligence estimates during the War indicated that some 200,000 North Vietnamese young men attained draft age every year, far higher than the rate at which they were being killed.  And that still didn’t consider Viet Cong recruiting in the south.

Finally, despite killing more than nine enemy soldiers for every American lost, the costs to the U.S. became unbearable. As more and more U.S. soldiers came home in body bags and as the lying and savagery of the War became known, the American public turned against the War and demanded it be stopped.

Against the U.S. strategy of attrition, the North Vietnamese pursued a strategy of “enervation” or protracted war. This meant tiring the enemy of his will to fight. It meant dragging out the War, harassing the enemy, avoiding serious engagement except where the likelihood of success was high, withdrawing before serious losses were sustained, and counting on the American public to tire of a seemingly endless but unwinnable war.

This is the strategy Vietnam had used to defeat the French. It worked equally well to defeat the Americans.

The U.S. had almost inconceivable superiority in firepower, mobility, communications, and depth of resources—the conventional assets that it assumed would ensure its victory.  Nixon famously groused to Kissinger that his massively escalated bombings were not working: “This fourth-rate country has got to have a breaking point.”

But the U.S. approach to the War—all parts of it, political, intelligence, and military—were deeply, fundamentally, irretrievably flawed.  It could not win the support of the local population.  It could not win on the ground.    And, after the Tet Offensive in early 1968 demolished the upbeat fiction in the U.S. that the War was being won, it could not even sustain the will of its own population to continue the War.

The U.S was not simply outfought.  It was out-thought.

The military, which was the lead actor in the War, is quick to blame others for its loss.  It was the liberal media that turned the people against the War.  It was the pampered protesters, the college students, who soured the country.  It was the arm-chair warriors in the Pentagon who tied the military’s hands behind its back.  And so on.  And on.  And on.  Anybody but itself.

These political, intelligence, and military reasons for the U.S. loss in Vietnam are not hard to identify.  They are made of the deadly combination of ignorance, deceit, and incompetence.  We simply need the clarity of intellect and the courage of will to name them.

But steeped as they are in the still more deadly elixir of arrogance, profiteering, and denial, they all but assure that the U.S. will continue to lose its major wars.  Iraq and Afghanistan stand as examples.  There’s no way to know when or how the losing ends, but until we come to grips with the lessons of Vietnam the suspicion must be that it won’t.  That is the true tragedy of Vietnam.

 

The Forward Base Falcon Disaster

October 10, 2017

by Christian Jürs

Late on the evening of October 10, 2006, Iraqi resistance groups lobbed mortar and rocket rounds into the immense ‘Forward Base Falcon,’ the largest American military base in Iraq, located 13 km south of the Green Zone in Baghdad. In addition to accurate mortar fire, Grad and Katyusha rockets were also used.

Falcon base was designed to house a large contingent of American troops, mostly drawn from the 4th Infantry Division, stationed at Fr. Bliss, Texas. At the time of the attack, there were approximately 3000 men inside the camp, which also was filled with ammunition supplies, fuel, tanks and vehicles.

Iraqi contractors had assisted in the construction of the camp, which occupied nearly a square mile and was surrounded with guard tower-studded high concrete walls, and it is now apparent that the Resistance movement had been given important targets from “sources familiar with the layout” of the base.

After the initial shelling, fuel and ammunition stores began to erupt with massive explosions that could be heard, and seen, miles away inside the Green Zone where U.S. military and diplomatic units were heavily guarded.

The explosions, all of them termed “immense” by BBC reporters, continued throughout the night.

In response, US aircraft indiscriminately rocketed and bombed various parts of the city, BBC and AFP correspondents reported, trying to knock out the launch sites of the rockets

The BBC’s Andrew North, in Baghdad, said the explosions started at about 2300 (2100 BST) and were becoming “ever more frequent” as the huge fires spread throughout the base, punctuated by tremendous explosions as more fuel and ammunition dumps ignited.

“Intelligence indicates that civilians aligned with a militia organization were responsible for last night’s mortar attack,” said Lieutenant Colonel Jonathan Withington, spokesman for the U.S. 4th Infantry Division.

An after action report, issued by the Department of Defense, stated that: “On October 10, 2006, at approximately 10:40 p.m., a 82mm mortar round, fired by militia forces from a residential area in Abu T-Shir, caused a fire at an Ammunition Supply Point (ASP) at FOB Falcon. The ASP, containing tank and artillery rounds, in addition to smaller caliber ammunition, set off a series of large explosions. About 100 troops from the 4th Infantry Division were reported to be stationed at the base at the time, but no injuries were reported.”  (Emphasis added.) “The damage to the area will not degrade the operational capability of MND-B (Multinational Division Baghdad),”

When the flames had been brought under control on the morning of the 11th of October, primarily because the entire camp had been gutted, nine large American military transports with prominent Red Cross markings were observed by members of the foreign media taking off, laded with the dead and the wounded.

Over 300 American troops, including U.S. Army and Marines, CIA agents and U.S. translators were casualties and there also were 165 seriously injured requiring major medical attention and 39 suffering lesser injuries  122 members of the Iraqi armed forces were killed and 90 seriously injured members of same, were also evacuated to the U.S. military hospital at al-Habbaniyah located some 70km west of Baghdad.

Satellite pictures and aerial photographs from neutral sources showed that Camp Falcon suffered major structural damage and almost all the U.S. military’s supply of small arms ammunition, artillery and rocket rounds, tons of fuel, six Apache helicopters, an uncounted but large number of soft-skinned vehicles such as Humvees and supply trucks were damaged or totally destroyed. Foreign press observers noted “an endless parade” of military vehicle recovery units dragging burnt-out heavy tanks and armored personnel carriers to another base outside Baghdad.

Many of the walls and towers of the camp were damaged or leveled as were many of  the barracks, maintenance depots, and there was considerable damage to the huge mess halls that could hold 3000 soldiers, the huge recreation center with its basketball courts and indoor swimming pools and all the administration buildings

Although official U.S. DoD statements indicated that there were no deaths; that only a hundred men were inside the base guarding billions of dollars of vital military equipment and that there were “only two minor injuries to personnel,” passes belief and certainly reality is more painful than propaganda.

Not only has the U.S. military machine lost much of its armor and transport, and its entire reserves of ammunition and special fuel, but the casualty list for only the first day is over 300..

Here is a transcription of that list who were evacuated to other hospital units:.

In re: Insurgent attacks on Forward Base Falcon on 10-11 October, 2006

Official Casualty List from U.S. military hospital at al-Habbaniyah located some 70km west of Baghdad. U.S. medical personnel at al-Habbaniyah initially stated that the US military hospital at the massive American-occupied air base there had begun to receive dead and wounded personnel. The military hospital in al-Habbaniyah,  the largest in occupied Iraq, was opened on 12 May this year in response to sharply rising (and redacted)  US casualties.

List compiled and effective as of  11 Oct 06 at 2300.

 

– A –

 

Pfc James R. Adams, 7th Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Captain Kenneth Adler, Army Reserve 346th Psychological Operations Company

Pfc Bobby Ray Albertson , Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile UnitTwo

1st Lt.Keith Allen, Army Reserve 346th Psychological Operations Company

Spc Cletus Anderson, 204th Support Battalion, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Lance Cpl John Martin Ansley, Marine Forces Reserve’s 2nd Battalion, 25th Marine Regiment

Spc Toby Anthony, National Guard’s 149th Brigade Combat Team

Pfc Gustavo Armijo, 57th Military Police Company, 8th Military Police Brigade

Pfc Michael Armstrong, 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division

Capt Steven Arnold, 67th Armor Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

James Arthur  Ash II, Central Intelligence Agency

Cpl Edward Atkinson, 47th Combat Support Hospital, 62nd Medical Brigade

 

– B –

 

Pfc Roy Bailey, National Guard’s 149th Brigade Combat Team

Spc John Baldwin, 47th Combat Support Hospital, 62nd Medical Brigade

Pfc Charles Barbe,  Army National Guard’s 1569th Transportation Company

Pfc Thomas Barnhart , 204th Support Battalion, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Pfc James Barry, 67th Armor Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Capt Robert Bell, 3rd Battalion, 16th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division

Spc William Bennett , Army Reserve 346th Psychological Operations Company

Pfc Saul Benson, 549th Military Police Company, 385th Military Police Battalion

Pfc Joseph Berge, 542nd Maintenance Company, 44th Corps Support Battalion

Pfc Joseph Berkeley , 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division

Capt Colmar Betts,  414th Civil Affairs

Zack Billings, Department of Defense

Edward Blair,, Civilian Contractor

1st Lt.Ronald Bort, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile UnitTwo

Pfc Bowen, James, 1st Battalion, 37th Field Artillery Regiment, 25th Infantry Division

Pfc Thomas R. Boyd, 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division

Spc Mel Brewer, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Master Sgt.Roger Brown , 204th Support Battalion, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Pfc Francis Byrne,  Army Reserve 346th Psychological Operations Company

 

– C –

 

Pfc Arthur Cahill, 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division

Pfc Fernando Calderon, 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division

Alex Callaghan, Civilian Contractor

Pfc Peter Campbell,  Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile UnitTwo

Cpl Douglas Carmody,  118th Military Police Company, 519th Military Police Battalion, 16th Military Police Brigade

Pfc Ashanti Carter, 67th Armor Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Pfc Henry Cartwright, Army National Guard’s 1569th Transportation Company

Pfc Ken Casey,  3rd Battalion, 16th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division

Pfc Russell Cavanaugh, 57th Military Police Company, 8th Military Police Brigade

Spc Raymond Chamberlain, 47th Combat Support Hospital, 62nd Medical Brigade

Pfc Einar Christiansen, 414th Civil Affairs

Spc Zack Christopher,  7th Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Pfc Eric Clark, 549th Military Police Company, 385th Military Police Battalion

Ronald Colby, Civilian Contractor

Pfc Marcus M. Cole, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Pfc Paul Collins, 1st Battalion, 37th Field Artillery Regiment, 25th Infantry Division

Pfc Rory Conner, Department of Defense

Pfc Roger Connolly, 1st Battalion, 37th Field Artillery Regiment, 25th Infantry Division

Major Michael Connors,  414th Civil Affairs

Steven Cooke, Department of Defense

Spc Matthew Cooper,  Army National Guard’s 35th Special Troops Battalion

Edward C. Courtney, Central Intelligence Agency

Capt Jimmy Lee Craig,  Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile UnitTwo

Spc Samuel Cramer, Army National Guard’s 1569th Transportation Company

Pfc Micah Creighton,  Army Reserve 346th Psychological Operations Company

Spc Leonard Cunningham,  3rd Battalion, 16th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division

Cpl Paul E. Curtis, Army National Guard’s 1569th Transportation Company

 

– D –

 

Pfc Sebastian Daly, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division

1st Lt.Benjamin Davis, 57th Military Police Company, 8th Military Police Brigade

Raymond Day, Civilian Contractor

Pfc Justin Delaney, 4th Support Battalion, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Pfc Christopher Dixon , Marine Forces Reserve’s 2nd Battalion, 25th Marine Regiment

Cpl Paul Doherty, 414th Civil Affairs

Pfc Nicholas Dolan, 67th Armor Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Pfc Lawrence Donahue, 1st Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division

Pfc Randall Douglas, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry Regiment, 4th Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Carl Dowd , Civilian Contractor

Master Sgt.Phillip Doyle, 542nd Maintenance Company, 44th Corps Support Battalion

Pfc Edmund Drake, 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division

Spc Charles Duval, 2nd Battalion, 27th Infantry, 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division

 

– E –

 

Spc Brandon East , Army National Guard’s 35th Special Troops Battalion

Pfc Jeremy Edwards, 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division

Spc Shane Elkins, 549th Military Police Company, 385th Military Police Battalion

Edgar Elliott , Central Intelligence Agency

Pfc Ronald Ellis, 4th Support Battalion, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

2nd Lt.Paul H. Etheridge, 4th Battalion, 42nd Field Artillery Regiment, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Sgt Kenny Evans, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

 

– F –

 

Cpl Thomas Fairchild, Army Reserve 346th Psychological Operations Company

Pfc Ben Farrell, 2nd Battalion, 8th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Pfc Robert Feeney,  1st Battalion, 12th Infantry Regiment, 4th Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Cpl Angus Ferguson, 3rd Battalion, 16th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division

Lance Cpl Eetaban Fernandez, Marine Forces Reserve’s 2nd Battalion, 25th Marine Regiment

Spc Bradford Fields , , Army National Guard’s 1569th Transportation Company

Pfc Raymond, Finlay, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Major Eduard Fischer, 414th Civil Affairs

Pfc Kirk Fitzgerald, 2nd Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)

Arnold Flynn, Civilian Contractor

1st Lt.Gene Ford, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile UnitTwo

Pfc Scott Fort, 3rd Battalion, 67th Armor Regiment, 4th Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Capt Shelby Foster, 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division

Pfc Jon Franklin, Army National Guard’s 35th Special Troops Battalion

Spc Harold Frederickson, 47th Combat Support Hospital, 62nd Medical Brigade

Pfc Lawrence Frost, 204th Support Battalion, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

 

– G –

 

Pfc Michael Gaines, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Spc Christopher Gallagher,  National Guard’s 149th Brigade Combat Team

Pfc Rogelio R. Garza, 1st Battalion, 37th Field Artillery Regiment, 25th Infantry Division

Pfc Daniel Gardner, 4th Support Battalion, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Pfc Brad Garrison , Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile UnitTwo

Lance Cpl Kirk Geary, 2nd Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, 2nd Marine Division, II Marine Expeditionary Force

Pfc Randy Geohegan, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Spc Adam Gibson, 1st Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Master Sgt.Richard M. Gilligan, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Pfc Paolo Giovinazzo,  4th Battalion, 42nd Field Artillery Regiment, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Pfc Jeffery Givens, 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division

Cpl Mario Gold, 542nd Maintenance Company, 44th Corps Support Battalion

2nd Lt.Pedro Gomez, 4th Support Battalion, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Pfc Michael Gordon , 4th Battalion, 42nd Field Artillery Regiment, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Spc Gabriel Govia, 2nd Battalion, 8th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Thomas Grady,  Department of Defense

Pfc Kevin Graham, 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division

Pfc Paul Gray, 3rd Battalion, 16th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division

Pfc Samuel Green, Marine Forces Reserve’s 2nd Battalion, 25th Marine Regiment

Pfc Lloyd Griffith, 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division

Cpl Andrew Gustafson, Army Reserve 346th Psychological Operations Company

 

– H –

 

1st Lt. Seth Hall, , Marine Forces Reserve’s 2nd Battalion, 25th Marine Regiment

Pfc Tobias Hancock,  1st Battalion, 12th Infantry Regiment, 4th Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Pfc James Hansen, 4th Battalion, 42nd Field Artillery Regiment, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Sgt Stuart Harding , 3rd Battalion, 67th Armor Regiment, 4th Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Spc Randy Hardy, Army National Guard’s 35th Special Troops Battalion

Pfc Ronald Harris, 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division

Pfc Keith O. Harvey, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

1st Lt.Karl Hawkins, 414th Civil Affairs

Sgt. 1st Class Samuell Hayden, 67th Armor Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Cpl Randi Hays, 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division

Pfc Ben Henderson, 47th Combat Support Hospital, 62nd Medical Brigade

Pfc Kyle Henry, 1st Battalion, 37th Field Artillery Regiment, 25th Infantry Division

Spc Danid D.Herron, 2nd Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)

Capt Kenneth Hilliard, 1st Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Pfc John Hodge, 3rd Battalion, 67th Armor Regiment, 4th Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

2nd Lt.Lee Hoffman, 4th Support Battalion, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Master Sgt.David Hoke, 1st Battalion, 37th Field Artillery Regiment, 25th Infantry Division

Pfc Ted Holmes, 7th Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Kenny Howard, 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division

 

– I-

 

Keith Ingraham, 2nd Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)

Pfc Daniel Innis, 204th Support Battalion, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Cpl Shane Irving, 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division

 

– J –

 

Pfc Tarrnish Jackson, Army National Guard’s 1569th Transportation Company

Spc Lewellen Jacobs, 67th Armor Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Cpl Timothy Jasper, 67th Armor Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

1st Lt.Larry Jenkins, 414th Civil Affairs

2nd Lt.Phiillip Johnson, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile UnitTwo

Pfc Brian Johnstone, Army Reserve 346th Psychological Operations Company

Pfc Todd Jones, Army National Guard’s 1569th Transportation Company

Pfc Brendan Joscelyn, 1st Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

2nd Lt.Cpl Allan Jose, 57th Military Police Company, 8th Military Police Brigade

Pfc Thomas Joyce, 2nd Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)

Spc Benno Juarez, 3rd Battalion, 16th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division

 

– K-

 

1st Lt.Eric Kaufman, 7th Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Pfc Charles Kavanaugh , Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile UnitTwo

Cpl Jon Keats,  67th Armor Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Pfc Eric Keefe, 1st Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Spc Tony Keeler, 118th Military Police Company, 519th Military Police Battalion, 16th Military Police Brigade

Pfc Chester Keenan, 542nd Maintenance Company, 44th Corps Support Battalion

Pfc Frank Kennedy, 3rd Battalion, 67th Armor Regiment, 4th Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Pfc Jon Kent, 4th Support Battalion, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Sgt Jordan Kessler, 7th Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Capt Mark King , 4th Battalion, 42nd Field Artillery Regiment, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Pfc Neil Kirk, Army National Guard’s 35th Special Troops Battalion

Spc Jeff Klein, 1st Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Spc Alan Knoll, 57th Military Police Company, 8th Military Police Brigade

.Pfc Adam Koehler, 3rd Battalion, 16th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division

Capt Osmond Kray, Army National Guard’s 1569th Transportation Company

2nd Lt.Gary Krueger, 1st Battalion, 37th Field Artillery Regiment, 25th Infantry Division

 

– L –

 

Tracey LaFaver , Civilian Contractor

Lance Cpl Roger Lafferty,  Marine Forces Reserve’s 2nd Battalion, 25th Marine Regiment

Pfc Junior Lambert, 1st Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Spc Shawn Lane, 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division

Cpl Charles T. Langholz, 4th Battalion, 42nd Field Artillery Regiment, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Pfc Jimmy Bob Larkin, National Guard’s 149th Brigade Combat Team

Pfc Eric Larsen, 542nd Maintenance Company, 44th Corps Support Battalion

Sgt. 1st Class Robert Law, Army National Guard’s 35th Special Troops Battalion

Spc Andrew Richard, 3rd Battalion, 16th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division

Pfc Ricardo LeGallo, 4th Support Battalion, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

2nd Lt.William S. Leonard,  2nd Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, 2nd Marine Division, II Marine Expeditionary Force

Pfc Marshal Lindsley,  Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile UnitTwo

Master Sgt.Tommy Lee Lipton, 4th Support Battalion, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Pfc George Long, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry Regiment, 4th Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Pfc Jimmy Longtree, 542nd Maintenance Company, 44th Corps Support Battalion

1st Lt. Jasper Loomis, Army National Guard’s 35th Special Troops Battalion

Pfc Carstairs Lowe, 2nd Battalion, 8th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Spc Robert M. Lynch, Army Reserve 346th Psychological Operations Company

 

– M –

 

Pfc Paul McKinnon , 3rd Battalion, 16th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division

Pfc Keith MacVane, 67th Armor Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Cpl Gunnar Magnusson, Army National Guard’s 35th Special Troops Battalion

Capt.Martin Mahoney, 67th Armor Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Pfc Enzo Marini, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Rostan Markovic, Central Intelligence Agency

Spc John M. Marshall, Army National Guard’s 1569th Transportation Company

Pfc Michael Martin, 1st Battalion, 37th Field Artillery Regiment, 25th Infantry Division

Pfc Scott Marvin, 2nd Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)

Pfc Leroy Mason, 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division

Spc Greg Mathews, 3rd Battalion, 67th Armor Regiment, 4th Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Pfc Duncan Maxwell, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Pfc Brian Mayer, 47th Combat Support Hospital, 62nd Medical Brigade

Arthur Mazzocco, Department of Defense

1st Lt.Joseph McAllister, 3rd Battalion, 16th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division

Master Sgt. Daniel McBride, . 2nd Battalion, 8th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Pfc William McClellan, 2nd Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, 2nd Marine Division, II Marine Expeditionary Force

Spc Lou McConnell, Army National Guard’s 35th Special Troops Battalion

Sgt. 1st Class Albert McGinnis,. 3rd Battalion, 16th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division

Master Sgt.David McRae, 1st Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Matthew Medigovich, Central Intelligence Agency

Pfc Vincent Mendoza, 2nd Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)

Cpl Richard Milich, 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division

Pfc Ben Miller, 47th Combat Support Hospital, 62nd Medical Brigade

Cpl Robert Mitchell, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Pfc Terrence Mogen, 118th Military Police Company, 519th Military Police Battalion, 16th Military Police Brigade

Pfc Ted Montague, 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division

Pfc Yates Montecino, 67th Armor Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Pfc Esteban Morales, 542nd Maintenance Company, 44th Corps Support Battalion

Pfc Darrell Morgan, Central Intelligence Agency

Jeffery Morrison, Civilian Contractor

 

– N –

 

1st Lt.Noble Natsios, 67th Armor Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Pfc Carlos Naverez, Army National Guard’s 1569th Transportation Company

Sgt. 1st Class Edward Nelson , 1st Battalion, 37th Field Artillery Regiment, 25th Infantry Division

Cpl Donald Newcomb, 67th Armor Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Roger Newell, Civilian Contractor

Pfc Dorin Nicholson, 3rd Battalion, 16th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division

Pfc Bart Nolan, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Pfc Nelson Norton, 3rd Battalion, 67th Armor Regiment, 4th Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Pfc Wally Novak, Army National Guard’s 35th Special Troops Battalion

 

– O –

 

1st Lt.Chris O’Brien , 3rd Battalion, 16th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division

Pfc Stephen O’Connor, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Raymond O’Rourke, Civilian Contractor

 

– P –

 

Spc James W. Page,  4th Support Battalion, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Cpl Russell Palumbo, 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division

Pfc Nicholas Pappas, 67th Armor Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Pfc Troy Parker, 3rd Battalion, 16th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division

Thomas Parrish, Civilian Contractor

Pfc Mark Patten, 47th Combat Support Hospital, 62nd Medical Brigade

George Paul, Civilian Contractor

Lance Cpl Wallace Peabody,  2nd Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalion, 2nd Marine Division, II Marine Expeditionary     Force

Pfc Dale Peake, 3rd Battalion, 67th Armor Regiment, 4th Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Spc Reed Perry, Army National Guard’s 1569th Transportation Company

Pfc Samuel Petersen, 67th Armor Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Pfc Roger Platt, 3rd Battalion, 16th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division

1st Lt.Thomas Poole, 57th Military Police Company, 8th Military Police Brigade

Pfc William Porter, 118th Military Police Company, 519th Military Police Battalion, 16th Military Police Brigade

Sgt Daniel Powell, 1st Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Spc Todd Price, Army National Guard’s 35th Special Troops Battalion

Cpl Kevin Prisley, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Pfc Peter Purvis, 3rd Battalion, 16th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division

 

– Q –

 

2nd Lt.Quesada, Gonzalo, 542nd Maintenance Company, 44th Corps Support Battalion

Pfc Liam Quinn, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

 

– R –

 

Pfc Chad Railey, 3rd Battalion, 16th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division

Spc Ignacio Ramirez,  Army National Guard’s 35th Special Troops Battalion

Pfc Arthur Ramsen, Army Reserve 346th Psychological Operations Company

Benjamin Raymond, Civilian Contractor

Spc Todd Reckford, 204th Support Battalion, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Pfc Aaron Reynolds, 57th Military Police Company, 8th Military Police Brigade

Pfc Timothy Richard, 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division

1st Lt. Paul Richardson, 1st Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Pfc Robert Riley, 67th Armor Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Pfc Shawn Roberts, Army National Guard’s 35th Special Troops Battalion

Cpl Kirk Robinson, National Guard’s 149th Brigade Combat Team

Sgt. 1st Class James P. Rodgers, 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division

Master Sgt. Chad Romer, 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division

Pfc Martin Ross, 118th Military Police Company, 519th Military Police Battalion, 16th Military Police Brigade

Pfc Robert Rowan, 204th Support Battalion, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

2nd Lt.Seth Ryan, 3rd Battalion, 16th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division

 

– S –

 

Spc Ricardo Sagan, 118th Military Police Company, 519th Military Police Battalion, 16th Military Police Brigade

Pfc Hector Salazar, 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division

Cpl Ed Sampson, 3rd Battalion, 67th Armor Regiment, 4th Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

1st Lt Walter San Fellipo, 1st Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Bruce Sartiano,, 67th Armor Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Cpl Raymond Schmitz, Army National Guard’s 1569th Transportation Company

2nd Lt.Ernest Sherman , 57th Military Police Company, 8th Military Police Brigade

Pfc Mario Sims, 7th Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Spc Joshua Smith, 4th Support Battalion, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Pfc Andrew Snow, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile UnitTwo

Gerald Sorenson, Department of Defense

Lincoln Stadermann, Translator

Master Sgt.Michael Stephenson, 7th Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Pfc Carl Stone,, 542nd Maintenance Company, 44th Corps Support Battalion

Capt.Harold Sullivan, 3rd Battalion, 67th Armor Regiment, 4th Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

1st Lt. Lawrence Swenson, 1st Battalion, 37th Field Artillery Regiment, 25th Infantry Division

 

– T –

 

Cpl Augustus Tanner, 542nd Maintenance Company, 44th Corps Support Battalion

Pfc Reginald Tate, 67th Armor Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Spc Duane Taylor, 118th Military Police Company, 519th Military Police Battalion, 16th Military Police Brigade

Sgt. 1st Class Curtis Thomas, 4th Battalion, 42nd Field Artillery Regiment, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Pfc Stuart Thompsen, 57th Military Police Company, 8th Military Police Brigade

Spc Larry Thomson, 1st Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Capt David Towers, Army National Guard’s 35th Special Troops Battalion

Pfc Dean Townsend, 3rd Battalion, 16th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division

2nd Lt.James Tracy, Army Reserve 346th Psychological Operations Company

Pfc Paul Tucker, 1st Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Spc Daniel Tyson, 3rd Battalion, 16th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division

 

– U –

 

Pfc Romillo Ugarte, 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division

Cpl Austin Unger, 3rd Battalion, 16th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division

 

– V –

Spc Ramon Valadez,  1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division

Cpl Hector Velazquez,  Army National Guard’s 35th Special Troops Battalion

Spc WalterVincent, 1st Squadron, 17th Cavalry Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division

2nd Lt.ThomasVoelker, 204th Support Battalion, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

 

– W –

 

Spc Carl Wade, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Sgt. 1st Class Kevin Walker, 1st Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Pfc Ronald Walsh,, 3rd Battalion, 67th Armor Regiment, 4th Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Cpl Jack Ward, 2nd Battalion, 502nd Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)

Cpl Sean Weber, 1st Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division

Pfc Steven Webster, Army National Guard’s 35th Special Troops Battalion

Spc Paul Welch, 3rd Battalion, 16th Field Artillery Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division

Capt.Gene Westin, 1st Battalion, 37th Field Artillery Regiment, 25th Infantry Division

Master Sgt.Richard Wheeler, 542nd Maintenance Company, 44th Corps Support Battalion

Pfc Lawrence White, 67th Armor Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Pfc Andrew Willams, 7th Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Sgt. 1st Class Mario Williamson, Army National Guard’s 1569th Transportation Company

Russell Wilson, Translator

Michael Wisniewski, Civilian Employee

Cpl Chris Womack, 67th Armor Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Spc Burton Wood, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile UnitTwo

 

– Y –

 

Cpl Fernando Yates, 1st Battalion, 325th Airborne Infantry Regiment, 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 82nd Airborne Division

Istvan Yatsevitch, Civilian Contractor

Cpl John York,  4th Battalion, 42nd Field Artillery Regiment, 1st Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Pfc Peter Young, 1st Battalion, 67th Armored Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

 

– Z –

 

Pfc Mario Zammarella, 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Cpl Jose Zamora, 1st Battalion, 12th Infantry Regiment, 4th Brigade, 4th Infantry Division

Spc Reuben Zamora, 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division

Pfc Arno Ziegler, 542nd Maintenance Company, 44th Corps Support Battalion

1st Lt.Charles L. Zimmerman, 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry Regiment, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division

 

Forward Operating Base Falcon.

Over 114 American troops, including U.S. Army and Marines, three USAF personnel, two CIA agents, 14 U.S. translators were killed outright or died immediately afterwards en route to hospital or in hospital and 165 seriously injured requiring major medical attention and 39 suffering lesser injuries  122 members of the Iraqi armed forces were killed and 90 seriously injured members of same, were also evacuated to the U.S. military hospital at al-Habbaniyah located some 70km west of Baghdad.