TBR News September 3, 2017

Sep 03 2017

The Voice of the White House

Washington, D.C., September 3, 2017:”If the reports of a North Korean atomic weapon are not propaganda, then Trump has little choice than to make every effort to neutralize the obviously lunatic North Koreans. This country has committed acts of violence or threatened them for years. They have attack South Korean shipping, kidnapped their citizens, openly boast of having the South Korean capitol the potential target of heavy artillery and now are threatening everyone with long range rocketry and atomic weapons. This puts one in mind of the actions of the Serbians against Austria in 1914. That government connived at the assassination of the Archduke in Sarajevo and then wailed with anguish when the Austrians declared war on them. Of course this led to the involvement of others and the First World War began. Negotiation is always a better choice than warfare bit negotiation requires both sides of a issue to cooperate.”

 

Table of Contents

  • Possible two-stage hydrogen bomb seen ‘game changer’ for North Korea
  • North Korea: From war to nuclear weapons
  • Trump: N. Korea hostile and dangerous to US, talk of appeasement won’t work
  • The Unlikely Jihadi
  • MS-13: The rise of a deadly gang in US suburbia
  • The CIA’s Nazi Friends
  • In the Beginning

 Possible two-stage hydrogen bomb seen ‘game changer’ for North Korea

September 3, 2017

by Jack Kim and Ju-min Park

Reuters

SEOUL (Reuters) – North Korea’s claim of a successful hydrogen bomb test marks a major step in the isolated country’s long-stated goal of developing a nuclear-tipped missile that puts the U.S. mainland within range, experts say.

North Korea conducted its sixth and most powerful nuclear test on Sunday, which it said was a successful detonation of an advanced hydrogen bomb, technically known as a two-stage thermonuclear device.

All of North Korea’s six nuclear tests including the one on Sunday have taken place at its underground testing site in Punggye-ri, deep in mountainous terrain, and it is hard to independently verify the claims.

But experts who studied the impact of the earthquake caused by the explosion – measured by the U.S. Geological Survey at magnitude 6.3 – said there was enough strong evidence to suggest the reclusive state has either developed a hydrogen bomb or was getting very close.

The detonation produced 10 times more power than the fifth nuclear test a year ago, South Korean and Japanese officials said. NORSAR, a Norwegian earthquake monitoring agency, estimated the yield at 120 kilotons, significantly above the 15 kiloton “Little Boy” bomb dropped on Hiroshima and the 20 kiloton “Fat Man” dropped on Nagasaki at the end of World War Two.

“That scale is to the level where anyone can say (it is) a hydrogen bomb test,” said Kune Y. Suh, a nuclear engineering professor at Seoul National University.

“North Korea has effectively established itself as a nuclear state. This is not just a game changer, it’s a game over,” Suh said.

Lassina Zerbo, executive secretary of nuclear test ban watchdog CTBTO, said: “The physics of the event that we’re talking about today seems to indicate a much larger event than the one from 2016 and before.”

North Korea claims its intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) tested twice in July can reach large parts of the mainland United States.

But experts say it likely achieved that potential range only by topping the test missile with a payload lighter than any nuclear warhead it is currently able to produce.

Pyongyang is also yet to prove that any warhead it places on a long range-missile can survive re-entry into the earth’s atmosphere after an intercontinental flight.

Developing a hydrogen bomb would be key to have a lighter warhead, because that would offer much greater explosive yield relative to size and weight.

“Getting this high of a yield would likely require thermonuclear material in the device,” said David Albright, a physicist and founder of the non-profit Institute for Science and International Security in Washington.

“It would show that their design, whatever the specific design, has achieved a yield that is capable of destroying modern cities.”

Albright, however, still questioned the North’s claim that it was a genuine two-stage thermonuclear device.

North Korea said in January 2016 that it tested a miniaturized hydrogen bomb. But outside experts said it was likely a “boosted” device, meaning an atomic bomb which uses some hydrogen isotopes to create bigger yield.

TWO-STAGE REACTION?

A hydrogen bomb usually uses a primary atomic bomb to trigger a secondary, much larger explosion.

Such a weapon, with the first stage based on nuclear fission – splitting atoms – and the second on nuclear fusion, produces much more power than traditional atomic bombs, or “pure fission” devices.

Hours before the latest test, North Korean state media published photographs of leader Kim Jong Un inspecting a peanut-shaped device that it said was a hydrogen bomb designed to be loaded on a new ICBM.

The elongated shape of the device shows a marked difference from pictures of the ball-shaped device North Korea released in March last year, and appears to indicate the appearance of a two-stage thermonuclear weapon, experts said.

“The bomb North Korea showed today, if you look at the shape, the front part looks like an atomic bomb which triggers nuclear fission and the back part, a second stage that generates nuclear fusion reactions,” said Chang Young-keun, a rocket science expert at the Korea Aerospace University.

Once nuclear fusion is started, fast neutrons are created which once again trigger nuclear fission of uranium inside the bomb.

“This means explosions can happen double and triple. And that’s why its power is great. Even if it’s the same size and weight,  if it’s a hydrogen bomb, its power can be tens or hundreds times bigger,” Chang said.

North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Institute said Sunday’s test verified the functioning of a hydrogen bomb, including the “fission to fusion power rate and all other physical specifications reflecting the qualitative level of a two-stage thermo-nuclear weapon,” according to the official KCNA news agency.

For the first time, North Korea also specifically mentioned the possibility of a electromagnetic pulse, or EMP, attack. Such a strike would involve detonating a bomb in the atmosphere, instead of firing a long-range missile at a major U.S. city.

Some U.S. policymakers and experts have raised concerns about such an attack, which could cause a massive power surge and deal a devastating blow to U.S. electric grid and critical infrastructure.

Additional reporting by Soyoung Kim and Jane Chung in Seoul, David Brunnstrom in Washington and Shadia Nasralla in Vienna; Editing by Soyoung Kim and Raju Gopalakrishnan

 North Korea: From war to nuclear weapons

Since 1948, North Korea has defied international norms to carve out its own place in the world. DW examines the country’s controversial history and development of a nuclear program.

September 3, 2017

by Lewis Sanders IV

DW

Founding a nation: 1945-1950

Following the end of World War II, the Soviet Union and the US agreed to split the Korean Peninsula along the 38th parallel. US forces remained in the southern half following the surrender of Japan, while Soviet forces occupied the northern half.

In response to the South’s declaration of statehood as the Republic of Korea, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in 1948 declared itself a state with Kim Sung Il, a popular guerrilla commander, as its Soviet-designated leader.

Kim was later established as the leader of the Workers’ Part of Korea, which consolidated power across the northern part of the peninsula. By 1949, statues of Kim were erected and people began calling him the “Great Leader.”

The Korean War: 1950-1953

In 1950, with the backing of communist China and the Soviet Union, North Korean forces invaded the South, culminating in the capture of Seoul. The US responded by leading a UN military operation that drove communist forces north towards the Chinese border. Chinese troops joined the battle and pushed the UN forces south again.

The country was roughly divided along the aforementioned US-Soviet agreement. An armistice was signed on July 27, 1953. Technically, the war continues to this day since no peace treaty has been signed.

Nuclear comrades: 1956-1962

In 1956, the Soviet Union offered North Korean nuclear scientists basic knowledge to begin developing their own nuclear program. Three years later, Moscow and Pyongyang signed a nuclear cooperation agreement.

North Korea’s Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Researched Center opened, becoming the communist nation’s premier nuclear facility. It reportedly produced the fissile material for the country’s first nuclear weapon.

Missile development: 1976-1993

By most accounts, Egypt provided North Korea with Scud-B type missiles between 1976 and 1981. In 1984, Pyongyang produced and tested a native version of the Scud-B called the Hwasong-5.

One year later, North Korea became a signatory of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, North Korea lost its primary source of security and economic support from its founding. That did not stop the communist nation from going forward in 1993 with the launch of the Hwasong-7, a medium-range ballistic missile.

Death of ‘almighty god’: 1994-2002

On July 8, 1994, North Korean leader Kim Il Sung died unexpectedly from a heart attack at the age of 82. His son, Kim Jong Il assumed power as supreme leader of North Korea shortly afterwards, marking a new era in its history

From 1994 to 1998, North Korea suffered a devastating famine and economic crisis known locally as the “Arduous March.” Between 240,000 and 4 million people are estimated to have died from starvation or hunger-related illness during this period.

North Korea pledged in 1999 to enact a moratorium on missile tests, and later pledged in 2002 to extend it beyond 2003.

‘Axis of evil’: 2002-2006

In 2002, US President George W. Bush included North Korea in his “axis of evil” speech, accusing the country of sponsoring terrorism and seeking weapons of mass destruction, alongside Iran and Iraq.

One year later, Pyongyang announced its withdrawal from the non-proliferation treaty, which prompted the “six-party talks” aimed at providing a diplomatic alternative to curbing North Korea’s nuclear program. The talks included representatives from North Korea, South Korea, the US, China, Japan and Russia.

Nuclear tests: 2006-2010

In 2006, North Korea conducted its first nuclear weapons test. However, weeks after the test, North Korea agreed to rejoin the “six-party talks” to discuss its nuclear program. Three years later, Pyongyang staged its second nuclear test, effectively shutting down the “six-party talks.”

A South Korean patrol boat sank unexpectedly in 2010 following an explosion in the ship’s hull, killing 46 people. An international investigation concluded that the South Korean vessel was sunk by a torpedo launched by a North Korean submarine.

Rising son: 2011-present

On December 17, 2011, Kim Jong Il died of a suspected heart attack, according to North Korean media. His youngest son, Kim Jong Un, assumed power as the supreme leader of the country.

Under his leadership, North Korea has witnessed significant progress in its nuclear and missile development program. Pyongyang conducted one nuclear test in 2013 and two in 2016, prompting major concerns from the international community. In July 2017, North Korea successfully launched a native intercontinental ballistic missile (ICMB) named Hwasong-14.

North Korea’s sixth nuclear test – the fourth to take place with Kim Jong Un as leader – was conducted on September 3, 2017. Pyongyang claimed that, on this occasion, it had successfully tested a thermonuclear weapon.

 

Trump: N. Korea hostile and dangerous to US, talk of appeasement won’t work

September 3, 2017

RT

US President has branded North Korea a ‘rogue nation and a threat’ after Pyongyang said it conducted its sixth nuclear device test. Donald Trump added that South Korea must understand by now that “talk of appeasement” with its neighbor “won’t work.”

In a series of tweets on Sunday, the American leader described North Korea’s words and actions as “very hostile and dangerous to the United States”.

He also criticized China for its role in resolving the North Korea crisis, saying that Beijing “is trying to help but with little success.”

Earlier, North Korea announced that it had conducted its sixth nuclear test. It also claimed that it has built a hydrogen bomb small enough to fit on an ICBM

After Pyongyang’s latest successful rocket tests, the Trump administration ramped up the hostile rhetoric, threatening to use force before North Korea can reach the point where it can pose a threat to America.

Pyongyang’s position is that it needs a viable nuclear deterrence to prevent an aggressive war by the US and its regional allies. North Korean conventional forces are vastly outnumbered and outgunned compared to those of the US and South Korea.

Amid the rising tension, Russia and China have been calling on both sides to tone down the hostility and offer concessions in order to pave the way for negotiating a solution. So far, neither Washington nor Pyongyang have agreed to do so. The US rejected the idea to suspend joint military drills with South Korea, which are perceived as a threat in the North, while Pyongyang said it will not suspend its nuclear and rocket development.

 

 

The Unlikely Jihadi

The FBI Pressured a Lonely Young Man Into a Bomb Plot. He Tried to Back Out. Now He’s Serving Life in Prison.

September 3 2017

by Trevor Aaronson

The Intercept

Harlem Suarez was an unlikely jihadi.

When he was born in Cuba, Suarez had blue skin. His fragile brain had been deprived of oxygen, a tragedy his family points to in explaining his lifelong social and intellectual challenges. As a child, Suarez also suffered several significant head injuries, including being struck by a brick and falling off motorcycles without a helmet on. His parents brought him to Key West, Florida, in 2004, when he was 12 years old. He struggled in the public education system and dropped out of high school. He then took odd jobs in Key West — stocking store shelves, cleaning up restaurants, working in kitchens. Even after more than a decade in the United States, he spoke English without confidence.

In 2015, seeing reports about the Islamic State on cable news, Suarez became intrigued by the terrorist group, he explained to an FBI informant. He was 23 years old at the time and still living in Key West. He was slender and fit, with tattoos covering his chest, stomach, and arms. He wore his brown hair cropped close to his scalp, and a goatee covered the bottom of his chin.

Suarez began to identify as Muslim and gave himself an Arabic name: Almlak Alaswd, which translates to “dark angel.” He said he wanted to be part of ISIS, but he knew little about the group or its rival organizations. He thought Osama bin Laden had founded ISIS, and he admitted to an FBI informant that he didn’t know what Hamas was or how the group was different from ISIS.

Suarez created a Facebook profile and began posting ISIS propaganda and videos. He seemed to be searching for ISIS members in his ignorant attempt to become one. Facebook had already taken down four of Suarez’s previous profiles for improper content; each time, Suarez just created a new one and continued to post ISIS material. His online activity attracted the FBI’s attention, and an agent in Miami asked a rookie informant named Mohammed Skaik to help determine if Suarez might be a threat.

A U.S. military officer in the inactive reserves, Skaik was born in the Middle East and moved to the U.S. at age 16. He was fluent in Arabic, his first language, and he spoke English with a flawless American accent. When the FBI recruited Skaik in late 2014, he was a research assistant at a Florida medical school, and he had ambitions to study to be a doctor. The FBI offered what was essentially a part-time gig posing online as a man sympathetic to and interested in ISIS.

Following FBI instructions, Skaik sent Suarez a Facebook friend request. “Hey, brother, can you add me, please?” Skaik wrote. “I have something extremely important to communicate to you.”

Suarez accepted the friend request. On his profile, Suarez said he lived in Miami. Skaik was just north in West Palm Beach, so not knowing that Suarez was actually in Key West, the informant assumed he and Suarez were practically neighbors.

“It’s good to see someone around here that lives nearby me,” Skaik wrote on Facebook. “A word of advice: I’ve been down your alley and got my accounts taken down numerous times. I would be very careful not to post things onto my account relating to my location. Just an advice from a brother to another. I hope to get to know you.”

Suarez replied by sending Skaik his cellphone number, and they began to exchange text messages. Suarez explained that he wasn’t in Miami but was instead “more down,” referring to the Florida Keys to the south.

“I have a car,” Skaik texted. “We can go to the mosque and train together.”

“I was trying to make timers bomb,” Suarez told him.

The message startled Skaik, he later told a jury. He didn’t anticipate that Suarez would so readily disclose his attempts to a build a bomb. Skaik sent a message to his FBI handler, and Suarez quickly became a priority. Within days, Skaik was making the four-hour drive to Key West. He and Suarez first met in the parking lot of Japanese steakhouse chain Benihana. Suarez drove up on a black and white Yamaha moped. He was wearing black sunglasses and a black, long-sleeve, button-down shirt. “How you doing?” Suarez said, greeting Skaik. Still seated on his moped, Suarez gave the informant a hug. “You really are driving a moped,” Skaik said with surprise.

He and Skaik walked to a wooded area near the Key West airport. Once they were in a secluded spot, Suarez opened his bag and showed off his equipment. He had two body armor vests. He had a handgun. “I show you one of these, brother,” he told Skaik, who secretly videotaped the encounter. “I’ve been getting ready, boy. This shit cost a lot of money.” He then pulled out an AR-15 assault rifle.

Suarez’s small arsenal seemed to confirm the FBI’s initial concerns. But there were also early indications that Suarez might have been more of an aimless big talker than a violent jihadi. He was not familiar with Dabiq, the ISIS magazine that had become essential reading for wannabe ISIS members, and he wasn’t watching ISIS propaganda videos on the dark web but instead on CNN. When the informant asked him how he communicated with people overseas, suggesting that encrypted methods would be most appropriate, Suarez was stumped and seemed to know nothing about encryption.

“Do you use, like, WhatsApp?” the FBI informant asked.

“Well, I use Facebook,” Suarez replied. “I was trying to use, um, how you call this thing — Tweeter?”

“Twitter,” Skaik corrected.

Suarez admitted that he didn’t have a plan of attack, and he also was under the impression that ISIS members had been flowing into the United States through the U.S.-Mexico border by the hundreds with the help of drug cartels. “We ain’t alone, you know?” he told Skaik with authority. “But it’s, it’s hard to find another of us, like — I don’t know why.”

Suarez’s research skills left a lot to be desired. He told the informant there wasn’t a mosque in Key West. (There was one, about 5 miles from his apartment.) And he seemed to know little about Islam. (“I heard that you cannot, you cannot, um, eat pork, right?” he asked Skaik.)

Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the FBI’s top priority has been to stop attacks in the U.S. before they occur. The bureau’s primary tool has been a policy of preemption, with undercover agents and informants looking for would-be terrorists before they have the opportunity to strike. Sting operations, in which agents or informants lead targets right up to the brink of a supposed attack and then arrest them, are the hallmarks of the FBI’s preemption policy. Since September 2001, nearly 300 people have been arrested and indicted following terrorism stings in which the FBI provided the means and opportunity necessary for the terrorist plot. A 2014 Human Rights Watch report found that many of these cases resulted in prosecutions against “individuals who perhaps would never have participated in a terrorist act on their own initiative.”

Following that report, as ISIS gained territory in the Middle East and began to distribute its propaganda widely over the internet and with a greater level of sophistication than Al Qaeda had exhibited, the FBI in 2015 refocused much of its counterterrorism resources inside the U.S. on ISIS — on so-called lone wolves who, inspired by ISIS propaganda, move forward with attacks on their own. FBI officials point to Omar Mateen, who killed 49 people at an Orlando nightclub in June 2016, as an example of a successful ISIS lone wolf. To date, 66 ISIS sympathizers have been arrested following FBI stings, some for plotting attacks like Mateen’s and others for conspiring to travel to Syria to join the ranks of ISIS proper.

Suarez presented a conundrum for the FBI. He said he wanted to join ISIS, even though his understanding of the group and its religion was rudimentary. He was actively looking for likeminded people, even though he admitted he wasn’t finding any. He had body armor vests, even though he didn’t have the armored plates that slip inside. He had weapons, including an assault rifle, even though he admitted he didn’t have much ammunition.

“What would you do in a situation like that?” said Peter Ahearn, a retired FBI special agent who headed the field office in Buffalo, New York. “Would you want to be the agent who let this guy go, and then you find out later that he killed people in some attack?”

It’s a valid question. But as the FBI aggressively investigated Suarez, the government’s case turned on its head, with Suarez quickly transforming from the potential hunter into the very real hunted.

Skaik introduced the young man to two undercover agents who played the parts of hardened ISIS members. One claimed to be military-trained; the other said he was a professional bomb maker. Suarez, who realized too late that he was playing with fire in exploring his naive curiosity about ISIS, tried to back out in passive ways, the FBI’s evidence showed. He didn’t return calls and was consistently hard to reach. When the FBI agents asked for money to build a bomb, Suarez claimed to be broke, though he would later say he had $4,000 in the bank. Instead of participating in a bomb plot on the Fourth of July holiday, as he’d discussed with undercover agents, Suarez dodged their calls and instead went out drinking in Key West.

But Suarez was worried about consequences. Skaik knew where Suarez and his parents lived, and Suarez had no reason to doubt these men were from the murderous group he’d been hearing about on cable news. He didn’t know how to get out of the situation he’d created. “I was worried about my parents’ life,” Suarez later told a jury. Suarez said he had concocted a plan to protect himself and his family. If these ISIS guys wanted him to plant a bomb, he’d take that bomb to an isolated beach and detonate it. No one would die; no one would get hurt. He’d fulfill his obligation and protect his family. But it didn’t work out that way.

Over a period of about two weeks, Suarez and Skaik spoke by phone a half-dozen times after meeting in person in Key West. Their rough plan was to film a video for ISIS, post it online, and then launch some sort of bomb attack on the Fourth of July. Skaik said he had an ISIS contact who could provide the bomb.

But while Suarez never outright rebuffed Skaik’s prodding to make a video and move forward with an attack, he was much more concerned about grinding out his day-to-day existence. “I’m kind of like getting stressed out because no job, and bills, bills, they’re still coming and coming,” Suarez told Skaik. Suarez was so hard up that he’d fenced his assault rifle, which he owned legally, to a pawnshop. Suarez was apologetic, because he and Skaik had discussed how he’d hold the AR assault rifle in the ISIS video they were to make. But the hiccup didn’t concern the FBI informant.

Audio: FBI surveillance tape

“Well, that’s OK,” Skaik said. “Then you can, I mean, you can … hold my rifle then. It’s not a big deal.”

In FBI stings, informants often develop close relationships with their targets, either as father figures or close friends. Suarez’s conversations with Skaik suggested the Key West man was lonely, heartbroken, and had few friends. He confided in Skaik that he and his girlfriend had recently broken up after he’d suggested that they have a threesome with her female friend. “She told me that she’s not like that kinda type of (sic) girl,” Suarez told him. He later heard that his ex-girlfriend was in another relationship. “I should not care, ’cause, you know, we wasn’t together, but like, you know, I really, like, love her, you know what I’m saying?”

Skaik responded by lavishing Suarez with praise. He told Suarez that he wanted to join ISIS and always figured he’d have to travel to Syria to do it. Until he’d met Suarez, he said, he’d never imagined he could be an ISIS member here in the United States.

“When I met you, I knew there was something about you,” Skaik told Suarez by phone. “You know, like, I knew that I don’t have to go overseas; I knew you were the real deal, you know, like, I was like, ‘This guy, he’s a leader, he’s a fantastic leader.’ I think you are, man.”

Suarez was similarly effusive about their bromance. “It’s not just me; it’s me and you, you know. We are the brain, and we’re gonna be the bosses, you know; it’s me and you together, you know. You know what I’m saying, like, I cannot do this without you either, you know?”

On May 23, 2015, Suarez and Skaik met at a Knights Inn hotel in Homestead, just south of Miami. Skaik brought the video camera. As they were setting up, Skaik asked Suarez what his latest thoughts were about their Fourth of July bombing plans. As usual, Suarez’s ideas were half-baked.

“So are we gonna do anything in Key West? Like on the Fourth of July? Is there a lot stuff that goes on over there?” Skaik asked.

“We cannot do — we must do it, like, around here. Homestead.”

“Homestead?” Skaik asked, surprised.

“Yeah, close in the, you know, middle, middle,” Suarez answered.

“Gotcha. What’s in Homestead?”

“I don’t know,” Suarez admitted.

For the video, Suarez dressed in all black and wore a ski mask that covered everything but his eyes. He also wore one of his body armor vests (he still didn’t have the armored plates) and a black and yellow scarf around his neck. Sitting on the floor of the hotel room, a white wall behind him, Suarez read from a rough script that he and Skaik had come up with over lunch at Burger King. Skaik aimed the video camera.

“All right, let’s, let’s try to do one without the paper,” Suarez said, referring to the script.

“OK,” Skaik said.

“Let’s see how, how it goes.”

Suarez then cleared his throat and Skaik began the countdown: “Three, two, one —”

“I call to all my brothers worldwide to come to USA soil,” Suarez said, beginning his monologue. “Brought your weapons, AK, grenades, bring all your tanks. Shit, hold on. Fuck.”

“OK, you wanna redo it?” Skaik asked.

“Yeah,” Suarez said.

Skaik started the countdown again: “Three, two, one —”

“I call to all my brothers in the worldwide,” Suarez said. “Stand up for our right, our Muslims’ right. Brought your AK and shoot everyone against us. This is the time to fight for the caliphate and create the entire worldwide caliphate.” Suarez paused. “Well?” he asked.

“Good. All right, we recorded this one,” Skaik said. “That’s perfect.”

The FBI had their jihadi video. Now agents needed a bomb plot.

On June 3, 2015, Skaik traveled again to Key West, this time with his supposed ISIS associate, an FBI agent who went by the name Sharif. A decorated soldier who had received the Bronze Star and Purple Heart for his service in Iraq, Sharif had been working undercover for the FBI for about three years. His real name has not been disclosed.

Skaik and Sharif picked up Suarez, and together they went to Denny’s for lunch. Suarez seemed perplexed by Sharif. A black man with an American accent who was not only Muslim, but a member of ISIS? It didn’t make sense to him.

“But wait, wait, wait, you’re American?” Suarez asked him.

“Yeah,” Sharif answered.

“Oh, for real?”

“Yeah.”

“Shit.”

Sharif provided his cover story: He was born in the United States, but his father taught him Arabic. He then moved overseas with his family and spent nearly two years in the Middle East before joining the U.S. Army, where he specialized in supplies and logistics.

Suarez and Sharif exchanged small talk. Suarez admitted that he didn’t speak “the Muslim language,” but that he understood what ISIS was standing for and he wanted to be part of the movement.

“I like you, brother,” Sharif told Suarez.

“Thank you,” Suarez replied.

“I told you he’s, uh, very, very smart guy, and, you know, and a great leader too,” Skaik said.

“Very smart, very smart,” Sharif followed.

Suarez insisted to Skaik and Sharif that he wanted to learn how to make bombs; he needed someone to teach him. But the FBI consistently steered him toward a plan in which they’d provide the bomb. “It’s like someone cooking, you know?” Skaik told him over lunch. “Like, I can tell you how to make that pasta, but when you make it, it tastes like shit!”

Even as they were directing Suarez, Skaik and Sharif spoke to him as if he were the leader. “Sheikh, I’m not trying to question your leadership,” Sharif said. Sharif told him that he had a contact who could build a bomb; Suarez just needed to kick in a little bit of money for the materials. “I mean realistically, how much money do you think you have to put toward this, to get them started on this?” Sharif asked him.

“Right now, I don’t have enough,” Suarez said.

“You don’t have, uh — I’m sorry, what’d you say?”

“I don’t have, like — I’m kinda short.”

Suarez explained that not only did he not have money, but he also didn’t have any of his guns. He’d pawned them for cash. Nevertheless, he seemed to be living in a wandering fantasy, constantly talking of different targets, from bombing a police cruiser to taking the bomb to a pool, despite having no clear means to launch any such attack. It appeared to frustrate the undercover FBI agent.

Audio: FBI surveillance tape

“Bro, brother, you, you said, like, cop car, you said open places, you said —” Sharif said, his voice terse.

“No, I know, I know, but uh —” Suarez replied, stumbling over his words.

“When I leave here, you tell me exactly what you want, what you want to do, when you want to do it, how many, how big, how little. I go talk to the brothers.”

Two days later, Skaik called Suarez. He said he saw Sharif at the mosque and his ISIS contact had agreed to make a bomb for Suarez. He also agreed to teach Suarez how to make a bomb after he’d planted the first one, Skaik explained, but he didn’t have many details. “I’m just a middleman,” Skaik said.

“What do you mean?” Suarez asked him. “You’re my partner.”

Skaik laughed uncomfortably.

“You’re my right hand,” Suarez added.

The FBI sting was moving along. But then, out of nowhere, Suarez dropped out of contact for 21 days. He didn’t return calls or respond to text messages.

Audio: FBI surveillance tape

On June 30, 2015, Suarez finally called Skaik. “I’ve been trying to get a hold of you, man,” Skaik told him. “Like, have you been getting my text messages at all?”

Suarez’s explanation for losing contact was convoluted. His phone’s screen had cracked. He was working a lot. But Skaik moved quickly to endear himself to the target again. “I just miss you,” the informant told Suarez. He explained that he’d stalled Sharif; everything was still fine to move forward. But if Suarez indeed wanted to move forward with the attack, he was showing little initiative. The Fourth of July holiday, when he had talked of planting a bomb, had come and gone. A week later, on July 11, 2015, Suarez called Skaik again and gave him a new phone number on which he could be reached. Sharif called him a couple of days after that and scolded him for being unresponsive.

Audio: FBI surveillance tape

“I went back to the brothers, and I spoke on your behalf, and then I don’t hear from you guys for over a month,” Sharif said. “Listen to me, brother, these guys that I speak to for you are serious guys.”

Suarez was in his bedroom, where a large, wooden four-poster bed was at the center. A Sony flat-screen television was on one wall, next to the door. Behind the door, visible when it was closed, hung an American flag. A toy helicopter rested on a tall dresser. Suarez’s collection of hats, their bills unbent, was on one of the walls. When Sharif called, Suarez’s mother was in the other room. He didn’t want her to hear, so he turned up the volume on the television, which also made it difficult for the undercover FBI agent to hear.

“Hey, turn the TV down some; it’s too loud,” Sharif told him.

“Hold on, hold on, hold on,” Suarez said, complying. “Go ahead.”

“These guys I spoke to for you are serious guys, all right?” Sharif explained. “If you and Mohammed, if you guys are not serious Islamic State brothers, then I don’t know why you guys are bothering me and playing games with me.”

Sharif gave Suarez an assignment. If he wanted to move forward, he needed to purchase a prepaid phone and be reachable at all times on that phone. Suarez did as he was told, but he only paid for a few minutes — barely enough time to hold conversations with Sharif and Skaik. But no matter. The FBI sent Skaik down to Key West again on July 19, 2015, and he delivered a new phone with more than enough minutes to remedy the FBI’s communication problems. In return, Suarez gave Skaik a backpack, nails, his old prepaid phone, and $100 — the items he was instructed to provide for the bomb.

“The video’s almost ready,” Skaik told Suarez. “Like, I put the music, I put the subtitles. It’s pretty fucking cool.”

Suarez would not see Skaik again for more than a year, when the informant arrived in U.S. District Court in Key West to testify against him. Skaik was paid $90,000 for his work with the FBI during this period.

Suarez received a phone call from his supposed bomb maker on July 24, 2015, but only after he’d failed to answer a number of calls from him. The bomb maker said his name was Omar, and he wasn’t happy about having to call so many times. “When I call you from this point on, I expect you to … pick up my phone call,” he said.

Unbeknownst to Suarez, Omar was an inspector with the U.S. Department of Justice. He was born in India, but he spoke perfect American English. His real name has not been revealed. Omar kept the conversation brief and maintained his authority throughout, at times barking orders at Suarez.

“I will be in Key West with your package ready to go for you in Key West on Monday between 10:30 and 11:00. I will call you when I’m —”

“But I’m, uh —” Suarez said, starting to interrupt but seeming to have no argument to make.

“Do not be late,” Omar said. “I’m gonna tell you again: do not be late. When I call you, make sure you are there on time. Do you understand?”

“Yes, yes,” Suarez replied.

Three days later, Omar drove to Key West. A hefty man who wore a blue and black patterned button-down shirt, Omar parked in the lot of an Italian restaurant next to Benihana, where Suarez had first met the FBI’s informant. Suarez hopped in the passenger seat of Omar’s car. Suarez was dressed in a gray hoodie and gray and purple hat. He had a red beach towel wrapped around his neck.

Omar handed Suarez the fake bomb. It was in the backpack Suarez had provided. The nails he’d given Skaik were attached to the side of the bomb. The cellphone he’d provided was wired to the bomb as the trigger mechanism. Omar showed him how to power on the bomb and then how to trigger it by calling the number.

“That’s it, brother,” Omar told him. “And then you just wanna turn it off right over here. Turn off that switch. There you go. Pretty simple, right? And power it all the way down. There you go. Do you have any questions?”

“No,” Suarez answered.

“How do you feel?” Omar asked.

“I’m feelin’ good.”

“Yeah?”

“Kinda exciting,” Suarez added.

As Suarez exited Omar’s car with the fake bomb wrapped inside his red beach towel, FBI agents arrested him. The U.S. Attorney’s Office in Miami charged Suarez with attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction. “There is no room for failure when it comes to investigating the potential use of a weapon of mass destruction,” FBI Special Agent in Charge George L. Piro said in a prepared statement announcing Suarez’s arrest.

The odds were stacked against Suarez from the start. The Justice Department has a perfect record of conviction in ISIS cases. Prosecutors offered Suarez a plea deal that would have resulted in a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison. Both Suarez and his lawyer, Richard F. Della Fera, were open to the plea deal, fearing that he might be sentenced to life in prison if convicted at trial.

A neuropsychologist who examined Suarez after his arrest found him to be naive, with a tendency to acquiesce to others. In Della Fera’s view, Suarez’s acquiescence made him easy prey for the forceful undercover FBI agents. But it also factored into his decision to plead out. In May 2016, Suarez’s mother called him in jail. He told his mother he believed it was impossible to win the case, but she steamrolled over his instinct to plead guilty, telling him not to think that way and instead to have faith in God. “Although he is in his mid-20s, defendant’s mother treats him like a child,” Della Fera wrote in a court filing.

At his trial, Suarez attempted to explain away his interactions with the FBI by describing how he wanted to learn more about ISIS, which he discovered by watching CNN, but did not know what to do when he found himself in too deep with Sharif and Omar. “I wanted to have a conversation so that I could learn how these people are, what these people think, and how these people act,” Suarez said.

He testified that, after not returning Skaik’s calls, he felt threatened by Sharif’s demands that he get a phone and be responsive. “In a very strong manner, and to me it was a very threatening manner because in my mind they were people from the — they were people from the Islamic group,” Suarez said.

“Could you describe for us why you agreed to meet with Omar on July 27?” Della Fera asked Suarez, referring to do the day he collected the fake bomb.

“I saw that I had no other choice but to keep on doing what they were telling me to do, since I had been trying for many times to get out of that circle, giving them excuses, but they would make me go back, and I had no other choice but to go to that place.”

The jury didn’t accept Suarez’s excuses and convicted him on February 1. U.S. District Court Judge Jose E. Martinez, a former prosecutor who was appointed to the bench by President George W. Bush, gave Suarez the maximum punishment: life in prison.

Suarez’s sentence is indicative of the increasingly harsh punishment ISIS defendants caught up in FBI stings are now facing in federal courts. While federal judges rarely gave life sentences to sting targets allegedly affiliated with Al Qaeda and other groups — the Fort Dix Five being a notable exception — Suarez is one of three ISIS defendants to receive a life sentence in the last year.

In each of the three ISIS cases, the other two being those of Munir Abdulkader and Justin Nojan Sullivan, the FBI provided the weapons in the supposed plots. Since Suarez was arrested after taking custody of the fake bomb, there’s no way of knowing with certainty what he would have done with it.

During Suarez’s testimony, Della Fera asked him what he planned to do with the bomb the FBI provided.

“The only thing that I thought was to take it to a place where there were no people and detonate it there,” Suarez answered.

“Did you have a place in mind where you might be able to accomplish that?”

“Big Coppitt,” Suarez said, referring to an island next to Key West.

“And is that a crowded area, or is that an isolated area?” Della Fera asked.

“Isolated.”

 

MS-13: The rise of a deadly gang in US suburbia

The last years have seen a surge in violence by the notorious MS-13 street gang in the US, especially in middle-class suburbs. But will President Trump’s plan to arrest, jail and deport its members stop the violence?

September 2, 2017

DW

At first glance, the towns of Montgomery County on the outskirts of Washington, DC seem like any other suburbs: rows of tidy-looking houses and the occasional strip mall, equipped with ample parking space.

But this seemingly harmless region experienced 18 gang-related deaths in the last two years, with further possible cases currently under investigation. A majority of them were committed by the notorious MS-13 gang.

Savagery as trademark

The gang is best known for its brutal tactics. In one of Montgomery County’s malls, a 16-year old ordered the killing of two teenagers, who were chased, stabbed and just barely managed to escape.

Last summer, an 18-year old was lured into a park in the county and stabbed 153 times by gang members. Another 18-year old was also stabbed and then stoned while he tried to crawl away from his assailants. He was found dead underneath a bridge.

This type of brutal violence by young members of MS-13 is not just the problem of DC’s suburbs: In Long Island, New York, the case of two teenage girls beaten to death with baseball bats by gang members caused national outrage, and similar cases have been reported nationwide.

On an official visit to Long Island in July, US President Donald Trump announced “to every gang member and criminal alien, we will find you, arrest you, we will jail you, and we will deport you.” But the reality of fighting the recent spread of gang violence is, as so often, more complicated than that.

Using brutality to gain influence

MS-13, also known as Mara Salvatrucha, is a street gang founded in the 1980s in Los Angeles by El Salvadorian undocumented immigrants. They spread to the East Coast in the 1990s, but are now active in 40 states in the US, as well as the “Northern Triangle” of Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador.

The recent rise in gang violence in the US is attributed to a crackdown on gangs by the El Salvadorian government. Their strategy of the “mano dura,” or “iron fist,” has led to a loss of revenue for MS-13 in the country – a tactic that Attorney General Jeff Sessions got to see first hand when he visited the country to discuss MS-13. To compensate that loss, the gang has ramped up activities in the US.

Montgomery County became a crucial part of that plan: “We were warned by federal authorities about directions specifically related to MS-13 from El Salvador to try to get the gangs to make more money and to increase their ranks,” says Montgomery County State’s Attorney John McCarthy.

Their brutality is part of their tactic to increase their standing and influence. “If I use a machete and hack your body up, it sends a message that permeates through those communites,” says Paul Liquorie, head of special investigations at the Montgomery County police.

Spread inside the immigrant communities

The police have made numerous arrests in connection to the recent homicides. But the more widespread and subversive gang activities are the ones that are harder to combat.

MS-13 mostly engages in extortion, human trafficking and drug dealing and was known to target illicit businesses such as underground restaurants, bars or brothels. But in recent years, the activities have expanded to target members of the immigrant community who own legal businesses.

Crimes like these are harder to fight against because the victims themselves are less likely to report to the police. “There is the fear of the gang and the reprisal of the gang and they are also skeptical of the law enforcement from their native countries in general,” says Liquorie. “And then there is the crackdown on illegal immigration by the current administration, which makes them less likely to come forward and to speak to authorities.”

Targeting ‘low-hanging fruit’

Arrests alone also don’t stop the growth of the gang. Although over a quarter of Montgomery County’s inmates are gang-affiliated, MS-13 continues to grow through new recruits. Gang members of MS-13 actively target children as young as 12, registering some of themselves in school solely for the purpose of recruitment or buying ice cream for the children of a whole neighborhood.

“We know that it is particularly impacting  unaccompanied children that are now in the school system,” says Abel Nunez of CARECEN, an organization helping Central American immigrants. Having often experienced trauma in their home countries – sometimes at the hands of gangs as well – and being more prone to living in difficult family environments, they are seen as “low-hanging fruit.”

“We have thousands of these kids in my community. Some stay, flourish and do wonderfully. Some fall off the radar,” says McCarthy. And gang members initially seem to offer these children what they desperately need: a sense of belonging.

If recruitment targets do not respond to this approach, MS-13 resorts to threatening the target’s family back in their home countries in Central America, where American authorities cannot intervene.

“The irony of that is also that many of the young people fled to the US with the hope of escaping the gangs,” McCarthy adds.

Deportation: Not the solution

As to the “deport” part of Trump’s strategy: “Deportation is a tactic, not a strategy,” says Liquorie. “We have seen time and time again people who have been deported returning back to the United States because they are already networked into the criminal element that is running the human smuggling routes.”

Instead, those on the ground agree that the most effective way is to try and offer alternative activities and safe spaces to those who are most vulnerable to recruitment. Montgomery’s recreational department arranges soccer and after-school study groups to keep at-risk children out of the reach of the gangs. The education system also emphasizes bringing those newcomers up to speed with extra classes to help them integrate faster into the surrounding community.

Outreach networks are also trying their best to work within the communities and connect with vulnerable teens. “Then, rather than looking to the gang to give you ice cream, you are looking to the street outreach officer, paired with a police officer, as a role model who are providing that treat,” says Liquorie.

But the core problem of improving the family environment to make the home a safe space away from gangs is the hardest to accomplish – and not one solved either by ice cream or by deportation.

Deportation: Not the solution

As to the “deport” part of Trump’s strategy: “Deportation is a tactic, not a strategy,” says Liquorie. “We have seen time and time again people who have been deported returning back to the United States because they are already networked into the criminal element that is running the human smuggling routes.”

Instead, those on the ground agree that the most effective way is to try and offer alternative activities and safe spaces to those who are most vulnerable to recruitment. Montgomery’s recreational department arranges soccer and after-school study groups to keep at-risk children out of the reach of the gangs. The education system also emphasizes bringing those newcomers up to speed with extra classes to help them integrate faster into the surrounding community.

Outreach networks are also trying their best to work within the communities and connect with vulnerable teens. “Then, rather than looking to the gang to give you ice cream, you are looking to the street outreach officer, paired with a police officer, as a role model who are providing that treat,” says Liquorie.

But the core problem of improving the family environment to make the home a safe space away from gangs is the hardest to accomplish – and not one solved either by ice cream or by deportation.

Deportation: Not the solution

As to the “deport” part of Trump’s strategy: “Deportation is a tactic, not a strategy,” says Liquorie. “We have seen time and time again people who have been deported returning back to the United States because they are already networked into the criminal element that is running the human smuggling routes.”

Instead, those on the ground agree that the most effective way is to try and offer alternative activities and safe spaces to those who are most vulnerable to recruitment. Montgomery’s recreational department arranges soccer and after-school study groups to keep at-risk children out of the reach of the gangs. The education system also emphasizes bringing those newcomers up to speed with extra classes to help them integrate faster into the surrounding community.

Outreach networks are also trying their best to work within the communities and connect with vulnerable teens. “Then, rather than looking to the gang to give you ice cream, you are looking to the street outreach officer, paired with a police officer, as a role model who are providing that treat,” says Liquorie.

But the core problem of improving the family environment to make the home a safe space away from gangs is the hardest to accomplish – and not one solved either by ice cream or by deportation.

The CIA’s Nazi Friends

September 1, 2017

by Christian Jürs

 

From a long list, once in the private files of Robert Trumbull Crowley, formerly deputy director of Clandestine Operations for the CIA, we have discovered a large number of prominent Nazis hired by the CIA from 1948 onwards. They were most often members of the Gehlen Org, a CIA German spy organization set up at Pullach in Bavaria, under the command of Colonel James Crtichfield. Gehlen was code-named “Rusty” and there is a thick Critchfield/Rusty file also at hand.

The first person on the list was former SS-Oberführer or Senior Colonel, Willi Krichbaum .Krichbaum was an associate of one Heinrich Müller, head of the Gestapo and a later CIA agent,  and later the Deputy Chief of the Gestapo. Krichbaum was in charge of the deportation of the Hungarian Jews in 1944—a deportation that took nearly 300,000 lives. Krichbaum is also the man who shot Raoul Wallenberg. The Geheime Feld Polizei or the Secret Field Police which Krichbaum had commanded was responsible for all manner of atrocities, including the killing of Soviet prisoners of war. Although Russia was not a member of the Geneva Convention, Germany was a signator and this Convention forbade the execution of prisoners of war. Krichbaum was Gehlen’s chief recruiter, mostly of former Gestapo and SD people.

Krichbaum continued to work for Gehlen, according to an interview with Colonel Critchfield, until at least 1956 when the West German government took over control of the group.

The second name on the list was SS-Standartenführer or Colonel Walter Rauff who had a most interesting career. In 1942, Walter Rauff was chief of the SD units attached to the AOK Afrika, Rommels’ Afrikakorps. In 1943, after the collapse of the DAK, Rauff worked in Italy as the chief of the SD in Milan. In this capacity, Rauff was involved with SS General Karl Wolff’s negotiations to surrender the German troops in Italy in 1945. This was a pet project of Allen Dulles and was called “Operation Sunrise.” During the course of the negotiations, Dulles became very friendly with Rauff. Consequently, as the new Gehlen organization was formed, Dulles was instrumental in acquiring Rauff for an advisory position with them.

In 1941, Rauff had been involved with the SD anti-partisan activities in the captured areas of the Soviet Union. Rauff conceived, constructed and personally supervised the use of gas vans. These vans had the exhaust pipes vented inside the rear compartments which were then filled with Jews who died of carbon monoxide poisoning. While it spared some SD men from the guilt associated with murdering large numbers of civilians, it did have certain negative aspects—the collection of bodies in the back of the van. When the rear door was opened to remove the dead, the stench proved to be a serious occupational hazard. An ingenious man, Rauff had a special fitting constructed that helped alleviate this unfortunate problem. A lengthy file on Rauff’s gas vans is stored at the National Archives.

At the end of the war, Rauff was imprisoned in Italy. He later emerged in Germany, happily working for the Gehlen group. Unfortunately for him, his presence became known to the wrong people, and he found it necessary to move to Syria where he continued to represent Gehlen’s interests. As the stress of discovery there became too much for Gehlen to bear, it was decided that Rauff should move to Chile. His friend and later protector, Allen Dulles, ordered that he be given new identity papers and funds for travel and relocation. While in Chile, the loyal Rauff continued to provide intelligence reports to Gehlen and his other protectors.

Another senior Gehlen aide was former SS-Oberführer Dr. Franz Six. Six was an intellectual academic, Professor of Political Science at Königsberg University. Six joined the SS on April 20, 1935 and became a member of the SD. In 1941, Six was in command of an Einsatzgruppe and was directly responsible for the murder of the Jews in the Russian city of Smolensk. Following this military triumph, Six was made the head of Section VII of the RSHA. In 1943 he was sent to the Foreign Ministry where he was in charge of the Cultural Division. In 1946, Dr. Six was an early member of the Gehlen organization but was eventually tracked down and his supporters were unable to prevent his standing trial in April of 1948 for his actions. He received a sentence of 25 years. However, US authorities interceded on his behalf and on September 30, 1952, Six was released and at once returned to his duties with Gehlen.

SS-Sturmbannführer (Major) Alois Brunner was a Gestapo official who worked directly under Adolf Eichmann in the deportation department. Ambitious and energetic, Brunner was an instigator of the notorious razzia carried out in France in 1942 against the Jews of Paris. So outraged was his putative chief, Müller, that Brunner was transferred to Sofia in Bulgaria. He was sentenced to death by a French court, in absentia because Brunner had gone to Damascus, Syria, as Gehlen’s resident agent. He used a number of names including “Georg Fischer” and “Waldo Munk.” Brunner was later made a part of a CIA-directed program to train the security forces of Abdel Nasser and Israeli agents attempted to blow him up with a letter bomb but failed. In addition to the French death sentence, Brunner was also on the wanted list of the CIC.

Probably the worst offender of all was SS-Gruppenführer Odlio Globocnik, once the Gauleiter of Vienna until fired by Hitler for theft and pillage. Globocnik went on to run the Lublin camps in Poland where he stole millions more and was responsible for the gassing of large numbers of Jews and Poles. His stolen millions saved him from prosecution. After working for a time for the British, he eventually ended up as an American resource, also in Damascus. The name of the program that sent him there was called “Argos.”

Like its Biblical counterpart, the 20th century road to Damascus was traveled by converts to the new religion of the West.

There were many more individuals connected with the Gestapo or SD who openly worked for Gehlen including SS-Standartenführer Frederich Panziger, another old friend of Müller’s who had married into his family. Panziger was not responsible for wartime atrocities but was a key player in the break-up of the Rote Kapelle, a Russian spy ring considered to be of great value to Gehlen.

If retired Lt. Colonel Hermann Baun had thought to damage his nemesis Gehlen, he was in error. His lengthy and detailed report only made Gehlen more popular with the US intelligence agency that ran him and, through them, with the US-controlled puppet government of West Germany—a government that did exactly what it was told and clicked its heels together while doing it.

What did the CIA and those in the more elevated US positions of command know about the flawed membership of their prize German possession? Was the quickly suppressed Baun report the only indicator that had surfaced between 1948 and 1956? If there was any substantive material on this subject, it certainly would never be made available to anyone and would, undoubtedly, be sequestered in some remote place in Arizona or perhaps even somewhere on the grounds of an academic institution closer to hand.

Correspondence and conversations with Colonel James Critchfield, once the CIA overseer of the Gehlen organization during its tenure as an American agency, has shed considerable light on the subject.

Critchfield initially acknowledged awareness of the use by the CIA-run Gehlen agency of a number of the individuals encountered earlier in this chapter. However, the Colonel, now living in comfortable retirement in Williamsburg, Virginia, stated that aside from Dr. Six, he had no knowledge of any of the allegations of war crimes against his former employees, which he termed “outrageous.” He stated finally that Krichbaum, whom he had earlier claimed to have played a “very important role in our history” was certainly not a member of the SS, not Deputy Chief of the Gestapo, not involved with the deportation and deaths of the Hungarian Jews, and could never have shot Raoul Wallenberg. The membership of Krichbaum in the SS, his rank, and his position inside the Gestapo organization is absolutely beyond doubt. All of Willi Krichbaum’s official history, as that of the others included in this study is presently available for public inspection in the US National Archives records in Washington.

Also beyond doubt is the participation of a significant number of unsavory individuals in the CIA-controlled Gehlen organization and no question whatsoever as to the atrocities they committed while members of the SD and Gestapo.

From 1945 on, the US had control of the Berlin Document Center, which was the repository for all SS, Gestapo and SD personnel files. US investigators were required to check the backgrounds of all potential German employees against their records. In addition, CROWCASS (Central Registry of War Crimes and Security Suspects) files contained the names of suspected or wanted war criminals. The CROWCASS information was widely circulated to American agencies, including the CIA, which were in a position to hire or come into contact with such people. These files, which contained a great deal of potentially damaging information on German nationals, were turned over to Gehlen in 1948, no doubt to assist his recruitment drives.

When pressed, Colonel Critchfield acknowledged the existence of the background and personal history files and dossiers but averred that the investigation of his employees had been a matter for the Central Registry of the CIC. When asked if he had ever been advised by this agency that many of his senior functionaries were on the wanted lists, Critchfield gave no response.

Intelligence agencies have a tendency to place former military personnel in positions of responsibility precisely because they are trained to obey, without questioning, orders from superiors.

 

In the Beginning

September 3, 2017

by Harry von Johnston, PhD

Beginning in mid-November 1896 and lasting until May 1897, many Americans became convinced that an American had perfected the world’s first practical heavier-than-air flying machine. This little-known episode in American history was extraordinary in that, at the height of the rumors, it is estimated that tens of thousands of Americans reported that they had seen the craft at various points across the nation . On numerous occasions it was reportedly seen thousands of miles apart, at the same time. The maneuvers described by witnesses, were far above any technology of the period-even by today’s standards. It was typically described as oval or cigar-shaped with an attached undercarriage, having a powerful headlight, and giant fans or wings protruding from both

The Pacific Northwest sightings

The California airship wave had been building up for about a week and dominated the California press amid sensational, near saturation-level press coverage when the sightings began to spread to nearby states, and eventually across the country. One of the first sightings in the Pacific Northwest was at McMinnville, Oregon, on the night of November 24th when, according to that city’s Telephone-Register newspaper, several residents claimed they saw an airship pass over the city . Curiously, at this point, there was a deluge of airship sightings across the Pacific Northwest, except in Oregon. This prompted the Portland Evening Telegram to remark that “It is news to say that the ship has not been seen in Portland” and had nearly missed the state altogether

The answer for the apparent immunity in Oregon from what some people labeled as “airshipitis,” appears to have resulted from a combination of cloudy weather and responsible journalism. As soon as the sightings began in Oregon on November 24th, several state newspapers editors quickly attributed the sightings within the region to sensational California journalism designed to sell newspapers, and labeled the affair a hoax.

Coverage in Nevada and Washington

By and large, the Nevada press was not especially critical of the reports and sightings flourished. Near Reno, one resident claimed that an airship with a searchlight passed by and voices could be heard coming from the craft, including “We are four degrees too far north, change the course” . This account was simply reported by the paper without any criticism. As for the nature of the California sightings where the wave began, the Carson City Morning Appeal stated “There are thousands of people in California who believe that a flying machine has been invented that sailed from Oroville to Sacramento and from there to Oakland one night last week. It was seen first in Sacramento and the inventor promises to exhibit it over San Francisco in a few days”. There was no discussion of the airship having been a hoax fueled by misperceptions, lying, and press sensationalism. In Washington, while there was some press criticism of the airship claims , many press accounts were also uncritical. Consider the following report of a sighting at Marble:

Marble, Wash., May 5.–The town of Marble was greatly excited today over the appearance of an airship. Some men working at the mill discovered it as it appeared over the mountains at the southern part of town, and watched it disappear in a northeasterly direction. It was in full view, and the fans could easily be recognized …

Other newspapers reporting this story in a matter-of-fact manner included the Ellensburg Localizer, and the Chelan Leader, while a separate sighting over Spokane on Thursday night, April 15th, was reported uncritically by the Walla Walla Union and the Spokesman-Review .

Over the past seventy years, numerous sighting waves have occurred in the US and around the world involving UFOs, with a great deal of press speculation that they are or may be alien spaceships. UFOs sighting reported in the mass media remain as common as ever

And one ought to consider that according to F.B.I statistics nearly 800,000 or more people are reported missing each year. Out of the 800,000 people reported missing, approximately 75% percent of missing person cases are resolved within 24 hours. Most of these are runaways and victims of parental kidnapping.  650,000 are accounted for leaving a balance of 150,000 per annum unaccounted for.

Of these, none are ever heard from again. Perhaps they all gravitated to Los Angeles where they were eventually killed and eaten by the natives.

 

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