TBR News December 8, 2019

The Voice of the White House
Washington, D.C. December 8, 2019:“Working in the White House as a junior staffer is an interesting experience.
When I was younger, I worked as a summer-time job in a clinic for people who had moderate to severe mental problems and the current work closely, at times, echos the earlier one.
I am not an intimate of the President but I have encountered him from time to time and I daily see manifestations of his growing psychological problems.
He insults people, uses foul language, is frantic to see his name mentioned on main-line television and pays absolutely no attention to any advice from his staff that runs counter to his strange ideas.
He lies like a rug to everyone, eats like a hog, makes lewd remarks to female staffers and flies into rages if anyone dares to contradict him.
It is becoming more and more evident to even the least intelligent American voter that Trump is vicious, corrupt and amoral. He has stated often that even if he loses the election in 2020, he will not leave the White House. I have news for Donald but this is not the place to discuss it.
Commentary for December 8: ”Because he feels that Europen leaders have mocked him, Trump is furious and is planning a revenge against them. He especially hates Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau so he is planning to sanction Canadian wood pulp.
The Canadian forest industry as a whole (both pulp and paper and lumber) employs directly and indirectly nearly 600,000 workers and contributes roughly two per cent, or over $20 billion, to Canada’s annual GDP. Canada remains the world’s largest producer of newsprint.
By blocking Canadian paper from the United States, Trump will also impact the print media in the United States whom he believes are plotting to humiliate and destroy him. Workers whose offices are near Trump, are telling us that he has been shouting and kicking furniture in his office over what he feels is ‘Deep State’ evil directed at him.”

The Table of Contents
• Trump’s food stamp cuts are cruel politics and bad economics
• After disrupter Trump’s early departure at NATO summit, diplomats rally
• If Tehran is pushed too far, it may hit out in ways that are disastrous
• Hezbollah
• Origins of the Pearl Harbor Attack: Planned in Moscow
• Russian Intelligence Organizations
• The Season of Evil

Trump’s food stamp cuts are cruel politics and bad economics
December 6, 2019
by Jeff Spross
The Week
On Wednesday, the Trump administration made a unilateral policy change to cut back the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), colloquially known as food stamps, with the result being that hundreds of thousands of Americans who previously received the benefits will now be ineligible.
In the grand scheme, this isn’t that surprising: The Republican Party has tried again and again to cut SNAP and the rest of the anti-poverty safety net — most recently under the guidance of former Republican Speaker of the House and “serious wonk” Paul Ryan. What is noteworthy is that President Trump was supposed to herald a different kind of Republican Party: more skeptical of elites, more sympathetic to the hard-working “forgotten” people. That GOP efforts to strip struggling Americans of aid have continued or even increased in intensity under Trump simply throws the destructiveness of this obsession into particularly sharp relief.
Let’s begin with the basic policy and economics. SNAP is one of the country’s most important safety net programs, providing aid to roughly 40 million people per month in 2018, and considerably more in the depths of the last recession. Under current law, able-bodied adults without children or other dependents are already limited to receiving SNAP benefits for three months every three years, though they can receive them for longer if they are either working or in training programs. More important for our purposes here, states are also able to get waivers from the federal work requirements to allow those specific recipients to stay on the program longer when unemployment is higher. The amount of waivers issued jumped after the 2008 crisis, but is now back to its pre-crisis norm.
After Republicans in Congress tried and failed to slash SNAP in 2018, the Trump administration has moved to use its executive power leeway to strangle the program. Wednesday’s announcement was the first of three planned changes: Basically, the White House is going to make those state waivers harder to get, requiring counties to have at least a 6 percent unemployment rate before states can waive the work requirements there.
The U.S. Department of Agriculture estimates this change will kick 688,000 people off of SNAP. And Department Secretary Sonny Perdue was explicit about the White House’s reasoning: “Unemployment is 3.6 percent, the lowest in 50 years,” Perdue said. “There are currently more job openings than people to fill them. … Now, in the midst of the strongest economy in a generation, we need everyone who can work, to work.”
What’s wrong with this logic? While it’s true that there are currently more job openings than unemployed people, what Perdue doesn’t mention is that this almost never happens. The last time job openings pulled even with the unemployed was almost 20 years ago; in between, the number of people looking for work significantly outpaced available jobs.
It’s also important to note that unemployment statistics tend to chronically undercount the number of Americans who actually want and need employment. Bad jobs that pay low wages have also metastasized as a portion of the workforce since the last time unemployment got this low. And, of course, the 3.6 percent unemployment rate and the ratio of job seekers to open jobs are both national statistics, hiding a lot of variation from place to place and region to region.
It gets worse.
Economic analysis has long recognized SNAP as one of the government’s best policies in terms of stimulating more economic growth. Because SNAP benefits go to Americans struggling to make ends meet, they immediately spend the money, which enters the economy as additional consumption, boosting business revenues and increasing job creation. Republicans often complain about how SNAP’s spending automatically went up during the Great Recession as incomes fell and more Americans’ qualified for the program. But this too is a good thing: it means SNAP immediately steps in to boost the economy during a downtown, without anyone having to wait for Congress to proactively pass new laws.
Finally, at the individual level, people are rather obviously better able to work when they have three reliable and nutritious meals a day. Cutting them off from that aid via work requirements only hurts their ability to participate in the workforce. The same holds true for health care, through programs like Medicaid, which the Trump administration is also trying to cut via work requirements. And it’s true of housing, where the White House’s latest appointed leader is arguing that people should somehow be required to achieve financial stability before they are provided with reliable housing.

After disrupter Trump’s early departure at NATO summit, diplomats rally
December 6, 2019
by Michael Birnbaum
The Washington Post
BRUSSELS — NATO’S glassy headquarters was still standing Thursday, a day after the end of a whirlwind summit with President Trump that had threatened to blow it away.
On substance, in fact, the meeting of NATO leaders that took place just outside London was an almost normal gathering, despite fears that Trump or one of his brothers in unpredictability — French President Emmanuel Macron or Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan — could derail the proceedings.
Trump stormed into the meeting summit as a disrupter and rushed out earlier than planned after fellow leaders were caught on camera laughing about his erratic style. In between his entrance and exit, though, the alliance approved a list of new measures that heartened policymakers who had been battered by years of uncertainty from the White House.
“What we prove today is that NATO delivers on substance,” said NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, a usually subdued Norwegian leader who allowed himself a half grin — perhaps of relief — after he steered the group of 29 squabbling heads of state toward an almost normal conclusion. At NATO, he said, “the rhetoric is not always excellent, but substance is perfect.”
At NATO headquarters Thursday, diplomats and military officers walked in and out of the lobby Starbucks joking and ordering celebratory lattes. Ambassadors were back in their offices after the migration to London, where the summit was held at a 18th-century estate outside the city.
They pointed to a list of achievements that was summarized in a dry, two-page declaration that leaders signed on to at the meeting — not scintillating literature but nevertheless important in giving a political endorsement that sets vast bureaucracies in motion to fulfill the directions.
NATO set up a large new rapidresponse force to be able to speed quickly across Europe if ever there were a conflict. They committed to keeping their nextgeneration cellular networks secure, a U.S. priority amid fears that China’s Huawei telecommunications company could help Beijing get access to European networks as the continent upgrades to speedy 5G connections. They agreed to start thinking about the implications of China’s growing strategic power. And Turkey signed off on updated military plans to defend Eastern Europe against Russia that it had been holding up for months because it was angry that fellow members were working with Kurdish forces in Syria that Ankara views as a threat.
And Macron — who last month declared that NATO was suffering “brain death” as it catered to Trump’s single-minded focus on defense spending — was placated by a promise to set up a committee to reconsider the alliance’s broad strategic vision.
“We were expecting worse,” said one senior NATO official after the meeting, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss the closed-door meeting, which lasted three hours and in which most leaders hewed closely to their scripted talking points.
That may have been a touch boring — but boring might be good in the Trump era, given the alternatives, the official said, although some were waiting a full 24 hours after Trump’s departure to fully exhale, given his past track record of blowing up summits even after he has left.
At a 2018 meeting of the Group of Seven leaders in Canada, for example, as Air Force One pulled away, Trump withdrew his signature from a declaration in a fit of pique after feeling slighted by his hosts.
This time, though, Trump on Thursday portrayed the whole visit as a success, despite his early exit.
“Tremendous things achieved for U.S. on my NATO trip. Proudly for our Country, no President has ever achieved so much in so little time,” he tweeted.
Among the Eastern European countries most vulnerable to Russia, which has been the alliance’s primary focus in recent years, there was still some nervousness about the outcome of the meeting. But the unease had less to do with Trump and more to do with Macron, who has declared he wants to reboot a dialogue with the Kremlin and that terrorism, not Russia, ought to be the primary focus for the alliance.
At the meeting, Macron tried to signal to Eastern European leaders that he did not plan to compromise their security in the name of better relations with Moscow.
“I’m under no illusions,” Macron said afterward. “But if we want to move forward in fostering stability in Europe, we need to move forward with that dialogue” with Russia.
On Monday in Paris, Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel are scheduled to bring together Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky for the first time. And some policymakers remain uncomfortable about what could unfold.
“The French and Germans are pushing on Ukraine. There’s no doubt about it,” said a senior NATO diplomat, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal alliance discussions. “We’re concerned that they’ll try to twist Zelensky’s arm to accept solutions that are unacceptable.”
Zelensky has declared that he wants to achieve peace in eastern Ukraine, where Russian-backed separatists have been waging war since 2014. Ukraine’s Eastern European partners fear that he could be pressured into accepting Russia’s annexation of Crimea or otherwise pushed into making a deal that would be politically unacceptable at home and that could embolden Russia to be aggressive in other vulnerable countries in the future.

If Tehran is pushed too far, it may hit out in ways that are disastrous
Netanyahu warns of impending catastrophe as US officials say short-range ballistic missiles secretly positioned in Iraq
December 7, 2019
by Simon Tisdall
The Guardian
The crisis in the Gulf, which took Iran and the US to the brink of war in June, was never resolved – and shows every sign of reigniting. Like antagonists in a school-yard fight who refuse to shake hands and make up, the two sides, backed by regional allies and proxies, are sullenly waiting for it all to kick off again. The next bout could be much worse.
In the American camp, alarm bells began ringing in earnest last week. US officials claimed Iran was secretly positioning short-range ballistic missiles in Iraq, within range of Israel and US bases in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.
The Iraq deployments, if true, would be consistent with past Iranian moves to equip Shia militias in Lebanon, Yemen and Syria with improved missile capabilities. Supposed Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) missile bases in Syria and Iraq have been targeted by Israeli air strikes in recent months. Iran-backed militia have fired rockets at Israel.
The US has moved 14,000 additional troops to the Gulf region this year. Despite this, it fears a repeat of September’s attack on Saudi oil facilities. John Rood, a senior Pentagon official, warned last week of renewed hostilities: “We continue to see indications … that potential Iranian aggression could occur.”
Israel views the proliferation of precision-guided missiles in the hands of Iranian proxies as a major strategic threat that must be repulsed by all means. Its prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, is pressing Trump to re-focus on the issue following an ineffectual US response to the oilfield and tanker attacks.
Netanyahu had hoped to lobby Trump and other Nato leaders in person at last week’s London summit, but was prevented from attending due to “logistical concerns”. Instead he met Mike Pompeo, the US secretary of state and fellow hawk, in Portugal, where he stressed that Iran’s activities increasingly threatened Israel and the entire Middle East.
The US policy of “maximum pressure” on Iran through sanctions was launched last year after Trump reneged on the 2015 nuclear deal with Tehran. Trump raised specific concerns about ballistic missiles and said Iran’s behaviour must change.
One year on, Iran’s continuing defiance suggests that the policy is not working, in military terms at least, and is hastening a new confrontation.
Netanyahu and like-minded US and Saudi hardliners partly blame European leaders who still support the nuclear deal. Israel’s leader is particularly exercised about Iran’s gradual resumption of banned nuclear activities in retaliation for Trump’s bad faith.
When six European countries joined Britain, France and Germany last weekend in backing the new, so-called Instex financial barter mechanism, which is intended to help Iran circumvent US sanctions, Netanyahu was furious.
“These European countries should be ashamed of themselves. Have they learned nothing from history? … They are enabling a fanatic terrorist state to develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, thereby bringing disaster to themselves and upon everyone else,” he said.
It’s suggested that Netanyahu was barred from the Nato meeting because Britain’s Boris Johnson, France’s Emmanuel Macron and Germany’s Angela Merkel – the so-called E3 – had no wish to hear his complaints. Yet they have a big problem, too.
Europe’s softly-softly policy is not working any better than that of the brash Americans. The E3 complained to the UN last week that Iran’s “nuclear-capable” ballistic missile programme undermines the 2015 deal, which is in any case unravelling. But they lack alternative ideas about halting a slide to war.
Inside the Iranian camp, meanwhile, little is going right, either. Regional military expansion has not increased national security. Iran’s neo-colonial importunities in Iraq and Lebanon are under vocal attack. The Syrian war drags on, draining resources. And domestic unrest is building.
Amnesty International estimates that at least 208 people died in nationwide protests over fuel price rises that turned political last month. The true figure may be much higher. The regime initially blamed “Zionists”, and “foreign outlaws”. The Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, pointed to a “dangerous conspiracy” implicating the US, Israel and Saudi Arabia.
But such claims persuade nobody. Iran’s clerics seem to have experienced genuine shock at the depth of their own unpopularity, and the willingness of ordinary citizens to challenge their rule despite a brutal crackdown. Belatedly sensing the full extent of public fury at home, the regime has now softened its tone, saying it will show “Islamic mercy” to those arrested.
Before resuming their Gulf grudge match, both sides should ask themselves what they want to achieve – and whether dialogue might better serve their purposes. All have much to lose. Appearing to recognise this, Hassan Rouhani, Iran’s president, repeated an offer to talk, but only if sanctions were lifted first. Trump has not replied.
Iran’s internal troubles undoubtedly owe much to US sanctions. But the idea that, by further increasing external pressure, the regime can be forced to bow to US-Israeli demands, or else be toppled from within, remains fanciful in the extreme. Likewise, Iran’s apparent calculation that Trump, seeking re-election next year and averse to waging foreign wars, will not attack is dangerously complacent. And they should know by now that Europe, cowed by Washington, will not ride to the rescue.
If Tehran is pushed too far, if the regime’s survival is in doubt, if ethnic and regional cracks begin to show, and if fundamentalists in the clergy, IRGC and judiciary seize control of policy, Iran may hit out in ways that could be utterly disastrous all round.
And if either Trump or Netanyahu (or both), made desperate by corruption scandals, facing political extinction and driven by hubris, decides to create a grand drama in which he can star as national saviour, then batten down the hatches. It’s Gulf War III.

Hezbollah
Hezbollah, a Lebanese-based Shiite group, has fought the IDF (Israel Defense Forces) from the early 1980s to 2000, when the IDF was deployed in Lebanon. In 2006 the two sides clashed again, for 34 days, a war that ended in a tie but was not certainly an IDF victory.
Hezbollah is the world’s most heavily armed non-state actor, and has been described as “a militia trained like an army and equipped like a state.”
This is especially true with regard to its missile and rocket forces, which Hezbollah has in vast quantities arrayed against Israel.
The next round will happen when Israel believes that Iran has produced a nuclear weapon, a move which will certainly result in Israel attacking Iran’s nuclear sites.
Iran will retaliate with its proxies, mostly with Hezbollah.
Israel’s evaluation of the duration and cost of a war with Hezbollah, along with its other ramifications and consequences, will play a major part in Israel’s decision whether to bomb Iran or not.
Israel does not have long-range heavy bombers but the United States does, hence the constant prodding by the current Israeli government to procure an American strike on Tehran.
Meanwhile there is an ongoing tension between Israel and Hezbollah and a miscalculation by one or both sides might certainly ignite a major war.
The IDF, one of the strongest militaries in the Middle East, outnumbers and outguns Hezbollah in both troops and weapon systems. Yet Hezbollah has quite a powerful hybrid force, which has antiaircraft and anti tank missiles, hundreds of drones and above all up to 150,000 rockets and missiles, some of which cover all of Israel. Hezbollah could fire more than a 1,000 rockets a day during a confrontation with Israel and many of these missiles have GPS control systems and can strike accurately at specified targets.
Israel has systems to shoot down rockets, mostly the Iron Dome. Yet Israel does not have enough of them to intercept most of Hezbollah’s rockets, so the IDF can’t rely on a defensive strategy.
IAF (Israeli air force) has mostly fighter–bombers such as F- 15/16. The IAF has been training to launch thousands of sorties in Lebanon but the IAF might not be able to stop the pounding of Israel by Hezbollah. To do that Israel needs boots on the ground i.e. to carry out a major land offensive following a massive strategic bombing by U.S. heavy bombers.
On August 13, 2015, the IDF published the “IDF Strategy”, which explains how the IDF plans to operate in the next war. In September 2017 the IDF ran its biggest exercise in almost two decades, aimed against Hezbollah. The IDF, which had some major setbacks in the 2006 war, will be determined to prove it has learned its lessons. However, defeating Hezbollah is a tall order since Hezbollah, which is rooted inside the Shiite community in Lebanon, can always continue fighting with guerrilla and terror tactics. Israel will therefore strive for more limited objectives, mostly to destroy Hezbollah’s rockets and cause the group heavy casualties in order to deter it and other groups as well from confronting Israel.
The IDF will penetrate several dozen kilometers into Lebanon, on a wide front, to completely destroy all possible Hezbollah missiles and missile sites but it will stay there for a few weeks at most. Israel does not wish to renew its deployment in Lebanon, exposing its troops to attacks, as it was in the 1980s and the 1990s.
The IDF’s elite armor and infantry units will carry the burden of the offensive. Special Forces such as the 89th commando brigade will assist by launching raids behind the lines, collecting information etc.
The IDF relies on reserves. Tens of thousands of them will be mobilized. Many might be called while rockets hit them at their homes and on their way to their bases, where they get their weapons, vehicles etc. Rockets might continue to strike them when they will move to the frontline.
Israeli officials repeatedly warned about the danger of storing rockets in about 200 villages and towns in Lebanon. If rockets are launched from those places, the IDF will strike them, possibly causing huge collateral damage. The civilians living there will be warned in advance to evacuate their homes. Hopefully they will be able to do that, for Hezbollah might order some of them to remain behind, to serve as human shields.
The IDF can inflict a major blow to Hezbollah by catching it off guard. A massive surprise attack might be Israel’s best chance to handle the rockets and reduce Israel’s casualties. However, such an attack could cause significant collateral damage since the Lebanese population might not have sufficient time to escape.
Further, there is no guarantee that the United States would enter the conflict.
The IDF will have to run urban warfare, including underground, inside tunnels. The IDF has been training for that in various ways. Its troops must be familiar with the terrain of Lebanon so they exercise in similar areas, in the north of Israel. Cooperation between the corps such as infantry and armor is another important factor the IDF has been working on, as part of the preparations to fight Hezbollah. The IDF will also use its advanced C4I (Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence) network.
Unfortunately for this thesis, this system has been compromised by Russian specialists and the results given to Hezbollah command.
Hezbollah got stronger and bigger during the Syrian civil war. The group is now more like a military organization, but this could actually benefit the IDF because it will be easier to find and attack Hezbollah fighters. The latter also got accustomed to enjoy air superiority and receiving air support from the Russian and the Syrian air forces while confronting Syrian rebels who had no aircraft. In a war against Israel Hezbollah will be both without air support and it will have to deal with a powerful air force, albiet one without long-range heavy bombers.
The newer Russian anti-aircraft defenses, however, are extremely effective and, like US bombers, the Israeli planes would suffer heavy losses.
The United States sees Hezbollah as a terrorist group. Prior to 9 / 11 Hezbollah killed more Americans than any other militant Muslim group. In the next war Israel will require US support. On the diplomatic level Israel will need the United States to stand by Israel in the UN Security Council, which, given the pro-Israel attidudes of President Trump, is fully expected.
Militarily the United States can provide Israel with weapons, ammunition and spare parts, without sending US troops.
The next round between Israel and Hezbollah is expected to be much more destructive than the 2006 war. The IDF wants to try to reduce the cost to Israel and to shorten the war by conducting a large scale and effective air, land and sea offensive. To accomplish this, they must somehow get the United States involved both to save the lives of IDF personnel and avoid the massive expenses of a major war. To prevent a Hezbollah missile attack on a very vulnerable Israel, the current IDF plan is to launch a sudden joint US/Israeli attack on all of southern Lebanon.
President Trump has expressed his “firm desire” to strike southern Lebanon with US forces but to date, the response of the Pentagon has been extremely negative. The area Israel wants flattened is full of very effective Russian anti-aircraft defenses and American losses of attacking aircraft would be “significant” in the opinion of American military experts.
Further, should the United States prepare to assist Israel, it is believed that Russian intelligence will quickly detect such actions and Hezbollah would be forwarned in sufficient time to launch pre-emptive strikes, to include silo-based heavy missiles.
Mashinostroyeniya, KBKhA
Specifications:
Weight: 220 tonnes
Length: 36.3 m
Diameter: 3.0 m
Warhead:10–24 MIRVs (various type and yield, including HGVs); At the maximum reported throw-weight of up 10,000 kg, the missile could deliver a 50 Mt charge (the maximum theoretical yield-to-weight ratio is about 6 megatons of TNT per metric ton, and the maximum achieved ratio was apparently 5.2 megatons of TNT per metric ton in B/Mk-41).
Engine: First stage: PDU-99 (RD-274 derived)
Propellant: Liquid
Operational range: approx. 10,900 kilometres (6,800 mi)
Speed: over Mach 20.7; 25,000 km/h (16,000 mph)
Guidance system: Inertial guidance, GLONASS, Astro-inertial
Accuracy: 10 m
Launch platform: Silo
These missiles could easily reach American military and intelligence bases in the Middle East and Europe hence the reluctance of the Pentagon officials.

Origins of the Pearl Harbor Attack: Planned in Moscow
Stalin’s Intelligence Game
Playing the United States and Japan against Each Other, this resulted in Pearl Harbor and the Japanese attack on the United States in 1941

In the spring of 1941, Stalin feared the Soviet Union would become trapped in the vise of a two-front war, crushed between Germany and Japan. To escape the trap, three separate Soviet intelligence operations in Chungking, Tokyo, and
Washington, without knowledge of each other, manipulated Japan to attack Ameri- can forces in the Pacific and bring the United States into World War II. In concerted covert efforts directed from Moscow, Soviet intelligence worked to divert
Japanese expansionism south against “colonialist imperialism,” so that Japan would take over French Indochina, the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia), and American interests in the Philippines protected by the U.S. Navy, instead of pushing westward through Siberia. Stalin’s desperate purpose was to fend off a unified, two-pronged attack by Germany and Japan that he feared would destroy the Soviet Union.
Stalin’s nightmare was a German-Japanese “handshake in the Urals.”
Attacking Southeast Asia meant the Japanese navy would come into conflict with the American Pacific fleet, which had been moved from southern California to Pearl Harbor in October 1939 and in May 1940. Stalin signed a nonaggression treaty with the Germans in 1939, then a neutrality pact with the Japanese in 1941, playing the pride and duplicity of Berlin and Tokyo off against each other. His goal was to deflect a Japanese attack away from the Soviet Union.
War between the United States and Japan was the alternative Stalin favored.
Retracing the reasons for Stalin’s frenzy to push the Japanese to attack the
United States reveals the answer to one of the great mysteries of the twentieth century.
Both communist devotees of Stalin and anticommunist commentators have long wondered why Stalin entered a pact with the devil named Hitler, knowing what a dangerous ally he might become. The 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact of Non-Aggression, signed in August of that year, was a landmark on the path to World War II. The answer to the mystery: Stalin was already fighting the Japanese in the Far East and he feared a two-front war.
Until recently, we had only one piece of the skeleton in the closet of history, the confession of Richard Sorge, a dynamic, heavy-drinking officer of Soviet militaryintelligence, the GRU (Glavnoe Razvedyovatelnoe Upravlenie), under cover as a German foreign correspondent in Tokyo. A statue of Richard Sorge, clad in a foreign correspondent’s trench coat, stands in homage to him on a Moscow back street near GRU headquarters.
Sorge enjoyed access to the highest officials of the German embassy and to members of the Japanese prime minister’s cabinet before he was arrested by the Japanese and hanged for spying in November 1944.
Now there are new pieces to clarify those events: officially released, deciphered intercepts of Russian intelligence traffic during 1939-1946, code-named VENONA; the memoirs of Vitali Pavlov, an NKVD (Narodny Kommissariat Vnu-trennikh Del, predecessor to the KGB) intelligence officer; and secret messagesfrom the Russian archives, which throw new light on the work of Vasili Zarubin, an experienced NKVD intelligence officer sent to China during the tense months before Pearl Harbor.
This is a Soviet intelligence success story, which changes the conventional history of the year 1941 and our memory of Pearl Harbor. It is a story that until now none of the participants wanted known.
What was Operation Snow? It is the title of a book published in Russian in
1996, but not in English, in which a high ranking retired KGB officer, Vitali
Pavlov, recalled his mission to Washington in April and May 1941.2 Pavlov, then a junior officer on his first trip abroad, was sent to the United States seven months before the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor to meet with Harry Dexter White, then director of Monetary Research for the Treasury.
Did “Snow” mean “White”? Yes,
Harry Dexter White had been a Soviet “asset” since the early 1930s, providing information to Whittaker Chambers, a courier for the communist underground.
By 1941 White was a top aide and adviser to Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury. Pavlov wrote that the Soviets feared a Japanese attack from the east, and his mission was to discuss with White what could be done to keep the Japanese from joining forces with the Germans. Tsarev’s reference to Operation Snow brought back into focus his earlier statement that in the years leading up to World War II the United States was not a main intelligence target “except as a balance against Japan.”
What did “balance” mean to the Soviet Union?
In the spring of 1941, Vitali Pavlov, an eager 27-year-old intelligence officer, msat nervously in his office on the sixth floor of Lubyanka, NKVD headquarters, torn by fear of invasion. The Soviet Union was facing a two-front war with the threat of attack from Japan in the east and Germany in the west. Pavlov and his colleagues devised a plan for him to go to Washington and help deflect a Japanese attack on the Soviet Union. His mission was to be a “sacred secret” (meaning they would carry it to their graves with no paper trail).
The goal: exacerbate tensions between the United States and Japan to divert Japanese expansionism away from Siberia and toward Southeast Asia, where Japan would come into conflict with the United States and its Pacific fleet. Pavlov’s plan did not begin and end with him, but was part of a larger Soviet design to worsen relations between Japan and the United States, even if their efforts led to war, to prevent a Japanese invasion of the Soviet Union.
Pushing the limits of discord between capitalist powers was a central tenet of
Lenin’s foreign policy. Stalin learned it well and used it in the 1939 Non-Aggression
Pact. Stalin’s contribution was to set up intelligence operations worldwide to capitalize on these rifts to further Soviet interests.
In this light we must examine Sorge, Pavlov, and Zarubin in their activities on the eve of the war.
Pavlov’s mission in April 1941, when he met with Harry Dexter White, U.S.
Treasury Director of Monetary Research, at the Old Ebbitt Grill across the street from the Treasury Department in Washington, D.C., was to confirm that White’ thinking toward Japan was in line with Soviet interests.
Soviet intelligence knew that White formulated all of Morgenthau’s recommendations bearing on foreign relations, especially monetary policy toward China, Japan, and the Soviet Union.
In the name of peace in Asia, Pavlov urged White to demand that Japan remove its troops from China, which the Soviet Union knew the Japanese would never accept.
The impetus for Operation Snow began in the top leadership of Soviet intelligence. It followed a report from New York NKVD resident Gaik Ovakimian in
January 1941 to Moscow Center suggesting that Harry Dexter White be used to press Soviet aims for the Far East. Ovakimian’s report was the seed from which Pavlov’s mission grew.
On January 30, 1941, Foreign Intelligence Director Pavel Fitin compiled a spravka (summary), which reported that the NKVD New York resident, Gaik
Ovakimian (code name, GENNADI), had cabled from New York to raise the possibility of using agents and friendly sources in America to influence the formulation of American foreign policy toward Japan. The summary went to Lavrenti Beria, head of the NKVD, and his deputy, Vsevelod Merkulov.
The text read: “GENNADI reported 28 January from New York about agent possibilities of influencing from outside the formulation of USA foreign policy toward
Japan because:
(1) USA cannot accept unlimited Japanese expansion in the Pacific region which affects its vital interests,
(2) Having at its disposal thenecessary economic and military might, Washington is capable of preventing aggression, but it prefers to negotiate mutually acceptable solutions under the conditions that Japan:
(1) stops its aggression in China and areas adjacent to it,
(2) recalls its military forces from the continent and halts its plans of expansion in this region.
Signed Fitin (Chief of the Fifth Department, Main Administration of
State Security)
On this summary report are handwritten notes:
VERNO [verified] Captain of State Security Grauer under instruction of
Comrade Merkulov.
In view of the upcoming negotiations with the Japanese by the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, Comrades Kabulov and Grauer are directed to urgently prepare information for instancia [the leadership, in this case Vyacheslav Molotov and Joseph Stalin]. Also undertake verification of GENNADI’s sources, ZVUK [Jacob Golos], RICHARD [Harry Dexter White], and ROBERT [Nathan Silvermaster] in line with data from the First Special Department, special investigation department, and NKVD Lithuanian SSR pending to the fact that they were known to Shpigelglas, Gutzeit, Sobel, now arrested by us.
Signed Merkulov”
Merkulov was giving instructions for operational research on the intentions of the Japanese, to identify hidden motives behind the Japanese desire in early 1941 to sign a neutrality pact with the USSR. He was instructing his staff to check on Harry Dexter White’s relatives in Lithuania for anti-Soviet activities to make certain of White’s political reliability. This was the period following the Great Purges of the 1930s in which Stalin arrested “enemies of the people” who he believed were competing with him for control of the Soviet Union and the world communist revolution. Soviet intelligence organizations were regrouping and vetting their ranks. Moscow Center wanted to make certain that the purge and execution of suspected senior officers such as Shpigelglas, Gutzeit, and Sobel had not affected the loyalty of their own New York-based espionage chief, Golos, or the continued services of two American sources, White and Silvermaster.
Fitin’s summary reveals that the impetus for Operation Snow came from the top, following Ovakimian’s suggestion. Fitin’s report demonstrates that there are traces of Operation Snow in the NKVD archives, that not every shred of the paper trail was destroyed.
Stalin’s internal purges, during which he had his suspected rivals for absolute power executed, exiled, or sent to labor camps, occurred in the period 1934-1939.
During these purges, Stalin had about 100 senior Soviet intelligence officers re- called, including Akhmerov. Only about twenty-five survived. This was the period of “cleansing” for the intelligence services, with ensuing executions and banishments, during which foreign intelligence operations came to a near standstill. Pavlov’s rapid rise to deputy director of the American desk of NKVD intelligence was a result of the purges.
When these upheavals began to quiet down and intelligence officers went back to supplying the leadership with intelligence on war preparations in 1941, they found their system in suspended animation. Akhmerov was still being kept on the shelf in Moscow. Moscow Center first had to reassess its most valued assets in Washington, to see who was still working for them. They had to indoctrinate their agents and sources to the Soviet viewpoint in matters of diplomacy affecting Soviet national interest. It made sense to dispatch a young officer untainteby association with the previous suspected generation and still unknown in the United States to make the necessary call.
It was under these circumstances that Pavlov left for an inspection tour of the Washington rezidentura (intelligence station). His real mission was to determine whether the NKVD’s important U.S. Treasury assets were still in place and would cooperate with the USSR. In his memoir, Pavlov states that before going to America the NKVD assessment of the situation was: “USA cannot reconcile with uncontrolled Japanese expansion in the Pacific area which affects their vital interests.
Having adequate economic and military might, Washington is capable of preventing Japanese aggression but it prefers to reach mutually beneficial decisions with Japan if it
(1) stops its aggression in China and bordering areas,
(2) recalls its military forces from the continent and halts its expansion plans in this region,
(3) pulls out its forces from Manchuria.”
Pavlov’s explanation is a replay of Fitin’s spravka, reporting Ovakimian’s suggestion from New York.
White contacted AGENT X [Joseph Katz] looking for BILL [Akhmerov] because he wanted to thank him for one idea that had been realized with great success. Akhmerov worked out the detailed plan for a meeting in Washington. It was called Operation Snow to match the name White. We understood that only by strengthening the position of the group in Japanese ruling circles who advocated the extension of Japanese aggression in China southward could we postpone the Japanese plan to conquer the northern territories. We understood that the doubts of the Japanese militarists to immediately implement their northern plans to a great extent depended on the position of the U.S. From what we knew about White it was clear that we could influence through Morgenthau the strengthening of a line in the
American administration that would counterbalance the Japanese expansion.
I was to pass on to White the above-mentioned three principles. It was presumed that White would formulate them himself to be presented to the American administration.
With these instructions firmly in his mind, Pavlov left for Washington. If he succeeded, he would change history. He had been entrusted with a “sacred secret so awesome that he did not reveal it for more than half a century.
For the Soviet Union, Japan was a threatening and ambiguous enemy. European Russians-citizens of Moscow and those west of the Urals-imbibe fear of attack from the east with their mothers’ milk.
Deep in their national memory is conquest by cruel Mongol hordes who ruled Russia for more than 200 years, from the thirteenth to the fifteenth century. Russians believe that the followers of Genghis Khan left no improvements, only a more defined slant to the cheekbones of Russians acquired through the rape of their female ancestors.
A more recent memory was the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, in which the Japanese pushed Russia out of the Pacific Rim areas it had moved into since 1895. The British National Review for September 1904 noted: “The military power of the Island Empire has been revealed.”
In the 1920s and 1930s, the Kwantung Army of Japan set out to rid Manchuria of its Chinese warlord ruler and create an autonomous state in the vast, untamed territory. The Japanese military hoped Manchuria would be a buffer zone against the Soviet Union on its border; it would provide space and resources for Japan’s merchants and impoverished proletariat.
On September 18, 1931, the Kwantung Army took over Mukden, “to keep order.” In 1933 the Japanese invaded northern China proper.
The Soviet Union sent military advisers to both nationalists and communists, the two groups competing to rule China. The Soviet Union’s goal in China was to control Japanese expansionism.
In the early 1930s, the Soviet Union began a propaganda campaign against
Japanese aggression through the Comintern, the communist international organization that, under Moscow’s aegis, controlled communist parties worldwide. Soviet intelligence distributed the “Tanaka Memorial,” said to be a 1927 memorandum from Baron Giichi Tanaka to the Emperor, outlining Japan’s imperial ambitions to become a “continental nation”: Japan’s destiny was to establish a predominant position in China and Southeast Asia. Tanaka’s design would develop a new plan against Siberia.
The Communist Party translated the Memorial into English and first published it in the United States in the Comintern theoretical magazine, ‘Communist International’, in December 1931, then later reprinted it as a book. Evidence points to Soviet intelligence and propaganda organs jointly rewriting the actual document.
Tanaka’s ideas had been skillfully manipulated to make Japan an aggressor. All of the Memorial’s prophecies were to become Japan’s strategy for World War II.’
Within Japanese leadership circles, both aggressive militarists and thoughtful intellectuals agreed on the moral rationale for invading China and pushing southward to control all of Southeast Asia, including the Philippines, Australia, and New
Zealand. They believed in the spiritual unity of East Asians, and in ridding the western Pacific Rim nations of imperial domination by European powers.
The Japanese included the United States in this group-enemy image because American power competed with Japan for trade, political influence, and control of the seaways.
Most important in Japan’s antagonism against the United States was American support for China and its struggle to repel Japanese aggression. Japan considered
America to be an imperialist nation not only for its own overseas territories, but because American naval forces also protected the colonial domination of the French, British, and Dutch in China, Indochina, and the East Indies, controlling the flow of oil, rubber, tin, and other natural resources necessary to military and industrial strength.
The Japanese called their vision “The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.” They saw themselves to be the liberators of East Asia from European and American imperialists.
Stalin never doubted that the United States would in some way support Japan in its dream of attacking Siberia. Ever since 1919, when the United States intervened on the side of the Whites during the 1918-1920 civil war, for a short time landing troops in Siberia to fight the Red Army, Stalin had a deep distrust of offers of friendship from America. This continued even after President Roosevelt granted diplomatic recognition to the USSR in 1933. Stalin believed that eventually the “capitalist-fascist-imperialists” in Washington would be overthrown in favor of communism.
With Japan’s occupation of Manchuria in 1931, Stalin became preoccupied with the new threat from the east and put his military on a “half-war, half-peace” footing.
As early as 1931 and 1932, while the Japanese army was invading Manchuria on the Soviet border, Stalin’s intelligence services were setting up networks in California to sabotage shipping in case of a new Russo-Japanese war.
In 1937 a shooting incident between Chinese and Japanese troops at the Marco Polo Bridge near Peking escalated into open war. The Japanese declared a “new order” in China. The question remained whether Japan’s expansionism would be directed north to Siberia and the entire Soviet Far East, or south to secure Japanese military and commercial domination of China and Southeast Asia. Through China,
Japan would be on its way to the riches of Southeast Asia, while ridding the Eastof Western colonialists.
In June 1938, Soviet Commissar of State Security in the Far East Genrich
Samuelovich Lyushkov defected across the Manchurian border and revealed to the Japanese occupation army full details of the levels of Soviet military strength in the region. Lyushkov, who took his family with him, feared he would be a victim of the purges Stalin was carrying on against his own officers.
After he surrendered, Lyushkov was transferred to Tokyo, where he was interrogated by Japanese military intelligence and military attaches at the German embassy. Lyushkov provided the Soviet order of battle both in Ukraine and the Far East. His debriefing was turned into a memorandum of approximately 100 pages, “Report on a Meeting Between Lyushkov and the German Special Envoy, and Related Information.”
The secret pages were photographed by Richard Sorge, correspondent of the
German newspaper Frankfurter Zeitung, who used his journalist’s cover to head a
Soviet espionage ring in Tokyo.
Sorge was a German national, secretly working for the Red Army’s Fourth Bureau, the GRU, military intelligence. Sorge, the son of a German father and Russian mother, became a communist while recovering from wounds he received fighting on the German side in World War I.
His legs had been shattered and he was left with a lifelong limp. From having been an avid volunteer in the German army, he went into deep disillusionment and depression and emerged a dedicated Marxist.
Sorge had close friendships with high ranking diplomats and military officers in the German embassy; one of them, the military attache Major Erwin Scholl, lent the Lyushkov document to Sorge, unaware of the use the newspaperman would make of its pages.
Lyushkov’s main thesis: because of widespread discontent caused by Stalin’s purge in the Red Army and strong opposition to Stalin in Siberia, the Soviet military machine in the Far East would collapse under a Japanese offensive. Lyushkov is also believed to have provided the military wireless codes being used by the Red Army. He described the location, organization, and equipment of twenty-five Soviet divisions. It was clear to Lyushkov’s German and Japanese interrogators that his defection resulted from Stalin’s purges of the Red Army high command and reflected the army’s weakened strength.
For the Germans and Japanese, this information created the temptation to strike the Soviet Union soon, while it was weak from internal strife. To his Japanese and German friends, Sorge played down the importance of Lyushkov’s information; he compared it to anti-Nazi books written by German refugees suggesting that the Nazi regime faced imminent collapse.
But Moscow was getting another message. Sorge later confessed: “One consequence of Lyushkov’s report was a danger of joint Japanese-German military action against the Soviet Union.”
Western leaders were less aware of Stalin’s problem in the East, which figured as strongly into his calculations as his alliance with Hitler. At all cost Stalin needed to avoid a two-front war. In fact, he was already at war with Russia’s historic rival, Japan. In 1938 the Soviets and Japanese had fought each other in a series of incidents on the Manchurian frontier, about seventy-five miles southwest of Vladivostok, without a clear victory on either side.
What began as skirmishes in January 1939 gradually brought in larger Japanese units; by May, major Japanese forces were engaged against Soviet-Mongolian units near Khalkhin-Gol (the Khalkhin River on the Manchurian border with Mongolia) and the town of Nomonhan.
The Japanese call it the Nomonhan Incident.
By July it had become a war, to which the Japanese brought heavy pressure to bear against the Soviet troops. Even while Stalin’s and Hitler’s emissaries were negotiating their infamous 1939 Non- Aggression Pact, Soviet and Japanese troops were battering each other at Khalkhin- Gol.
In a decisive Soviet tank offensive that took place in August, General (later Marshal) Georgi Zhukov, then a corps commander, exhibited his aggressive leadership. Zhukov’s massive armored assault was a totally unexpected innovation that defeated the Japanese and led to his rise in the Soviet officer corps.
With Sorge’s microfilm of Lyushkov’s report in hand, the Soviet High Command knew what the Japanese expected when they pushed across the Manchurian border at Khalkhin-Gol. As a result, Zhukov built up his forces to much greater strength and overwhelmed the Japanese.
Sorge continued to advise Moscow during the fighting, warning that although sizable Japanese reinforcements might be transferred to the battlefield from North China and Manchuria, there was no evidence that large-scale units were being sent from Japan. This was the evidence, reported Sorge, for his standing firm on the view that: “Japan had no intention of waging war against the Soviet Union.” He repeated variations of this radio message several times during the fighting.
At this point Zhukov assumed command of the Soviet First Army Group. For weeks he maintained a defensive posture, methodically but stealthily building up his forces. He created a three-to-two superiority in manpower, two-to-one strength in artillery and airplanes, and a four-to-one advantage in armor. He gathered 35 infantry battalions to fight 25 Japanese infantry battalions; 20 cavalry squadrons against 17 Japanese cavalry squadrons. Zhukov had nearly 500 tanks, 346 armored cars, and 500 planes to go up against the Japanese Sixth Army, which had no tanks.
Zhukov drew the Japanese in without revealing his strength, then counterattacked for the kill. The attack against the Japanese forces came at 5:45 a.m., August 20, 1939, only three days before the announcement of the Non-Aggression Pact. The battle raged for more than ten days, until the Japanese were driven back across the frontier in disorder.
The defeat of the Japanese at Khalkhin-Gol forced a reassessment in Tokyo of plans for the timing to attack the Soviet Union and discredited the army officers responsible for the defeat.
Red Army intelligence has never released evidence of the connection between
Lyushkov’s information and the defeat of the Japanese at Khalkhin-Gol. In 1941, when Sorge was arrested by the Japanese for espionage activities, a leading
Japanese procurator, Yoshikawa Mitsusada, made the connection between the failure of the Japanese military operation at Khalkhin-Gol and Sorge’s transmission to Moscow of the Japanese evaluation of Soviet strength based on Lyushkov’s information. In their study of Sorge, F. W. Deakin and G. R. Storry wrote,
“Sorge’s activity in connection with the Lyushkov affair was one of the greatest services he rendered to the Fourth Bureau (Soviet Military Intelligence) during his Japan mission.”
When the fighting ended, it had changed the course of history. Khalkhin-Gol was the decisive turning point that created fear and doubt for the Japanese in their plan to attack the Soviet Union through Siberia.
Two years later the Japanese focused south into Indochina, but until they attacked Pearl Harbor, Stalin was uncertain whether or not the Japanese would attempt another invasion of the Soviet Far East.

Russian Intelligence Organizations
The Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR)
The SVR, the successor to the First Chief Directorate of the KGB, is responsible for collecting foreign intelligence. The SVR was created when the KGB was dismantled in the aftermath of the August 1991 coup against the Gorbachev government. The Chairman of the KGB, Vladimir Kryuchkov, and other senior Officials were involved in the plot to overthrow Gorbachev, and the KGB was broken up in retribution for these actions. The internal security, counterintelligence, border guard, and protection service missions formerly assigned to the KGB were given to newly created organizations. The SVR concentrates on collecting political, economic, scientific, and technical information, and relies on HUMINT, SIGINT, and open source analysis for producing intelligence. The majority of SVR case officers operate under diplomatic cover from Russian embassies and consulates. Although the number of SVR personnel has allegedly been reduced by 30 percent, the agency continues active collection operations. It is also suspected that the SVR continues to be involved in conducting propaganda and influence operations.
The Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU)
The GRU and the Ministry of Defense supported Gorbachev against the August 1991 coup, and, unlike the KGB, the GRU survived the aftermath of the coup largely intact. The GRU is responsible for providing strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence for the Russian armed forces. Principle missions include the collection of indications and warning intelligence, data on advanced military technologies, and specific information on the intentions and military capabilities of potential adversaries. Collection techniques include gathering open source information, acquiring overt and clandestine HUMINT, conducting satellite and aircraft imagery reconnaissance, and collecting SIGINT from various platforms (ships, aircraft, satellites and ground stations).
Collection activities that threaten U.S. interests are those under the First Deputy Chief and the Space Intelligence Directorate. The Space Intelligence Directorate manages the Russian space reconnaissance program in coordination with the Fleet Intelligence Direction of the Fifth Directorate. The Fleet Intelligence Direction is responsible for space systems that provide intelligence supporting naval forces. The Space Intelligence Directorate is responsible for the development, manufacture, launch, and operation of Russian space-based reconnaissance systems. The directorate is located at Vatutinki, 50 kilometers southwest of Moscow. It operates its own cosmodromes, several research institutes, supporting mission ground centers, and a centralized computer processing facility.
The Chief of Information is responsible for the analysis of information obtained through the intelligence collection operations managed by the First Deputy Chief. Analytical activities are organized into geographical sections and a limited number of functional activities that cut across geographic areas. An example of functional orientation is the Mnth Directorate, which acquires and assesses scientific and technical data for the military design bureaus. Of particular interest to the OPSEC manager is the Institute of Information, which operates separately from the directorates under the Chief of Information and is responsible for developing intelligence products based on the fusion of open source materials and classified information.
The Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information (FAPSI)
The FAPSI was created in October 1991 by Presidential decree. It is the newest of the Russian intelligence agencies, and relatively little information is available on its organizational structure and activities. The FAPSI is responsible for both communications security for the Russian Federation, and SIGINT operations against targeted foreign activities. It has also been given responsibility for the development and maintenance of databases and communications systems to support Russian intelligence and law enforcement activities. FAPSI is chartered to lease government communications lines to private investors, to set up communications activities on the territory of other sovereign states, and to conduct foreign business activities. The access provided through such activities will allow FAPSI the opportunity to monitor communications systems in which it has an interest, and will permit the purchase advanced telecommunications technologies from foreign companies. The former Soviet Union, and now Russia, have been denied the opportunity to purchase advanced communications and information systems from the West. It appears that the Russians hope that the entrance of FAPSI into the commercial telecommunications market will end this isolation.
Russian Intelligence Operations
HUMINT
Both the GRU, and the SVR as the successor to the KGB, conduct HUMINT operations that target the United States. The most recent example of a HUMINT operation conducted by Russia is the case of Aldrich Ames. Ames was a Central Intelligence Agency employee in the Directorate of Operations. In his work with the Directorate of Operations, Ames was able to obtain information pertaining to ongoing operations targeting the former Soviet Union and later Russia. Ames volunteered to work for the KGB in April 1985 as a walk-in to the Soviet Embassy in Washington and continued to work for the SVR after the fall of the Soviet Union. His espionage activities continued until his arrest on the morning of February 21, 1994. Upon his arrest, it was determined that Ames had been paid at least $2.5 million for his services and that he had compromised, by his own admission, “virtually all Soviet agents of the CIA and other American and foreign services known to me.” In addition, he stated that he provided the former Soviet Union and Russia with a huge quantity of information on U.S. foreign, defense, and security policies.
It is very likely that the Russians will continue to place a significant emphasis on the development of HUMINT sources because of the quality of information they have received in the past.[13] Since the August 1991 coup, the number of HUMINT operations conducted by the SVR and KGB that target the United States and the West have risen rather than fallen. In March 1993, the FBI and German counterintelligence authorities reported that SVR/GRU activities in their respective countries had grown by over 12 percent from pre-coup levels.This is due to a number of factors. First, as a result of arms control treaties, joint business opportunities, and numerous cultural and economic exchanges, the Russian intelligence services now have greater access to American society, government, and industry. Second, there has been a significant influx of Russian emigres into the United States. The FBI estimates that over 105,000 Russians emigrated to the United States in the late 1980s. The Russians have traditionally used emigres as a means to gather intelligence. Third, there has been a substantial influx of Russian students into the United States; many of these students are studying technical disciplines that are required by the Russians to improve both military and civil industries. Fourth, travel restrictions on Russian diplomatic and consular personnel in the United States have been lifted, making it easier to collect information on U.S. activities.
SIGINT
Russia continues to maintain one of the most sophisticated SIGINT programs in the world. The GRU’s Sixth Directorate uses over 20 different types of aircraft, a fleet of 60 SIGINT collection vessels, satellites, and ground stations to collect signals intelligence. Together with FAPSI, the GRU operates SIG1NT collection facilities in over 60 diplomatically protected facilities throughout the world. These agencies also operate large ground collection facilities within the territory of the Commonwealth of Independent States, at Cam Rank Bay, Vietnam, and at Lourdes, Cuba. These activities provide the Russians with worldwide SIGINT collection capabilities.
The SIGINT facility at Lourdes is among the most significant intelligence collection capabilities targeting the United States. This facility, less than 100 miles from Key West, is one of the largest and most sophisticated SIGINT collection facilities in the world. It is jointly operated by the GRU, FAPSI, and Cuba’s intelligence services. The complex is manned by over 1,000 Russian personnel and is capable of monitoring a wide array of commercial and government communications throughout the southeastern United States, and between the United States and Europe. Lourdes intercepts transmissions from microwave towers in the United States, communication satellite downlinks, and a wide range of shortwave and high-frequency radio transmissions. It also serves as a mission ground station and analytical facility supporting Russian SIGINT satellites. The facility at Lourdes, together with a sister facility in Russia, allows the Russians to monitor all U. S. military and civilian geosynchronous communications satellites. It has been alleged that the Lourdes facility monitors all White House communications activities, launch control communications and telemetry from NASA and Air Force facilities at Cape Canaveral, financial and commodity wire services, and military communications links. According to one source, Lourdes has a special collection and analysis facility that is responsible for targeting financial and political information. This activity is manned by specially selected personnel and appears to be highly successful in providing Russian leaders with political and economic intelligence.
The former Soviet Union also used a variety of other means to collect signals intelligence. The Soviets operated SIGINT collection sites in over 60 countries from diplomatically protected embassies, consulates, trade legations, and residences. It is possible that these activities are continuing in the United States. The location of a number of Russian diplomatic facilities in the United States would provide Russian SIGINT collectors with access to sensitive information. Russian collection activities could derive sensitive information on Government policies from monitoring Government activities in the Washington, DC area, and sensitive financial and trade information using Russian facilities located in New York, San Francisco, and Seattle. The location of microwave towers and cellular communication repeaters in the vicinity of Russian diplomatic facilities in these cities increases the potential damage from collection activities. In the past, vans from the Soviet Mission to the United Nations were observed in the vicinity of the GE Americom satellite ground station in Vernon Valley, NJ, and vans from the San Francisco consulate were observed in the vicinity of AT&T microwave towers in Northern California. In both cases, the vans appeared to be conducting SIG1NT monitoring at these facilities.[19]
The Russians have probably also continued the Soviet practice of using covert mobile collection platforms. During the Cold War, the Russians frequently used tractor-trailers, and other vehicles with concealed SIGINT collection equipment to gather intelligence in Western Europe. Western intelligence officials estimate that the Soviets conducted over 7,000 covert vehicular SIGINT operations in NATO countries annually. During these operations, the Soviets gathered electronic order of battle (EOB) data, monitored exercise communications, conducted direction finding operations, and calibrated Soviet SIGINT satellites to determine geolocation accuracies. The Soviets also allegedly used clandestine collection vans located in Mexico to monitor activities at White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. Vans operating from Tijuana, Mexico reportedly were able to monitor all of Southern California and Western Arizona. There have also been reports that Aeroflot aircraft and clandestine collection vehicles have been used to collect SIGINT data inside the continental United States.
The Russians also use satellites for collecting SIGINT. The first Soviet SIGINT satellite was the Cosmos 189 ELINT satellite, which was launched in 1967. Over the next 24 years, the Soviets placed over 200 SIGINT satellites into orbit. The Russians continue to maintain a robust presence in space. During 1994, the Russians conducted 48 spacecraft launches, 50 percent of which were military missions including advanced imagery systems, ocean reconnaissance, and electronic intelligence collection. In 1995, the Russians have programmed 45 space launches; again approximately 50 percent will be military missions.
The GRU is tasked with operating Russian ELINT satellites. ELINT satellites use active and passive techniques to detect specific targets. They complement the data provided by imaging satellites and assist in developing a more complete picture of an adversary’s forces or intentions. These satellites are designed to track and geolocate radio and radar emanations of ships at sea, mobile air defense radars, fixed strategic early warning radars, and other military emitters for the purpose of identification, location, and signals analysis. The data can then be used for targeting, offensive and defensive engagement planning, and countermeasure development.
Collection activities are managed by the Satellite Intelligence Directorate, and data analysis is performed by the Decrypting Service of the Sixth Directorate. Currently, there is no evidence of the existence of a Russian COMINT satellite, however, it is likely that the Russians could develop such a system if they wished.
IMINT
The primary IMINT threat posed by Russia is represented by satellite imagery systems. The first Soviet reconnaissance satellite was launched in 1962. Over the next 30 years, the Soviets launched over 850 photoreconnaissance satellites. On average, the Soviets, and now the Russians, have been able to maintain 2 photoreconnaissance satellites in orbit each year with an average of 780 mission days per year. Russian imagery systems are assessed to be able to obtain resolutions of better than one-third of a meter. The Russians currently use three types of imagery satellites depending on the imagery requirement.
The third-generation photoreconnaissance satellite is a medium resolution system (1.5 to 3 meters) that is used for wide area surveillance missions. The satellite flies in low earth orbits at altitudes ranging from 235 to 245 kilometers. It is designed for mission durations of 2 to 3 weeks, and requires that the satellite be deorbited for return of film canisters. During Operation Desert Storm, the former Soviet Union launched three of these spacecraft to fly repetitive ground tracks over the Persian Gulf region. The capability to quickly launch and recover these satellites allowed the Soviets to double their coverage of the area in response to the intelligence requirements of Soviet political and military leaders. The Russians appear to be phasing the third-generation satellite out of operation in favor of follow-on systems.
The fourth-generation photoreconnaissance satellite provides the Russians with increased operational capabilities. The spacecraft flies elliptical orbits at altitudes of 170 kilometers, which improves resolution. The principal improvements in the systems are the ability to return film canisters without deorbiting the spacecraft, and the extension of orbital lifetime. The productive lifetime of the fourthgeneration satellite now averages 60 days per mission. During the last 5 years, the Russians have launched 6 high resolution satellites, and 1 topographic mapper annually. During the Persian Gulf War the former Soviets launched 4 fourth-generation satellites in a period of less than 90 days, illustrating the ability of the Russians to surge reconnaissance systems in times of crisis or international tension. The groundtrack of these satellites was aligned with the Persian Gulf region to provide additional coverage during daylight hours.
The fifth-generation satellite is an electrooptic imaging system that provides the Russians with near real-time imagery. The fifth-generation imagery satellite greatly improves the reconnaissance capabilities of the Russian Federation. It provides quicker return of intelligence data and ends the restrictions posed by the limited amount of film that can be carried by a photoreconnaissance satellite. In general, the fifth-generation satellite is used for global reconnaissance, and the third and fourth generation satellites are used for coverage of particularly sensitive areas.
Overall, the Russians have continued to maintain a robust space reconnaissance program, despite predictions that the program would wane after the demise of the Soviet Union. The Russians have been able to maintain a constellation of 160 satellites in orbit simultaneously, the same level as under the Soviet Union, despite a 35 percent reduction in launches. The one major problem faced by the Russians is the lack of an all weather/day/night imaging system. Both electro-optic and photographic systems require daylight and clear weather to be able to image an area. In the 1980s, the Soviet attempted to develop a synthetic aperture radar (SAR) system to provide all weather and night coverage. This program failed to develop a militarily acceptable product, and the resulting Almaz spacecraft was converted into a commercial mapping system. No comparable SAR system is currently known to be under development.
MASINT
The Russians have a number of programs that can provide MASINT data. The Russian Prognoz satellite has infrared detection capabilities similar to those provided by the U.S. Defense Support Program (DSP) satellite system. The Prognoz can be used to conduct a variety of missions in support of infrared intelligence (IRINT). Other MASINT-related systems include a wide variety of sophisticated radar systems that can be used for radar intelligence (RADINT), a well-developed acoustic intelligence (ACOUSTINT) program for antisubmarine warfare, and a highly developed nuclear intelligence (NUCINT) program that collects samples from nuclear testing.
Russian Intelligence Collection Trends
Russia is likely to continue to aggressively use its intelligence services to gain information concerning the United States. They will retain the ability to develop all source intelligence and will use the information gained through these efforts to improve their standing in global political, economic, and security matters. Russia will continue to pursue intelligence concerning U.S. military capabilities, foreign policy initiatives, and the development of military technologies. There is likely to be an increased emphasis on obtaining commercial or dual use technology through intelligence operations
Defectors from the former Soviet and the Russian intelligence services have stated that industrial espionage activities will escalate in the years ahead. Russia requires advanced technology to bolster its economy and foster increased technological progress. Defectors have stated that the SVR will target the increasing number of joint U.S./Russian business ventures in an effort to legally obtain or steal desirable Western technologies. The Russians do not in many cases have the ability to pay for those items they need to improve economic growth so they are willing to steal them or obtain them through other illegitimate means. Additionally, the Russians still must contend with restrictions on certain technologies that they desire. Most of these technologies are dual use technologies that would play a significant role in the development of advanced weapons systems or improved Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I) systems. In 1994, the United States denied a request by the Russian government to purchase advanced telecommunications systems from AT&T. The request was denied based on an assessment by the National Security Agency that the technology would be used in C3I systems. Based on past collection patterns, it should be assumed that the Russians are still targeting these technologies.
Another likely trend is that, because of the reported reduction in the number of SVR intelligence officers, the Russians will place increasing emphasis on gaining information through technical intelligence disciplines, and open source analysis.[31] Although the opportunity to collect HUMINT has expanded as a result of the relaxation of security standards in focused on Russia; the reduction in the number of SVR intelligence officers, the closing of diplomatic facilities throughout the world, and the loss of access to former Warsaw Pact intelligence services will lead to a overall reduction in intelligence acquired through HUMINT. HUMINT is likely to be more carefully targeted to gain information not readily available through technical intelligence collection or through open source exploitation. The Russians have always relied on open source information and will continue to obtain intelligence by analyzing public data in comparison with intelligence derived through classified sources. The Soviets used a variety of research and political institutes for the analysis of open source data. The majority of these institutes have been retained by the Russians and are likely performing the same roles as they did under the Soviet Union. The Russians will continue to use information gained through these research institutes and from the collection opportunities provided by joint trade, research, and educational activities

The Season of Evil
by Gregory Douglas

Preface
This is in essence a work of fiction, but the usual disclaimers notwithstanding, many of the horrific incidents related herein are based entirely on factual occurrences.
None of the characters or the events in this telling are invented and at the same time, none are real. And certainly, none of the participants could be considered by any stretch of the imagination to be either noble, self-sacrificing, honest, pure of motive or in any way socially acceptable to anything other than a hungry crocodile, a professional politician or a tax collector.
In fact, the main characters are complex, very often unpleasant, destructive and occasionally, very entertaining.
To those who would say that the majority of humanity has nothing in common with the characters depicted herein, the response is that mirrors only depict the ugly, evil and deformed things that peer into them
There are no heroes here, only different shapes and degrees of villains and if there is a moral to this tale it might well be found in a sentence by Jonathan Swift, a brilliant and misanthropic Irish cleric who wrote in his ‘Gulliver’s Travels,”
“I cannot but conclude the bulk of your natives to be the most odious race of little pernicious vermin that Nature ever suffered to crawl upon the surface of the earth.”
Swift was often unkind in his observations but certainly not inaccurate.

Frienze, Italy
July 2018-August 2019

Chapter 21

Chuck had intended to spend the night in San Francisco but he had located the exact vehicle he wanted late in the afternoon and by seven, had purchased it and taken time for a leisurely dinner on Grant Avenue with Mr. Lew, his old friend and fence.
When he parked in the space behind his apartment, he was entirely preoccupied with details of the forthcoming trip and was absolutely stunned when he walked into the kitchen from the back door.
The first thing he saw were the backs of Connie and her fleshy Briton, both stripped to their leather undies. As if this wasn’t bad enough, in front of them, hands cuffed together and connected with ropes to hooks screwed into the ceiling, were the entirely nude figures of Lars and his new maid of honor. Both had been gagged and they were facing each other with about a foot of space between them. The girl was staring with the eyes of a frightened horse as Tolliver was bringing his whip back for another pass.
Chuck, who could move very quickly when he chose to do so, grabbed the whip in one hand, whirled an astonished Tolliver around with the other and then punched him in his soft stomach with a very hard right fist.
Connie began to shriek, then clawed at Chuck who ignored the gasping Powermaster and flattened her with a right to the jaw.
He was in a cold fury as he kicked Tolliver squarely in his leather-encased genitals.
“Asshole, where are the cuff keys?”
Tolliver couldn’t answer if he had wanted to so Chuck took the whip and slashed him across the face with the butt of it, breaking his nose.
With blood flowing down his face, the prophet of the Real Truth came face to face with reality and the distinct possibility of a very painful and immediate death,
“Here, here!” he hissed, his upper plate broken in his mouth, as he pulled a small key from the waistband of his costume, “here, take it, take it!”
And Chuck did and then beat the man senseless with the whip butt.
Connie and her companion were both unconscious and bleeding copiously on the tile floor while Chuck unchained the latter day Romeo and Juliet and pulled off their gags.
Gwen began to shriek in a thin, high-pitched tone and he slapped her sharply across the cheek. When she stopped, Chuck turned to Lars who was rubbing his wrists.
“You stupid fucking asshole! What the shit is happening here? I can’t be gone for an hour and there you are, hanging up by your thumbs with a huge hardon and some fucking freak beating your norske ass with a bullwhip! Jesus God, what a mess. Take the broad and get some clothes on her while I deal with the Morlocks.”
Chuck rummaged around in the kitchen until he found a box of small plastic trash bags, pulled one each over the heads of the true believers to prevent the leakage of blood and then turned off the lights in the kitchen before opening the back door. The grounds were dark, saving for a few standing lights in the bushes, and the pool behind the building was shut down for the night.
“Ladies first,” Chuck muttered as he dragged Connie by the feet out the door and lowered her into the pool after first taking off the bloody bag.
Tolliver followed her into the ebon depths and all that marked their passing were clusters of bursting bubbles on the surface of the water.
He found their clothes scattered all over the kitchen and gathered them up, depositing them at random around the pool and over the furniture. The bag with its contents was left on a table beside the now still waters. He had the foresight to remove the videotape from the camera before dropping it into the pool.
After Chuck wiped up the blood on the tile floor, he burned the crimsoned paper towels in the fireplace and then went back to Lars’ bedroom to further lecture the occupants on their stupidity. The girl was a problem but he had no real interest in silencing her permanently.
He found the door locked, pulled out his picks and in less than five seconds, opened the door.
The couple had obviously gotten over their fright because they were engaged in frantic copulation on the bed. When Chuck turned on the light neither of them either noticed or cared.
He closed the door behind him and shook his head.
“Gone five hours and look at what happened! Now what? Two corpses and a minor with a badly stretched vagina. God damn!” he shouted as he went into the living room and searched for a bottle of cognac he had hidden in the bookcase.
From the gruntings and squealings down the hall, he knew he had at least another hour to sort out solutions to his problems.
After two drinks, he began to wonder what would happen in the morning when someone found the manager and her friend, drowned at the bottom of the heart-shaped pool and dressed in cute leather underwear. The police would have an entertaining morning for certain and of course they would have to stay in the apartment until the furor dissipated.
The noises of realized passion continued from the end of the hall and Chuck finally went to bed after carefully rechecking the kitchen floor for blood traces.

Chuck slept badly and woke up early. While drinking a cup of strong coffee, he peeked out through the curtains that covered the window looking out onto the pool area.
There was no one in the pool and he looked at his watch. The hour was ten minutes after eight and the day was warm. By all rights, there ought to be at least one rubbery woman in her sixties trying to get a tan.
He saw some kind of a yellow notice attached to the gate leading to the pool and considering what he had put in it, Chuck went out through the front door wearing a pair of trunks and carrying a large towel.
The sign informed that the pool was temporarily closed due to imminent repairs and that swimmers were requested to use the pool on the other side of the complex.
By standing up as high as he could, Chuck could just make out vague, dark shapes in the turquoise depths. The pool was heated and the day was warm but he doubted if decomposition would build up enough gasses in the corpses to cause them to float for at least a week.
He went back to the apartment and took a long, hot shower before working on the plans for the trip to Minnesota.
About ten, a very tired and entirely naked Lars trudged into the dining room where Chuck was working.
“My, my, there he is now. Mr. Fuck himself. Did you sleep well lad?”
Lars grunted and walked into the kitchen towards the pot of coffee.
“No, she kept me up all night.”
“When you get older, you will wish something could keep you up all night.”
Lars poured himself a cup of coffee and sat down across from Chuck.
“Eric or who ever you are today, why don’t you at least put on some pants? And you might consider a shower. You smell of musk and dried semen, not to mention female excretions.”
“Shit, shit, I never thought I would have too much sex, Chuck but I did last night. Are you still mad at me?”
Chuck sighed and folded up the map of the western United States on which he was making marks.
“No, I’m not mad at you anymore but we have to decide what to do about the gash in there. I mean, she doesn’t know what happened to her aunt…”
Lars drained the cup.
“What did happen to her? Did you screw her?”
No, booby, I dumped both of the perverts…say, I am sorry about that word. It just slipped out….both of them into the pool. I’m afraid they drowned and are yet to be found.”
“Shit.”
“Yes, it happens. Very good. We have to tough it out here until the bodies are found and then field any questions from the police. The broad knows nothing?”
“She surely likes her sex.”
“That’s obvious from the love bites on your upper body. They look like plague tokens. She knoweth not that her foul auntie is bloating at the bottom of the pool. Fine, then don’t tell her. You two are obviously deeply in love…”
Lars made a face.
“Oh yes, lad, the angels are fluttering around your nuptial couch, strumming their harps while she is strumming your engorged mass. Well, just keep her busy and content in there until we convince the law that we know nothing and then off we go. I mean, who wants to stay in a fancy apartment where the S and M manager and her aged lover drown in the pool while pounding on each other. The big O being sought with fatal results.”
“‘O’?”
“Orgasm. Shooting your wad, coming, ejaculating. I’m sure you know all of these nice words. Anyway, Connie and the limey fairy are now dead and good riddance. You know, Lars, if I hadn’t walked in, your back might look like a rasher of bacon now and God knows what the poor girl would look like. People like that are far better off at the bottom of a pool somewhere. Do you want some breakfast? How about a dish of raw oysters covered with cold chocolate sauce for starters?”
“Chuck, you are very sick, believe me. Do you want me to throw up?”
A faint voice, growing in volume, came from Lars’ room.
“Honey, honey, where are you?”
Chuck laughed.
“The voice of the turtle is heard in the land, Lars. Go back and do the beast with two backs for a while and please, take a shower first. My God, it must stink in there.”
It did but Lars was too preoccupied to care.
Later in the afternoon, Chuck had finished his trip planning when Gwen wandered into the living room wearing only one of Lars’ shirts. He looked at her and decided that she had nice legs but her face was filled with exhaustion and satiation
“Hi'” she said as she sat down cross-legged on a chair. Chuck averted his eyes from a view of her private parts and tried to make light conversation.
“Hi to you too. I hope you weren’t hurt last night…”
She smiled shyly.
“He’s so big, I thought something would bust inside me.”
Chuck coughed.
“That really wasn’t what I meant. I refer to the whipping.”
“Oh that? No, I really wasn’t thinking about that but I guess I could have been hurt. Have you seen Connie?”
Chuck cleared his throat.
“Yes, well I believe she and her friend went to some college to teach a course in advance perversion to the students. Gwen…that is your name?”
“Yes. I mean it’s Gwenneth but…”
“I know. Gwen will do. Listen, your aunt was..is…not a nice woman. Ah…Lars and I are going to take a trip and we want you to come with us. Would you like that?”
Her face with the purple bags under the eyes lighted up and she clapped her hands together. Her dreams of love were being realized at last.
“Oh yes, very much. But all my clothes are over at Aunt Connie’s place…”
“Never mind,” said Chuck, “I’ll go over later and collect them for you. I think you should stay here for a few days and then we can go. Would you mind staying here with Lars?”
“Oh no! I want to do that so much!”
“I see. Well, so much for that. Is there anything else I can help you with?”
She stood up and opened the shirt.
“Well, Lars tells me my tits are just right but I think they are too small. What do you think?”
Chuck looked at her chest with polite interest.
“Well I think…they look fine to me. You’re probably a late bloomer.’
“What does that mean?”
“Time will tell. What’s Lars doing now?”
She giggled, something that annoyed Chuck intensely.
“Oh he’s sleeping now. Do you think I could go swimming? It’s so hot outside.”
“No, dear, not now. The pool is being fixed. Why don’t you take a nice, warm shower and get all clean. Then I can wake Lars up and cook lunch for everyone. How would that be?”
It would certainly be better than for Gwen to encounter her aunt at the bottom of the pool.
“I guess so.” Her face brightened. “I can go and wake him up and we can take a shower together!”
And she ran back to the bedroom leaving Chuck shaking his head.
“Oh my, what a wonderful trip we will have. As long as she doesn’t show her tits to waitresses and gas station attendants, we might make it without being arrested.”
And he went into the kitchen to see what he could fix up for lunch.
No one appeared the next day to repair the pool and in the meantime, Chuck had gotten into the manager’s apartment and taken out all of Gwen’s clothes, the only copy of his rental agreement and about three hundred dollars in loose change he found in the office filing cabinet. He went through Tolliver’s effects and found another fifteen hundred dollars cunningly hidden in a worn cash belt.
Before he left and locked up behind him, he typed out a note on the office typewriter to the effect that Connie was leaving for Mexico and would never return.
In the desk he had found a rubber stamp copy of her signature and he stamped this on the bottom of the note and then taped it to the outside of the door.
Since this visit was accomplished at three in the morning, none of the tenants observed it. In fact, there was so much shrubbery surrounding the buildings that Chuck decided he could probably steal the desk as well.

(Continued)

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