TBR News May 9, 2020
The Voice of the White House
Washington, D.C. May 9, 2020: Working in the White House as a junior staffer is an interesting experience.
When I was younger, I worked as a summer-time job in a clinic for people who had moderate to severe mental problems and the current work closely, at times, echos the earlier one.
I am not an intimate of the President but I have encountered him from time to time and I daily see manifestations of his growing psychological problems.
He insults people, uses foul language, is frantic to see his name mentioned on main-line television and pays absolutely no attention to any advice from his staff that runs counter to his strange ideas.
He lies like a rug to everyone, eats like a hog, makes lewd remarks to female staffers and flies into rages if anyone dares to contradict him.
It is becoming more and more evident to even the least intelligent American voter that Trump is vicious, corrupt and amoral. He has stated often that even if he loses the
election in 2020, he will not leave the White House. I have news for Donald but this is not the place to discuss it. “
Comment for May 9, 2020:” “Who was Tyler Gatewood Kent? Kent was a code clerk at the US Embassy in London while Joe Kennedy was Ambassador to England.
He copied thousands of highly classified messages, passed some to the Germans and a few to Russian contacts.
He was caught and Kennedy allowed the British to prosecute him. He went to jail and the document copies were stashed away in England.
Somehow, someone got their hands on them, sent copies to the late Willis Carto and he, in turn, gave copies to Thomas K. Kimmel, Jr. grandson of Admiral Kimmel and then working at altitude for the FBI.
When Kimmel died recently in Florida, his collection of interesting documents passed to the hands of another.
Now, as I understand it, a German publisher has all the Kimmel horde and is planning to publish excerpts from the Kent papers.
I know that at least some of the papers prove that Roosevelt and Churchill were plotting to get the US into a war with Germany.
Also, there were nasty comments by Kennedy who called Churchill “a fat little alcoholic fairy” and mention of the Duke of Windsor as a “lisping fairy.”
There are other discussions that, when published, will cause havoc in England and great interest in Germany.
I would publish on the Internet myself but it would be better to wait until the book(s) come out first.
Would the German government crack down on the publisher?
I spoke with a good friend in the German State Attorney’s office and they said they would not.
They are very tired of the CIA trying to run Germany and are planning to get out of both Nato and the EU.
I could mention more interesting historical facts in detail but this is not the medium for that.
Truth is mighty, sir, and shall prevail.”
The Table of Contents
• US job losses have reached Great Depression levels. Did it have to be that way?
• Coronavirus inflicts huge U.S. job losses as pandemic breaches White House walls
• Report on use and development of chemical and biological weaponry
• Encyclopedia of American Loons
US job losses have reached Great Depression levels. Did it have to be that way?
The US and Europe have taken different approaches to tackling pandemic-induced unemployment but which is best long term?
May 9, 2020
by Dominic Rushe
The Guardian
In two, terrible, months the coronavirus pandemic has driven unemployment in the US to levels unseen since the 1930s Great Depression. Did it have to be this way?
Covid-19 has cost more than 33 million Americans their jobs in the last seven weeks – 10% of the entire US population. The official unemployment rate had shot up from 4.4% to 14.7% on Friday – a figure that probably wildly underestimates the true scale of job losses.
Across the Atlantic in Europe unemployment rates, while rising sharply, have yet to match the devastating rises experienced in the US. The UK is facing 9%-plus unemployment. In Germany the International Monetary Fund is predicting an unemployment rate of just 3.9% for 2020, up from 3.2% last year.
The stark differences can in part be explained by a German word: “Kurzarbeit.” And two – largely – opposing views on the best way to recover from this unprecedented lockdown and the tsunami of job losses that have followed.
Kurzarbeit – literally “short work” – allows businesses facing a temporary emergency to apply for government subsidies to keep paying workers’ salaries until the crisis passes.
“Keeping people connected to their employers is a good idea,” said Simon Johnson, professor of entrepreneurship at the MIT Sloan School of Management and a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. Retaining skilled workers and maintaining households in crisis, in principle, should allow people, companies and countries to bounce back faster once the crisis passes, he said.
Many European counties, including the UK, Italy and the Netherlands, have adapted versions of the model for the current crisis after witnessing Germany’s speedy recovery from the last recession. “The people who are closest to Germany actually seem to have got this, those that are further have struggled to understand it,” he said.
The US, instead, is largely relying on its unemployment insurance program to deal with the crisis. After much political infighting Congress agreed to boost state benefits by $600 a week until the summer. The money more than doubles the weekly maximum unemployment benefits in most states.
The philosophical split is not pure. Kurzarbeit’s shadow can be seen in the US’s $669bn paycheck protection program (PPP). PPP was meant to help small businesses keep staff on the payroll during the crisis in return for forgivable loans. But that hastily assembled program has proved complicated to apply for and administer. Large sums initially went to big companies, including the LA Lakers basketball team and the Shake Shack burger chain. Many small businesses have complained they were squeezed out of the system or frightened off by the uncertainty over whether or not they will have to repay the money.
Nor has the US’s unemployment program been without problems. Many state systems have collapsed under the weight of applications – a situation that has left hundreds of thousand, if not millions, of Americans facing uncertain futures.
‘The whole thing was just so confusing’
When the pandemic hit the US, Simon and Codi Bates were running three restaurants in the hip college town of Lawrence, Kansas. They closed everything in March and had to lay off 130 people. The timing was awful. Wedding season was just starting and the couple’s Cider Gallery event space had to close its doors too.
The Bateses did initially look at PPP. “We have had two different bankers and a whole team of accountants telling us different things at different times. We get calls at eight o’clock at night on it,” said Simon Bates. “The whole thing was just so confusing.” Like many US businesses they decided they were better off letting staff go until the future was clearer.
Some of the people they laid off are now better off than they were when they were working. Bates has been slowly reopening his restaurants for takeout and has re-employed about a dozen people but at least one person who he asked to come back told him that he would rather wait it out on his supercharged unemployment benefits.
That may not be a bad idea for both of them. “Our business is a social business. Who knows how people’s perspectives have been changed by this,” said Bates. “Carry-out may be the way things are for the next year, two years? I just don’t know.” In the near future, he may only need a fraction of his old staffing numbers.
Other hard-hit industries like retail, hotels and entertainment may also face a long wait before business returns to normal – if indeed it ever does. Maybe it is better that the people in those industries make the shift to another one.
“The danger [with this approach] is that if people become unemployed for any length of time, they lose their skills and they lose their ability to get back into the labor force,” said Johnson, adding that just such an experience contributed to the US’s slow recovery from the last recession.
On the flip side, he added, the German model potentially ties people to jobs that may no longer exist.
That’s certainly the position of Ryan Bourne, R Evan Scharf chair for the Public Understanding of Economics at Cato Institute, a libertarian thinktank. Although he questions whether we have enough data yet to say which approach – if either – will prove the more effective.
“I don’t think, near term, that the unemployment numbers are the best metric to assess the success of these systems,” said Bourne. “Long term, the key here is how much is the economy going to change during this period of lockdown? I think subsidies to keep people on payrolls make most sense.
“If, on the other hand, the economy is permanently changed, people don’t want to go back to restaurants, people don’t want to go back to cinema, people buy different manufactured products, then, it might seem harsh, but you want the economy to adjust and businesses will fail,” he said.
Time will tell which system proves better able to deal with the biggest economic challenge of the decade.
If US unemployment continues to rise, there may be more pressure for the Trump administration to add some German to its economic lexicon. The Fox News host Tucker Carlson, a sometimes favorite of Donald Trump, has referenced kurzarbeit recently and the Trump administration is already discussing further bailouts.
As both Johnson and Bourne point out, philosophical arguments over the relative merits of economic approaches to tackling the biggest job crisis in living memory will be tempered by stronger forces – political decisions and the course of the virus.
But at some point, said Bourne, governments will have to face a big question. Does it make sense to keep “emergency measures in place indefinitely for a potential future that might never return”.
Coronavirus inflicts huge U.S. job losses as pandemic breaches White House walls
May 9, 2020
by Lucia Mutikani and Maria Caspani
Reuters
WASHINGTON/NEW YORK (Reuters) – The U.S. government reported more catastrophic economic fallout from the coronavirus crisis on Friday as the pandemic pierced the very walls of the White House and California gave the green light for its factories to restart after a seven-week lockdown.
A day after the White House confirmed that President Donald Trump’s personal valet had tested positive for the virus, Trump told reporters that Katie Miller, press secretary to Vice President Mike Pence, had also been infected. She is married to senior Trump aide and immigration policy hard-liner Stephen Miller and travels frequently with Pence.
The back-to-back diagnoses of individuals close to Trump, Pence and the White House inner circle raised questions about whether the highest levels of government are adequately safeguarded from infection.
“We’ve taken every single precaution to protect the president,” White House spokeswoman Kayleigh McEnany told reporters.
Earlier in the day, the Labor Department reported the U.S. unemployment rate rose to 14.7% last month, up from 3.5% in February, demonstrating the speed with which the workforce collapsed after stay-at-home orders meant to curb the outbreak were imposed across most of the country.
Worse economic news may be yet to come. White House economic adviser Kevin Hassett said the unemployment rate was likely to climb to around 20% this month. The jobless rate for April already shattered the post-World War Two record of 10.8% set in November 1982.
The economic devastation has heightened the urgency of governors’ efforts to get their states’ economies moving again, even though infection rates and deaths are still rising in parts of the country.
California, the first state to issue stay-at-home orders on March 19, partially reopened shuttered commerce on Friday. Retailers such as bookstores, jewelers, clothing merchants, sporting goods shops and florists were permitted to begin offering curbside pickup and deliveries, while manufacturing and warehouse facilities were allowed to resume operations if they met infection-control requirements.
Governor Gavin Newsom, a Democrat, said California had managed to flatten its infection curve in recent weeks, allowing the state to safely proceed with gradually restarting the economy.
CHILD VICTIM
More than 77,000 Americans have died from COVID-19, the respiratory illness caused by the novel coronavirus, out of more than 1.29 million confirmed cases, according to a Reuters tally.
Elderly individuals and people with underlying chronic health conditions have been the most vulnerable.
But New York Governor Andrew Cuomo on Friday reported the death of a 5-year old boy from a rare inflammatory syndrome believed to be linked to the coronavirus, highlighting a potential new pandemic risk for children.
Just as minorities have been especially hard hit by the virus itself relative to their population size, African Americans and Hispanics also suffered disproportionately greater job losses in April – at 16.7% and 18.9%, respectively, the Labor Department data showed. The jobless rate was also higher among women, at 15.5%, compared with 13% for men.
Rita Trivedi, 63, of Hudson, Florida, was furloughed as an analyst at Nielsen Media Research on April 23 and has struggled to secure benefits from the state’s troubled unemployment system. She fears running short of money to cover her husband’s medical bills and other expenses.
“I’m more than anxious, I’m more than worried – it’s ‘can’t sleep’ kind of anxious,” Trivedi said. “I’m just so tense thinking about these things and how to manage.”
Trump, seeking re-election in November, initially played down the threat posed by the coronavirus, and has given inconsistent messages about the expected duration of the economic shutdown and its consequences.
Those jobs will all be back, and they’ll be back very soon,” he told Fox News on Friday.
CALIFORNIA
Newsom said California, home to 40 million residents with an economy ranking among the top five or six in the world, was doing worse than the nation as a whole, with unemployment running over 20 percent.
But he said roughly 70% of California’s economy was eligible to reopen “with modifications” under his plan, though it remained to be seen how many businesses would jump at the chance, and how many customers would immediately return.
In Los Angeles, few retail businesses appeared to be open in the downtown area. It also was unclear how much, if any, assembly line production in California had yet resumed.
Electric car manufacturer Tesla Inc (TSLA.O) was aiming to restart its factory in Fremont, California, on Friday, Chief Executive Officer Elon Musk wrote in an email to staff.
But a health official in Alameda County, where the plant is located, said local lockdown measures remained in effect and supersede Newsom’s relaxation of statewide restrictions.
“We’ve been working with them, but we have not given the green light,” health officer Erica Pan said of Tesla.
At least 40 of the 50 U.S. states are taking steps to lift restrictions affecting all but essential businesses – including Arizona, Mississippi and South Dakota, which on Friday all reported record numbers of cases.
Public health experts warn that reopening prematurely, without vastly expanded virus testing and other safeguards, risks fueling renewed outbreaks. They also say the state-by-state hodgepodge of differing policies may confuse the public and undermines social distancing efforts.
Reporting by Lucia Mutikani, Jeff Mason, Mari Caspani, Andy Sullivan, Lisa Shumaker, Rajesh Kumar Singh, Lisa Lambert, Tim Ahmann and Susan Heavey and Andrew Hay; Writing by Will Dunham and Steve Gorman, Editing by Howard Goller, Bill Tarrant and Sonya Hepinstall
Report on use and development of chemical and biological weaponry
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Chapter I
INTRODUCTION
1. Background
The threat or use of CB weapons is a possible condition of future warfare and could
occur in the early stages of war to disrupt United States (US) operations and logistics. In many of the regions where the US is likely to deploy forces, potential adversaries may use CB weapons. Potential adversaries may seek to counter US conventional military
superiority using less expensive and more attainable, asymmetrical means. To meet this challenge, US forces must be properly trained and equipped to operate effectively and decisively in the face of NBC attack s.1 Additionally, US forces could be confronted in an environment where TIC present a hazard to US forces. 2
a. Use of CB Weapons.3 Adversaries may employ CB agents and other toxic materials to achieve specific effects. In addition to the physical effects, there exist psychological effects, both in the immediate target area and in other vulnerable areas that may be potential targets.
(1) Chemical agents have effects that can be immediate or delayed, can be mpersistent or nonpersistent, and can have significant physiological effects. While relatively mlarge quantities of an agent are required to ensure an area remains contaminated over mtime, small- scale selective use that exploits surprise can cause significant disruption and may have lethal effects.
(2) Biological agents can produce lethal or incapacitating effects over an extensive area and can reproduce. The delayed onset of symptoms and detection, identification, and verification difficulties for biological agents can also confer important advantages to adversaries who decide to use biological agents.
(3) The means available to adversaries for delivery of CB weapons range from specially designed, sophisticated weapon sy stems developed by nations to relatively inefficient improvised devices employed by terrorists and other disaffected individuals and groups.
b. US Policy. 3 This paragraph contains brief descriptions of treaty, legal, and policy strictures on chemical and biological warfare (CBW ).
(1) The Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare,” also known as the Geneva Protocol of 1925, prohibits chemical and bacteriological methods of warfare. Most parties interpret the protocol as a prohibition only of the first use of these agents in war. It did not ban the development, production, or stockpiling of these weapons. In 1974, the US Senate gave advice and consent to ratification of this protocol, subject to the reservation that the US would not be bound by the provisions with respect to an enemy state or its allies who fail to respect the prohibitions of the protocol. On 22 January 1975, the US ratified the protocol subject to this reservation. The protocol entered into force for the US on 10 April 1975. The relevance of the Geneva Protocol is largely superseded by the more mrestrictive Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and mUse of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (also known as the Chemical Weapons Convention [CWC] and by the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological and Toxic Weapons (also k nown as the Biological Weapons Convention [BWC]) summarized below.
(2) The Presidential Statement on Chemical and Biological Weapons, 25
November 1969, renoun ced the US use of lethal biological agents and weapons and confined ,biological research to defensive measures such as immunization and safety. Under the terms of the BWC, parties undertake not to develop, produce, stock pile, or acquire biologicalagents or toxins “of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective and other peaceful purposes,” as well as weapons and means of delivery. The BWC does not establish a specific verification regime. The US ratified the BWC on 29 March 1975.
(3) Executive Order No. 11850, 8 April 1975, Renunciation of Certain Uses in
War of Chemical Herbicides and Riot Control Agents, renounced first use of herbicides in ,war (except for specified defensive uses) and first use of RCAs in war except for defensive ,military modes to save lives.
(4) The CWC, which entered into force on 29 April 1997, ban s the development,
production, acquisition, stockpiling, transfer, or use of chemical weapons. It provides for the destruction of all chemical weapons stocks within 10 years after entry into force. It contains a vigorous challenge regime to ensure compliance. The US ratified the CWC on 25
April 1997.
2. Threat
a. Changes. Countries with chemical weapons programs are adding agents and
more sophisticated delivery systems. Similarly, the sophistication of CBW capabilities is increasing. Proliferation of weapons techno logy, precision navigation technology, and CBW technology in developing nations presents the US with a complicated national security challenge. Intelligence efforts include co llection and analysis of nations’ dual-use, CB industrial capabilities, and development of the indications and warning of adversarial use of dual-use capabilities.
b. Challenges. The US faces a number of regional proliferation challenges. Many
of these are detailed in the January 2001 report published by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Proliferation: Threat and Response. At least 25 countries now possess—or are in the process of acquiring and developing—capabilities to inflict mass casualties and destruction: NBC weapons or the means to deliver them.5
c. Proliferation. Proliferation of CBW technology also raises several important
issues. Various nations could export a wide array of chemical products, including
Australian group-controlled items to numerous countries of proliferation concern. The controlled items include specific chemical agent precursors, pathogens with biological
warfare (BW) applications, and dual-use eq uipment that can be used in both CBW
programs.
d. Increases in Proliferation. In the next several years, the threat from the
proliferation of CBW may increase. This could result from the development of CB agents that are more difficult to detect and from the adoption of more capable delivery systems.
States with existing programs may master the production processes for complete weapons development and will be less depen dent on outside suppliers.
Any nation with the political will and a minimal industrial base could produce CBW agents suitable for use in warfare. Efficient weaponization of these agents,however, does require d esign and production skills usuall y found in countries that possess a munitions development infrastructure or access to such skills from cooperative sources.
(2) On the other hand, almost any nation or group could fabricate crude agent dispersal devices. Such weapons might be ca pable of inflicting only limited numbers ofcasualties; nevertheless, they could have significant operational repercussions due to thepsychological impact created by fears of CBW agent exposure. 4
(3) Genetic engineering gives BW developers the tools to pursue agents that could defeat the protective and treatment protocols of the prospective adversary.
Genetically engineered microorganisms also raise the technological hurdle that must be overcome to provide for effective detection, identification, and early warning of BW attacks.
(4) Numerous characteristics need to be controlled for a highly effective BW agent. Historically, the accentuation of one characteristic often resulted in the attenuation of one or more other characteristics, possibly even rendering the modified agent ineffective as a weapon. Advances in biotechnology, genetic engineering, and related scientific fields provide ever-increasing potential to control more of these factors, possibly leading to an enhanced ability to use BW agents as battlefield weapons.
e. Novel BW Agents.1 Advances in biotechnology and genetic engineering may facilitate the development of potentially new and more deadly BW agents. The ability to modify microbial agents at a molecular level has existed since the 1960s, when new genetic engineering techniques were introd uced, but the enterprise tended to be slow and unpredictable. With today’s techniques, infectious organisms can be modified to bring about disease in different ways. The current level of sophistication for many biological agents is low, but there is enormous potential—based on advances in modern molecular
biology, fermentation, and drug delivery technology—for making more sophisticated
weapons. The BW agents may emerge in two likely categories: man-made manipulations of classic BW agents and newly discovered or emerging infectious diseases. An example of a recent new pathogen (though not necessarily ideal BW agents) includes streptococcus ,pneumonia S23F, a naturally occurring strain of pneumonia resistant to at least six of the more commonly used antibiotics.
(1) The potential types of novel biological agents that could be produced through genetic engineering methodologies are listed below. Each of these techniques seeks mto capitalize on the extreme lethality, virulenc e, or infectivity of BW agents and exploit this mpotential by developing methods to deliver more efficiently and to control these agents on the battlefield.
(a) Benign microorganisms genetically altered to produce a toxin, venom ,or bioregulator.
(b) Microorganisms resistant to antibiotics, standard vaccines, and therapeutics.
(c) Microorganisms with enhanced aerosol and environmental stability.
(d) Immunologically altered microorganisms able to defeat standard identification, detection, and diagnostic methods.
(e) Combinations of the above four types with improved delivery systems.
2) The future likelihood of infectious agents being created for BW purposes will be influenced by technological trends such as—
(a) Genetically engineered vectors in the form of modified infectious organisms may become increasingly available as medical tools and techniques become more widely available.
(b) Strides will be made in the understanding of infectious disease mechanisms and in microbial genetics that are responsible for disease processes.
(c) An increased understanding of the human immune system function and disease mechanisms will shed light on the circumstances that cause individual susceptibility to infectious disease.
(d) Vaccines and antidotes will be improved over the long term, perhaps to the point where classic BW agents will offer less utility as a means of causing casualties.
(e) Many bioengineering companies (both US and foreign) now sell all-in–one kits to enable researchers to perform recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) experiments. The availability of free onl ine gene sequence databases and analytic software over the Internet further amplifies and disseminates this capability. It is now possible to transform relatively benign organisms to cause harmful effects.
3. Militarily Significant Aspects of Toxic Chemical Agents
a. Classification. A toxic chemical agent is any chemical which, through its chemical action on life processes, can cause death, temporary incapacitation, or permanent harm to humans or animals.6 For the purpose of this manual, chemical agents are further divided into chemical warfare (CW) agents and military chemical compounds. The terms “persistent” and “nonpersistent” describe the time chemical agents remain in an area and do not classify the agents technically.
(1) CW Agents. The CW agents are toxic chemica ls and their precursors prohibited under the CWC. These agents include choking, nerve, blood, blister, and incapacitating agents. Their physiological actions are as follows:
(a) Choking Agents. Choking agents cause damage to the lungs, irritation to the eyes and the respiratory tract, and pulmonary edema (“dry-land drowning”).
(b) Nerve Agents. Nerve agents inhibit cholinesterase (ChE) enzymes. This inhibition permits acetylcholine (ACh), wh ich transmits many nerve impulses, to collect at its various sites of action.7 The body’s muscles and glands become overstimulated due to excessive amounts of ACh. At sufficient doses, this can lead to an inability of the body to sustain breathing.
(c) Blood Agents. The blood transports these agents to all body tissues. Hydrogen cyanide (AC) and cyanogen chloride (CK) are cellular poisons, and they disrupt the oxidative processes used by the cells. Arsine (SA) is different. It causes hemolysis of the red blood cells.8 The central nervous system (CNS) is especially vulnerable to lack of oxygen rega rdless of the etiology, and respiratory and cardiovascular collapse resulting from AC and CK poisoning. In the case of SA poisoning, the proximal cause of death is mmyocardial failure.
.(d) Blister Agents (Vesicants). Blister agents are noted for producing reddening and blistering of the skin, but the eyes and respiratory tract are more sensitive than the skin. Eye exposure results in reddening of the eyes and temporary blindness or permanent effects. Inhaled mustard damages mucous membranes and the respiratory tract.
(e) Incapacitating Agents.Used in a military context, incapacitation is understood to mean inability to perform one’s military mission. Since missions vary, for the purpose of this manual, incapacitation means the inability to perform any military task effectively. An incapacitating agent is an agent that produces temporary physiological or mental effects, or both, which will render individuals incapable of concerted effort in the performance of their assigned duties. Medical treatment is not essential but can facilitate amore rapid recovery.
(2) Military Chemical Compounds. Military chemical compounds are less toxic and include materials such as respiratory irritant agents, RCAs, smoke and obscurants, and incendiary materials. The term excludes CW agents. Their physiological actions are as follows:
(a) RCAs (Lacrimators). The RCAs are chemicals that rapidly produce in humans sensory irritation or disabling physical effects which disappear within a short time following termination of exposure. 6 They are local irritants that, in very low concentrations, act primarily on the eyes, causing intense pain and tearing. At high concentrations they irritate the respiratory tract and the skin. They sometimes cause nausea and vomiting.
(b) Respiratory Irritant Agents. These agents were previously called vomiting agents. Their primary action is irritation of the respiratory tract.10 In addition, these agents cause lacrimation (tearing), irritation of the eyes, uncontrollable coughing, sneezing, nausea, and a general feeling of bodily discomfort. Usually symptoms disappear in 20 minutes to 2 hours, leaving no residual injury.
b. Duration of Effectiveness. Several factors determine the time a chemical agent remains effective. These include, but are not limited to, the method of dissemination, weather and terrain co nditions, and the physical and chemical properties of the agent.
(1) Method of Dissemination. Chemical agents are usually disseminated in the field in the form of vapors (gases), aerosols, or liquids. When a chemical agent is disseminated as a vapor from a bursting munition, initially the cloud expands, grows cooler and heavier, and tends to retain its form. Aerosols are finely divided liquid and/or solid substances suspended in the atmosphere and behave in much the same manner as vaporized agents. Liquid agents can be absorbed (soaked into) and adsorbed (adhered to) by surfaces. They can then be evaporated or desorbed (off-gas) from surfaces, causing a vapor hazard.
(2) Weather and Terrain Conditions. Many weather factors and terrain conditions influence the duration of effectiveness of chemical agents. Most important weather factors include temperature, temperature gradient, wind speed, relative humidity, and precipitation. Important terrain conditions include vegetation, soil, and terrain contours.
(3) Physical Properties. Some of the important physical properties are vapor density, vapor pressure (VP), volatility, freezing point (FP), and melting point (MP). Vapor density determines whether the agent is lighter or heavier than air, thus determining whether the agent will settle to low areas or float away and dissipate in the at mosphere. Vapor pressure is used to determine the volatility of an agent. The volatility has an effect upon the vapor concentration. It also affects the duration of an agent hazard after dissemination. The boiling and freezing points of chemical agents influence their operational use and the means of disseminating them..
(4) Chemical Properties. The chemical properties of an agent include its stability and reactivity with water and other substances.
c. Potency and Physiological Actions. Factors that contribute to the adverse human health effects of chemical agents include toxicity, route of exposure (ROE ), dosage, exposure duration, minute volume (MV), temperature, endpoint, physiological stressors, rate of detoxification (ROD), and rate of action (ROA). Note that not all factors are applicable to all exposure scenarios. For example, MV is not applicable to a percutaneous liquid exposure. Dosages are given for a 70-kilo gram (kg) male with an MV of 15 liters per minute (L/min). Additional toxicological data are required to determine if the toxicity estimates can be applied to women. Emphasis is placed on acute toxic effects. Acute toxic effects are those occurring within moments to a few days of the toxic exposure. The toxicity estimates provided are not applicable to the general population.
d. CWC Chemicals. There are, by conservative estimates, 25,000 or more chemicals subject to the CWC regulation—listing each chemical by name is not practical. Chemicals covered under the CWC are divided into three categories as follows:
(1) Schedule 1 chemicals have little or no use in industrial and agricultural industries. They pose a high risk to the object and purpose of the CWC by virtue of their high potential for use in activities prohibited under the CWC.14
(2) Schedule 2 chemicals may be useful in the production of chemical weapons; however, they also have legitimate uses in other industrial areas. They pose a significant risk to the object and purpose of the CWC.14
(3) Schedule 3 chemicals have legitimate uses in industrial areas and pose a risk to the object and purpose of the CWC. 14
e. Dual-Use Precursors. Precursors for CW agents also have civil uses in industrial and agricultural industries
g. Agent Mixtures. Mixing chemical agents with each other or with other materials
can alter the characteristics and effectiveness of the agents. Mixtures may lower the
freezing point, increasing agent effectiveness over a wider temperature range. The addition of thickeners or thinners to agents will in crease or decrease persistency: for example, soman (GD) mixed with thickeners will increase persistency; RCAs mixed with thinners will decrease persistency. In addition to changing the physical properties, mixing agents together will create special problems through their physiological effects. These problems can produce difficulty in identification, immediate and delayed effects, or contact and vapor hazards occurring simultaneously. Some mixtures would make it difficult to maintain the ,seal of the protective mask. Mixing some agents can also increase the toxic effects, either ,by a synergistic effect or by an improved absorption through the skin.
4. Militarily Significant As pects of Biological Agents
a. Classification. A biological agent is a microorganism that causes disease in personnel, plants, or animals or causes the deterioration of material.6 Biological agents can be classified as pathogens, toxins, bioregulators, or prions.
(1) Pathogens. Pathogens are disease-producing microorganisms,6 such as bacteria, rickettsiae, or viruses. Pathogens are either naturally occurring or altered by random mutation or recombinant DNA techniques.
(2) Toxins. Toxins are poisons formed as a specific secreting product in the metabolism of a vegetable or animal organism, as distinguished from inorganic poisons. Such poisons can also be manufactured by synthetic processes.6 Toxins are produced by a variety of organisms, including microbes, snakes, insects, spiders, sea creatures, and plants.
(3) Bioregulators. Bioregulators include biochemical compounds that regulate cell processes and physiologically active compounds such as catalysts and enzymes. Although they can be found in the human body in small quantities, introduction of large quantities can cause severe adverse effects or death.
(4) Prions. Prions are proteins that can cause neurodegenerative diseases in humans and animals.16 Proteins have a unique, genetically defined amino acids equence that determines their specific shapes and functions. Normal cell proteins have the same amino acid building blocks but they fold differently than prions. When prions enter brain cells, they apparently convert normal proteins into prions. Ultimately, the infected brain cells die and release prions into the tissue. These prions enter, infect, and destroy other brain cells. Prions entered the public’s consciousness during the mad cow epidemic that hit England in 1996. Transmission of the prions from cows to man is suspected to cause human illness. There are no known therapies effective against prions.
b. Uses. Biological agents can be disseminated and used against personnel, animals, plants, or material. Food and industrial products can be rendered unsafe or unfit for use by contamination or by the effects resulting from contamination with biological agents. The US military forces are deployed throughout the world. Associated with the movement of troops are risks of introduction of exotic agricultural pests and animal disease agents through soil contamination and transportation of regulated items such as fruits, vegetables, meat, and dairy products, other food items, and animal products (e.g., trophies) The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APH IS) oversees the entry of cargo, personnel, equipment, personal property, mail, and their means of conveyance into the US.
(1) Antipersonnel. Biological antipersonnel agents are those that are effective directly against humans. The threat would select these agents on the basis of the agents’ ability to cause death or disability. Potential biological antipersonnel agents include toxins, bacteria, rickettsiae, viruses, and toxins.
(2) Antianimal. Biological antianimal agents are those that could be employed against animals to incapacitate or destroy them through disease. The purposeful spreading of infectious agents that attack cattle or other domestic animals can lead to serious consequences for a country’s food supply or ex port of animal products (hides, wool, fats, and biological medicinal products such as adrenalin, insulin, pituitary extracts, cortisone, vaccines, and antisera).
(3) Antiplant. Biological antiplant agents are organisms that cause disease or damage to plants. These agents may be used intentionally by an enemy to attack food or economically valuable crops, thereby reducing a nation’s ability to resist aggression.
(4) Antimaterial. Antimaterial agents are organisms that degrade or break down some item of material. For example, fungi may damage fabrics, rubber products, leather goods, or foodstuffs. Some bacteria produce highly acidic compounds that cause pitting in metals; these agents could create potential problems with stockpiled material. Some bacteria can use petroleum products as an energy source and cause residues that might clog fuel or oil lines.
c. Duration of Effectiveness. The duration of effectiveness of a biological agent refers to the persistency of the agent in the environment. It depends on the characteristics of the agent and environmental factors.
(1) Biological agent characteristics such as encapsulation (natural, such as bacterial spores, or manmade protective coverings), addition of dyes to the spray fluid, or possibly genetic engineering (of pathogens) may protect some agents from sunlight and other destructive natural forces. Bacteria that are resistant to environmental extremes frequently produce spores to allow survival during adverse conditions. Spore formation is not a method of reproduction inasmuch as each vegetative cell forms only a single spore and each spore germinates to form a single vegetative cell. The bacterium (vegetative cell makes a copy of its DNA. The DNA becomes surrounded by a series of membranes that accumulate calcium, dipicolinic acid (heat-resistant factor ),and protein layers. The resistant spore might remain dormant for years without requiring nutrients or water and might survive under extreme ranges of temperature. When conditions become favorable, the spore develops into an actively growing vegetative cell.
(2) Ultraviolet (UV) radiation, relative humidity, wind speed, and temperature gradient are important weather factors in determining duration of effectiveness.
d. Methods of Dissemination. Biological agents may be disseminated as aerosols, liquid droplets (toxins only), or dry powders. See Appendix L for additional information on dissemination of biological agents.
(1) Biological agents may be delivered in either wet or dry form. Dry powders composed of very small particles tend to have better dissemination characteristics and have advantages in storage. Dried agents require an increased level of technological sophistication to produce, although freeze-drying and spray-drying technologies have been available in the industry for a number of years.
(2) The BW agents might be released against our forces or against civilian populations by means of sprays, explosive devices, and contamination of food and water. Most commonly, delivery methods use aerosolized agents.
(a) A BW agent can be released as a line source. A line source would be released perpendicular to the direction of the wind, upwind of the intended target area.
(b) A second type of aerosol source is a point source, which is a stationary device for aerosolization of the agent, such as a stationary sprayer. A modified point source would be a group of spray devices, such as specially designed bomblets dispersed in a pattern on the ground or a missile or artillery shell designed to release such bomblets.
e. Physiological Aspects. Employment considerations for BW agents include the following:
(1) ROE. The important portals of entry are the respiratory tract, the exposed mucosal surfaces (moist surfaces of nose, mouth, and eyes), and the digestive tract. In a biological attack the respiratory route would be the primary route of entry. The respiratory system is much more susceptible to penetration. The body is more resistant to invasion by microorganisms through the skin; however, penetration across the skin can occur. This is particularly true of abraded (broken) surfaces and some toxins such as mycotoxins. Toxins absorbed through the respiratory tract can produce signs and symptoms different from those acquired through natural occurrence. For example,staphylococcal enterotoxin B when ingested in food causes acute gastrointestinal ( GI) illness; however, when delivered via aerosol to the respiratory tract, it produces respiratory disease. Personnel can encounter biological agents by natural routes, such as in water and food or by vectors.
(2) Dosage. The BW agents are inherently more toxic than CW nerve agents on a weight-for-weight basis and can potentially provide broader coverage per pound of payload than CW agents.
(a) Infective Dose. The infectivity of an agent reflects the relative ease with which microorganisms establish themselves in a host species. Pathogens with high infectivity cause disease with relatively few organisms.
(b) Lethal Dose. Some pathogens produce toxins that can result in disease (for example, anthrax, botulinum, cholera, diphtheria, and typhus). The extreme toxicity of many toxins causes the lethal dose to be much smaller than that of chemical agents. Hence, units of micrograms (µg) or even nanograms (ng) may be used instead of milligrams (mg) in expressing toxicity. Human toxicity estimates are based on animal data, and the ROE for the animals is not always what would be expected on the battlefield.
Some human toxicity data are based on accidental contact, ingestion, or inhalation of these ,natural poisons.
(3) ROA. The rate of reaction to toxins varies widely. Rapid-acting toxins generally incapacitate within minutes. Delayed-acting a gents may take several hours to days to incapacitate. The time for maximum effects for pathogens is normally more than 24 hours (unless the pathogen produces a toxin). However, the incubation periods of microorganisms used in BW may be far shorter than those expected by examining the natural disease.
f. Requirements for a Weaponized BW Agent. The key factors that make a biological agent suitable for an attack include availability or ease of production in sufficient quantity; the ability to cause either lethal or incapacitating effects in humans at doses that are achievable and deliverable; appropriate particle size in aerosol; ease of dissemination; stability (while maintaining virulence) after production in storage, weapons, and the environment; and susceptibility of intended victims with nonsusceptibility of friendly forces.
(1) Availability or Ease of Production . Many replicating agents (bacteria and viruses) can be produced in large quantities with modern fermentation and viral production technologies. Some toxins, like ricin, are widely available because their source in nature is ubiquitous and the process necessary to harvest the toxin is technically straightforward. On the other hand, some replicating agents are very difficult to grow in quantity, and many toxins are produced in nature in such low quantities that harvesting them is impractical (shellfish toxins are a good example).
(2) Incapacitation and Lethality. BW agents are likely to be selected for their ability to either incapacitate or kill the human targets of the attack. A BW agent does not necessarily have to be lethal to be useful as a military weapon. An agent such as Venezuelan equine encephalitis (VEE) virus could cause incapacitation among large numbers of unit personnel. If lethality is desired, agents such as anthrax have high case fatality rates once infection is established in unimmunized hosts.
(3) Appropriate Particle Size in Aerosol. An effective weaponized BW agent is of a particle size that would allow it to be carried for long distances by prevailing winds and inhaled deeply into the lungs of the unsuspecting victims. The size range of particles that meets both of these conditions is 1 to 5 microns in diameter. Particles larger than this would either settle out into the ground or more likely be filtered out in the upper respiratory tract of those who inhale them. Particles in this size range are invisible to the human eye; thus, a cloud of such particles would not generally be detected by those attacked, even if such a cloud were to be carried through their position. It is worth noting, however, that particles outside this size range are still dangerous and able to cause deadly illnesses, even though their transmission efficiency is less.
(4) Ease of Dissemination. An effective weaponized BW agent is easily disseminated in the open air by using off-the-shelf devices such as industrial sprayers or other types of aerosol-producing devices. These could be mounted on an airplane, boat, car, or other moving vehicle, or even placed in a stationary position. An alternative method would be to disseminate the agent in an enclosed space (e.g., a building) where it could more efficiently infect or intoxicate humans living or working in the area.
(5) Stability after Production. Once an adversary produces a BW agent in quantity, it must be fairly stable—either in bulk storage or once put into a weapon or delivery system. It must, therefore, retain its viability and virulence or toxicity during production, storage, transportation, and delivery.
(6) Susceptibility and Nonsusceptibility. An effective BW agent is one to which the target force is known to be susceptible (i. e., not immunized against), but to which the adversary possesses high levels of immunity, usually via vaccination.
5. Militarily Significant Aspects of Toxic Industrial Chemicals
a. Classification. The TIC are chemicals that are toxic to plants, animals, or humans.
b. Uses. The TIC are found in abundance in all countries, and are used in chemical manufacturing processes, agriculture (pesticides), water treatment (chlorination), and many other areas. Each year, more than 70, 000 different chemicals amounting to billions of tons of material are produced, processed, or consumed by the global chemical industry. A large portion of these chemicals may exhibit characteristics or be sufficiently hazardous to be a threat in a military situation.
c. Characteristics of TIC. The TIC of military concern may exist as solids, liquids, or gases. For many cases, release of a TIC may involve a change of the state of the chemical, therefore making protection difficult. Like CW agents, TIC include many lethal compounds.
(1) Toxicity. M any TIC, due to their toxicity, can cause incapacitation or death.
(2) Corrosiveness. Many TIC are highly corrosive. Special equipment containers and procedures are necessary to ensure safe handling.
(3) Flammability. Many TIC are highly flammable and present a major fire hazard.
(4) Explosiveness. Unlike CW agents, TIC can be highly explosive and present a serious threat when handled.
(5) Reactivity. Many TIC react violently with water or other materials, and thus present dangers upon contact with other materials, including air.
(6) Byproducts. When burned, mixed, or exploded, many TIC produce additional highly toxic byproducts.
(7) Quantities available. The sheer volume and widespread availability of TIC present a serious danger in the event of a release.
d. Duration of Effectiveness. A number of factors determine the amount of time a TIC would present a danger after release. Factors include the physical properties of the TIC as well as weather, terrain, and conditions at the release site. These factors affect TIC in the same manner as that for chemical agents.
e. Physiological Aspects. Exposure to TIC affects the body in a variety of ways. Generally, they disrupt bodily functions. The effects are dependent on the routes of entry, toxicity of the chemical, and the concentration to which exposed.
(1) ROE. The TIC can enter the body through inhalation, ingestion, dermal absorption, or a combination of these methods. The primary concern for exposure is that of the inhalation of a TIC as a gas.
(2) Exposure Concentration and Levels of Concern. The type and seriousness of effects from exposure to TIC, like any chemical is dependent upon the concentration and length of time one is exposed. This concentration and time relationship is unique to every chemical. The dosages of TIC are expressed in parts per million (ppm). In general, TIC tend to be at least one order of magnitude less potent than nerve agents and tend not be rapidly lethal in small quantities. Standards have been developed for industry for different exposure scenarios.
(a) Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health (IDLH): The definition of IDLH that was derived during the Standards Completion Program (SCP) was based on the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) definition stipulated in 30 CFR 11.3(t). The purpose for establishing an IDLH value in the SCP was to ensure that a worker could escape without injury or irreversible health effects from an IDLH exposure in the event of the failure of respiratory protection equipment. The highly reliable breathing apparatus providing maximum worker protection was permitted. In determining IDLH values, the
ability of a worker to escape without loss of life or irreversible health effects was considered along with severe eye or respiratory irritation and other deleterious effects (e.g., disorientation or lack of coordination) that could prevent escape. As a safety margin, the SCP IDLH values were based on the effects that might occur as a consequence of a 30- minute exposure. However, the 30-minute period was not meant to imply that workers should stay in the work environment any longer than necessary. In fact, every effort should be made to exit immediately.
(b) Refer to the United States Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine (USACHPPM) Technical Guide 230, Chemical Exposure Guidelines for Deployed Military Personnel, for obtaining the military exposure guidelines for assessing exposure concentrations for TIC.
f. TIC Hazard Assessment. As part of the IPB process, a planner must assess the likelihood of a release or exposure as well as the actual TIC material. Some example considerations are —
(1) Accidents in civilian operations significantly increase when technically trained personnel flee an area, such as a combat zone (CZ). Civilian personnel remaining may be pressured to operate equipment beyond their training/technical expertise in a area of combat.
(2) Pipelines can offer a very attractive target for terrorists because actions can be planned well in advance of execution and pipelines do not rely on shipping or transportation scheduled.
(3) Storage yards, ports, airfields and rail yards often contain significant amounts of transiting TIC. This not only presents opportunities for improvised use against US forces, but also presents increased possibility of accidents and targets for those who want to destroy the TI C (such as ammunition precursor chemicals).
g. Pesticides. Large stockpiles of obsolete pesticides have been accumulated in virtually all developing countries over periods sometimes exceeding four decades. The term “pesticides,” as used by US forces include insecticides, rodenticides, fungicides, and herbicides. The health effects of pesticides depend on the type of pesticide. Some, such as the organophosphates and carbamates, affect the nervous system. Others may irritate the skin or eyes. Some pesticides may be carcinogens. Others may affect the hormone or endocrine system in the body.The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has recognized the dangers of many pesticides and publishes lists of those pesticides that are either banned or severely restricted in their use. Applicable service personnel ( e.g., Army preventive medicine (PVNTMED), Air Force civil engineering, public health) can provide information on specific pesticides that could be used in specific areas of operation (AOs).
.NOTES
1 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, ISBN: 0-1 6 -0 4 2 7 2 7 -4,
US Gove rnment Pri nting Office , November 1997.
2 A.K. Steumpfle et al., Final Report of International Task Force-25: Hazard From Toxic
Industrial Chemicals, March 18, 1996.
3 Joint Publication 3-11, Joint Doctrine of Operations in NBC Environment, 11 Ju ly 2000.
4 DOD Chemical and Biological Defense Program Annual Report to Congress, Vol. I, April
2002.
5 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, US Government
Printing Office, January 2001.
6 Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,
as amended through 05 June 2003.
7 FM 8-285/Navy Medical (NAVMED) P-5041/ Air Force Joint Manual (AFJMAN) 44-
149/Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 11-11, Treatment of Chemical Agent Casualties and Conventional Military Chemical Injuries, 22 December 1995.
8 L. Fishbein and S. Czerczak, Concise International Chemical Assessment Document 47:
Human Health Aspects, WHO, 200 2.
9 Brigadier General (BG) Russ Zajtchuck, et al. (eds.), Textbook of Military Medicine:
Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Office of the Surgeon General, 1997,
Chapter 11, “Incapacita ting Agents.”
10 Sharon Reutter et al., Review and Recommendations for Human Toxicity Estimates for
FM 3-11.9, ECBC-TR0 349, September 2003.
11 FM 3-6/FMFM 7-11-H/Air Force Manual (AFM) 105-7, Field Behavior of NBC Agents
(Including Smoke and Incendiaries), 3 November 1986.
12 Jeffrey H. Grotte and Lynn I Yang, Report of the Workshop on Chemical Agent Toxicity for
Acute Effects: Institute for Defense Analyses, May 11-12, 1998, IDA Document D-2176, June 2001.
13 Anna Johnson-Winegar, PhD, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Memorandum,
Subject: Interim Certification of Chemical and Biological Data, December 27, 2001.
14 Federal Register, Department of Commerce, Bureau of Export Administration, “15 CFR Part
710 et al., Chemical Weapons Convention Regulations; Final Rule,” December 30, 1 999.
15 Office of the US President , The Biological and Chemical Warfare Threat, 1999.
16 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (C DC), Office of Health and Safety (OHS),
“BMBL Section VII: Agent Summary Statements, Section VII-D: Prions,” 17 Ju ne 1999,
http://www.cdc.go v/OD/ OHS/BIOSFTY/bmb14/bmbl4s7d.htm , 19 August 2003.
17 Ruth Levy Guyer, “ Research in the News: Prions: Puzzling Infectious Proteins,”
http://science-education.
nih.gov/nihHTML/ose/sn apshots/multimedia/ritn/prions/prions1.html , 8 August
2003.
I-14.18 AFMAN 1 0 -2602, Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Conventional (NBCC) Defense
Operations and Standards (Operations), 1 December 2002 .
19 USDA, APHIS, “Protocol for Military Cleara nce,” 18 June 2001.
20 BG Russ Zajtchu k,et al. (eds.), Textbook of Military Medicine: Medical Aspects of
Chemical and Biological Warfare, Office of the Surgeon General, 1997, Chapter 21, “The Biological Warfare Threat.”
21 TM 3-216/AFM 355-6, Technical Aspects of Biological Defense, 12 January 1971.
22 BG Russ Zajtchu k , et al. (eds.), Textbook of Military Medicine: Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Office of the Surgeon General, 1997, Chapter 20, “Use of Biological Weapons.”
23 FM 8-284/NAVM ED P-5042/AFMAN (I) 44-156/Ma rine Corp Reference Publication
(MCRP) 4-1 1 .1C, Treatment of Biological Warfare Agent Casualties, 1 7 July 2000.
24 BG Russ Zajtchu k , et al. (eds.), Textbook of Military Medicine: Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare, Office of the Surgeon General, 1997, Chapter 30,
“Defense Against Toxin Weapons. ”
25 FM 8-9/NAVMED P-5059/AFJMAN 44-151, NATO Handbook on the Medical Aspects of NBC Defense Operations AMEDD-6(B), 1 February 1996.
26 CDC, NO I SH, Documentation for Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health
Concentrations, National Technical Information Serv ice (NTIS) Publ ication No. PB-94-195047, May 1994. 27 Mark Davis, Baseline Study on the Problem of Obsolete Pesticide Stocks, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) Pesticide Disposal Series N.9, 2001.
28 US EPA, “Pesticides: Health and Safe ty: Human Health Issues,” 19 May 2003,
http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/health/human.htm , 19 August 2003.
5. Nerve Agents
Nerve agents are more toxic than other CW agents. They may cause effects with in
seconds and death with in minutes.15 The nerve agents are all liquids, not nerve gas per se.
They can be absorbed through any body surface and can penetrate ordinary clothing rapidly.1 They are divided into the G agents and V agents . The V agents have high boiling points, low volatility, and resultant high persistency. 12 Even though the V agents are considered primarily a contact hazard 12 ; they are at least twice as potent as GB, and even a minute amount of airborne material is extremely hazardous. 10 Nerve agents are cumulative poisons. Repeated exposure to low concentrati ons may produce symptoms.1 Level 4 mis sion-oriented protective posture (MOPP4) is required for protection.1
a. Physiological Effect. Both the G and V agents have the same physiological action on humans. Normally, the enzyme acetylcholinesterase (AChE) binds and hydrolyzes the neurotransmitter ACh, which term inates the activity of ACh at the receptor sites. Upon exposure, the nerve agents bind to AChE, ma king it una ble to bind with ACh.
As a result, ACh is not hydrolyzed. The accumulation of ACh causes hyperactivity of the body organs stimulated by cholineraic neruons.15 Individuals poison ed by nerve agents may experience symptoms in the following order:
•Miosis, runny nose, and chest tightness.
•Dim vision and headache.
•Nausea, vomiting, and cramps.
Drooling, excessive sweating, drowsiness, and confusion.
•Difficulty breathing, tw itching, jerking, and staggering.
•Convulsions and coma.
b. Miosis. When airborne vapor comes in contact with the eyes, miosis occurs as a result of a direct local effect of the nerve agent on the eyes and can occur prior to any inhibition of ChE in the blood. This type of exposure is frequently accompanied by tightness of the chest and/or rhinorrhea, and any or all other symptoms can occur. In cases of nerve agent exposure not involving vapor contact with the eyes, miosis is one of the last effects to occur before death.10
c. Treatment. Treatment of nerve agent poisoning includes use of atropine, 2-PAM
chloride, convulsant antidote for nerve agents (CANA), and pyridosti gmine bromide (PB).
(1) Atropine binds to receptor sites blocking the excess acetylcholine caused by nerve agent poisoning.
(2) 2-PAM Cl a cts by reactivating ChE inhibited by a nerve agent. 15 Prompt treatment is essential because after the agent binds to AChE, a second reaction occurs in which the agent loses one alkyl or alkoxy group. This phosphorylated AChE is called an m“aged” enzyme and is completely resistant to both spontaneous and oxime-medicated (2-
PAM Cl) reactivation. The “aging” period varies from minutes to hours depending on the type of agent.16 For GD, the “aging” half-time is within 2 minutes. 17
(3) The CANA prevents and treats convulsions caused by exposure to nerve agents in moderate to severe cases.1
(4) PB is a pretreatment for exposure to GD. PB and AChE bind and form what is called a carbamoylated AChE. Although PB is also an AChE inhibitor, it is unlike nerve agents in that the interaction between PB and AChE is freely and spontaneously mreversible and it does not undergo the aging process. The carbamoylated AChE is fully mprotected from attack by nerve agents. Atropine is still needed to counteract the excess mACh and 2-PAM Cl is still needed t o reactivate AChE active sites that were protected by PB. 17 PB is available to US forces in active theaters of operation (TOs). 1
d. Tabun (GA) (see Table II-6). GA was the first of the nerve agents developed by
the Germans.15 GA is primarily an inhalation hazard. See Table II-7 (page II-17) for GA toxicity estimates.
Vaporization, Vapor Pressure, Entropy and Thermodynamic Functions,” J. Amer. Chem. Soc., Vol. 72, p. 2424, 1950.
5 Properties of War Gases Volume IV: Vesicants (U), ETF 100-41/Vol-4, Chemical Corps Board, Army Chemical Center, MD,
December 1956, CLASSIFIED Report (AD108459).
6 Nowlin, T.E., A New Binary VX Reaction-Two-Liquid System (U), EATR 4700, USA Munitions Command, Edgewood
Arsenal, MD, November 1972, UNCLASSIFIED Report (AD524088).
7 Buchi, K.M., Environmental Overview of Common Industrial Chemicals with Potential Application in the Binary Munitions
Program, CRDEC-TR-87041, USA Chemical Research Development and Engineering Center, Aberdeen Proving Ground,
MD, July 1987, UNCLASSIFIED Report (ADA186083).
8 Lide, D.R., CRC Handbook of Chemistry and Physics, 82nd ed., CRC Press, Washington, DC, 2001.
10. Other Chemical Warfare Agents
In the past, other compounds were studied and evaluated to determine their potential as CW agents. Most compounds were found u nlikely to be used for various reasons (e.g.,unstable in storage). Some CW agents stud ied but not commonly known are listed in Table
II-59.
Encyclopedia of American Loons
Bob Thiel
Bob Thiel is a fundamentalist conspiracy theorist. He is probably most famous for writing books accusing various politicians of ushering in the End Times, and apparently tries to stay a bit ahead of the curve – for instance, his book Hillary Clinton, Prophecy, and the Destruction of the United States appeared in February 2016, and discussed topics like “Is Hillary Clinton the Antichrist?” and “20 Reasons Why Hillary Clinton Is Apocalyptic.” In particular, the book endeavored to investigate (his own deranged mind to establish) Clinton’s “possible connections to freemasonry and shamanism” and why she is “specifically causing the people of the United States to err further away from biblical morality, which will lead to destruction.” The book was in many ways a sequel to Barack Obama, Prophecy, and the Destruction of the United States (you will be excused for suspecting extensive use of the find-replace function in Word). In 2017 he followed up with Donald Trump and America’s Apocalypse: Is Donald Trump Fulfilling Biblical, Islamic, Catholic, Buddhist, and other America-Related Prophecies? Note the “America-Related” part.
His earlier books include 2012 and the rise of the secret sect, which describes for instance how a “multi-national committee of the United Nations is calling for the elimination of the U.S. dollar as the world’s reserve currency – a position held for over 60 years. This would be disastrous for the U.S as it produces a global currency and opens the door for the Antichrist;” yes, dollars are blessed protective tokens keeping the Antichrist at bay, so of course the UN is working hard to undermine the currency – you really shouldn’t have asked. At the time Thiel styled himself as “one of the world’s preeminent authorities on the events likely to occur in 2012 and beyond,” and the book ostensibly examines prophecies of the Mayans, and I Ching, Catholic, Hopi, New Age, Talmud, Islam, Buddhist, and Hindu religions before formulating its own. Apparently Thiel thought the Roland Emmerich 2012 movie was some kind of documentary: “When I heard that a 2012 prophecy movie was being developed at Sony, I was immediately interested in what would be included. When I knew that the focus of the film would be on the Mayan prophecy, I was inspired to write a book on the things that a two-hour movie couldn’t possibly include.” The confusion sort of explains a great many things.
Other books include The Last Pope: Do Biblical and Catholic Prophecies Point to Pope Francis I? and Fatima Shock!: The Real Truth About Fatima and Future Apparitions, as well as Proof Jesus Is The Messiah: Biblical, Prophetic, and Historical Facts, which promises to explain for instance to explain “why don’t most Jews accept Jesus.”
Diagnosis: Thoroughly confused, and responding to confusion the best way he can: with anger. Probably harmless.
Caroline Leaf
Oh, good grief!
Caroline Leaf is a religious fundamentalist who combines religious extremism with incoherent altmed pseudoscience, woo and fluffy new age word salads – it’s not just religious woo, but religious quantum woo. According to Leaf, “There is growing evidence that biological systems operate at the level of quantum physics. When applied to neuroscience, the Quantum Zeno Effect indicates that the brain becomes what you focus on [yeah: read that again]. Focus is directed attention and is a function of the mind. Thus, quantum physics supports the notion of mind over matter.” Calling this attempt at technobabble “not even wrong” would be an insult to incoherent nonsense. Leaf has managed to gain a relatively impressively sized audience, though, and is a staple on predatory shows targeted at the gullible and/or desperate, like Kenneth and Gloria Copeland’s Believer’s Voice of Victory and her own Dr. Leaf Show.
Leaf is the kind of person who says that thoughts can change your DNA. Indeed, according to Leaf, “… whatever reaction we have changes the DNA and the DNA then expresses and it builds either that which is what our bodies are wired for, so whether you’re Born Again or not, your body’s wired for love because that’s the design that God has made, and if we make a wrong choice, we build that.” Well, no, that’s not remotely how this works. But according to Leaf, not only does it work that way, but your current thoughts, by altering your DNA, are “affecting the future generations as well because the thoughts from your father, your grandfather, your great-grandfather … and your mother has come through the sperm and the ova. So whatever thoughts we have as we go through life that we build into our heads basically passes through the sperm and the ova to the next four generations.” Just think about it, but keep in mind that Leaf probably assumes that you won’t; yes, your thoughts are “affecting the cells. It actually gets captured inside. Exactly … 75–100 trillion cells in our body are impacted by every single thought that we think. So it’s captured as a physical thing, it’s passed through the generations.” And yes, she is, indeed, alluding to epigenetics, which she doesn’t remotely understand but neither does her audience (so perhaps she might understand it,* which doesn’t really make any of this any better): “… we’re not bound by the sins of our fathers, We call that epigenetics. It’s actually called the science of epigenetics. Epi – over and above the genes – the fact that our mind controls genetic expression” (something that does sound suspiciously like it contradicts a rather central tenet of mainstream Christianity; better not think too hard about it – there’s no danger that Leaf ever did.) And for the grand finale, Leaf is going to tell us what thoughts are made of: “… we are speaking from physical thoughts made of proteins and all kinds of chemical structures inside of our brain that look like trees.”
Apparently Leaf has a degree in topics related to neuroscience; one imagines some interesting exchanges between her and her advisors. (Her website tells us that “The main coordinating center of the nervous system is the brain, which is located in the skull.” At least she got that part right – it’s more or less the only part she got right – and we can sort of imagine the aforementioned advisors breathing a sigh of relief.)
Leaf is the author of Switch On Your Brain and Think and Eat Yourself Smart, which you can safely pass over. Also, “[s]ince 1981, she has researched the science of thought as it relates to thinking, learning, renewing the mind, gifting, and potential,” which is an awfully strange way of putting it if you have been involved in, you know, actual scientific research on the brain or on psychology.
According to Leaf’s website (random capitalization abounds), “75% to 95% of the illnesses that plague us today are a direct result of our thought life,” and if you wonder where she got those numbers you are probably not in the target audience for her website (she does have testimonials, though). Also, “[m]edical research increasingly points to the fact that thinking and consciously controlling your thought life is one of the best ways, if not the best way of detoxing your brain.” No, she doesn’t provide any references here either, for rather obvious reasons (“detoxing your brain” means removing “toxic thoughts and emotions”.) But it is indeed a fine example of “deepity”. We’ll grant her that, and wonder in dread what her books read like.
Her website has a “scientific FAQs” section (which must really be seen to be believed) and a “Scriptural FAQs” section, which are more or less interchangeable and have nothing to do with science (“Man is a triune being consisting of a spirit, soul and body. The mind is synonymous to the soul. The mind operates in the spirit and, by extension, in the spiritual realm” – that’s the Science section). The “Scientific FAQs” section does, however, push anti-GMO conspiracies and complementarianism (“Mankind is created in the image of God – both male and female. The male and the female are different from, and yet complementary to, one another. God’s image is reflected in both men and women” – yes, that’s also from the Science section), and contains a substantial section on how speaking in tongues is good for your mental health as well as the general health benefits of prayer and worship (“Interestingly a number of scientific studies indicate that we are wired for God, that is, our brains have been designed to commune with God,” says Leaf, and cites this one; the part after “that is” is what we might call her “interpretation” of the research discussed in said article). There is a very tentative critique of some of her claims here.
Diagnosis: If you fall for this idiocy, you are really, really stupid. There’s really no way around it. No, seriously: this is among the dumbest New Age fluff we’ve yet encountered, and we’ve encountered a fair amount.