The Voice of the White House
Washington D.C. January 24, 2013: “China is threatening Japan (unwise) over ownership of some remote Japanese islands and now North Korea, a client of China, is threatening the U.S. with a nuclear attack. The North Koreans are stark crazy, run by a nut family and dangerous and unstable. If they seriously threaten us, believe it there will be a preemptive attack and China can take in millions of glowing refugees. The Chinese are unstable and if one studies their history, they periodically go crazy and do very stupid things. Like threatening the Japanese or egging North Korea to threaten us. China has too many people, little food, almost no natural resources and their water supplies are drying up. It will only be a matter of time before they implode and the sooner the better!”
North Korea plans nuclear test and says rocket programme is targeted at US
Long-range rockets and proposed ‘high-level nuclear test’ are targeted at ‘arch-enemy of the Korean people’, Pyongyang says
January 24, 2013
North Korea has responded to tighter UN sanctions with a threat to conduct another nuclear test the regime said would target its greatest enemy, the US.
The country’s powerful national defence commission poured scorn on Tuesday’s UN security council resolution condemning the launch last month of a long-range rocket, and the decision to expand sanctions against the already impoverished state.
The North insists the launch was part of its peaceful space programme, but the US and its allies believe the purpose was to test its ballistic missile technology.
On Thursday, the regime appeared to confirm those suspicions when it said its rocket programme had a second, military purpose: to target and strike the US.
The commission, North Korea’s most powerful military body, said the rocket launches would continue and warned the country would conduct a third, “high-level” nuclear test.
“We are not disguising the fact that the various satellites and long-range rockets we will launch, as well as the high-level nuclear test we will carry out, are targeted at the United States, the arch-enemy of the Korean people,” the commission said in a statement carried by the official Central Korean News Agency. “Settling accounts with the US needs to be done with force, not with words.”
The statement did not say when the test, which would be the first under the current leader, Kim Jong-un, would take place. Analysts said it could happen in mid-February, just before South Korea’s new president, Park Geun-hye, is sworn into office and the North marks the birthday of its previous leader, Kim Jong-il.
Daniel Pinkston, deputy director of the International Crisis Group’s north Asia programme, said Pyongyang’s justification for its weapons programme had always been “dealing with the imperialist Americans”. He added: “It’s serious and I would expect them to do a nuclear and more missile tests.”
North Korea conducted its previous nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009, soon after the UN imposed sanctions in response to rocket launches. Any progress the North makes in its missile and nuclear programmes is a cause for concern, although it is thought to be some way off having the ability to produce a nuclear warhead small enough to mount on a reliable long-range missile.
North Korea has enough plutonium to build between four and eight nuclear weapons, according to Siegfried Hecker, a nuclear scientist who visited the country’s main Yongbyon nuclear complex in 2010. Other reports suggest the country has enough fissile material for about a dozen plutonium warheads.
The previous year, the regime said it would begin enriching uranium, giving it another means of building a nuclear arsenal.
It is not clear what the defence commission meant by “high level”, but there is speculation the next test could involve a uranium, rather than plutonium, device. That would signal that the regime’s scientists have mastered the complicated process of producing highly enriched uranium.
The threat coincided with a visit to South Korea by the US’s special envoy on North Korea, Glyn Davies, who called on Pyongyang to abandon plans for the test.
“Whether North Korea tests or not, it’s up to North Korea,” Davies said. “We hope they don’t do it, we call on them not to do it. It would be a mistake and a missed opportunity if they were to do it. This is not a moment to increase tensions on the Korean peninsula.”
China, the North’s only diplomatic ally and its biggest trading partner, is likely to have angered Pyongyang by backing this week’s UN resolution. China’s foreign ministry on Thursday called on all parties in the region to “refrain from action that might escalate the situation”.
“We hope the relevant party can remain calm and act and speak in a cautious and prudent way and not take any steps which may further worsen the situation,” ministry spokesman Hong Lei told reporters in Beijing.
Scholar Wang Junsheng, an expert on Korean issues at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, told the Global Times newspaper: “By passing the resolution China was warning North Korea … and by blocking more sanctions China was telling North Korea to return to the right track, the six-party talks.”
Wi Yong-seop, a South Korean defence ministry spokesman, said the North could conduct a test “at any time if its leadership decides to go ahead”.
Experts in the US recently said the North's main nuclear test site had been repaired after recent heavy rain, adding that preparations for a test could take just two weeks
International Israeli Internet Spying & Fraud
by Michael Bagley
For the past five years, there have been growing fears that somehow, outsiders have been able to penetrate into the confidential computer files of government agencies, business entities such as banks and defense contractors and individuals.
Some of this appeared to be an attempt to obtain highly classified information that could be of use to others and in other instances, attempts to get into the personal, and corporate, bank accounts of individuals and corporations.
This is a brief study of some of the salient aspects of this problem of computer theft and espionage and we will start with the discovery of massive computer penetration in Israel. We will then consider further penetrations of American business and intelligence computer systems by agents of a foreign government as opposed to confidence men and then conclude with the use of the same methods to commit frauds on the gullible in the United States and elsewhere.
Some of the first public notice of this problem surfaced first in Israel in 2004 when Israeli law enforcement cyber crime experts discovered that what is known as a Trojan Horse (illicit spyware planted on an unsuspecting computer) had been inserted into about 60 major Israeli businesses. Isreali law enforcement subsequently indicted various members of three of Israel’s largest private investigative agencies on charges of criminal fraud. These spyware plants were in various commercial areas such as : Israeli military contracting, telephone systems, cable television, finance, automobile and cigarette importing, journalism and high technology. These intrusive spyware plants were nearly identical with ones developed by the American NSA and widely used inside the United States to glean political, economic and counter-intelligence information from a huge number of American businesses and agencies. Israeli investigators believed that there was illicit cooperation between the American agency and a counterpart in Israel.
These Trojan horses that penetrated the Israeli computers came packaged inside a compact disc or were sent as an e-mail message that appeared to be from an institution or a person that the victims thought they knew very well. Once the program was installed, it functioned every time the victim’s computer system was in use, logging keystrokes or collecting sensitive documents and passwords before transmitting the information elsewhere.
This clandestine theft of valuable commercial, military and political secrets is certainly not limited to Israel and many important agencies and individuals have become increasingly concerned about what is called “phishing” in which both con men and foreign (and domestic) intelligence agencies can locate, capture and use valuable personal, political and financial information. In September of 2005, the Anti-Phishing Working Group, an ad hoc group of corporate and law enforcement groups that track identity theft and other online crimes, said it had received more than 13,000 unique reports of phishing schemes in that month alone, up from nearly 7,000 in the month of October, 2004..
In late 2005, a new form of phishing, called “spear-phishing” emerged.
. So-called spear-phishing is a highly concentrated and far more effectove version of phishing. That’s because those behind the schemes bait their hooks for specific victims instead of casting a broad, ill-defined net across cyberspace hoping to catch throngs of unknown victims.
Spear-phishing, say security specialists, is much harder to detect than phishing. Bogus e-mail messages and Web sites not only look like near perfect replicas of communiqués from e-commerce companies like eBay or its PayPal service, banks or even a victim’s employer, but are also targeted at people known to have an established relationship with the sender being mimicked. American banks such as Chase and Bank of America are among those whose names are faked and also the online auction house of Ebay and the international money transfer firm of PayPal receive considerable attention from the international conmen and credit thieves. These thieves are not necessarily gangs operating for financial gain but also include theft of trade secrets, private corporate banking and highly sensitive military and political information.
While some of these phishers are merely out to make money, others are interested in securing military secrets and political activities, all at the highest and what is hopefully considered as the most secure.
As a case in point, in June of 2005 , the National Infrastructure Security Coordination Centre, a British government agency that monitors national UK computer security, took the step of publicly warning about a spear-phishing campaign of “targeted Trojan e-mail attacks” aimed at industrial and government computer networks. The warning noted that the e-mail messages appeared to come from a trusted sender, that antivirus software and firewalls was completely incapable of protecting recipients, and that, in fact, there was no way to completely protect any computer connected to the Internet from the Trojan attacks once recipients opened and downloaded a faked e-mail message containing a virus.
The report noted that: “Files used by the attackers are often publicly available on the Web or have been sent to distribution lists,” the warning said. “The attackers are able to receive, trojanise and resend a document within 120 minutes of its release, indicating a high level of sophistication.”
In December of 2005, a more traditional phishing scam infected about 30,000 individual computers worldwide, according to CipherTrust, a computer security firm. Consisting of what CipherTrust said was about 50 million e-mail messages that a German hacker deployed simultaneously, the communiqués purported to come from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency and a German intelligence agency and tried to convince recipients to provide personal information and open a file containing a virus. The F.B.I. issued a warning about the scheme and a spokeswoman said that thousands of people swamped the agency with phone calls inquiring about it. Public awareness and FBI actions sharply reduced and finally obliterated this specific form of fraud but no information has been released to the public by the FBI concerning the identity or motives of many of the hackers. No bank or financial institution ever contacts their depositors and customers by email with warnings about misuse of their credit cards or errors in their personal accounts. The phishers have advanced technologically to the point where actual company logos can be snatched from Web sites to build customized databases of corporate logos. Any email message purporting to come from any bank or financial institution, most especially one that has the proper company logo and format but contains grammatical errors should ever be responded to.
Some computer security specialists suggest at least one basic approach that might allow e-mail recipients to learn right away that a communiqué appearing to come from a company like Amazon.com actually originated somewhere in the Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, Russia or any of the other places that law enforcement officials say are hot spots for phishing scams According to CipherTrust, a spear-phisher can rent a server for about $300 month after paying a $100 setup fee; install spam-sending software on the server for about $1,200 a month; and get spam-sending proxies, a database of e-mail addresses, and other necessary add-ons for another $1,900 a month. How much phishers make depends on how many victims they hook, but the relatively small expense means the work can be lucrative. According to a research report issued in June by Gartner Inc., a consulting firm, about 2.4 million Americans reported losing about $929 million to phishing schemes during the previous year.
In 2005, is has been estimated by the FBI and private cyper-protection agencies that about 73 million American adults who use the Internet believed that they received an average of more than 50 phishing e-mails during the prior 12 months. And that, of course, is just what Internet users actually know might be happening.
Phishers main goal is to obtain a victim’s checking-account number and, in addition, credit card and A.T.M. card numbers, which they can copy onto bogus cards they have manufactured for the purpose of extracting money and goods from a victim’s account.
It should be noted that many American banks have serious security gaps in the software used to analyze magnetic stripe coding on the back of A.T.M. cards, and these gaps have permitted card hijackers to use bogus copies. American regulators, concerned about online vulnerabilities at the country’s banks, have sharply tightened security requirements at financial institutions.
Although Interner Provider (IP) numbers lead to Italy, the Netherlands, the Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, and Russia, a secret investigation by NSA and other American domestic and foreign intelligence agencies has disclosed that almost all of the scams originate inside Israel and that while the Israeli authorities are aware of this, the fact that information considered “vital to the interests of the State of Israel” is part of the intercepts, no action has been taken against operations that are not directed against Israeli agencies or individuals. Further, one of the caveats to the continued functioning of these enormously profitable computer frauds is that any monies gleaned from them must be deposited in Israeli, and not foreign, banks.
Isreali intelligence, having formed a cooperative association with Israeli internet swindlers, has, according to an NSA report, not hesitated to spy on their American counterparts.
Among the Israeli corporations on the receiving end of stolen information were two telecommunications affiliates of Bezeq, the country’s largest telephone company. The Israeli government held a controlling interest in Bezeq until it sold most of its stake to private investors, including Los Angeles media mogul Haim Saban, shortly before the Trojan horse scandal became public. A lawyer representing Bezeq and the two affiliates, YES and Pele-Phone, declined to comment on the investigation; Mr. Wismonsky said that Bezeq itself appeared to have been a victim, not a recipient, of stolen information.
Israeli intelligence also is able to oversee almost all telephonic contacts, to include internet usage, in the United States.
This is accomplished by obtaining and analyzing data that is generated every time someone in the U.S. makes a telephone call.
Here is how the system works. Most directory assistance calls, and virtually all call records and billing inside the U.S. are done for the telephone companies by Amdocs Ltd., an Israeli-based private telecommunications company.
Amdocs has contracts with the 25 biggest telephone companies in America, and even more worldwide. The White House and other secure government phone lines are protected, but it is virtually impossible for any American to make a call on any American phone without generating an Amdocs record of it.
In recent years, the FBI and other government agencies have investigated Amdocs more than once. The firm has repeatedly and adamantly denied any security breaches or wrongdoing. In 1999, the super secret National Security Agency, headquartered in Ft. George Meade in northern Maryland, issued what is called a Top Secret Sensitive Compartmentalized Information report, TS/SCI, warning that records of calls in the United States were getting into foreign hands – in Israel, in particular.
Investigators do not believe such calls are being listened to, but the data about who is calling whom and when is extremely valuable in itself. An internal Amdocs memo to senior company executives suggests just how Amdocs generated call records could be used. “Widespread data mining techniques and algorithms…combining both the properties of the customer (e.g., credit rating) and properties of the specific ‘behavior….’” Specific behavior, such as who the targeted customers are calling is also noted.
The Amdocs memo says the system should be publicly advertised as “helping to prevent telephone fraud.” However, U.S. counterintelligence analysts say it could, and unquestionably was, also be used to spy via the records of the American telephone system. The N.S.A has held numerous classified conferences to warn the F.B.I. and C.I.A. how Amdocs records could be used.
At one classified NSA briefing, a diagram by the Argonne National Laboratory was used to show that if phone records are not completely secure, major security breaches are more than possible.
Another NSA briefing document said, “It has become increasingly apparent that systems and networks are vulnerable…Such crimes always involve unauthorized persons, or persons who exceed their authorization…citing on exploitable vulnerabilities.”
Those vulnerabilities are growing, because according to another briefing, the U.S. relies too much on foreign companies like Amdocs for high-tech equipment and software. “Many factors have led to increased dependence on code developed overseas…. We buy rather than train or develop solutions.”
U.S. intelligence does not officially believe the Israeli government is involved in a misuse of information, and Amdocs insists that its data is secure. What U.S. government officials are worried about, however, is the possibility that Amdocs data could get into the wrong hands, particularly organized crime. And that would not be the first time that such a thing has happened.
In a 1997 drug trafficking case in Los Angeles, telephone information, specifically of the type that Amdocs collects, was used to “completely compromise the communications of the FBI, the Secret Service, the DEA and the LAPD.”
There has been considerable but very quiet concern about the 60 Israelis who were detained in the anti-terror investigation, and the suspicion that some investigators have that they may have picked up information on the 9/11 attacks ahead of time and not passed it on.
There exists a classified Justice Department report stating that the Mossad, the Israeli intelligence agency, did indeed send representatives to the U.S. to warn, just before 9/11, that a major terrorist attack was imminent. How does that leave room for the lack of a warning?
What investigators have stated is that that warning from the Mossad was nonspecific and extremely vague and general, and they believe that it may have had something to do with the Israeli desire to protect what are called “sources and methods” in the intelligence community while at the same time attempting to convince American authorities that they were being cooperative and friendly. There is very substantive and documented evidence that those sources and methods were, and still are, taking place in the United States.
The question arose in the Select Intelligence Committee on Capitol Hill, chaired by former CIA agent, Porter Goss. Concern was expressed concerning this Mossad spying issue but nothing came of this and the matter was very quickly, and quietly, shelved
An official listing of known Mossad agents and a much larger one listing Mossad informants in the United States is perhaps the best indicator of the degree and extent that this official Israeli organ has penetrated American security, business and military organizations. Its publication would certainly create terrible havoc and would very adversely impact on American/Israeli diplomatic and military relations.
Reports indicate that such established agencies as the Anti Defamation League, several identified national newspapers and one major television network also harbor and assist a significant number of active Mossad agents engaged in espionage activities.
The concern about telephone security extends to another company, founded in Israel, that provides the technology used by the U.S. government for electronic eavesdropping. The company is Comverse Infosys, a subsidiary of an Israeli-run private telecommunications firm, with offices throughout the U.S. It provides wiretapping equipment for law enforcement. Investigative reports also indicate that these offices have been and are being used as bases for intelligence operations directed against the United States via the Mossad agents working in this country.
Here is the method that foreign wiretapping works in the U.S.
Every time a call is made in America, it passes through the nation’s elaborate network of switchers and routers run by the phone companies. Custom computers and software, made by companies like Comverse, are tied into that network to intercept, record and store the wiretapped calls, and at the same time transmit them to investigators.
The manufacturers have continuing access to the computers so they can service them and keep them free of technical errors. This process was authorized by the 1994 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, or CALEA. Senior government officials have reluctantly acknowledged that while CALEA made officially authorized, and unauthorized, wiretapping much easier for Federal authorities, it has led to a system that is seriously vulnerable to compromise, and may have undermined the whole wiretapping system.
Attorney General John Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert Mueller were both warned on October 18, 2001 in a hand-delivered letter from 15 local, state and federal law enforcement officials, who complained that “law enforcement’s current electronic surveillance capabilities are less effective today than they were at the time CALEA was enacted.”
Congress insists the equipment it permits to be installed is secure. But the complaint about this system is that the wiretap computer programs made by Comverse have, in effect, a back door through which wiretaps themselves can be intercepted by unauthorized parties.
In this case, the unauthorized parties is the Israeli Mossad and through them, the government and commercial interests of Israel itself.
Adding to the suspicions is the fact that in Israel, Comverse works closely with the Israeli government, and under special programs and gets reimbursed for up to 50 percent of its research and development costs by the Israeli Ministry of Industry and Trade. But investigators within the DEA, INS and FBI have all privately stated that to pursue or even suggest Israeli spying through Comverse is considered career suicide because of the enormous political and political power wielded by the Israeli lobby, the extremely pro-Israeli American television and print media and many Jewish financial organizations in the United States.
And sources say that while various F.B.I. inquiries into Comverse have been conducted over the years, they have been halted before the actual equipment has ever been thoroughly tested for leaks. A 1999 F.C.C. document indicates several government agencies expressed deep concerns that too many unauthorized non-law enforcement personnel can access the wiretap system. The FBI’s own small office in Chantilly, Virginia that actually oversees the CALEA wiretapping program, is among the most agitated about the Israeli ongoing threat.
It is the FBI’s office in Quantico, Virginia, that has jurisdiction over awarding contracts and buying intercept equipment. And for years, they have awarded the majority of the business to Comverse. A handful of former U.S. law enforcement officials involved in awarding Comverse lucrative U.S. government contracts over the years now work for the Israeli-based company.
Numerous sources say some of those individuals were asked to leave government service under what knowledgeable sources call “troublesome circumstances” that still remain under administrative review within the Justice Department.
And what troubles investigators the most, particularly in New York City, in the counter terrorism investigation of the World Trade Center attack, is that in a number of cases, suspects they had sought to wiretap and survey immediately changed their telecommunications processes. This began as soon as those supposedly secret wiretaps went into place
There are growing and very serious concerns in a very significant number of top-level American intelligence and counterintelligence. Many of these agencies have begun compiling evidence, and instigating a very highly classified investigation, into the very strong probability that the Israeli government is directly involved in this matter and has been from the outset.
Speaking confidentially, top U.S. intelligence agencies indicate that “the last thing needed is another Pollard scandal.”
Following the 9/11 attacks, Federal officials have arrested or detained nearly 200 Israeli citizens suspected of belonging to an “organized intelligence-gathering operation.” The Bush administration has deported most of those arrested after Sept. 11, although some are in custody under the new anti-terrorism law. Some of these detainees are being investigated for their possible penetration of known Arab terrorist groups located in the United States, Canada and Europe and through this, having gained specific knowledge of the time and location of the September 11 attacks.
It has been established that an Israeli firm generated billing data that could be used for intelligence purpose, and a recent Justice Department report describes concerns that the federal government’s own wiretapping system may be vulnerable.
In Los Angeles, in 1997, a major local, state and federal drug investigation suddenly collapsed. The suspects: Israeli organized crime organizations, composed mostly of Russian Jews, with ongoing operations in New York, Miami, Las Vegas, Canada, Israel and Egypt.
The allegations: cocaine and ecstasy trafficking, and sophisticated white-collar credit card and computer fraud. . A DEA report under date of December 18 stated that there existed serious security breaches in DEA telecommunications by unauthorized “foreign nationals” — and cites an Israeli-owned firm with which the DEA contracted for wiretap equipment .
The problem: according to classified law enforcement documents, is that the Israeli-based gangsters had the Federal and State law enforcement beepers, cell phones, even home phones under constant surveillance. Some identified Israeli gangsters who did get caught, readily admitted to having hundreds of confidential law enforcement telephone and beeper numbers and had been using them to avoid arrest.
An official LAPD intelligence report states:
“This compromised law enforcement communications between LAPD detectives and other assigned law enforcement officers working various aspects of the case. The Israeli-based criminal organization discovered communications between organized crime intelligence division detectives, the FBI and the Secret Service.”
Shock spread from the DEA to the FBI in Washington, and then the CIA. An investigation of the problem, according to law enforcement documents, concluded, “The (criminal) organization has apparent extensive access to database systems used to identify pertinent personal and biographical information.”
When investigators tried to find out where the information might have come from, they looked at Amdocs, a publicly traded firm based in Israel. Amdocs generates billing data for virtually every call in America, and they do credit checks. The company denies any leaks, but investigators still fear that the firm’s data is getting into the wrong hands.
When investigators checked their own wiretapping system for leaks, they grew concerned about potential vulnerabilities in the computers that intercept, record and store the wiretapped calls. A main contractor is Comverse Infosys, which works closely with the Israeli government, and under a special grant program, is reimbursed for up to 50 percent of its research and development costs by Israel’s Ministry of Industry and Trade.
Asked about another sprawling investigation and the detention of 60 Israeli since Sept. 11, the Bush administration treated the questions with frightened circumspection. The reason for this is also contained in the body of several U.S. investigative and highly classified reports. The extremely competent Israeli Foreign Intelligence branch, the MOSSAD, had penetrated the groups of terrorists who planned, and eventually executed, the hijacked aircraft attack on the World Trade Center, the Pentagon and the White House. After some debate in the highest official circles in Tel Aviv, the Israeli government decided to pass the very concrete and specific information about the September 11th attack to competent authority in the United States. This was done on three specific occasions, the Department of State, the CIA and the NSC all having been given MOSSAD reports. The nature of the attacks were specified as were two different dates of attack. That the Bush Administration was informed of this planned attack by a putative ally and in specific detail and did nothing to attempt to circumvent it, came as a great surprise to Israeli officials. When it became obvious to them that their specific and timely warnings were obviously ignored, it then put Israel politicians in the position of having information which, if released to the American public, would cause terminal political damage, they decided, according to intercepted internet communication, that discretion was the better part of valor
Europe’s Challenge: A Terrorist Homeland in North Africa
January 18, 2013
Dozens of hostages have reportedly been killed after Algerian forces attempted a rescue operation at a natural gas complex overtaken by Islamist gunmen. The incident demonstrates the brutality and determination with which militant Islamists in North Africa operate, just a short plane ride south of European soil.
Western leaders on Friday were pressing for details on a bloody operation by Algerian special forces to free hundreds of hostages from their Islamist captors at a desert natural gas field. The Islamists said they took the hostages in retaliation for French intervention in neighboring Mali, and have threatened further attacks in the future.
Algerian forces began the rescue mission on Thursday, arriving at the gas field in helicopters and opening fire as the Islamists sought to move the hostages to another site. Authorities said dozens of hostages were killed, as were some of the militants, and at least 22 hostages were still unaccounted for. Leaders of Western countries with citizens taken hostage expressed anger at not having been consulted on the raid before it happened.
Officials have not yet released a concrete death toll, but the attack highlights the precarious security situation in the region, which is strategically important for Europe due to its geographic proximity and natural resources.
The region is larger than Western Europe, an inhospitable desert that is sparsely populated and where government control is scarcely seen. In recent years, the northwest of Africa has developed into an enormous region where drug smugglers and Islamist terrorists can move about with impunity. They cross state borders with ease, operating in Mauritania or Mali one day, only to turn up a few days later in Niger or Libya.
The attack on the natural gas field in eastern Algeria proves that Western fears of terrorist operations in the region extend beyond the north of Mali, where Islamists have been in control since last year. A week ago, the French military launched “Operation Serval,” a cooperation with Malian forces to push back the Islamists. Germany and other Western allies are providing logistical support to the operation while the country’s West African allies have pledged to send troops.
Hollande Lays Out Ambitious Goals
French President François Hollande said on Tuesday that the goal of the mission in Mali was to ensure that “when we end our intervention, Mali is safe, has legitimate authorities, an electoral process and there are no more terrorists threatening its territory.” It is an extremely ambitious objective and one that seems far out of step with reality for the near future.
Even if French and Malian forces manage to oust the Islamists, there are a number of neighboring countries for them to retreat to, including Mauritania, Algeria and Niger. There the Islamists could sit out the intervention and simply wait for European forces to withdraw.
Security within Mali’s Saharan neighbors, after all, is nearly as fragile as it is in Mali itself. Mauritania shares a border with Mali some 2,240 kilometers (1,390 miles) long, and is one of the most sparsely populated countries in the world. The military has been weakened by several coups and security forces are poorly organized.
Mauritania’s vulnerability appeared greatest after a mysterious incident in October 2012, when President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz was injured after his convoy was shot at. Officials said it was a mistaken military attack, though doubts have been raised on the story’s plausibility. Abdel Aziz has had to go to France for medical treatment, leading to speculation that he can no longer carry out his duties.
Sahara Region Rife with Instability
Similar to Mauritania is Mali’s eastern neighbor Niger. Ethnic Tuareg rebels have been fighting the central government in Niamey for years, and the terrorist group Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb has been active in the country since 2008.
On top of that come internal power struggles. In 2010, the military staged a coup ousting President Mamadou Tandja. Largely free elections restored civilian rule in 2011, although parts of the country remain out of the government’s control. The US think tank Fund for Peace has repeatedly ranked Niger among the world worst failed states.
The security situation in Libya has visibly worsened since the beginning of the uprising against dictator Moammar Gadhafi nearly two years ago. The military has been essentially dissolved and weapons from Gadhafi’s armed forces have flooded the markets in the region, ending up in the hands of various militias, including the extremists in northern Mali. Fifteen months after Gadhafi’s death, a stable and sustainable government has yet to take hold. Real control over the country rests with competing warlords, and Islamist groups in the region have profitted.
The blood bath at the oil field shows that Algeria has been the most impacted by the developments in Mali. For this reason, Algiers has long opposed French military intervention in its southern neighbor. Algeria itself is still suffering the consequences of its civil war in the 1990s, in which fighting between the military and Islamists killed hundreds of thousands of people.
The military is still the most powerful force in the country, however it has still proved incapable of securing the 1,400-kilometer border with Mali. Regular attacks on Algerian soldiers in the south show the strength of the Islamists.
Plethora of Islamist Groups Active in Region
A variety of militias are active in the expansive desert region stretching from Mauritania to Niger. Many form strategic alliances, while at the same time competing for power and control over human trafficking and the smuggling of drugs and cigarettes.
The most notorious of these groups is Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb. It emerged six years ago from a rebranding of the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat. In contrast to the Al-Qaida offshoots in Afghanistan, Iraq or the Arabian Peninsula, AQIM has long almost entirely refrained from attacking targets in the West.
Instead, the organization, which is said to have almost 1,000 members, has concentrated on kidnapping Western nationals and holding them for ransom to fill their coffers. Also in contrast to other Al-Qaida affiliates, AQIM has held off on trying to impose its Salafist ideology on native populations, thereby winning over their support.
An AQIM splinter group is the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA). The catalyst for the split was reportedly a power struggle between the Algerian-dominated AQIM leadership and fighters from Mauritania and other countries. In November 2011, the group kidnapped a group of Western aid workers from a refugee camp in Algeria. The hostages were freed in July 2012 for a ransom of $18 million (€13.5 million). Northern Mali has since become the most important region for the MOJWA, controlling large parts of the region.
One-Eyed Algerian Behind Hostage Crisis
The Signed-In-Blood Battalion was formed only in December 2012 as another splinter group from the AQIM. The group was founded by a one-eyed veteran of Algeria’s civil war named Mokhtar Belmokhtar, believed to be the mastermind behind the hostage crisis at the Algerian natural gas facility. The group said the attack was a direct reaction to French operations in Mali. Belmokhtar has threatened further attacks if French troops do not withdraw from the region.Finally Ansar Dine is an Islamist group that emerged in the region after the fall of Moammar Gadhafi. A few months after the organization first announced its formation in 2012, it took control in northern Mali. Its fighters are well equipped with weapons from Gadhafi’s arsenal, and its leaders espouse radical Salafism.
It rejects as un-Islamic the Sufi practice of saint veneration, widespread across northern Africa. After taking control of several northern Malian cities, Ansar Dine destroyed numerous tombs of Muslim saints. It has imposed a brutal form of Sharia law on the region, cutting off the hands of people it accuses of theft and whipping unmarried couples.
France has declared these fundamentalist groups as their main targets in their Mali operations. Getting the upper hand anytime soon, however, promises to be a difficult task.
FBI Documents Shine Light on Clandestine Cellphone Tracking Tool
January 10, 2013
The FBI calls it a “sensitive investigative technique” that it wants to keep secret. But newly released documents that shed light on the bureau’s use of a controversial cellphone tracking technology called the “Stingray” have prompted fresh questions over the legality of the spy tool.
Functioning as a so-called “cell-site simulator,” the Stingray is a sophisticated portable surveillance device. The equipment is designed to send out a powerful signal that covertly dupes phones within a specific area into hopping onto a fake network. The feds say they use them to target specific groups or individuals and help track the movements of suspects in real time, not to intercept communications. But by design Stingrays, sometimes called “IMSI catchers,” collaterally gather data from innocent bystanders’ phones and can interrupt phone users’ service—which critics say violates a federal communications law.
The FBI has maintained that its legal footing here is firm. Now, though, internal documents obtained by the Electronic Privacy Information Center, a civil liberties group, reveal the bureau appears well aware its use of the snooping gear is in dubious territory. Two heavily redacted sets of files released last month show internal Justice Department guidance that relates to the use of the cell tracking equipment, with repeated references to a crucial section of the Communications Act which outlines how “interference” with communication signals is prohibited.
It’s a small but significant detail. Why? Because it demonstrates that “there are clearly concerns, even within the agency, that the use of Stingray technology might be inconsistent with current regulations,” says EPIC attorney Alan Butler. “I don’t know how the DOJ justifies the use of Stingrays given the limitations of the Communications Act prohibition.”
The FBI declined a request to comment on specific questions related to the legality of Stingrays, as it says the matter remains in litigation. Spokesman Christopher Allen told me by email that “in general the FBI cautions against drawing conclusions from redacted FOIA documents.”
A potential legal conflict, however, is not all the documents draw attention to. They disclose that the feds have procedures in place for loaning electronic surveillance devices (like the Stingray) to state police. This suggests the technology may have been used in cases across the United States, in line with a stellar investigation by LA Weekly last year, which reported that state cops in California, Florida, Texas, and Arizona had obtained Stingrays. More still, the trove offers a rare hint at the circumstances in which Stingrays are deployed. “Violent Gang Safe Street Task Forces Legal Issues” is the title of one newly released set of FBI presentation slides related to tracking tactics.
It’s likely that in the months ahead, a few more interesting nuggets of information will emerge. The FBI has told EPIC that it holds a mammoth 25,000 pages of documents that relate to Stingray tools, about 6,000 of which are classified. The Feds have been drip-releasing the documents month by month, and so far there have been four batches containing between 27 and 184 pages each. Though most of the contents—even paragraphs showing how the FBI is interpreting the law—have been heavy-handedly redacted, several eyebrow-raising details have made it through the cut. As I reported back in October, a previous release revealed the Feds have an internal manual called “GSM cellphone tracking for dummies.”
The release of the documents was first prompted last year after EPIC launched a lawsuit under the Freedom of Information Act. The suit was triggered after it emerged during a court case in 2011 that the feds had used a cell-site simulator in order to track down a suspect, with one agent admitting in an affidavit that the tool collaterally swept up data on “innocent, non-target devices” (U.S. v. Rigmaiden). The government has previously argued that tools like the Stingray are permissible without a search warrant—outside the search and seizure protections offered by the Fourth Amendment—because they use them to gather location data, not the content of communications. The Justice Department says cellphone users have no reasonable expectation of privacy over their location data—a claim that has incensed privacy and civil liberties groups.
Putin orders Russian computers protected after spy attacks
* Decree signed after security firm uncovered spy ring
* Computers of former Soviet bloc countries infected
January 22, 2013
MOSCOW: President Vladimir Putin has ordered Russian authorities to protect state computers from hacking attacks, the Kremlin said on Monday, after an Internet security firm said a spy network had infiltrated government and embassy computers across the former Soviet bloc.
Dubbed Red October, the network used phishing attacks – or unsolicited emails to intended targets – to infect the computers of embassies and other state institutions with a programme designed to harvest intelligence and send it back to a server.
Putin signed a decree on Jan. 15 empowering the Federal Security Service (FSB) to “create a state system for the detection, prevention and liquidation of the effects of computer attacks on the information resources of the Russian Federation”.
State computer and telecommunications networks protected by the cyber security system should include those inside Russia and at its embassies and consulates abroad, according to the decree, which was published on a Kremlin website on Monday.
The Russian Internet security firm Kaspersky Labs said last week that the computer espionage network, discovered last October, had been seeking intelligence from Eastern European and ex-Soviet states including Russia since 2007. (http://r.reuters.com/mag45t )
Many of the systems infected belonged to diplomatic missions, Vitaly Kamluk, an expert in computer viruses at Kaspersky Labs, said last week. He declined to name specific countries.
Kamluk said last week that the network was still active, and that law enforcement agencies in several European countries were investigating it.
Kaspersky Labs said the infiltrators had created more than 60 domain names, mostly in Russia and Germany, that worked as proxies to hide the location of their real server.
The FSB declined immediate comment last week when asked whether Russia had taken action to bring any suspected members of the espionage network to justice, or acted to improve Internet security in light of the discovery.
The FSB – the main successor agency of the Soviet KGB – requested a written query, to which it has not yet responded. The Kremlin declined immediate comment on Monday when asked whether Putin’s decree was linked to Red October
Powder Keg in the Pacific
Will China-Japan-U.S. Tensions in the Pacific Ignite a Conflict and Sink the Global Economy?
January 22, 2013
Don’t look now, but conditions are deteriorating in the western Pacific. Things are turning ugly, with consequences that could prove deadly and spell catastrophe for the global economy
In Washington, it is widely assumed that a showdown with Iran over its nuclear ambitions will be the first major crisis to engulf the next secretary of defense — whether it be former Senator Chuck Hagel, as President Obama desires, or someone else if he fails to win Senate confirmation. With few signs of an imminent breakthrough in talks aimed at peacefully resolving the Iranian nuclear issue, many analysts believe that military action — if not by Israel, than by the United States — could be on this year’s agenda.
Lurking just behind the Iranian imbroglio, however, is a potential crisis of far greater magnitude, and potentially far more imminent than most of us imagine. China’s determination to assert control over disputed islands in the potentially energy-rich waters of the East and South China Seas, in the face of stiffening resistance from Japan and the Philippines along with greater regional assertiveness by the United States, spells trouble not just regionally, but potentially globally.
Islands, Islands, Everywhere
The possibility of an Iranian crisis remains in the spotlight because of the obvious risk of disorder in the Greater Middle East and its threat to global oil production and shipping. A crisis in the East or South China Seas (essentially, western extensions of the Pacific Ocean) would, however, pose a greater peril because of the possibility of a U.S.-China military confrontation and the threat to Asian economic stability.
The United States is bound by treaty to come to the assistance of Japan or the Philippines if either country is attacked by a third party, so any armed clash between Chinese and Japanese or Filipino forces could trigger American military intervention. With so much of the world’s trade focused on Asia, and the American, Chinese, and Japanese economies tied so closely together in ways too essential to ignore, a clash of almost any sort in these vital waterways might paralyze international commerce and trigger a global recession (or worse).
All of this should be painfully obvious and so rule out such a possibility — and yet the likelihood of such a clash occurring has been on the rise in recent months, as China and its neighbors continue to ratchet up the bellicosity of their statements and bolster their military forces in the contested areas. Washington’s continuing statements about its ongoing plans for a “pivot” to, or “rebalancing” of, its forces in the Pacific have only fueled Chinese intransigence and intensified a rising sense of crisis in the region. Leaders on all sides continue to affirm their country’s inviolable rights to the contested islands and vow to use any means necessary to resist encroachment by rival claimants. In the meantime, China has increased the frequency and scale of its naval maneuvers in waters claimed by Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines, further enflaming tensions in the region.
Ostensibly, these disputes revolve around the question of who owns a constellation of largely uninhabited atolls and islets claimed by a variety of nations. In the East China Sea, the islands in contention are called the Diaoyus by China and the Senkakus by Japan. At present, they are administered by Japan, but both countries claim sovereignty over them. In the South China Sea, several island groups are in contention, including the Spratly chain and the Paracel Islands (known in China as the Nansha and Xisha Islands, respectively). China claims all of these islets, while Vietnam claims some of the Spratlys and Paracels. Brunei, Malaysia, and the Philippines also claim some of the Spratlys.
Far more is, of course, at stake than just the ownership of a few uninhabited islets. The seabeds surrounding them are believed to sit atop vast reserves of oil and natural gas. Ownership of the islands would naturally confer ownership of the reserves — something all of these countries desperately desire. Powerful forces of nationalism are also at work: with rising popular fervor, the Chinese believe that the islands are part of their national territory and any other claims represent a direct assault on China’s sovereign rights; the fact that Japan — China’s brutal invader and occupier during World War II — is a rival claimant to some of them only adds a powerful tinge of victimhood to Chinese nationalism and intransigence on the issue. By the same token, the Japanese, Vietnamese, and Filipinos, already feeling threatened by China’s growing wealth and power, believe no less firmly that not bending on the island disputes is an essential expression of their nationhood.
Long ongoing, these disputes have escalated recently. In May 2011, for instance, the Vietnamese reported that Chinese warships were harassing oil-exploration vessels operated by the state-owned energy company PetroVietnam in the South China Sea. In two instances, Vietnamese authorities claimed, cables attached to underwater survey equipment were purposely slashed. In April 2012, armed Chinese marine surveillance ships blocked efforts by Filipino vessels to inspect Chinese boats suspected of illegally fishing off Scarborough Shoal, an islet in the South China Sea claimed by both countries.
The East China Sea has similarly witnessed tense encounters of late. Last September, for example, Japanese authorities arrested 14 Chinese citizens who had attempted to land on one of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands to press their country’s claims, provoking widespread anti-Japanese protests across China and a series of naval show-of-force operations by both sides in the disputed waters.
Regional diplomacy, that classic way of settling disputes in a peaceful manner, has been under growing strain recently thanks to these maritime disputes and the accompanying military encounters. In July 2012, at the annual meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Asian leaders were unable to agree on a final communiqué, no matter how anodyne — the first time that had happened in the organization’s 46-year history. Reportedly, consensus on a final document was thwarted when Cambodia, a close ally of China’s, refused to endorse compromise language on a proposed “code of conduct” for resolving disputes in the South China Sea. Two months later, when Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton visited Beijing in an attempt to promote negotiations on the disputes, she was reviled in the Chinese press, while officials there refused to cede any ground at all.
As 2012 ended and the New Year began, the situation only deteriorated. On December 1st, officials in Hainan Province, which administers the Chinese-claimed islands in the South China Sea, announced a new policy for 2013: Chinese warships would now be empowered to stop, search, or simply repel foreign ships that entered the claimed waters and were suspected of conducting illegal activities ranging, assumedly, from fishing to oil drilling. This move coincided with an increase in the size and frequency of Chinese naval deployments in the disputed areas.
On December 13th, the Japanese military scrambled F-15 fighter jets when a Chinese marine surveillance plane flew into airspace near the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. Another worrisome incident occurred on January 8th, when four Chinese surveillance ships entered Japanese-controlled waters around those islands for 13 hours. Two days later, Japanese fighter jets were again scrambled when a Chinese surveillance plane returned to the islands. Chinese fighters then came in pursuit, the first time supersonic jets from both sides flew over the disputed area. The Chinese clearly have little intention of backing down, having indicated that they will increase their air and naval deployments in the area, just as the Japanese are doing.
Powder Keg in the Pacific
While war clouds gather in the Pacific sky, the question remains: Why, pray tell, is this happening now?
Several factors seem to be conspiring to heighten the risk of confrontation, including leadership changes in China and Japan, and a geopolitical reassessment by the United States.
* In China, a new leadership team is placing renewed emphasis on military strength and on what might be called national assertiveness. At the 18th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, held last November in Beijing, Xi Jinping was named both party head and chairman of the Central Military Commission, making him, in effect, the nation’s foremost civilian and military official. Since then, Xi has made several heavily publicized visits to assorted Chinese military units, all clearly intended to demonstrate the Communist Party’s determination, under his leadership, to boost the capabilities and prestige of the country’s army, navy, and air force. He has already linked this drive to his belief that his country should play a more vigorous and assertive role in the region and the world.
In a speech to soldiers in the city of Huizhou, for example, Xi spoke of his “dream” of national rejuvenation: “This dream can be said to be a dream of a strong nation; and for the military, it is the dream of a strong military.” Significantly, he used the trip to visit the Haikou, a destroyer assigned to the fleet responsible for patrolling the disputed waters of the South China Sea. As he spoke, a Chinese surveillance plane entered disputed air space over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in the East China Sea, prompting Japan to scramble those F-15 fighter jets.
* In Japan, too, a new leadership team is placing renewed emphasis on military strength and national assertiveness. On December 16th, arch-nationalist Shinzo Abe returned to power as the nation’s prime minister. Although he campaigned largely on economic issues, promising to revive the country’s lagging economy, Abe has made no secret of his intent to bolster the Japanese military and assume a tougher stance on the East China Sea dispute.
In his first few weeks in office, Abe has already announced plans to increase military spending and review an official apology made by a former government official to women forced into sexual slavery by the Japanese military during World War II. These steps are sure to please Japan’s rightists, but certain to inflame anti-Japanese sentiment in China, Korea, and other countries it once occupied.
Equally worrisome, Abe promptly negotiated an agreement with the Philippines for greater cooperation on enhanced “maritime security” in the western Pacific, a move intended to counter growing Chinese assertiveness in the region. Inevitably, this will spark a harsh Chinese response — and because the United States has mutual defense treaties with both countries, it will also increase the risk of U.S. involvement in future engagements at sea.
* In the United States, senior officials are debating implementation of the “Pacific pivot” announced by President Obama in a speech before the Australian Parliament a little over a year ago. In it, he promised that additional U.S. forces would be deployed in the region, even if that meant cutbacks elsewhere. “My guidance is clear,” he declared. “As we plan and budget for the future, we will allocate the resources necessary to maintain our strong military presence in this region.” While Obama never quite said that his approach was intended to constrain the rise of China, few observers doubt that a policy of “containment” has returned to the Pacific.
Indeed, the U.S. military has taken the first steps in this direction, announcing, for example, that by 2017 all three U.S. stealth planes, the F-22, F-35, and B-2, would be deployed to bases relatively near China and that by 2020 60% of U.S. naval forces will be stationed in the Pacific (compared to 50% today). However, the nation’s budget woes have led many analysts to question whether the Pentagon is actually capable of fully implementing the military part of any Asian pivot strategy in a meaningful way. A study conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) at the behest of Congress, released last summer, concluded that the Department of Defense “has not adequately articulated the strategy behind its force posture planning [in the Asia-Pacific] nor aligned the strategy with resources in a way that reflects current budget realities.”
This, in turn, has fueled a drive by military hawks to press the administration to spend more on Pacific-oriented forces and to play a more vigorous role in countering China’s “bullying” behavior in the East and South China Seas. “[America’s Asian allies] are waiting to see whether America will live up to its uncomfortable but necessary role as the true guarantor of stability in East Asia, or whether the region will again be dominated by belligerence and intimidation,” former Secretary of the Navy and former Senator James Webb wrote in the Wall Street Journal. Although the administration has responded to such taunts by reaffirming its pledge to bolster its forces in the Pacific, this has failed to halt the calls for an even tougher posture by Washington. Obama has already been chided for failing to provide sufficient backing to Israel in its struggle with Iran over nuclear weapons, and it is safe to assume that he will face even greater pressure to assist America’s allies in Asia were they to be threatened by Chinese forces.
Add these three developments together, and you have the makings of a powder keg — potentially at least as explosive and dangerous to the global economy as any confrontation with Iran. Right now, given the rising tensions, the first close encounter of the worst kind, in which, say, shots were unexpectedly fired and lives lost, or a ship or plane went down, might be the equivalent of lighting a fuse in a crowded, over-armed room. Such an incident could occur almost any time. The Japanese press has reported that government officials there are ready to authorize fighter pilots to fire warning shots ig Chinese aircraft penetrate the airspace over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. A Chinese general has said that such an act would count as the start of “actual combat.” That the irrationality of such an event will be apparent to anyone who considers the deeply tangled economic relations among all these powers may prove no impediment to the situation — as at the beginning of World War I — simply spinning out of everyone’s control.
Can such a crisis be averted? Yes, if the leaders of China, Japan, and the United States, the key countries involved, take steps to defuse the belligerent and ultra-nationalistic pronouncements now holding sway and begin talking with one another about practical steps to resolve the disputes. Similarly, an emotional and unexpected gesture — Prime Minister Abe, for instance, pulling a Nixon and paying a surprise goodwill visit to China — might carry the day and change the atmosphere. Should these minor disputes in the Pacific get out of hand, however, not just those directly involved but the whole planet will look with sadness and horror on the failure of everyone involved.
Food fraud report reveals rise in manufacturers’ cost-cutting measures
US organisation tracks increasing reports of watered milk, diluted olive oil and other dangerous substitutes in the food chain
January 23, 2013
by Amanda Holpuch in New York
Some fine wines are complimented for their grassy aroma, but if your cup of tea has that earthy, sweet scent it might be because the tea manufacturer put lawn cuttings in it.
The practice is known as food fraud, and it is used as a cost-cutting measure by food manufacturers. US Pharmacopeial Convention (USP), an independent scientific non-profit organization, announced Wednesday that its updated database showed incidences of food fraud increasing dramatically in 2011 and 2012.
This means the instances of food manufacturers doing things such as adding lawn grass and fern leaves to tea is much greater than originally thought.
The database’s creator and lead analyst, Dr Jeffrey Moore explained that the database was crafted to help food manufacturers, regulators and others improve the safety of the food supply.
“While food fraud has been around for centuries, with a handful of notorious cases well documented, we suspect that what we know about the topic is just the tip of the iceberg,” said Moore.
The database is made up of 1,300 scholarly and news reports of food fraud spanning the 30-year period between 1980 and 2010. But the updated database records 800 new examples of food fraud published in 2011 and 2012.
USP’s findings show that milk, olive oil and spices continue to have a high vulnerability to food fraud, with dilution the most common cause of problems.
Indian authorities discovered in a 2012 study that most samples of the country’s milk were diluted or contained unappetizing agents such as hydrogen peroxide, detergent and urea – a compound that is naturally found in urine and can be synthetically produced. Some South American milk manufactures replaced milk fat with vegetable oil, another product susceptible to food fraud.
Olive oil is most often diluted with lower quality versions of the product, but reports also show instances of waste oil being used as cooking oil in China.
The new reports reveal that seafood, lemon juice and tea are also especially vulnerable to food fraud.
A 2009 study showed that sushi restaurants frequently misrepresented what sort of fish they were selling. The USP is particularly concerned with the sale of escolar fish, which is banned in multiple countries because it can cause a special form of food poisoning. Fish sellers will sometimes sell escolar as white tuna or butterfish.
“Seafood is an example where food safety controls are species-specific, making replacement of one fish with another especially troublesome,” Moore said.
Some of the reports contain documents dating back to the 19th century that show how food sellers would dilute gin with water to increase its weight and add cayenne, sugar and cinnamon to gin for taste.
Charts from foreign regulatory bodies are also included in the data, including a chart developed by India’s ministry of agriculture that lists common adulterants in food that can cause harm to people’s health. Tea leaves can be contaminated with artificially colored saw dust or foreign tea leaves. Sand, stones and “filth” could be used to bulk up food grains.
Food fraud has caused significant public outcry in recent history. Last week, reports surfaced that some beef burgers sold in British supermarket chains contained horse and pig DNA. One sample of Tesco Everyday Value Beef Burgers showed that horsemeat accounted for 29% relative to the burger’s beef content.
China experienced one of the worst food safety issues of this century in 2008 when six infants died and 300,000 babies became ill from contaminated milk. Melamine was found in milk powder, and it is thought it was added deliberately to help the milk powder pass nutrition tests.
USP sets standards for medicine, food and dietary supplements and has presented their data to the FTC. The USP first unveiled their database in the Journal of Food Science in April 2012. The findings showed that milk, vegetable oils and spices had the highest frequency of documented cases of food fraud.
Melting Glaciers in Andes Could Spell Continental Water Crisis in South America
Climate change is driving ‘unprecedented’ shrinking of crucial resource
January 23, 2013
by Jon Queally, staff writer
The great glaciers of South America are disappearing at rates never seen in modern times and the continent’s fresh water supply is at serious risk if the trend continues, says a new study.
Driven by global climate change, the report—published in the online academic journal Crysophere—shows that the Andean glaciers have shrunk anywhere from 30% to 50% since the 1970s.
“Glacier retreat in the tropical Andes over the last three decades is unprecedented,” said Antoine Rabatel, the lead author of the study and a scientist with the Laboratory for Glaciology and Environmental Geophysics in Grenoble, France.
“Because the maximum thickness of these small, low-altitude glaciers rarely exceeds 40 meters, with such an annual loss they will probably completely disappear within the coming decades,” Rabatel added.
If that happens, warned scientists, millions of people who depend on the glaciers to feed mountain streams and replenish water reserves would be at catastrophic risk.
And the Carbon Brief adds:
Retreating glaciers aren’t just a visible indication of climate change – there are practical consequences, too. Another author of the new study, Alvaro Soruco, says the Andean glaciers are an important source of fresh water for nearby populations:
“Glaciers provide about 15 per cent of the La Paz water supply throughout the year, increasing to about 27 per cent during the dry season.”
Rabatel explained to Carbon Brief today that as well as domestic consumption, the supply of water from mountain glaciers is important for agriculture and hydropower. So water shortages could become more problematic for local communities if the ice melt doesn’t stop soon.
Successive studies show that glaciers are melting in response to climate change. But there are still relatively few studies like this one, with data spanning several decades. Such research is invaluable to climate scientists looking to get an idea of the full impact of rising temperatures are having on the world’s glaciers – and what to expect in the future.
CIVIL DISTURBANCE OPERATIONS
United States Army Military Police School
Fort McClellan, Alabama 36205-5030
Courtesty of Germar Rudolf
ACTION: Plan operations to control a civil disturbance.
1. Mission of Military Forces during Civil Disturbances. The mission of military forces during civil disturbances, both in CONUS and OCONUS, which cannot be overly emphasized, is to help local and state authorities to restore and maintain law and order. This mission may be accomplished by breaking up unauthorized gatherings and by patrolling the disturbance area to prevent the commission of lawless acts.
During operations to restore order, military forces may present a show of force, establish roadblocks, break up crowds, employ crowd control agents, patrol, serve as security forces or reserves, and perform other operations as required. Successful fulfillment of the missions will depend to a large extent upon sufficient planning, training, police information, and coordinated actions of individuals and units.
2. Planning and Preparation. To be most effective, planning should be coordinated with local civil authorities to provide a complete coverage of all matters pertaining to operations and ensure that areas requiring joint efforts are properly considered. The provost marshal performs a key role in civil disturbance planning due to the mission of restoring law and order assigned a military force in confrontation management operations. His knowledge of police methods is particularly valuable to the commander and staff in their preparation to assist a community to restore law and maintain order. Considerations should be given to the provost marshal as a member of the advance party to further coordinate and represent the commander with civil police agencies.
Planning is a continuing process involving personnel, correct information, logistics, and operational considerations. It provides for action to be taken before, during, and after disturbances. A military unit preparing for confrontation management duty passes through two general phases: the planning and training phase, and the alert phase.
a. The Planning and Training Phase. In planning for crowd control or civil disturbance operations, planners must decide what data, equipment and training will be needed in order to respond to the demonstration and restore law and order. This phase includes all preparations that are made prior to the unit being alerted. Included in this phase are preparations of unit alert plans and standing operating procedures (SOP), survey of areas and routes, preparation of plans for probable areas of disturbances, preparation of equipment and crowd control devices to include both non lethal and lethal munitions, training in confrontation management operations, and rehearsals of plans.
b. The Alert Phase. This phase may be a short time or may extend over a period of days. During this phase, the unit is fully prepared and ready to move. Vehicles are loaded with equipment and ready for movement. Soldiers are dressed in the prescribed uniforms. Weapons, ammunition, non-lethal munitions, crowd control agent munitions, and supplies are ready for issue. Soldiers must be briefed on the situation and mission to the extent possible in conformance with instructions from higher headquarters. Talks by company commanders and platoon leaders must prepare the Soldiers psychologically for the forthcoming mission
c. National Guard Units. During the planning phase, National Guard units which may be subject to call for duty should make the preparations prescribed in AR 135-100. Special attention must be given to the orientation of personnel with regard to their status when federalized.
3. Alert Plan. Each organization which may be involved in civil disturbance should prepare a detailed alert plan, based upon expected missions. It must be a logical development of the alert plan of the next higher unit.
The plan must provide for an orderly process by which the unit will be brought to a state of operational readiness which will help it to perform its assigned mission promptly and efficiently.
a. The alert plan should be based upon local conditions and whether you are in CONUS or OCONUS. It must be revised as a result of lessons learned and experience gained by rehearsals, or as necessary, to conform to changes in the alert plan of the next higher headquarters. It should include such items as:
(1) Verification procedures for the warning order.
(2) Personnel notification procedures and places of assembly.
(3) Required actions for each element of the organization.
(4) Procedures for issuing special equipment, supplies, and material.
(5) Vehicle preparation.
(6) Security restrictions.
(7) Administrative details
(8) Tentative briefing requirements for unit personnel.
(9) Provisions for opening a unit journal and establishing a journal file immediately upon receipt of the warning order.
(10) Coordination with civil authorities.
b. The alert plan must be thoroughly understood by every member of the unit. Each individual must know his duties, those of his next senior, and the unit’s mission. He must be prepared to replace his next senior.
4. Standing Operating Procedures (SOP). Procedures for confrontation management operations should be included in unit SOP. In addition, procedures for apprehension, search, detention of persons, seizure of property, obtaining witnesses and statements, crowd control formations, identifying extraction and apprehension teams and reserve forces to assist with crowd control when needed. Additionally it should also identify the type of crowd control equipment to be utilized, and the procedures for employment and use of non lethal weapons and munitions.
5. Organization. The development of an effective force capable of controlling civil disturbances dependslargely upon proper organization. The following five principles of organization should be considered inplanning for all civil disturbance operations:
6. Unit Integrity and Decentralized Control.
a. General. An important aspect of confrontation management is the great number of missions involved which creates the need for forces to engage in a variety of operations at the same time. This is a factor which must be thoroughly planned for and constantly evaluated in the development of an effective control force. The need for immediate decisions is great and the requirement for direct supervision is important; therefore, control must be decentralized. Commanders must develop small units capable of functioning as separate teams, as well as part of the overall force. These small units must be responsive to the changing situation and capable of immediate reaction based on the decisions of their leaders.
b. Unit Integrity. To use small unit capability to the best advantage, organizational development should be based on unit integrity. For instance, for an infantry unit the squad should be considered the basic patrol unit; this gives a platoon (minus the weapons squad) the capabilities of a total of three 10-man patrols and the company (minus the weapons platoon) a total of nine. If smaller units are necessary, the fire team concept should be used. Other types of units may need to organize in a similar fashion.
c. Decentralized Control. For proper development of decentralized control, clearly defined duties should be assigned to the lowest possible level and adequate authority given to the responsible person to permit him to do his job effectively.
d. One of the most important phases of civil disturbance planning is the selection of personnel for confrontation management duty. Personnel selected for this duty should be selected using the following criteria:
(1) The ability to remain calm underphysical, mental, and emotional strain.
(2) Respect all persons.
(3) Maintain an impartial, patient attitude.
(4) Be able to issue orders in a manner crowd members can understand.
(5) Must not show signs of fear.
(6) Be in a good physical condition.
e. The noncommissioned officer (NCO) has a tremendous duty in this area. The NCO is usually the person closest to the Soldiers on a day-to-day basis and may be in the best position to see a man who may have become unreliable for civil disturbance control duty. This type of observation is priceless to the commander.
7. Logistical Planning.
a. General. Civil disturbance operations involve special consideration for logistical support depending on whether you’re here in the United States or overseas. Logistical planning covers all phases of such operations from preparation and training to the end of the mission. Planners must include provisions for necessary supplies, services, and facilities, through local services, if necessary. These may include provisions for food, beverages, ammunition, special crowd control equipment and sanitation facilities.
b. Equipment and Material.
(1) Individual and organizational equipment prescribed in common tables of allowances (CTA) and tables of organization and equipment (TOE) for Soldiers and units usually are sufficient for civil disturbance control operations. Additional you may add non-lethal munitions to your existing organic weapons systems such as the M203. For example, adding the M9 pistol for the extraction and apprehension teams, a M16 or M4 with a 203 attached, or a 12 gage shotgun with non lethal munitions
capabilities. The shotgun with non lethal capabilities can be utilized by the over watch personnel. Other examples of additional equipment which may be needed are armored vehicles, mechanical crowd control agent dispersers, floodlights, spotlights, searchlights, cameras of the Polaroid type, movie cameras, public address systems, heavy construction equipment, aircraft, ambulances, first aid kits, firefighting equipment, grappling hooks, ladders, ropes, special weapons, communications equipment, and recording devices. Equipment that will not be needed should be left behind.
(2) Plans must also provide for a supply of barricade and roadblock materials and equipment such as: heavy single strand wire, barbed wire, concertina wire, heavy stakes, heavy nails and spikes, and power saws. Signs and sign making materials, including quick-drying paints, must be available for use with barricades and roadblocks
(3) Unit-Accompanying Supplies. Preparation of unit-accompanying supplies and equipment is important for rapid reaction in emergency situations. Among the items which must be provided for are ammunition, food, water, gasoline, lubricants, spare parts, crowd control agents, maps, and administrative supplies. Unit-accompanying supplies should be developed with unit integrity in mind.
A running inventory must be kept and complete inspections made as necessary. Based upon the characteristics of each item, a procedure for periodic exchange of certain items should be established.
For example, crowd control agents, ammunition, foodstuff, and gasoline deteriorate in prolonged storage. Retention of unserviceable materials will have grave consequences in the event of an emergency. Further, ammunition should be kept apart by type as well as lethal and non lethal
c. Transportation. Plans must provide for all types of transportation needed in civil disturbance operations.
In developing transportation requirements, consideration must not be given only to requirements of deployment, but must also include requirements within the disturbed area. Commercial buses for mass transportation within the objective area, and the use of rental sedans should be considered. TOE vehicles should be increased as necessary to provide sufficient flexibility and mobility for operational and support
elements. In this regard, transportation units are to be considered in the task force development.
d. Maintenance. Considerations should be given to expanding the existing maintenance capability of theunit. Particular attention should be given to replacement of windshields, tires, rearview mirrors, lights, and radio antennas. Coordination should be made with the field maintenance facility to establish maintenance and evacuation procedures after the unit is committed.
e. Re-supply. Definite procedures must be established for re-supply in the objective area. Consideration should also be given to the establishment of logistical contact teams in the objective area. These contact teams should have direct communications with support units so that critical supplies can be obtained as soon
as required with a minimum of delay. Priorities for requisitions should be established to afford the maximum response to requests for re-supply.
f. Loading Plans.
(1) Personnel Loading Plan. To ensure the disturbance control force arrives in the objective area prepared for immediate employment, commanders must develop personnel loading plans around the principle of unit integrity. Loading plans must be rehearsed and should become SOP within the unit.
Personnel loading plans must be developed for each mode of transportation mentioned above.
(2) Equipment Loading Plan. Attention to unit integrity also must be given the equipment loading plan.
Each element of the force must be escorted by its required equipment and a small reserve of ammunition, crowd control agents, and basic supplies.
g. Medical Facilities. Plans must provide for the provision of emergency medical attention to military personnel and civilians. Plans should provide for qualified personnel, ambulance service, medical and civilian, whenever possible.
8. Operations Planning.
a. Prior to deploying the control force, a counter demonstration working group should be developed to coordinate the resources that will need to be employed by the task force (TF). Detailed planning for the procedures used in civil disturbance operations at each level of command should include provisions to implement plans of the next higher echelon. This working group should include:
(1) Public Affairs
(2) Joint military commission (JMC), if organized
(3) Provost marshal office (PMO)
(4) G2, Assistant Chief of Staff nG5 (Civili Afairs) (G5), Assistant Chief of Staff G-6 (signal) (G6)
(6) Civil Affairs
(7) Army Airspace command and control (A2C2)
(11) Fire support element
b. Plans should be prepared for each probable major operational area. These plans should be based on a physical reconnaissance whenever possible. Each plan should indicate an assembly area with primary and alternate routes thereto, tentative locations of road-blocks and observation posts, temporary quarters for billeting and feeding, a patrol plan, a security plan for certain facilities, and other such details. Maps, overlays, aerial photographs, and sketches should be obtained and necessary plans developed for distribution and reserve stockpiling.
c. An outline should be provided for command and control of joint operations with civil authorities to include joint patrols, exchange of equipment, etc. Full use of existing civil police operational limits will prove helpful for adjusting and sending Soldiers for best area coverage.
9. Movement. Movement to the main areas must be considered in developing operations plans. The disturbance control force is extremely weak during movement and could receive a substantial setback if rioters disrupt the movement route and debarkation points. En route security, to include aerial observation, must be
provided at such places as over-passes, high buildings, and other vulnerable points. Further, the means of movement is critical to the success of the operation because of the time factor involved. Normally, Soldiers will be committed to civil disturbance missions on extremely short notice and must arrive promptly if the disturbance is to be contained with minimal damage to property and injury to persons. Since rioters can apply tactics which will delay the arrivals of Soldiers, the most direct routes are selected which are least vulnerable.
Alternate routes must be planned for.
10. Assembly Areas. Movement planning must include the advance selection of areas for assembly of units and the accounting for personnel and checking equipment. Assembly areas should be sufficiently removed from the disturbed areas to preclude their being engulfed by the riotous element.
11. Bivouac Areas and Billets.
a. The selection of bivouac areas and billets should be based on the following desirable characteristics:
(1) Close distance to disturbed area.
(2) Large enough to avoid congestion.
(3) Relatively easy to secure.
(4) Adequate primary and alternate routes available to the scene of disturbances.
(5) Adequate sanitation facilities.
(6) Communications facilities.
b. Whenever possible, maximum use of federal, state, or public property should be made in order to stop extra claims for property damages and displeasure among the public. The use of public schools provides excellent billeting, communications, water, and sanitary facilities. However, if school is in session, use of schools may act as an irritant to the public. National Guard armories and Reserve Centers are ideal if available.
12. Command Posts. Locations for command posts should be selected in advance and plans prepared for staffing and equipping them with a minimum of delay. Consideration should be given to both the main command post and to tactical command posts within the various subdivisions where rioting is most likely to
occur. Security measures must be taken to ensure command posts are not penetrated or overrun be unruly elements. Collection of military and civil police command elements from highest to lowest level represents the best solution to the problem of command and control because of joint aspects involved. Consideration should be given to use of police precinct stations for collocated command posts because of their strategic locations throughout the entire area. Collocation of command posts in this manner facilitates continuing coordination between military and civil authorities.
13. Army Aircraft. Operations planning includes consideration for the use of Army aircraft (helicopters and fixed-wing) for command and control, communications, observation, reconnaissance, en route security, distribution of crowd control agents, controlling the movement of units, removing casualties, movement of Soldiers, re-supply, dropping leaflets, airborne loudspeaker broadcasting, and other appropriate requirements.
Plans should include searchlight-equipped observation helicopters to be used in organizing ground patrols to ensure complete coverage day and night.
PART B – Public Relations and Information.
1. Public relations.
a. Civil disturbance plans must include provisions for furnishing commanders in the area of operations with the personnel and equipment resources necessary to conduct information activities.
b. In order for public relations with the press to run smoothly, plans should provide for:
(1) Giving accredited media representative’s locally devised press passes that will make their passage through police lines and military checkpoints easier.
(2) Coordinating press requests for coverage of operations in the disturbance area to include arrangements for furnishing military personnel to act as press escorts where necessary.
(3) Establishment of a press room by the public affairs officer of the task force commander. This facility should be used for periodic press briefings and as a central point for giving the press unclassified information in the form of fact sheets and other background data concerning the operation.
(4) To keep Soldiers informed, plans should include:
(a) Arrangements for preparation and issuance of a daily fact sheet by the public affairs officer of the force commander.
(b) Arrangements for giving participating units free copies of local and regional newspapers, if practical.
(c) Answer press questions.
(5) Battalion and larger size units in the area of operation must be capable of:
(a) Responding to press questions or providing the public affairs officer of the next higher headquarters with correct data about the unit.
(b) Providing press escorts. 2. Information Planning.
(1) Due to the sensitivity and importance of information collection, analysis, and dissemination; all personnel engaged in civil disturbance operations must be familiar with and follow the policies of the Department of the Army.
(2) At the national level, the Department of the Army relies upon the Department of Justice to provide:
(a) Civil disturbance threat information required for support planning throughout the Army for military civil disturbance needs.
(b) Early warning of civil disturbance situations which may exceed the capabilities for control by local and state authorities.
(3) Army information resources are not used for the collection of civil disturbance information until the Department of the Army has made a determination that there is a distinct threat of civil disturbance beyond the capability of local and state authorities to control. Even after this determination has been made, the Army does not acquire, report, process, or store civil disturbance information on civilian
individuals or organizations whose activities cannot, in a reasonable manner, be related to the distinct threat of a civil disturbance which may require the use of federal military forces (in accordance with AR 380-13).
(4) When the Department of the Army or higher authority directs federal Soldiers to be placed on standby or be committed to help in restoring order, those troop elements involved are responsible (upon order) for processing civil disturbance data obtained by liaison personnel.
(5) The production of data, when authorized, is accomplished under the supervision of the intelligence officer; however, the collection effort required is a coordinated and continuing one on the part of all concerned. The collection effort must be based on essential elements of data required for sound local planning and the conduct of operations. The collocation of command posts and the establishment of joint operation centers make the collection and exchange of information run smoothly. Rapid distribution or this data is vital to enable a quick and effective response by the task force.
(1) Military information elements having counterintelligence resources will maintain the ability to collect civil disturbance threat data during the period in which there is a distinct threat of actual civil disorder requiring the use of federal military forces.
(2) On activation by the Department of the Army, military intelligence elements having counterintelligence capability will:
(a) Establish and maintain contact with suitable local, state, and federal authorities.
(b) Collect civil disturbance data concerning incidents, and estimate the capability of civil authorities to control the situation. This can be achieved through direct contact with civil authorities.
(c) Report collection results to the Department of the Army in accordance with current plans.
(d) Keep appropriate commanders informed.
(e) Provide intelligence support to the Personal Liaison Officer Chief of Staff of the Army.
(f) Recommend methods of overt collection, other than liaison, if required, to the Department of the Army for approval.
(3) Military intelligence elements may employ methods of collection other than liaison only on order of the Department of the Army. (4) Covert agent operations are not used to obtain civil disturbance data on persons or organizations
without specific advance approval of each operation by the Under Secretary of the Army.
(5) Basically, the following vital elements of data will be required for sound planning and operations once approval has been received:
(a) Objectives of elements which are a distinct threat to cause or are causing civil disturbances.
(b) Times and locations of disturbances.
(c) Cause of disturbances.
(d) Existence of persons, groups, or organizations which have distinctively threatened or are creating disturbances.
(e) Estimated number of persons who will be or are involved in civil disturbances.
(f) Assembly areas for crowds.
(g) Presence and location of known leaders and persons who are a distinct threat to cause civil disturbances.
(h) Organization and activities planned by the leaders who are a distinct threat to cause civil disturbance.
(i) Source, types and locations of arms, equipment, and supplies available to the leaders who are a distinct threat to cause civil disturbance.
(j) Use of sewers, storm drains, and other underground systems by the elements who are a distinct threat to cause or are causing civil disturbances.
(k) Identification of new techniques and equipment not previously used by elements that are a distinct threat to cause civil disturbances.
(l) Attitude of general masses towards:
(a) Groups causing civil disturbances.
(b) Civil law enforcement authorities.
(c) Federal intervention to control the disturbance. (m) Possible threat to public property including private utilities.
(n) Communications and control methods employed by elements referred to in paragraph 1 above.
PART C – Request for Federal Support/Training
1. Request for Federal Support.
a. Providing military support to state and local governments to assist them in quelling a civil disturbance or riot requires close coordination through a host of state and federal agencies. It requires a though briefing of
Soldiers at all levels on what they can and cannot do with respect to law enforcement. Civil authorities must be briefed on the restrictions placed on federal forces by the Constitution of the United States, federal statutes and laws.
b. Under the Constitution of the United States and United State Codes the President is empowered to direct federal intervention in civil disturbances to:
(1) Respond to state request for aid in restoring order
(2) Enforce the laws of the United States.
(3) Protect the civil rights of citizens
(4) Protect federal property and functions.
c. The Secretary of Defense retains approval for federal support to civil authorities involving the use of DOD forces, personnel, and equipment. The Secretary of the Army is the Department of Defense executive agent is the approval authority for federal emergency support in response to natural or man-made disasters(except weapons of mass destruction [WMD]). The Directorate of Military Support (DOMS) plans and executes the DOD domestic support mission to civil authorities. The DOMS is the DOD primary contact for all federal departments and agencies during DOD involvement in most domestic support operations.
DOMS is also the staff agency responsible to the Chief of Staff, Army and Secretary of the Army for recommending to them appropriate measures necessary to cope with civil disturbances and terrorism and to transmit the approved recommendations to Department of Defense agencies for execution and to supervise the execution. The missions and functions of DOMS are outlined in AR 500-50. Additional roles of responsibilities of various agencies can be found in FM 3-19.15
Prior to activating federal military forces there is a sequence of steps that must occur. When data begins to show that a disturbance may develop into a situation that will require the help of federal forces, several actions are introduced at the federal level while state and local law enforcement agencies attempt to contain
the disorder. Such actions may include increasing the readiness posture of forces named to help the jurisdiction concerned.
d. As the situation worsens and the state employs its National Guard, the U.S. Attorney General would send his personal agent to the scene of the disorder. This agent is named as the Senior Civilian Representative of the Attorney General (SCRAG) and is the organizer of all federal activities in the area of the disorder, including contact with local civil authorities. At the same time, the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army would send his personal liaison officer (PLOCSA) to the scene along with members of the Department of the Army Liaison Team (DALT) that serves as his planning staff. e. At the same time the PLOCSA and DALT are sent, the Chief of Staff might order the task force
commander with his key staff officers and unit commanders to the disturbed area for reconnaissance. These military personnel would try to blend in by wearing civilian clothing and using rental or police transportation.
f. Should the disturbance continue to increase beyond local and state government capabilities, the state legislature or the governor would send a request to the President for help by federal Soldiers. The Attorney General of the United States has been named by the President to receive and organize requests from states for federal military aid.
g. The task force commander and the PLOCSA would report their findings and recommendations to the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, who in turn passes the data to the Secretary of Defense. The Senior Civilian Representative from the Attorney General, after consultation with the PLOCSA and the task force commander, makes his recommendation to the Attorney General. Following consultation with Department of Defense officials, the Attorney General, as an organizer of all federal civil disturbance activities, makes the recommendation to the President for using federal forces to help in restoring law and order.
h. Before the President can send federal Soldiers, he must first issue a proclamation prepared by the Attorney General. The proclamation orders the crowd to leave the scene peaceably within a specified period of time. At any time during this sequence, the Attorney General may seek informal Presidential approval to pre-position federal Soldiers in the area of the disturbance. By policy, pre-positioning of less than a battalion does not require Presidential approval.
i. The President’s executive order triggers the employment of the task force; this move is fulfilled in a minimum amount of time as a result of sound planning and realistic training.
j. With a letter of instruction as guidance, the task force commander will start operations to subdue the disturbance. The letter of instruction specifies command and control, rules of application of force, policy on custody and detention of civilians, limitations on searches, and required reports. The commander supports the local authorities but he does not take orders from them.
k. After federal Soldiers are committed, the Department of the Army transmits to the state governor and others concerned, messages announcing the federalizing of Army and designated National Guard and Air National Guard units to active duty. These forces, once federalized, are placed under the command of the task force commander. Throughout the operation, the task force commander consults with the Senior Civilian Representative from the Attorney General regarding military operations and decisions, when feasible. He promptly advises the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, on action taken as a result of the consultations.
The Senior Civilian Representative from the Attorney General, in consultation with the task force commander, establishes and maintains liaison with civil authorities in the areas of operation and is the primary coordinator for all federal activities. After the disturbance has been reduced to the point that civil authorities are again capable of maintaining law and order, the decision to redeploy federal forces is made with the same care and coordination that took place prior to deployment. The announcement to redeploy will usually be made by the Secretary of the Army; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, will order federal forces back to home stations and the National Guard and Air National Guard will be returned to state control.
a. The best made plans are of little value if the men carrying them out are not capable and well-trained.
Therefore, all supervisors must ensure that each person is trained and equipped to handle the various tasks that he may be required to handle during a civil disturbance control mission. Civil disturbance training must be incorporated into the annual training program. The training must be intensive, realistic and sustained to better prepare the Soldiers to perform the civil disturbance mission. A lack of individual training in civil disturbance operation may result in adverse effect to the point of endangering lives, especially the lives of
b. There are two basic areas of training to be considered in this lesson: individual training and unit/team training.
3. Individual Training.
a. Soldiers involved in civil disturbance duty require training to adjust themselves to the noise and confusion created by large numbers of people facing them. Countless other elements contribute greatly to anxieties and tensions. Individual Soldiers will be shouted at, insulted, shamed, belittled or called abusive
names. They must learn to ignore these taunts and not allow personal feelings to interfere with the fulfillment of their mission. Any unauthorized actions taken against the demonstrator, may result in unfavorable publicity blaming the control force as using brutal tactics. Additionally, Soldiers can expect objects to be thrown at them, but must learn to avoid these objects; they must never throw objects back.
Soldiers should understand that the well-disciplined fulfillment of orders is the most effective force applied against troublemakers. They must be instructed in all aspects of self-control so they may be mentally prepared for participation in civil disturbance operations.
b. Psychological influences.
(1) The action of civil disturbance participants and the general civil disturbance environment combine
to impose strong pressure upon members of the controls force. Just as the crowd may be swept into violence by such psychological influences as hoping to remain anonymous, the transference of moral responsibilities, and the release of deep set emotions, reactions of the control force may be improper because of the effect of such factors on them. Control force personnel must be made aware of these factors so they do not become victims of their influence. For instance: control force personnel at Kent State fired at a group of students. As far as can be determined, no one gave the order to fire and no one knows who fired first, but the actions of one or more persons were certainly imitated by other members of the control force.
(2) Civil disturbance operations and the emotional involvement and stress they create cause potentially dangerous situations which can lead to the excessive use of force by control force personnel. You must learn to expect the actions of civil disturbance participants and to operate in this stress environment.
Above all, you must control your emotions and guard against excessive response and the urge to get revenge.
c. Unit Training.
(1) In the development of a unit training program for civil disturbance, many considerations should be addressed in term of resources that are available. An analysis of the units personnel, of who is trained and who is not, what Soldiers have real life experience and have graduated from the Non lethal Individual Weapons Instructor Course (INIWIC), type of equipment that is available, non lethal capabilities, times and locations to conduct training. Additionally you must look at incorporating the units SOP in civil disturbance (depending on your theater of operations, CONUS and OCUNUS).
(2) The Unit training program should utilize the seven step approach found in FM 7-0 and 7-1, and be based on the unit’s METL, expected contingencies, prior training and the proficiency of the unit. The training program should not only cover the items described above but also cover all aspects of civil disturbance operations and should entail more than developing mechanical skill in crowd control formations. Training should emphasize protection of fire-fighters, their equipment, residents of the area, use of non lethal weapons and tactics and other people trying to control the disturbance. Training should also include techniques of operations in those areas where you are most likely to be used, as well as procedures for neutralizing special threats.
(3) The purpose of training the units in civil disturbance training is to evaluate their capability to respond and carry out their assigned mission to quickly and deliberately execute the disturbance control procedures required to prevent loss of life and property and regain control; of a civil disturbance.
Training should focus on, but is not limited to:
(b) Individual and collective drills.
(e) Weapons. (f) Munitions.
(g) Live-fire range exercises.
(h) Qualifications and familiarization.
(i) Soldier training exercises (STXs)
(j) Culminating exercises.
(4) Generally speaking, the basic unit training objectives are:
(a) Unit training is designed to develop persons to function as a team. To be effective, this training must include all members of the unit.
(b) Unit training must cover all aspects of civil disturbance operations. It must include more than developing mechanical skill in riot control formations.
(c) Rehearsals of alert phases, loading plans, and operations plans should be held as often as deemed necessary to reach and keep the required degree of skill.
(d) Integrated and concurrent training, stated in the appropriate ARTEPs should be included in unit training. Additional information on range set up and non-lethal training can be found in FM 3-
d. Weapons and Special Equipment. Personnel armed with special equipment must be well trained in its use. Examples of these special items may include the following: crowd control agent dispersers, non lethal weapons and munitions, grenade launcher, shotguns, sniper rifles, cameras, portable public address systems, night illumination devices, firefighting equipment, grappling hooks, ladders, ropes, armored personnel carriers, and roadblocks/barricades. It is important that every member of the control force be trained in using his assigned weapon and special equipment. e. Special Procedures. There are numerous threats, such as sniping and bombing, which may be
encountered during civil disturbance operations, which will require a specialized response to safely and effectively neutralize them. Experience shows the effectiveness of these countermeasures depends upon control and precision in execution. These in turn depend upon the quantity and quality of prior planning and proper training for handling such events.
f. Leadership. The conduct of civil disturbance operations places unusual demands on leadership skills.
Control force supervisors should be made aware of these unusual demands and be prepared to cope with them. Therefore, training for civil disturbance operations should not be restricted to the Soldier.
Commander and staff, at all levels, must examine their own experiences and degree of skill in these matters, to determine training required to reach operational readiness.
PART D – Operational Techniques/Application of Force
1. Operational Techniques.
a. General. In assisting civil authorities in the restoration of law and order, military forces will be called upon to take action in a multitude of situations of varying magnitudes. The application of the principles discussed in this lesson will contribute in great measure to the successful accomplishment of a civil disturbance mission.
b. Minimum Force. The commitment of military forces to enforce civil law must be considered as a drastic last resort, and their involvement must be limited to that degree justified by necessity. In combat situations
Soldiers are taught to fight and eliminate threats. In civil disturbance, Soldiers must deal with noncombatants that have internationally recognized rights. These rights must be respected while maintaining public order. The use of force must be restricted to the minimum degree consistent with mission fulfillment. The use of excessive or unnecessary force may subject the responsible person to civil or criminal liability and may serve to increase public sympathy for the demonstrators.
(1) The commitment of large numbers of Soldiers in a civil disturbance operation should not be misunderstood as the application of unnecessary force or the application of more than minimum force.
Early and massive commitment of Soldiers has in the past prevented, in many instances, the worsening of a low-level civil disturbance into a violent confrontation.
(2) When actually committing forces in a civil disturbance operation, consideration must be given to the relative merits of deploying forces in maximum number on a “high visibility” or “low visibility” basis.
There are advantages and disadvantages to both approaches; however, the determining factor should be the mood of the riotous element–the approach that is expected to produce the strongest deterrent effect upon their desire to commit further violence.
c. Operational Considerations. Military forces must be prepared for commitment in a civil disturbance role.
An integral part of this readiness is the preparation of appropriate plans of operation. In developing these plans, commanders and staff must consider certain basic principles which are considered applicable to the execution of civil disturbance missions.
(1) Objective Area. The objective of military forces in civil disturbance control operations is the restoration of law and order within the area of operations. To fulfill this objective, the area of operations should be filled with well-disciplined, well-equipped, and well-trained Soldiers. Action must be taken to hold back attempts by rioters to cause injury and damage to persons and property, and all persons succeeding in such acts of lawlessness apprehended and turned over to civil police.
(2) Positive Action. The successful application of the positive action principle depends to a great extent on getting correct data. Actions must be directed at defeating the overall purpose of the unruly element.
They must be designed so that the commander is in the position of gaining and exercising the initiative with an ultimate objective of imposing his will upon the unruly group. Plans must be flexible enough that advantage can be taken of rapidly changing situations, while recognizing the requirement to be prepared to meet unexpected developments. When applying this principle, stick strongly to rules of engagement, standards of conduct, and fair treatment of civilians.
(3) Mass. Proper consideration should be given to the commitment of sufficient forces at the proper time and place. It is important in this regard, therefore, that forces prevent or subdue successfully and rapidly any and all acts of disorder and lawlessness. When forces are committed piecemeal and in inadequate numbers, they may not be able to cope with the situation. If successful in their acts, rioters will gain confidence and further acts of violence will be pursued, causing the disturbance to worsen.
Vital to the proper application of the principle of mass is the need for good intelligence and close observation of the crowd and mob behavioral patterns. The most critical areas depend largely on the local situation and the reasons for the disturbance. In general, however, the business and industrial areas are most vulnerable to acts of violence.
(4) Economy of Force. This principle should not be considered as in conflict with the principle of mass.
It should, instead, be considered as complementing the principle of mass. Skillful and discreet use of force will assist the control force to apply both principles with minimum outlay of resources. The key to applying both of these principles at the same time and successfully is the use of highly mobile, well equipped reserve forces. Plans should call for the situation of the disturbance area with patrols equipped with non lethal capabilities to gather information and create the psychological impression of the control force being everywhere. However, the entire force should never be committed for this purpose. Patrol forces should be instructed to handle only acts of lawlessness which they are sure they can cope with and call for help in the more serious disturbances. Reserve forces should be strategically placed throughout the area and be capable of responding quickly to these calls for help.
(5) Maneuver. Proper maneuver is vital in gaining and maintaining the advantage. In a civil disturbance operation, the object of maneuver is to employ force in such a manner as to give them the advantage and thus achieve results which are least costly in men and material. This involves the selection of patrol areas and the control of critical routes to ensure freedom of movement. It also involves the choice of key terrain where a crowd may be more easily controlled. Finally, military forces should be able to move easily to help them reach the scene of any disturbance quickly.
(6) Unity of Command. Unity of command assures unity of effort by the action of all forces toward the common goal of restoring law and order. While unity of command is best achieved by vesting, a single commander with the required authority to fulfill tasks that must be done, it is not always possible.
Because of legal sanctions, local, state, and federal forces cannot be united under one commander in civil disturbance operations. Federal military forces to include the National Guard when federalized will not fall under the control of any local or state agency. Therefore the establishment of joint operations centers, and the recognition of each other’s capabilities and limitations, will create a positive attitude and will contribute to unit of effort.
2. Application of Force.
(1) Civil disturbance operations by federal forces will not be authorized until the President is advised by the highest officials of the state that the situation cannot be controlled with nonfederal resources available. The mission of the control force is to help restore law and order and to help maintain it until such time as state and local forces can control the situation without federal help. In performing this mission, the control force may have to actively participate, not only in subduing the disturbance, but also in helping to detain those responsible for it. Control force commanders are authorized and directed to provide such active participation, subject to restraints on the use of force.
(2) Prior to committing any federal forces in the quailing of civil disturbance whether in CONUS or OCONUS commanders should train and continually brief the control force on the rule of engagement (ROE). The commander is responsible for drafting, interpreting, disseminating, and training the control force on the ROE. The staff Judge Advocate (SJA) should be included in the ROE development to ensure that it will not improperly constrain actions, but still will remain consistent with domestic and international laws, polices, and orders of the chain of command.
(3) If non lethal weapon and munitions are to be utilized, they should be addressed within the ROE and disseminated to the lowest level, preferable to platoon and squad levels. This requires that all personnel have a clear understanding of the ROE and the commander’s intent.
(4) While serving with a multinational operation under the preview of the United Nations (UN) charter or customary international law the UN will may mandate certain restrictions on the use of force. By the use of overwhelming force during a civil disturbance under the UN may compromise diplomatic efforts to reach a peaceful solution. Commanders must beware that any confrontation of the ROE made by soldiers can have strategic political implications on current and future operations.
(5) The primary rule which governs the actions of federal forces in helping state and local authorities to restore law and order is that the control force use only the minimum force required fulfilling the mission.
This chief principle should control both the selection of appropriate operational techniques and the choice of options for arming the control force. In carrying out this principle, the use of deadly force is authorized only under extreme circumstances where certain specific standards are met. To emphasize limitations on use of firepower and to restrict automatic fire, rifles with only a safe or semiautomatic selection capability or modified to such a capability will be used as a basic weapon for Soldiers in a civil disturbance area.
(6) By utilizing the scalable effects concept in response to a gathering crowd or demonstration, the use of force policy must be clearly understood by the soldiers or control force that they may only use the minimum amount of force to quall the situation without the graduated response, which may cause a escalation of hostilities or violence. Commanders should consider using the following scalable effects process:
(a) Try to persuade the crowd to quietly disperse by talking to the leaders of the demonstration.
(b) Use translators as necessary.
(c) Let the first approach to the leaders or demonstrator by the local or state authorities (governor,
mayor or law enforcement personnel).
(d) Pass out handbills requesting that the crowd return home.
(e) Use video tale and still cameras to photograph individuals and events for later use in trails.
(f) Give warning before moving to the next level of force.
(7) All personnel, prior to participation in civil disturbance operationsneed to be trained and briefed as
(a) The specific mission of the unit.
(b) Rules of engagement and use of force governing the application of military force as they apply to the specific situation.
(c) A psychological orientation on the local situation, specifically addressing types of abuse which military personnel may be expected to receive and the proper response to these types of abuse.
b. Use of Deadly and Non-deadly Force.
(1) Commanders are authorized to use non-deadly force to control the disturbance, to prevent crimes, and to detain persons who have committed crimes; but the degree of force used must be not greater than that reasonably necessary under the circumstances. The use of deadly force, in effect, invokes the power of summary execution and can, therefore, be justified only by extreme circumstances. Accordingly, its use is not authorized for the purpose of preventing activities which do not pose a significant risk of death or serious bodily harm. If a mission cannot be accomplished without the use of deadly force, but deadly force is not permitted under the guidelines authorizing its use, accomplishment of the mission must be delayed until sufficient non-deadly force can be brought to bear. All the requirements of paragraph (b),below, must be met in every case in which deadly force is employed.
(2) The use of deadly force is authorized only under conditions of extreme necessity and as a last resort when all lesser means have failed or cannot be reasonably be employed. Deadly force is justified under one or more of the following circumstances:
(a) Self- defense and defense of others. When deadly force reasonably appears to be necessary to protect law enforcement or security personnel who reasonably believe themselves or others to be in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm.
(b) Assets involving national security. When deadly force reasonably appears necessary to prevent the actual theft or sabotage of assets vital to national security. DoD assets shall be specifically designated as “vital to national security” only when their loss, damage, or compromise would seriously jeopardize the fulfillment of a national defense mission. Examples include nuclear weapons; nuclear command, control, and communications facilities; and designated restricted area as containing strategic operational assets, sensitive codes, or special access programs.
(c) Assets no involving national security but inherently dangerous to others. When deadly force reasonably appears to be necessary to prevent the actual theft or sabotage of resources, such as operable weapons or ammunition, that are inherently dangerous to others; i.e., assets that, in the hands of an unauthorized individual, present a substantial potential danger of death or serious bodily harm to others. Examples include high risk portable and lethal missiles, rockets, arms, ammunition, explosives, chemical agents, and special nuclear material.
(d) Serious offenses against persons. When deadly force reasonably appears necessary to prevent the commission of a serious offense involving violence and threatening death or serious bodily harm.
Examples include murder, armed robbery, and aggravated assault. (e) Arrest or apprehension. When deadly force reasonably appears to be necessary to arrest,
apprehend, or prevent the escape of a person who, there is probably cause to believe, has committed an offense of the nature in (2) through (4) above.
(f) Escapes. When deadly force has been specifically authorized by the Heads of the DoD Components and reasonable appears to be necessary to prevent the escape of a prisoner, provided law enforcement or security personnel have probable cause to believe that the escaping prisoner poses a threat of serious bodily harm either to security personnel or others.
(3) Every Soldier has the right under the law to use reasonably necessary force to defend himself against violent and dangerous personal attack. The limitations of this paragraph are not intended to infringe on this right, but to prevent the unauthorized or random use of other types of deadly force.
(4) In addition, the following policies regarding the use of deadly force will be observed:
(a) Give an order to halt.
(b) Warning shot will not be fired.
(c) When a firearm is discharged it will be fired with the intent of rendering the person(s) at whom it is discharged incapable of continuing that activity or course of behavior prompting the individual to shoot.
(d) Shot will be firedonly with due regard for the safety of innocent bystanders.
(e) In the case of holstered weapons, a weapon should not be removed from the holster unless there is reasonable expectation that use of the weapon may be necessary.
(5) Even when its use is authorized, deadly force must be used only with great selectivity and precision against the particular threat which justifies its use. For example, the receipt of sniper fire, however deadly, from an unknown location can never justify “returning the fire” against any or all persons who may be visible on the street or in nearby buildings. Such random response is far too likely to result in accidents among innocent bystanders or fellow law enforcement personnel; the appropriate response is to take cover and try to locate the source of the fire so that the threat can be neutralized.
(6) Task force commanders are authorized to have live ammunition issued to personnel under their command. The individual Soldier will be instructed, however, that he may not load his weapon exceptwhen authorized by an officer, or provided he is not under the direct control and supervision of an officer, when the situation would justify the use of deadly force. Keeping control over the loading of weapons until such time as the need for such action is clearly established is of critical importance in stopping the unjustified use of deadly force. When possible, command and control arrangements should be specifically designed to facilitate such careful control of deadly weapons.
(7) The presence of loaded weapons in tense situations may invite the application of deadly force in response to being annoyed which, while subject to criticism, is not sufficient to justify its use; and increases the danger that the improper discharge of a weapon by one or more persons will lead others to
a reflex response on the mistaken assumption that an order to fire has been given. Officers should be clearly instructed, therefore, that they have a personal obligation to withhold permission for loading until circumstances show a high probability that deadly force will probably be necessary and justified under the guidelines previously discussed. Strong command must be exercised to assure that the loading of weapons is not authorized in a routine, premature, or blanket manner.
(8) Positive control over weapons must be exercised at all times. Individual Soldiers will be instructed that they may not fire their weapons except when authorized by an officer, or provided he is not under
the direct control and supervision of an officer, when circumstances would justify the use of deadly force. He must not only be thoroughly familiar with the rules for use of deadly force, but he must also realize that whenever his unit is operating under the immediate control of an officer, that officer will determine whether the firing of live ammunition is necessary.
c. Command and Control.
(1) The chain of command and areas of responsibility must be clearly defined at all levels. Whenever practicable, the assigned unit boundaries should coincide with the local police subdivisions to simplify coordination of activities in the area. Boundaries are usually located in streets or alleys with coordinating points at street intersections. When a street is named as a boundary, responsibility for both sides of the street is given to one unit to ensure proper coverage. Arrangement should be made to have civil police and Soldiers operate together. In addition to the joint action by police and Soldiers in the streets, arrangements should be made to exchange liaison officers at each headquarters from company through division on a 24-hour basis. Arrangements should also be made for the collocation of military and civilian police command elements.
(2) A written copy of special orders must be given to Soldiers upon their arrival on the scene. These orders, along with the restrictions in effect for the operations, must be understood and complied with by all Soldiers. The populace must be treated fairly in all cases. Any incident of unnecessary property damage or bodily harm will create anger which may result in increased acts of violence.
(3) Commanders at all levels should ensure that the Soldiers establish the immediate impression that they are well-disciplined, well-trained, and fully ready to fulfill their mission. This initial impression must then be maintained throughout the operation. Appearance is extremely important and the Soldiers should wear Kevlar helmets, web gear, and carry weapons at all times when outside buildings. Rest areas should not be located near assigned posts in public view. The psychological impact on the civilian populace of being faced by an alert, well-disciplined military force effectively deters some potential rioters and looters. Soldiers assigned to stationary posts and motorized or foot patrols should be relieved from those duties often since alertness fades quickly in this type of duty.
(4) To ensure that the Soldiers remain alert and observe the orders and instructions in effect, it is important that commanders at all levels get on the ground with the Soldiers to supervise their activities and to provide guidance in questionable cases. Having the commander on the ground with Soldiers is also an important morale factor and strengthens the Soldier’s sense of accomplishment.
(1) The apprehension of an individual lawbreaker or groups of violators is a vital function during civil disturbance operations. Because of the legal considerations involved, civil police should be used to make the actual apprehension whenever possible. When military forces detain or take a civilian in to temporary custody, he will be turned over to civil police as soon as possible.
(2) Military personnel should be instructed not to ask questions at the scene. No questions should be asked of the suspect other than identification inquiries such as name, place of residence, or place of employment. Questioning pertaining to the incident could create legal complications which might prevent a subsequent conviction.
(3) Personnel must promptly report to their superiors, follow-up in writing all important data concerning the detention of civilians, including the names and locations of witnesses. DD 2708, Receipt for Inmate or Detained Person, may be used for this purpose. Photographs taken at the scene and attached to the report are very valuable for identification purposes and for later use in court testimony. The report should be retained at the appropriate headquarters, and used as a basis for preparing a report to the civil police. Any physical evidence obtained, together with evidence tags and receipts completed as required, will be delivered with the detained person.
(4) Violators must be treated fairly and impartially. Minimum force necessary should always be a guiding principle. Consideration must be given to the safety of innocent bystanders, the seriousness of the incident, and the weapons of the violators. Attitudes and commands are especially important. An offender may respond to firm statements regarding the disadvantage to him of further action. If the desired response is obtained, the apprehension or detention should be made using clear and concise commands with the exercise of due caution and vigilance.
e. Handling and Processing of Detainees.
(1) It is important that military commanders give special consideration to the proper procedures in handling detainees even though this problem normally is the primary concern of civil authorities. The large numbers of offenders which may be apprehended or detained in an area of civil disorder poses a special problem for disturbance control forces. If time permits, prior formal arrangements concerning details of handling civilians taken into custody should be made; if this cannot be done, arrangements should be formalized at the earliest possible time.
(2) Detainees should be quickly processed and removed from the scene of the arrest. This procedure should include a quick search, out of sight of onlookers, if possible. They should then be separated prior to removal from the area. The separation is based on the amount of custody needed to secure the detainee, sex, and age. Injured prisoners must be removed to medical facilities. Female personnel must be provided to search female detainees. It is especially important that names and addresses of witnesses be recorded by apprehending or detaining personnel.
f. Army Detention Facilities.
(1) The Army will not operate facilities for confinement, custody, or detention of civilian personnel apprehended for violation of local or state laws as long as civil confinement facilities, operated by the Department of Justice, state, or local agencies are sufficient to accommodate the number of persons apprehended.
(2) When it appears that available local facilities are insufficient, due to the large number of persons apprehended or detained, and this fact can be verified by the person or agency responsible for the facilities, temporary confinement/detention facilities may be operated with prior approval from DA, specifically, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. These facilities will be operated only until custody of the persons detained can be transferred to and assumed by civil authorities. They will not be used for the confinement of persons charged or convicted under civil jurisdiction.
(3) Temporary confinement/detention facilities can be developed from local federal facilities provided they are adaptable to the requirements of custody and control. Such facilities should be established, if possible, within the affected area; this will conserve time, transportation, and escort personnel. However, if no suitable federal property is available within the affected area, they can be located elsewhere on any property under federal control as long as the persons to be detained are apprehended in the affected area. Whenever such temporary facilities are established during civil disturbance control operations, the Army is responsible for providing those personnel, facilities, and supplies necessary for the custody, control, health, comfort, and sustenance of persons detained.
(4) Officers and key NCOs specifically trained and experienced in confinement operations are required to operate such facilities. Guards and support function personnel operating under the direct control of such officers and NCOs need not be specifically trained or experienced in confinement operations as long as they are under close and continuing supervision of trained responsible personnel. Whenever females are detained, they must be held in physically separate detention facilities and under the control of selected female guards operating under the supervision of trained and experienced confinement personnel.
(5) Temporary detention facilities should be constructed and arranged to provide for adequate custody, control, and safety of detainees. It is advisable to use existing permanent-type buildings. Where sufficient permanent structures are not available, only that amount of new construction required for temporary custody, control, and administration of prisoners should be accomplished. Temporary field type facilities provide compartments to assure effective control.
(6) The same operational procedures that apply to the operation of installation confinement facilities and treatment of detainees apply to these temporary facilities except that those policies and procedures establishing training, employment, mail and correspondence, and administrative discipline requirements will not apply. Detailed guidance in procedures for confinement of detainees is contained in EPW Operations, FM 3-19.40.
g. Special Equipment. Certain items of equipment available to military and civil police forces can do much to limit injuries to civilian and military personnel and destruction of property. These items increase the psychological effects of a show of force and offer additional protection and versatility to civil disturbance forces during the operations.
(1) The 12 gage shotgun is a pup action shotgun currently in the non lethal capabilities set (NLCS) inventory. The pump action shotgun is chambered to take up to 3-inch shells. The 3-inchchamber allows for the use of M1012 and M1013 NL munitions. This shotgun also provides a visually distinct alternative to standard military weapons that may be desired based on mission considerations.
(2) The shotgun, as in the case of other firearms used in civil disturbance operations, is fired only on the orders of a qualified superior officer when lesser measures of force are not effective, or when the individual Soldier has no other means of protecting his life.
(3) The M7 is a 66-millimeter vehicle-mounted NL grenade-launching device that is mounted on a HMMWV. It is a indirect fire support system that can deliver the M99 blunt trauma grenade that creates a sting-ball effect. The M315 installation kit is used to install an M7 discharger on the turret ring of appropriate HMMWV variants. An adjustable bracket allows the launch angle to be depressed for engaging targets at ranges of 50, 75 and 100 meters. The system enforces standoff distances and deters potential threats.
(4) The M1012 is a single projectile round made of hard rubber that is shaped like a bomblet and designed to be fired at a single target. With the muzzle velocity of 500 feet per second, the M1012 as the effective range of no closer that 5 meters and no further that 30 meters. Engagement inside of 5 meters could result in serious bodily injury or death. Beyond 30 meters the kinetic dissipates to the point where the round becomes ineffective.
(5) The M1013 is a multiple projectile round with .23 caliber hard rubber pellets that is designed to be fired at and employed with the purpose of affecting multiple targets. With a muzzle velocity of 900 feet per second, the M1013 has an effective range of no closer than 5 meters and no further that 30 meters.
Engagements of less than 5 meter can result in seriously bodily injury or death. Beyond 30 meters the Engagements of less than 5 meter can result in seriously bodily injury or death. Beyond 30 meters the kinetic dissipates to the point where the round becomes ineffective
(6) The midsize riot control disperser (M37) is the size of a standard fire extinguisher that uses compressed air to force the RCA out to a range of 30 feet. It has the capacity to employ 18 burst of RCA into a hostile crowd while maintaining excellent standoff capabilities. The M37 can be refilled and is rechargeable. It can be refilled with CR solution (liquid agent) or CS (dry agent). For the purport of training the M37 can be filled with water and CS can be substituted with talcum power.
(7) The Squad riot control agent disperser (M33A1) is designed to provide crowd control and protection at the squad level. It is capable of projecting a ballistic stream of RCA’s beyond 25 feet in up to 25 half seconds burst. It consists of a frame and harness assembly, compressed-gas cylinder (agent container assembly) air pressure assembly, gun and hose assembly, multi-jet spray unit, and check valve assembly.
The M33A1 can be refilled and is rechargeable. For training purposes, CR can be substituted with water and CS and be substituted with talcum power.
(8) The above mention items are but just a few of the non lethal weapons and munitions available to the commander and unit to utilize during a response to the civil disturbance, and can be utilized to train and prepare Soldiers. Additional non lethal weapons and munitions as well as protective gear can be found in FM 3-19.15.
3. Vehicles. Armored vehicles and transport vehicles add to the readiness of the crowd control force. The use of these vehicles increases flexibility, reduces troop commitments, and provides protection for personnel. In considering the use of vehicles, however, it must be remembered that they should be secured by foot elements.
a. Armored Security Vehicles (ASV) can be used in several ways to keep the effects of civil disturbances at a minimum.
(1) Their use adds a considerable psychological effect to riot control formations while providing added protection for Soldiers. They provide a readily accessible barrier for Soldiers to crouch behind if necessary, and excellent protection for those inside.
(2) Their use as mobile command posts offers the added advantages of security, communication, and mobility.
(3) They are well adaptable to roadblock operations providing the advantages listed above, while at the same time providing an excellent barrier.
(4) Their use for patrolling an area of violence adds to the psychological effect, and allows Soldiers to maneuver in close to snipers in order to make an apprehension.
b. Standard military transport vehicles can be modified with sandbags, armor plating, wire screening, or similar materials to give some protection against sniper fire and thrown objects. They provide mobility and communication capability for area coverage. Soldiers should be deployed with ample vehicles to provide sufficient flexibility to handle all situations in an area of civil disturbance. TOE allowances should probably be increased for this purpose.
3. Other Equipment. In addition to the special equipment discussed above, certain other items should be available for use in operations within the disturbance area.
a. Armored vests and protective masks are required for anti-sniping operations and at other times when violence is expected. Flexibility is an important consideration. For example, the limitation on visibility must be considered when requiring the use of protective masks, and the limitation on mobility when wearing the armored vests.
b. Successful conduct of the overall operation may depend on other items. Auxiliary lighting should be available to include hand-portable lights, vehicular-mounted searchlights, spotlights, flood-lights, flashlights, flares (with caution toward fires), and vehicle headlights. Prefabricated wood or metal barriers, or suitable materials, such as wire or ropes, may be used to block off an area; signs should be provided to supplement these barriers. Evidence equipment, including movie and still cameras with telescopic lenses, and recording devices should be obtained and placed into position.
c. Other items of equipment should also be provided. Helicopters should be used for observation, communication relay, illumination, resupply, reserve displacement, and numerous other tasks. Adequate firefighting and fire protection equipment are vital in civil disturbance.
d. Provisions should be made for appropriate communications equipment for use at the scene and between the scene and the operations headquarters. Every available means of communications to include public address systems–both hand-portable and vehicle-mounted–should be used.
PART E – Operational Tasks
1. General. In any civil disturbance operation, certain tasks must be accomplished to reach the ultimate objective of restoring and maintaining law and order. To do this, action must be taken to gain control of the situation. Control forces must perform certain tasks that will develop a physical and psychological environment which will permit law enforcement personnel to enforce the law and maintain order. The importance of having a high degree of flexibility and selectively in the response cannot be overemphasized. It is just as important that the tasks selected be completed only after a careful evaluation of the situation. This evaluation must consider the particular uniqueness of the situation. In this respect, the commander selects those tasks that are most likely to reduce the intensity of the given situation. Therefore, not all tasks will apply in all situations, but control force commanders and unit leaders must identify those tasks which must be performed and then develop plans and procedures for their accomplishment. The operational and integrated tasks listed below are discussed in detail in the paragraphs and lessons to follow.
a. Operational Tasks.
(1) Isolate the area.
(2) Secure likely targets.
(3) Control crowds or mobs.
(4) Establish area control.
(5) Neutralize special threats.
b. Integrated Tasks.
(1) Gather, record, and report information. (2) Apprehend violators.
(3) Maintain communications.
(4) Maintain mobile reserves.
(5) Inform the public.
(6) Protect the fire service operations.
(7) Process detained personnel.
2. Isolate the Area.
a. This task includes the restriction and sealing off of the disturbed area. The objectives of sealing off the disturbed area are to prevent the disorder from spreading to unaffected areas, to prevent escape of persons bent on expanding the disturbance, to speed up the exit of the uninvolved, and to exclude unauthorized personnel from entering the affected area. In order to prevent the disturbance from expanding in size and strength, it is critical to prevent the inflow of extra demonstrators or curious onlookers into the disturbed area.
b. When military forces are committed to helping the civil authorities in controlling civil disturbances, the situation will be beyond the capability of local law enforcement agencies and a scene of major disorder should be expected. This disorder may be characterized by small, dispersed groups which are looting, burning, and generally causing havoc in the area, or it may be characterized by large groups participating in varying degrees of illegal conduct. The initial action taken by military forces to control the disorder is critical and should include the immediate isolation of the disturbed area.
c. The initial commitment of control force personnel may be required to clear a building or an area in order to isolate the persons creating the disturbance from those not yet motivated or actively involved. The primary emphasis should be on identifying what area and who has to be isolated.
3. Isolated Techniques. There are several techniques to use when isolating a disturbed area.
a. Barricades and Roadblocks. Barricades and roadblocks are physical barriers which deny or limit entry into and exit from the disturbed area. They can be used to totally deny passage of people and vehicles or to permit certain designated categories of persons and vehicles to pass. They must be positioned so as to prevent their being bypassed, surrounded, or cut off from support. In many cases, it may be impractical to physically seal an area due to the physical and geographical considerations, such as in the case of a college campus or a suburban area.
b. Barricades Against Personnel. Civil disturbance operations contingency planning should provide for the availability of portable barricades which slow down the passage of personnel. Concertina wire is a suitable material for rapid construction and effectiveness, although wooden sawhorses, ropes, and other field expedient devices may suffice. Concertina wire should be used sparingly and only under serious circumstances as it is indicative of violent disorders. c. Roadblocks Against Vehicles. The erection of effective roadblocks which cannot be easily breached by vehicles requires large, heavy construction materials. One item that can be stockpiled in advance is 55-gallon drums to be filled with water or earth on site. Other materials include sandbags, earthworks, trees, or heavy vehicles. Several roadblocks placed at intervals of 25 to 50 feet provide sufficient depth to prevent breaches by heavy or high-speed vehicles.
d. Construction Considerations. The construction of barricades and roadblocks should provide cover from small arms fire where this threat is likely. Provisions should be for night illumination of approaches to the position; however, care must be taken not to silhouette the personnel manning it. Construction materials which would chip or shatter upon impact by thrown objects should be covered with canvas or sandbags to prevent injuries from flying fragments. Warning signs should be placed in front of the position directing authorized personnel not to approach the position. One technique of providing a quickly erected barrier is the use of vehicles parked bumper to bumper; however, this procedure may subject the vehicles to damage by a hostile crowd. Another device which may be effectively used both as a barricade and a part of a formation is the use of a locally built frame of wood or metal with wire covering.
e. Perimeter Patrols. Perimeter patrols should be established to prevent entry or exit from the disturbed area, particularly by persons or groups trying to bypass barricades and roadblocks. These patrols operate along the outer operational boundary of the disturbed area. Perimeter patrols can be integrated with area patrol routes within the disturbed area.
f. Pass and Identification Systems. Unit, installation, or municipal contingency planning should include apass and identification system providing for the entry and exit of authorized personnel to and from the isolated area. Procedures should be established for press personnel, emergency medical personnel, public utility work crews, and for any other personnel who have a legitimate purpose for entering and exiting the isolated area. Consideration must be given to those persons residing within the disturbed area who must travel to and from work. An effective pass and identification system requires careful and detailed planning as a contingency measure.
g. Public Utility Control. Ensure that civil authorities have established a means for controlling public utilities to include street lights, gas, electric, water, and telephone services so that they may be turned on or off to support the tactics employed by the control forces.
4. Secure Likely Targets. a community and require security to prevent disruption of essential functions. In addition, certain facilities and buildings have become symbolic targets to radical or extremist elements and should be identified and afforded protection with the priorities established. Among the likely targets to be attacked are control force command posts, billeting areas, and motor parks. Another potential problem in civil disturbance operations is the threat posed by dissident elements intent on doing bodily harm to control force personnel and civilian dignitaries in the disturbed area. When such threats exist, military personnel may have to be committed to security operations. In particular, security must be placed on armories, arsenals, hardware, and sporting good stores, pawnshops, and gunsmith establishments, or other places where weapons or ammunition are stored. To conserve manpower, consideration may be given to evacuating sensitive items, such as weapons from stores and storing them in a central facility. Priorities for physical security must be established to prevent waste of available forces on less important facilities or those which have their own physical security forces. The degree of security necessary to protect various buildings and utilities is determined by considering the following:
(1) The importance of the facility to the overall well-being of the installation or community. Examples of this consideration include the loss of water or electrical power which would endanger the health of the community, the destruction of government buildings which would disrupt the functioning of government, and dissident capture of communications media which would provide a psychological advantage for further spread of the disorder.
(2) The vulnerability of the facility to acts of violence. Planning should estimate the possible degree of risk expected during a civil disturbance based on the facility’s physical layout, type construction, and existing protective measures.
(3) The intent and capability of the demonstrators. This consideration is an analysis of the destructive intent and capability of dissident elements. This includes determining likely targets and the degree of violence such activity will likely entail.
b. Security Techniques. The techniques for securing likely targets consists of providing physical control, the procedures for which can be found in FM 19-30, Physical Security. Military forces are ideally organized and equipped to perform this task; security of government buildings and public utility facilities is a normal mission for military forces in most types of civil disturbances. This releases civil police to operate within the disturbed area in their law enforcement capacity. Security techniques used to fulfill this task fall into two broad categories as discussed below.
(1) Use of Personnel. This category includes employment of sentinels, walking guards, and checkpoints. Military personnel used in this manner should be committed jointly with existing guard forces from the protected facility or agency. Consideration should be given to the possibility of increasing existing guard forces capability with additional equipment. When manning fixed security posts, guard teams must be of sufficient size to fulfill their mission and protect themselves until help arrives; however, availability of reserve forces in lieu of stationary guards should be considered in an effect to conserve guard forces.
(2) Use of Material. This category includes use of perimeter barriers, protective lighting and alarm systems, and intrusion detection devices. These are designed to deter and detect intruders and/or to slow down access to a facility by unauthorized personnel. Various measures of this type may or may not be in effect at the time of the civil disturbance. Military emergency planning should anticipate the requirement for the quick employment of additional physical security measures.
5. Building/Area Searches.
a. General. The conduct of a building/area search can be a hard and dangerous operation, especially when searching for a sniper. Whenever possible, searches should be performed by a special reaction team which has been trained and equipped for such an operation.
b. The command element of the team should establish a central location for coordination of all elements. Communications should be established and maintained with the force securing the area and with observation posts.
c. Deployment of Security Element. The security element should be positioned on the immediate perimeter of the area or building to observe any activity and all exists. The security element should also establish a preferred route of entry in to the building or area.
d. Preparation for the action element prior to their entry into the area or building should include the following: (1) A briefing on the area of building through the use of maps, drawings, and knowledgeable residents.
(2) Equipment and communications checks.
(3) The issuance of an operations order.
e. Commit the Action Element to the Area or Building. When committing the action element to an open area, crowd control agents should be used to saturate the area prior to entry. The action element should enter the area on one side of the perimeter established by the cover element and then proceed through the area towards the other side of the perimeter. When committing the action element to a building, the following methods of entry can be utilized.
(1) Enter at the top when possible.
(2) If entry at the bottom is necessary, an armored personnel carrier should be used.
f. Whenever a search is conducted, whether of a building or an area, it must be done systemically.
(1) In an open area, the action element should maneuver and search under the protection of cover, firing only when necessary to protect life and property. Either the security or action element may use crowd control agents to aid the advance of the action element. The security element on the opposite side should remain in position as the noose closes. The purpose here is to force the sniper or other dissidents to withdraw making themselves vulnerable to capture by the security element. The techniques used for neutralizing dissidents/snipers in an open area will require close coordination and communication between all elements involved.
(2) In an apparent unoccupied building themilitary working dog (MWD) should be used whenever possible. A well-trained MWD with its highly developed sense of smell can pinpoint the location of a dissident/sniper quickly and with a minimum of risk to members of the search force. When the MWD is not available, each room should be searched by at least a two-man team. One may throw a crowd control agent grenade in, wait for it to discharge, then enter quickly and place his back against the nearest wall. The second person follows and searches the room in detail. If available, a third person remains in the corridor to ensure that the suspect does not move from room to room while the two others are conducting their search. The action element leader should be kept informed of the team’s progress. When using riot control agents to help in the clearing of a building, grenades of the non-burning type should be used to avoid the possibility of fire.
(3) In an occupied building, when the dissident’s/sniper’s location is unknown, all suspected rooms must be searched. The action element should try to have occupants submit voluntarily to the search of their rooms. At the same time, occupants should be questioned in an attempt to pinpoint the sniper’s location. If occupants will not submit voluntarily and there is probable cause to believe that the dissident/ sniper is located in the room, a complete physical search of the room or rooms should be conducted. Use of the patrol dog will help in conducting such searches.
(4) In a building occupied or not, where the dissident’s/ sniper’s location is known, the action element voluntarily, crowd control agent grenades should be thrown or projected into the room from the outside by the security forces. If this is not practical, the door should be opened or broken down and crowd control agent grenades thrown into the room. If crowd control agents cannot be used, the patrol dog in his attack role can again be effectively used in subduing and capturing the dissident/sniper with a minimum of risk to the search element.