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TBR News June 28, 2012

Jun 28 2012

The Voice of the White House

         

             Washington, D.C. June 24, 2012: “A Presidential election is coming up in November and an enormous amount of very serious news is being suppressed in the media. The first issue is one of massive unemployment that is growing daily. The old time entry level jobs and part time jobs have totally vanished and only those who are skilled in certain technology fields like the computer world  can find work. Other blue collar jobs have been shipped overseas because of huge very cheaply paid workers and this by the same non-taxed rich who fiercely support the far Republican right. The second issue deals with the looming mortgage scandal wherein sixty million Americans will never get ownership of their mortgaged home because the big banks put millions of mortgages into ‘financial packages’ and stuffed these like sausages. To this day, no one knows who actually owns a mortgage so millions of unsuspecting Americans are just paying rent for property they have no title to.”

US shadow wars rely on drones, computers

June 18, 2012

by Robert Burns, Lolita C. Baldor and Kimberly Dozier

AP

 

WASHINGTON (AP) — After a decade of costly conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan, the American way of war is evolving toward less brawn, more guile.

Drone aircraft spy on and attack terrorists with no pilot in harm’s way. Small teams of special operations troops quietly train and advise foreign forces. Viruses sent from computers to foreign networks strike silently, with no American fingerprint.

            It’s war in the shadows, with the U.S. public largely in the dark.

In Pakistan, armed drones, not U.S. ground troops or B-52 bombers, are hunting down al-Qaida terrorists, and a CIA-run raid of Osama bin Laden’s hide-out was executed by a stealthy team of Navy SEALs.

In Yemen, drones and several dozen U.S. military advisers are trying to help the government tip the balance against an al-Qaida offshoot that harbors hopes of one day attacking the U.S. homeland.

In Somalia, the Horn of Africa country that has not had a fully functioning government since 1991, President Barack Obama secretly has authorized two drone strikes and two commando raids against terrorists.

            In Iran, surveillance drones have kept an eye on nuclear activities while a computer attack reportedly has infected its nuclear enrichment facilities with a virus, possibly delaying the day when the U.S. or Israel might feel compelled to drop real bombs on Iran and risk a wider war in the Middle East.

The high-tech warfare allows Obama to target what the administration sees as the greatest threats to U.S. security, without the cost and liabilities of sending a swarm of ground troops to capture territory; some of them almost certainly would come home maimed or dead.

            But it also raises questions about accountability and the implications for international norms regarding the use of force outside of traditional armed conflict. The White House took an incremental step Friday toward greater openness about the basic dimensions of its shadowy wars by telling Congress for the first time that the U.S. military has been launching lethal attacks on terrorist targets in Somalia and Yemen. It did not mention drones, and its admission did not apply to CIA operations.

“Congressional oversight of these operations appears to be cursory and insufficient,” said Steven Aftergood, an expert on government secrecy issues for the Federation of American Scientists, a private group.

“It is Congress’ responsibility to declare war under the Constitution, but instead it appears to have adopted a largely passive role while the executive takes the initiative in war fighting,” Aftergood said in an interview.

That’s partly because lawmakers relinquished their authority by passing a law just after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks that essentially granted the White House open-ended authority for armed action against al-Qaida.

Secret wars are not new.

For decades, the CIA has carried out covert operations abroad at the president’s direction and with congressional notice. It armed the mujahedeen in Afghanistan who fought Soviet occupiers in the 1980s, for example. In recent years the U.S. military’s secretive commando units have operated more widely, even in countries where the U.S. is not at war, and that’s blurred the lines between the intelligence and military spheres.

In this shroud of secrecy, leaks to the news media of classified details about certain covert operations have led to charges that the White House orchestrated the revelations to bolster Obama’s national security credentials and thereby improve his re-election chances. The White House has denied the accusations.

The leaks exposed details of U.S. computer virus attacks on Iran’s nuclear program, the foiling of an al-Qaida bomb plot targeting U.S. aircraft, and other secret operations.

Two U.S. attorneys are heading separate FBI investigations into leaks of national security information, and Congress is conducting its own probe.

It’s not just the news media that has pressed the administration for information about its shadowy wars.

Some in Congress, particularly those lawmakers most skeptical of the need for U.S. foreign interventions, are objecting to the administration’s drone wars. They are demanding a fuller explanation of how, for example, drone strikes are authorized and executed in cases in which the identity of the targeted terrorist is not confirmed.

“Our drone campaigns already have virtually no transparency, accountability or oversight,” Rep. Dennis Kucinich, D-Ohio, and 25 other mostly anti-war members of Congress wrote Obama on Tuesday.

A few dozen lawmakers are briefed on the CIA’s covert action and clandestine military activity, and some may ask to review drone strike video and be granted access to after-action reports on strikes and other clandestine actions. But until two months ago, the administration had not formally confirmed in public its use of armed drones.

In an April speech in Washington, Obama’s counterterrorism chief, John Brennan, acknowledged that despite presidential assurances of a judicious use of force against terrorists, some still question the legality of drone strikes.

“So let me say it as simply as I can: Yes, in full accordance with the law – and in order to prevent terrorist attacks on the United States and to save American lives – the United States government conducts targeted strikes against specific al-Qaida terrorists, sometimes using remotely piloted aircraft, often referred to publicly as drones,” he said.

President George W. Bush authorized drone strikes in Pakistan and elsewhere, but Obama has vastly increased the numbers. According to Bill Roggio of The Long War Journal, an online publication that tracks U.S. counterterrorism operations, the U.S. under Obama has carried out an estimated 254 drone strikes in Pakistan alone. That compares with 47 strikes during the Bush administration.

In at least one case the target was an American. Anwar al-Awlaki, an al-Qaida leader, was killed in a U.S. drone strike in Yemen in September.

According to a White House list released late last year, U.S. counterterrorism operations have removed more than 30 terrorist leaders around the globe. They include al-Qaida in East Africa “planner” Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, who was killed in a helicopter strike in Somalia.

The drone campaign is highly unpopular overseas.

A Pew Research Center survey on the U.S. image abroad found that in 17 of 21 countries surveyed, more than half of the people disapproved of U.S. drone attacks targeting extremist leaders in such places as Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. In the U.S., 62 percent approved of the drone campaign, making American public opinion the clear exception.

The U.S. use of cyberweapons, like viruses that sabotage computer networks or other high-tech tools that can invade computers and steal data, is even more closely shielded by official secrecy and, arguably, less well understood.

Sen. John McCain, R-Ariz., has been a leading critic of the administration’s handling of information about using computers as a tool of war.

“I think that cyberattacks are one of the greatest threats that we face,” McCain said in a recent interview, “and we have a very divided and not very well-informed Congress addressing it.”

Defense Secretary Leon Panetta and national security officials often talk publicly about improving U.S. defenses against cyberattack, not only on U.S. government computer systems but also against defense contractors and other private networks linked, for example, to the U.S. financial system or electrical grid. Left largely unexplained is the U.S. capacity to use computer viruses and other cyberweapons against foreign targets.

In the view of some, the White House has cut Congress out of the loop, even in the realm of overt warfare.

Sen. James Webb, D-Va., who saw combat in Vietnam as a Marine, introduced legislation last month that would require that the president seek congressional approval before committing U.S. forces in civil conflicts, such as last year’s armed intervention in Libya, in which there is no imminent security threat to the U.S.

“Year by year, skirmish by skirmish, the role of the Congress in determining where the U.S. military would operate, and when the awesome power of our weapon systems would be unleashed has diminished,” Webb said.

 

Scientists warn US east coast over accelerated sea level rise

Study says sea level is rising far faster than elsewhere, which could increase incidence of New York flooding

 

June 24, 2012

by Damian Carrington

guardian.co.uk

 

            Sea level rise is accelerating three to four times faster along the densely populated east coast of the US than other US coasts, scientists have discovered. The zone, dubbed a “hotspot” by the researchers, means the ocean from Boston to New York to North Carolina is set to experience a rise up a third greater than that seen globally.

Asbury Sallenger, at the US geological survey at St Petersburg, Florida, who led the new study, said: “That makes storm surges that much higher and the reach of the waves that crash onto the coast that much higher. In terms of people and communities preparing for these things, there are extreme regional variations and we need to keep that in mind. We can’t view sea level rise as uniform, like filling up a bath tub. Some places will rise quicker than others and the whole urban corridor of north-east US is one of these places.”

The hotspot had been predicted by computer modelling, but Sallenger said: “Our paper is the first to focus on using real data to show [the acceleration] is happening now and that we can detect it now.”

The rapid acceleration, not seen before on the Pacific of Gulf coasts of the US, may be the result of the slowing of the vast currents flowing in the Altantic, said Sallenger. These currents are driven by cold dense water sinking in the Arctic, but the warming of the oceans and the flood of less dense freshwater into the Arctic from Greenland’s melting glaciers means the water sinks less quickly. That means a “slope” from the fastest-moving water in the mid-Atlantic down to the US east coast relaxes, pushing up sea level on the coast.

“Coastal communities have less time to adapt if sea levels rise faster,” said Stefan Rahmstorf, at the Potsdam Institute Germany, who published a separate study in the same journal, Nature Climate Change, on Sunday. Rahmstorf’s team showed that even relatively mild climate change, limited to 2C, would cause global sea level to rise between 1.5 and 4 metres by the year 2300. If nations acted to cutting carbon emissions so the temperature rise was only 1.5C, the sea level rise would be halved, the researchers found.

The impacts of the rising seas are potentially devastating, said the scientists. “As an example, 1 metre of sea level rise could raise the frequency of severe flooding for New York City from once per century to once every three years,” said Rahmstorf, adding that low lying countries like Bangladesh are likely to be severely affected. His colleague Michiel Schaeffer, at Wageningen University in the Netherlands, said: “Sea level rise is a hard to quantify, yet a critical risk of climate change. Due to the long time it takes for the world’s ice and water masses to react to global warming, our emissions today determine sea levels for centuries to come.”

Sallenger’s work on the hotspot off the US east coast showed that the extreme acceleration in sea level rise could add 20-30% to the rise seen globally. “If this turns out to be a metre by 2100, it would add 20 to 30cm.” In May, North Carolina legislators drew ridicule from experts by proposing a law that would require estimates of sea level rise to be based solely on historical data and to rule out any acceleration in future rises.

Rahmstorf said: “Sallenger’s paper shows that, far from being spared accelerating sea level rise, [the coast here] has been over the past decades a hotspot of accelerating sea level rise.” But he added that the cause of the hotspot was not fully understood, meaning it was uncertain whether the acceleration would continue.

Sallenger said: “We came up with a very clear correlation between the acceleration of sea level rise and rising temperature in the hotspot area. That suggests to me that as long as temperature continues to rise the hotspot will continue to grow.”

 

Rising sea level a threat in East, study says

 

June 25, 2012

by David Abel

Boston Globe

As temperatures are projected to climb, polar ice to melt, and oceans to swell over the coming decades, Boston is likely to bear a disproportionate impact of rising sea levels, government scientists report in a new study.

The seas along the East Coast from North Carolina to New England are rising three to four times faster than the global average, and coastal cities, utilities, beaches, and wetlands are increasingly vulnerable to flooding, especially from storm surges, according to the US Geological Survey study published Sunday.

“Cities in the hot spot, like Norfolk, New York, and Boston, already experience damaging floods during relatively low-intensity storms,” said Asbury Sallenger, a Geological Survey oceanographer and lead author of the study in the journal Nature Climate Change. “Accelerated sea-level rise,” he said, will add to “the height that storm surges and breaking waves reach on the coast.”

The findings come as Boston and Massachusetts officials are taking the first of a range of responses to the threat of rising seas. The report did not project how much levels would rise in the Northeast, but globally, oceans are projected to increase between 2 feet and 6 feet by the end of the century, and as much as an additional 5 feet during the heaviest storms. Climate scientists say such storms are likely to increase in intensity and frequency over the coming decades.

In Boston, officials have begun mapping low-lying areas and critical systems that are most likely to be inundated. The maps show that if sea levels rise just 2.5 feet, it could take little more than a Nor’easter to put much of the Back Bay, East Boston, South Boston, Chelsea, Cambridge, and elsewhere underwater, including much of Logan International Airport and the financial district.

As a result, the Boston Water and Sewer Commission will begin inspecting hundreds of miles of sewers, storm drain connections, pumping stations, and other utility systems this summer to assess what needs to be done to protect them from rising seas. The Boston Redevelopment Authority, as part of its new climate adaptation plan, recently began requiring developers to fill out a questionnaire about their awareness of the potential impact of climate change and whether it is influencing their building plans.

The city, which now requires its departments to consider sea-level rise in planning decisions, has also launched a “green ribbon” commission to build support in the private sector for blunting climate change. The commission will advise the city and large companies on ways to cut greenhouse-gas emissions, increase energy efficiency, and prepare for rising seas

 

 

Climate change rate could be faster than thought, study suggests

Data indicate China’s carbon emissions could be 20% higher, prompting fears Earth is warming at a much faster rate

June 11, 2012-

Reuters

 

China‘s carbon emissions could be nearly 20% higher than previously thought, a new analysis of official Chinese data showed on Sunday, suggesting the pace of global climate change could be even faster than currently predicted.

 China has already overtaken the US as the world’s top greenhouse gas polluter, producing about a quarter of mankind’s carbon pollution that scientists say is heating the planet and triggering more extreme weather.

 But pinning down an accurate total for China’s carbon emissions has long been a challenge because of doubts about the quality of its official energy use data. It is used to compute how the planet’s climate will change, helping plan for more extremes of drought, flood and the impact on crops.

 “The sad fact is that Chinese energy and emission data as primary input to the models will add extra uncertainty in modelling simulations of predicting future climatic change,” say the authors of a study in the journal Nature Climate Change.

The team of scientists from China, Britain and the US, led by Dabo Guan of the University of Leeds, studied two sets of energy data from China’s National Bureau of Statistics. One set presented energy use for the nation, the other for its provinces.

They compiled the carbon dioxide emission inventories for China and its 30 provinces for the period 1997-2010 and found a big difference between the two datasets.

“The paper identifies a 1.4-billion tonne emission gap (in 2010) between the two datasets. This implies greater uncertainties than ever in Chinese energy statistics,” said Guan, a senior lecturer at the School of Earth and Environment at Leeds University.

That is slightly more than the annual emissions of Japan, one of the world’s top-five greenhouse gas polluters.

Guan said China is not the only country with inconsistent energy data.

Scientists say the world is already racing towards a warming of 2 degrees Celsius or more in coming decades because of the rapid growth in emissions from burning fossil fuels and deforestation. Adding another billion tonnes into computer models would accelerate the pace of expected warming.

According to Chinese national statistics, on average, CO2 emissions have been growing 7.5% annually from 1997 to 7.69 billion tonnes in 2010, the authors say in the study.

In contrast, aggregated emissions of all Chinese provinces have increased 8.5% on average to 9.08 billion tonnes in 2010.

By comparison, US emissions were 6.87 billion tonnes in 2010, according to the Environmental Protection Agency.

The scientists said differences in reported coal consumption and processing at the provincial level were the main contributors to the discrepancy in energy statistics.

The findings also expose the challenges China faces in introducing emissions trading schemes, which need accurate measurement, reporting and verification of energy use and carbon pollution at the local and national level.

Yang Fuqiang, a former Chinese energy official and senior adviser for the natural resources defense council in Beijing, said provinces routinely underestimate both their carbon emissions and their energy utilisation rates.

“I would say the biggest concern about the accuracy and reliability of (China’s emissions) data is coal – and that comes from too many small coal mines supplying small enterprises and industrial plants. They have no monitoring systems and generally speaking, they are also avoiding tax,” he said.

With provinces now under pressure to meet targets, they are now likely to underestimate emissions, he added.

China is committed to reducing energy intensity – the amount produced per unit of GDP – by 16% over the 2011-2015 period, and carbon intensity by 17%. It also plans to cap total energy use at 4.1 billion tonnes of standard coal by 2015.

 

 

Fed reports how much Great Recession shrank U.S. wealth

June 16, 2012

by Martin Crutsinger,

Associated Press

 

                 WASHINGTON – The Great Recession shrank Americans’ wealth so much that in 2010 median family net worth was no more than it had been in 1992 after adjusting for inflation, the Federal Reserve reported Monday.
            Median net worth declined from $126,400 in 2007 to $77,300 in 2010, a Fed survey of family finances found. The median marks the point where half had more and half had less. The recession officially began in December 2007 and ended in June 2009.
            Net worth is the value of assets like homes, bank accounts and stocks, minus debts like mortgages and credit cards
            The Fed’s findings are in its latest Survey of Consumer Finances, a comprehensive review of household finances that the Fed has done every three years dating to 1989.
            The Fed’s survey of consumer finances contains information only through 2010. A separate survey the Fed released last week showed that total family net worth climbed 4.7 percent in the January-March quarter to $62.9 trillion, about 28 percent above its recession low. The increase was fueled by stock market gains.
            Those gains put net worth about 5 percent below its pre-recession peak of $66 trillion. But since the first quarter ended, lower stock prices have eroded some household wealth.
            The Fed’s more detailed Survey of Consumer Finances is done every three years. The latest survey showed Monday that much of the drop in net worth from 2007 to 2010 reflected the collapse of the housing market, which drove down home values.
            Among families that owned homes, the Fed survey found that their median home equity declined from $95,300 in 2007 to $55,000 in 2010, a drop of 42.3 percent. Home equity is the home’s value minus how much is owed on the mortgage.
            The Fed survey found that median incomes fell from $49,600 in 2007 to $45,800 in 2010, a drop of 7.7 percent.
            The Fed survey found that the proportion of families carrying a credit card balance fell to 39.4 percent in 2010. That was down 6.7 percentage points from 2007. Among families with a credit card balance, the median balance fell from $3,100 in 2007 to $2,600 in 2010, a drop of 16.1 percent.
            The proportion of families with debt that had a debt payment that was late by 60 or more days during 2010 rose to 10.8 percent, up from 7.1 percent in 2007.

             European headwinds and yet more signs of economic gloom in the US and China panicked investors around the world on Thursday.

            The Dow Jones industrial average closed down 250 points, a fall of 2%, and markets across Europe also fell. The selloff followed the release of an independent report that suggested Spain would need to borrow up to $78.78bn to solve its banking crisis.

            Ratings agency Moody’s was expected to start downgrading global banks on Thursday and Friday, including the UK’s Barclays, Germany‘s Deutsche Bank and Citigroup and Goldman Sachs in the US.

             Moody’s warned in February that the ratings of 17 banks and securities firms were under review because they face increased funding costs and regulatory scrutiny.

            The news came amid signs that the German economy, the safest in Europe, is also weakening. German support has so far saved the eurozone from meltdown, but according to a closely watched report from the analyst Markit, Germany’s private sector shrank for the second month running in June, with manufacturing activity hitting a three-year low.

            Chris Williamson, Markit’s chief economist, said: “The rate of decline accelerated towards the end of quarter in terms of both output and new orders – so that doesn’t augur well for July and further months.”

            Signs of a global slowdown hammered the price of Brent crude oil, which has declined sharply in response to falling ­Chinese output. In London, oil dropped below $90 a barrel for the first time in 18 months as investors bet that the global economy was slowing.

            The oil price fall came as a gauge of China’s manufacturing showed its eighth consecutive drop in output in June. Collapse in demand across the eurozone for Chinese goods was blamed for the decline, though a fall in consumer spending in the US was a factor.

            On Wednesday, Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke warned that America’s insipid economic recovery was slowing. The news will be a major blow to Barack Obama as he gears up for an election in which the economy will dominate.

             Bernanke stepped in with a $267bn stimulus package, known as Operation Twist, that has so far failed to calm investor fears. Bernanke said he would act again if conditions worsened.

            There were further signs of stress today as the US labour department announced disappointing jobless figures and economic reports suggested a slowdown in manufacturing.

            Dan Greenhaus, chief global strategist at BTIG, said Bernanke was right to wait until the economic picture was clearer. “The Fed is a slave to events right now. They are just not in control,” he said.

            He said the Fed had little control over the two factors most affecting the US economy, Europe and the political in-fighting in the US over the so-called “fiscal cliff” – a 31 December deadline for the expiration of Bush-era tax cuts that will trigger draconian spending cuts if a compromise  is not reached.

            “The jobs report is nothing new but the trend is very, very, worrisome. Jobs were the final piece in the puzzle when it came to the recovery and now that situation is deteriorating,” he said.

            Initial claims for state unemployment benefits slipped 2,000 to a seasonally adjusted 387,000, the labour department said. The prior week’s figure was revised up to 389,000 from the previously reported 386,000. In February the number was around 360,000 and it is now creeping closer to 400,000, a level at which economists calculate the jobs market has stalled.

             Bernanke warned on Wednesday that Europe’s woes remained a threat to the US, and Thursday’s figures showed German manufacturing had nosedived. US production figures, too, slowed last month amid concern that the euro crisis was ­dragging the world’s biggest economies back into recession.

            Markit said its US manufacturing purchasing managers index fell to 52.9 in June from 54.0 in May, the lowest for 11 months. The Philadelphia Federal Reserve said drops in new orders and shipments had hurt manufacturers, which until a few months ago were expanding at a rapid pace.

            David Semmens, US economist with Standard Chartered, warned that the Fed report was “ugly” but warned not to read too much into one set of figures he added, however, that if the trend continued “people are going to be drastically more worried than they are right now.”

The bad news from the US triggered a gloomy report from Goldman Sachs, which recommended that clients set up short positions in the S&P 500, bets that the index would fall prompting further selloffs in the US markets.

The Central Intelligence Agency’s 9/11 File

Top Secret CIA Documents on Osama bin Laden Declassified

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 381

June 19, 2012

Edited by Barbara Elias-Sanborn with Thanks to Archive Senior Fellow Jeffrey T. Richelson

For more information contact:
Barbara Elias-Sanborn – 202/994-7000
belias@gwu.edu

 

             Washington, D.C., June 19, 2012 – The National Security Archive today is posting over 100 recently released CIA documents relating to September 11, Osama bin Laden, and U.S. counterterrorism operations.  The newly-declassified records, which the Archive obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, are referred to in footnotes to the 9/11 Commission Report and present an unprecedented public resource for information about September 11.

            The collection includes rarely released CIA emails, raw intelligence cables, analytical summaries, high-level briefing materials, and comprehensive counterterrorism reports that are usually withheld from the public because of their sensitivity.  Today’s posting covers a variety of topics of major public interest, including background to al-Qaeda’s planning for the attacks; the origins of the Predator program now in heavy use over Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran; al-Qaeda’s relationship with

            Pakistan; CIA attempts to warn about the impending threat; and the impact of budget constraints on the U.S. government’s hunt for bin Laden.

            Today’s posting is the result of a series of FOIA requests by National Security Archive staff based on a painstaking review of references in the 9/11 Commission Report.

 

DOCUMENT HIGHLIGHTS

            The documents released by CIA detail the meticulousness of al-Qaeda’s plot against the United States and CIA attempts to counter the rising terrorist threat. A previously undisclosed raw intelligence report that became the basis for the December 4, 1998, President’s Daily Brief notes that five years before the actual attack, al-Qaeda operatives had successfully evaded security at a New York airport in a test-run for bin Laden’s plan to hijack a U.S. airplane. [1998-12-03]. CIA analytical reports also provide interesting insights into al-Qaeda’s evolving political strategies. “In our view, the hijackers were carefully selected with an eye to their operational and political value. For instance, the large number of Saudi nationals was most likely chosen not only because of the ease with which Saudi nationals could get US visas but also because Bin Ladin could send a message to the Saudi Royal family.” [2003-06-01]

            Reports on early attempts to apprehend bin Laden detail the beginning of the U.S. Predator drone program in Afghanistan and Pakistan. “First Predator mission over Afghanistan [excised] September 7, 2000.” [1] “Twice in the fall of 2000, the Predator observed an individual most likely to be Bin Ladin; however we had no way at the time to react to this information.” [2004-03-19] American UAVs did not have sufficient weapons capabilities at the time the CIA likely spotted bin Laden in 2000 to fire on the suspect using the UAV.

            Al-Qaeda’s ties to Pakistan before September 11 are also noted in several documents. “Usama ((Bin Ladin))’s Islamic Army considered the Pakistan/Afghanistan area one region. Both Pakistan and Afghanistan serve as a regional base and training center for Islamic Army activities supporting Islamic insurgencies in Tajikistan, the Kashmir region and Chechnya. [Excised] The Islamic Army had a camp in Pakistan [Excised] purpose of the camp was to train and recruit new members, mostly from Pakistan.” [1997-07-14] While, “UBL elements in Pakistan reportedly plan to attack POTUS [U.S. President Clinton’s] plane with [excised] missiles if he visits Pakistan.” [2000-02-18]

            Similar to the 9/11 Commission Report, the document collection details repeated CIA warnings of the bin Laden terrorist threat prior to September 11. According to a January 2000 Top Secret briefing to the Director of Central Intelligence, disruption operations against the Millennium plot “bought time… weeks… months… but no more than one year” before al-Qaeda would strike. [2000-01-07] “A UBL attack against U.S. interests could occur at any time or any place. It is unlikely that the CIA will have prior warning about the time or place.” [1999-08-03] By September 2001, CIA counterterrorism officials knew a plot was developing but couldn’t provide policymakers with details. “As of Late August 2001, there were indications that an individual associated with al-Qa’ida was considering mounting terrorist operations in the United States, [Excised]. No further information is currently available in the timing of possible attacks or on the alleged targets in the United States.” [2001-08-24]

            Despite mounting warnings about al-Qaeda, the documents released today illustrate how prior to September 11, CIA counterterrorism units were lacking the funds to aggressively pursue bin Laden. “Budget concerns… CT [counterterrorism] supplemental still at NSC-OMB [National Security Council – Office of Management and Budget] level. Need forward movement on supplemental soonest due to expected early recess due to conventions, campaigning and elections. Due to budgetary constraints… CTC/UBL [Counterterrorism Center/Osama bin Laden Unit] will move from offensive to defensive posture.” [2000-04-05]

             Although the collection is part of a laudable effort by the CIA to provide documents on events related to September 11, many of these materials are heavily redacted, and still only represent one-quarter of the CIA materials cited in the 9/11 Commission Report. Hundreds of cited reports and cables remain classified, including all interrogation materials such as the 47 reports from CIA interrogations of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed from March 24, 2003 – June 15, 2004, which are referenced in detail in the 9/11 Report.

 

Highlights of the CIA September 11 Document Collection Include:

The 1998 Raw Intelligence Report on UBL’s Plans to Hijack an Airplane that Became an Item in the December 4, 1998 President’s Daily Brief [1998-12-03].

 

The report details how bin Laden was planning “new operations against the United States (U.S.) targets in the near future. Plans to hijack a U.S. aircraft were proceeding well. Two individuals from the relevant operational team in the U.S. had successfully evaded security checks during a trial run at “New York airport [excised].”

Internal CIA E-mails on Osama bin Laden

 

1998-05-05 – “[Title Excised]” “Planning for the UBL Rendition is Going Very Well,” To: Michael F. Scheuer, From: [Excised], Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as “Capture Op,” “[Gary] Schroen to Mike.” [Chapter 4, Endnote 22 9/11 Commission Report]

            1998-12-20 – “Re: urgent re ubl,” Note For: Michael F. Scheuer, From: [Excised], Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11

Commission Report as “[Gary] Schroen to Mike” [Chapter 4, Endnotes 117, 119 9/11 Commission Report]

1998-12-21 – “your note,” Note For: [Excised], From: Michael F. Scheuer, Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as “Mike to [Gary] Schroen,” [Chapter 4, Endnote 119 9/11 Commission Report]

1999-05-17 – “your note,” From Michael F. Scheuer, To [Excised], Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as “Mike to [Gary] Schroen” [Chapter 4, Endnote 174 9/11 Commission Report]

2001-05-15 – “[Excised] Query [Excised].” Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as “Dave to John.” [Chapter 8, Endnote 72 9/11 Commission Report]

2001-05-24 – [Title Excised] “Agee (sic) we need to compare notes,” Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as “Dave to John.” [Chapter 8, Endnote 64 9/11 Commission Report]

2001-07-13 – “[Excised] Khalad [Excised],” Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as “Richard to Alan” [Chapter 8, Endnote 64 9/11 Commission Report]

2001-08-21 – “Re: Khalid Al-Mihdhar,” Memorandum, Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as “Mary to John.” [Chapter 8, Endnote 106 9/11 Commission Report]

Two Definitive CIA Reports on the September 11, 2001 Attacks

2003-06-01 – “11 September: The Plot and the Plotters,” CTC 2003-40044HC, Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.
[Chapter 5, Endnotes 42, 60, 61, 64, 70, 105, Chapter 7, Endnotes 45, 52, 60, 83, 86, 92, 94, 95, 96, 97, 105 9/11 Commission Report]

This document is a comprehensive CIA history of the 9/11 attack. Analysis includes notes on al-Qaeda, the evolution of the plot, terrorist techniques, timelines  D  and detailed hijacker profiles.  2004-03-19 – “DCI Report: The Rise of UBL and Al-Qa’ida and the Intelligence Community Response,” Draft, Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report. [Chapter 2, Endnote 67]

This document is a detailed summary of CIA efforts to apprehend Osama bin Laden from 1989-2004. Highlights include:

Agency notes on bin Laden’s evolution from “terrorist financier” in the early 1990s to a significant threat to U.S. interests by mid-1990.

Discussions and debates regarding the use of Predator drones as early as 2000. [2]

Critiques of FBI information systems as impediments to counterterrorism efforts – “A major, ongoing concern is FBI’s own internal dissemination system. CIA officers still often find it necessary to hand-deliver messages to the intended recipient within the FBI. In additional FBI has not perfected its FI reporting system and headquarters-field communications so dissemination of intelligence outside of FBI is still spotty.” And the report confirms suggestions by the 9/11 Commission Report that “the different organizational culture and goals of the FBI and CIA sometimes get in the way of desired results.” (p. 22)

A group of Afghan trial leaders worked with the CIA on the UBL issue, but “[Excised] judged to be unlikely to successfully attack a heavily guarded Bin Ladin.” “Masood has to be engaged to help in the attempt to capture Bin Ladin, but with the understanding that he would be his own man, never an agent of surrogate of the US government… Even if he agreed to do so, his chances of success against the Taliban were judged to be less than five percent.” (p. 58) Note “DIF” written on multiple pages stands for “Denied in Full”

A Series of CIA Senior Executive Intelligence Briefs (SEIBS) from June-September 2001 Warning of “Imminent” Al-Qaeda Attacks:

2001-06-23 – “International: Bin Ladin Attacks May Be Imminent [Excised]” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief. [Chapter 8, Endnote 14, See also p. 257 9/11 Commission Report]

2001-06-25 – “Terrorism: Bin Ladin and Associates Making Near-Term Threats,” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief. [Chapter 8, Endnotes 12, 14]

2001-06-30 – “Terrorism: Bin Laden Planning High Profile Attacks [Excised],” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief. [Chapter 8, Endnote 12]

2001-07-02 – “Terrorism: Planning for Bin Ladin Attacks Continues, Despite Delay [Excised],” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief. [Chapter 8, Endnote 18]

2001-07-13 – “Terrorism: Bin Ladin Plans Delayed but Not Abandoned [Excised],” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief. [Chapter 8, Endnote 28]

2001-07-25 – “Terrorism: One Bin Ladin Operation Delayed, Others Ongoing [Excised],” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief. [Chapter 8, Endnote 28]

2001-08-07 – “Terrorism: Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in the US,” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief. [Chapter 8, Endnote 38. Chapter 11, Endnote 5. Page 342]

Detailed Reports on Al-Qaeda Organization

“The spike in the network’s activity stems in part from changes in Bin Ladin’s practices. To avoid implicating himself and his Taliban hosts, Bin Ladin over the past two years has allowed cells in his network, al-Qa’ida, to plan attacks more independently of the central leadership and has tried to gain support for his agenda outside the group. – The network also has benefited from a sharp increase in mujahidin recruitment since the resumption of the conflict in Chechnya in 1999, which exposed a new generation of militants to terrorist techniques and extremist ideology through training at al-Qai’da-run camps in Afghanistan. – Violence between Israelis and the Palestinians, moreover is making Sunni extremists more willing to participate in attacks against US or Israeli interests.” 2001-02-06 – “Sunni Terrorist Threat Growing,” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, The Central Intelligence Agency. [Chapter 8, Endnote 4 9/11 Commission Report]

Bin Laden’s Attempts to Acquire Weapons of Mass Destruction

“Bin Ladin and his associates have experimented by crude means to make and deploy biological agents… Bin Ladin has sought to acquire military-grade biological agents or weapons.” 2001-02-14 –”Afghanistan: Bin Ladin’s Interest in Biological and Radiological Weapons,” Central Intelligence Agency Analytical Report [Chapter 11, Endnote 5. 9/11 Commission Report Page 342]

A Positive CIA Assessment of CIA Counterterrorism Capabilities in August 2001

In contrast to the findings of the 9/11 Commission Report and a 2004 CIA Office of Inspector General’s review of its pre-9/11 counterterrorism practices, a report completed in August 2001 by the CIA Inspector General gives very positively reviews to CIA counterterrorism practices, the management of information and interagency cooperation. “CTC fulfills inter-agency responsibilities for the DCI by coordinating national intelligence, providing warning, and promoting the effective use of Intelligence Community resources on terrorism issues. The Center has made progress on problems identified at the time of the last inspection in 1994 – specifically its professional relationship with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

CIA 9/11 DOCUMENT LIST

1992-05-29 – DCI Task Force Report: Improving Intelligence Warning.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 11, Endnote23]

1992-07-17 – “Warning,” Memorandum for National Foreign Intelligence Board from the Director of Central Intelligence.

1993-07-22 – “Funding of the Gama’at al-Islamiya by Wealthy Saudi Oppositionist Usama Bin Ladin; Composition of Sudanese Wing of the Egyptian Gama’at al-Islamiya,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 1]

1994-10 – Office of Inspector General Inspection Report: The Agency’s Counterterrorism Effort.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 3, Endnote 82]

1995-12 – “Sketch of a South Asia-Based Terrorist Training and Logistic Network,” DI TR 95-12, CIA Analytic Report.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 2, Endnote 67]

1996-11-26 – “Terrorism: Historical Background of the Islamic Army, And Bin Ladin’s Move from Afghanistan to Sudan.”
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 2, Endnotes 25, 31, 35, 36, Chapter 4, Endnote 3]

1996-12-17 – “[Excised] Africa Division Recommendations Regarding Sudan,” Memorandum, For: Acting Director for Central Intelligence, From: [Excised], Central Intelligence Agency.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 7]

1996-12-18 – [Title Excised] “The Following Was the Structure of Usama Bin Ladin’s Islamic Army,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 3]

1996-12-19 – “Terrorism: Responsibilities and Background of Islamic Army Shura Council Members.”
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 2, Endnote 37]

1996-12-19 – “Terrorism: Activities and Functions of the Islamic Army’s Military Committee, and Political and Sharia Committee; Process of Approving Terrorist Operations,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 3]

1997-01-06 – “Terrorism: Usama Bin Ladin Trying to Develop WMD Capability,” Counterterrorist Center Commentary, CTC 97-30002, Central Intelligence Agency.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 2, Endnote 49]

1997-01-08 – “Terrorism: Fatwa Issued in 1992 by Usama bin Ladin’s Islamic Army to Attack U.S. Military in Saudi Arabia, Movement of Explosives [Excised] by the Islamic Army [Excised] to Saudi Arabia [Excised],” Central Intelligence Agency  XIntelligence Report.

 

[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 2, Endnote 47]

1997-01-09 – [Title Excised] “A Fatwa Issued by Usama Bin Ladin’s Islamic Army Which Allowed for Attacks Against the U.S. Military in Saudi Arabia,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 2, Endnote 47]

1997-01-27 – [Title Excised] “Usama Bin Ladin’s Islamic Army Issued a Series of Fatwas, Most of the Against the United States,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 3]

1997-01-31 – “Terrorism: Cooperation Among Usama Bin Ladin’s Islamic Army, Iran and the NIF,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 2, Endnote 85]

1997-01-31 – “Terrorism: Establishment of a Tripartite Agreement Among Usama Bin Ladin, Iran, and the NIF,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 2, Endnote 52]

1997-02-13 – “Terrorism: Possible Islamic Army Foreknowledge of an ‘Egyptian Operation’ and Logistical and Security Assistance Provided for the Attackers,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 2, Endnote 56]

1997-03-05 – “Terrorism: Usama Bin Ladin’s Links to a Southern Yemeni Group,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 2, Endnote 44]

1997-03-18 – “Terrorism: Usama Bin Ladin’s Attempts to Acquire Uranium,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 2, Endnote 49. Chapter 4, Endnote 3]

1997-04-18 – “Terrorism: Usama bin Ladin’s Historical Links to ‘Abdullah Azzam,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 22, 43]

1997-04-30 – “Terrorism: Usama Bin Ladin’s Activities in Somalia and Sudanese NIF Support,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 2, Endnote 45, Chapter 4, Endnote 3,] 1997-06-17 – “Terrorism: Usama Bin Ladin’s Financial Support to the Egyptian Al-Gama’at Al-Islamiyya, as well as Algerian and Libyan Extremists,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.  

[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 1]

1997-07-14 – “Terrorism: Activities of Bin Ladin’s in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 2, Endnote 67]

1997-08-01 – [Title Excised], “Plan to establish an Iraqi Element in Bin Ladin’s Islamic Army,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 2, Endnote 54]

1997-08-25 – “DCI Talking Points Regarding Operations Against Usama Bin Ladin,” Counterterrorism Center, Central Intelligence Agency.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 8]

1998-02-23 – “Text of World Islamic Front’s Statement Urging Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders,” Al Quds al Arabi, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Open Source Center.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 2, Endnote 1]

1998-05-05 – “[Title Excised]” “Planning for the UBL Rendition is Going Very Well,” To: Michael F. Scheuer, From: [Excised], Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as “Capture Op,” “[Gary] Schroen to Mike.”
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 22 9/11 Commission Report]

1998-06 – “TERRORISM: Terrorism: Bin Ladin Threatening to Attack US Aircraft,” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief [Undated- Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as June 1998 p. 342].
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 11, Endnote 5]

1998-08-14 – Bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam-An Update,” Central Intelligence Agency Briefing Materials.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 37]

1998-09-02 – “Talking Points Regarding Usama Bin Ladin for the DCI’s 2 September 1998 SSCI Briefing,” Central Intelligence Agency.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 102]

1998-09-22 – [Title Excised]. “Terrorism: Incorporation of Ayman Zawahiri’s al-Jihad Organization into Usama Bin Ladin’s al-Qa’ida; Recent Activities of Egyptian Associates of al-Qa’ida,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.

[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 2, Endnote 82]

1998-11-18 – “Further Options Available Against Usama Bin Ladin,” Central Intelligence Agency Summary Report.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 121]

1998-11-19 – DCI Directive, “Director of Central Intelligence Directive 1/1: The Authorities and Responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence as Head of the U.S. Intelligence Community.”
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 13, Endnote 8]

1998-11-24 – “[Excised] Options for Attacking the Usama Bin Ladin Problem,” Talking Points, Central Intelligence Agency.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 121]

1998-12-03 – [Title Excised] Planning by Usama Bin Ladin to Hijack U.S. Airplane, Successful Circumvention of Security Measures in U.S. Airport.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 112]

1998-12-04 – “Bin Ladin Preparing to Hijack US Aircraft and Other Attacks,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 112]

1998-12-18 – [Title Excised] “Possible Arrest of Two Persons Involved in Plan to Hijack U.S. Airplane in the United States,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 113]

1998-12-20 – “Re: urgent re ubl,” Note For: Michael F. Scheuer, From: [Excised], Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as “[Gary] Schroen to Mike.”
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnotes 117, 119]

1998-12-21 – “your note,” Note For: [Excised], From: Michael F. Scheuer, Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as “Mike to [Gary] Schroen.”
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 119 9/11 Commission Report]

1998-12-24 – “[Excised] Timeframe for Completion of Hijacking Operation [Excised],” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 113]

1999-01 – “Strains Surface Between Taliban and Bin Ladin,” Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report (Undated. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as January 1999 p. 342) .

 

[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 2, Endnote 82]

1998-11-18 – “Further Options Available Against Usama Bin Ladin,” Central Intelligence Agency Summary Report.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 121]

1998-11-19 – DCI Directive, “Director of Central Intelligence Directive 1/1: The Authorities and Responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence as Head of the U.S. Intelligence Community.”
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 13, Endnote 8]

1998-11-24 – “[Excised] Options for Attacking the Usama Bin Ladin Problem,” Talking Points, Central Intelligence Agency.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 121]

1998-12-03 – [Title Excised] Planning by Usama Bin Ladin to Hijack U.S. Airplane, Successful Circumvention of Security Measures in U.S. Airport.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 112]

1998-12-04 – “Bin Ladin Preparing to Hijack US Aircraft and Other Attacks,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 112]

1998-12-18 – [Title Excised] “Possible Arrest of Two Persons Involved in Plan to Hijack U.S. Airplane in the United States,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 113]

1998-12-20 – “Re: urgent re ubl,” Note For: Michael F. Scheuer, From: [Excised], Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as “[Gary] Schroen to Mike.”
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnotes 117, 119]

1998-12-21 – “your note,” Note For: [Excised], From: Michael F. Scheuer, Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as “Mike to [Gary] Schroen.”
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 119 9/11 Commission Report]

1998-12-24 – “[Excised] Timeframe for Completion of Hijacking Operation [Excised],” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 113]

            1999-01 – “Strains Surface Between Taliban and Bin Ladin,” Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report (Undated. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as January 1999 p. 342) .

 
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 11, Endnote 5]

            1999-01-08 – “[Title Excised], Claim that Bin Ladin Postponed Hijacking,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 113]

            1999-01-27 – “How Bin Ladin Commands a Global Terrorist Network,” 99-40003, DCI Counterterrorism Center, Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 5, Endnote 118, Chapter 6, Endnote 86]

            1999-02-10 – “[Excised] Talking Points: CIA Operations Against Usama Bin Ladin,” Central Intelligence Agency.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 157]

            1999-03-16 – “[Title Excised], Iraqi Delegation [Excised] Meet with Usama Bin Ladin in Afghanistan,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 2, Endnote 75]

            1999-04-05 – “[Excised] Terrorism: Targeting Study of U.S. Embassy, Nairobi, Kenya,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 3, Endnote 85]

            1999-04-09 – “Islamic Terrorists: Using Nongovernmental Organizations Extensively,” Counterterrorist Center, Intelligence Report, CTC 99-40007, Central Intelligence Agency.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 6, Endnote 86]

            1999-05-17 – “your note,” From Michael F. Scheuer, To [Excised], Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as “Mike to [Gary] Schroen.”
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 174]

            1999-06 – “Caucasus: Terrorist Threat to US Interests in Caucasus,” Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report (Undated- Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as June 1999 p. 342).
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 11, Endnote 5]

            1999-06-09 – “NEAR EAST: UAE: Imposition of Sanctions Could Disrupt Bin Ladin’s Finances,” National Intelligence Daily, Central Intelligence Agency.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 2, Endnote 77]

            1999-07-20 – “DCI UBL Update,” Central Intelligence Agency.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 188]

            1999-07-29 – “Ariana Afghan Airlines: Assets and Activities,” OTI IR 1999-170CX, Office of Transnational Issues, Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 2, Endnote 77]

            1999-08-03 – “UBL Update,” Central Intelligence Agency.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 188]

            1999-10-29 – “DDCI UBL Update,” Central Intelligence Agency.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 193]

            1999-11-12 – “DCI UBL Update,” Central Intelligence Agency.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 193]

            1999-12-11 – “Bin Ladin to Exploit Looser Security During Holidays,” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Central Intelligence Agency.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 11, Endnote 5]

            1999-12-17 – “Millennium Threat,” Briefing for DCI, December 16, 1999.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 6, Endnote 3]

            2000-01-07 – “Update, Islamic Extremist Terrorist Threat,” Central Intelligence Agency.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 6, Endnote 55]

            2000-02-18 – “DCI Update, Islamic Extremist Terrorism Threat,” Central Intelligence Agency.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 6, Endnotes 63, 101]

            2000-03-06 – “EXDIR Update – Islamic Extremist Terrorist Threat,” Central Intelligence Agency.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 6, Endnote 101]

            2000-03-27 – “Afghanistan: Bin Ladin Evading Sanctions,” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Central Intelligence Agency.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 11, Endnote 5]

            2000-04-03 – “Islamic Extremist Update,” Central Intelligence Agency.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 6, Endnote 101]

            2000-04-05 – “”EXDIR Update – Islamic Extremist Terrorist Threat,” Central Intelligence Agency.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 6, Endnote 101]

            2000-05-22 – “DDO Update, Islamic Extremist Update,” Central Intelligence Agency.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 6, Endnote 101]

            2000-06-30 –”Bin Ladin Orchestrating Possible Anti-US Attacks,” Intelligence Community Terrorist Threat Advisory, The Director of Central Intelligence.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 11, Endnote 23]

            2000-07-07 – “DDCI Update – Islamic Extremist Terrorist Threat,” Central Intelligence Agency.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 6, Endnote 103]

            2000-07-14 – “DCI Updates – Islamic Extremist Terrorist Threat,” Central Intelligence Agency.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 6, Endnote 114]

            2000-10-18 – “The Threat to US Personnel in Yemen,” Intelligence Community Terrorist Threat Assessment,” The Director of Central Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 6, Endnote 130]

            2000-11-02 – “Bin Ladin’s Terrorist Operations: Meticulous and Adaptable,” CTC 00-400117, Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 6, Endnotes 4, 6]

            2000-11-10 – “Attack on the USS Cole: Preliminary Findings,” DCI Counterterrorist Center,” Central Intelligence Agency.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 6, Endnote 140]

            2001-02-06 – “Sunni Terrorist Threat Growing,” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, The Central Intelligence Agency.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 8, Endnote 4]

            2001-02-14 –”Afghanistan: Bin Ladin’s Interest in Biological and Radiological Weapons,” Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 11, Endnote 5. Page 342]

            2001-03-23 – “Afghanistan: Taliban Holding Firm on Bin Ladin for Now,” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief, Central Intelligence Agency.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 11, Endnote 5. Page 342]

            2001-03-27 – “Afghanistan: An Incubator for International Terrorism,” CTC 01-40004, Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 2, Endnote 78]

            2001-04-12 – “Pursuing the Bin Ladin Financial Target,” CTC 01-40003HCS, Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 5, Endnote 126] 

            2001-05-03 – “Terrorism: Bin Ladin Public Profile May Presage Attack,” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 8, Endnote 9]

            2001-05-15 – “[Excised] Query [Excised].” Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as “Dave to John.”
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 8, Endnote 72]

            2001-05-23 – “Terrorism: Terrorist Groups Said Cooperating on US Hostage Plot [Excised],” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 8, Endnote 10]

            2001-05-24 – [Title Excised] “Agee (sic) we need to compare notes,” Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as “Dave to John.”
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 8, Endnote 64]

2001-05-24 – [Title Excised] “A Group Presently in the United States Planning to Conduct a Terrorist Operation Involving the Use of High Explosives,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 8, Endnote 9]

            2001-06-12 – “Terrorism: Biographical Information on Bin Ladin Associates in Afghanistan,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 8, Endnotes 12, 111]

            2001-06-23 – “International: Bin Ladin Attacks May Be Imminent [Excised],” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 8, Endnote 14, See also p.257]

            2001-06-24 – “MBC TV Carries Video Report on Bin Ladin, Followers in Training,” Foreign Broadcast Information Service.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 8, Endnote 16]

            2001-06-25 – “Terrorism: Bin Ladin and Associates Making Near-Term Threats,” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 8, Endnote 12, 14]

            2001-06-30 – “Terrorism: Bin Laden Planning High Profile Attacks [Excised],” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 8, Endnote 12]

            2001-07-02 – “Terrorism: Planning for Bin Ladin Attacks Continues, Despite Delay [Excised],” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief.

[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 8, Endnote 18]

            2001-07-03 – “DCI Update Terrorist Threat Review,” Central Intelligence Agency.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 8, Endnote 23]

            2001-07-06 – “Expanding Links Between Alien Smugglers and Extremists: Threats to the United States,” Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 8, Endnote 20]

            2001-07-13 – “[Excised] Khalad [Excised],” Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as “Richard to Alan.”
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 8, Endnote 64]

            2001-07-13 – “Terrorism: Bin Ladin Plans Delayed but Not Abandoned [Excised],” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 8, Endnote 28]

            2001-07-25 – “Terrorism: One Bin Ladin Operation Delayed, Others Ongoing [Excised],” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 8, Endnote 28]

            2001-08 – ” Office of Inspector General, Inspection Report of the DCI Counterterrorist Center, Directorate of Operations, IG 2000-0009-IN, Central Intelligence Agency..
[ Not cited in the 9/11 Commission Report. Provided to Jeffery Richelson via the Freedom of Information Act ]

            2001-08-06 – “Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in US,” President’s Daily Brief, Central Intelligence Agency.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 8, Endnote 38. Reprinted on Page 261 of the 9/11 Commission Report.]

            2001-08-07 – “Terrorism: Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in the US,” Senior Executive Intelligence Brief.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 8, Endnote 38. Chapter 11, Endnote 5. Page 342]

            2001-08-21 – “Re: Khalid Al-Mihdhar,” Memorandum, Central Intelligence Agency Email. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as “Mary to John.”
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 8, Endnote 106 9/11 Commission Report]

            2001-08-23 – “DCI Update Terrorist Threat Review,” Central Intelligence Agency.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 8, Endnote 103]

            2001-08-24 – “Terrorism: Sanitized Version of Threat Report,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 8, Endnote 39]

            2001-09 – Michael Warner, “Central Intelligence: Origin and Evolution,” Center for the Study of Intelligence.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 3, Endnote 70]

            2001-11-29 – “Terrorism: Extremists Planning Attacks Against US Interests in Pakistan,” Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 2, Endnote 80]

            2001-12-08 – “Terrorism: Discovery that 11 September 2001 Hijacker Mohammed Atta Did Not Travel to the Czech Republic on 31 May 2000,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 7, Endnote 69]

            2002-02-27 – “Identifying Al-Qa’ida’s Donors and Fundraisers: A Status Report,” Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 5, Endnotes 116, 117, Chapter 7, Endnote 70]

            2002-08-07 – “Terrorism: Amount of Money It Takes to Keep al-Qa’ida Functioning,” PWR080702-05, Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 5, Endnotes 111, 127]

            2002-10-17 – “Written Statement for the Record of the DCI,” Written Statement for the Record of the Director of Central Intelligence Before the Joint Inquiry Committee, Central Intelligence Agency.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 103, Chapter 6, Endnote 54, Chapter 8, Endnote 60]

 n         2002-11-14 – “Saudi Based Financial Support for Terrorist Organizations,” CTC 2002-40117CH, Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 2, Endnote 77]

            2002-12-06 – “Fraudulently Acquired Saudi Passports Facilitates Al Qa’ida Travel,” Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 12, Endnote 32]

            2003-03-10 – “Al-Qa’ida in Sudan, 1992-96: Old School Ties Lead Down Dangerous Paths,” CTC 200340028CHX, Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report.

[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 2, Endnote 30]

            2003-03-18 – “CT: Presence of Al-Qa’ida Operative Tawfiq Muhammad Bin Salah Bin Rushayd Bin Attash in Los Angeles In Summer 2000; Association of Bin Attash With U.S.-Based Extremists,” Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 7, Endnote 9]

            2003-06-01 – “11 September: The Plot and the Plotters,” CTC 2003-40044HC, Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Report.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 5, Endnotes 42, 60, 61, 64, 70, 105, Chapter 7, Endnotes 45, 52, 60, 83, 86, 92, 94, 95, 96, 97, 105]

            2003-06-20 – “Afghanistan Camps Central to 11 September Plot: Can Al-Qa’ida Train on the Run?” CTC 2003-40071CH, Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 7, Endnote 89, 93, 102]

            2003-07-02 – “[Title Excised] Shaykh Sa’id [Excised] devotes him time to managing al-Qa’ida’s finances,” CTC 2003-30072H, Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report. Cited in 9/11 Commission Report as “Shaykh Sa’id: Al-Qa’ida’s Loyal Senior Accountant.”
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 2, Endnote 59]

            2003-12-10 – “Requested Modifications to ‘Summary of Body of Intelligence Reporting on Iraq-al Qaida Contacts (1990-2003),'” Memorandum from Central Intelligence Agency Director of Congressional affairs Stanley M. Moskowitz to Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 2, Endnote 76]

[Undated – Likely 2004] – “DCI Document Request No. 16, Item No. 1, Production of the [Excised] Usama Bin Ladin Situation Reports (‘UBL Sitreps’),” Central Intelligence Agency.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 6, Endnote 1]

[Undated – Likely 2004] – “DCI Document Request No. 52, Item No. 2,” Central Intelligence Agency.
[Likely 9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 4, Endnote 2]

            2004-02-24 – “DCI Testimony: The Worldwide Threat 2004,” Testimony of George Tenet, Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 12, Endnote 28]

2004-03-11 – “Name Variants and Aliases of 11 September Hijackers and Associates as of 11 March 2004,” Central  TIntelligence Agency.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 7, Endnote 49]

2004-03-19 – “DCI Report: The Rise of UBL and Al-Qa’ida and the Intelligence Community Response,” Draft, Central Intelligence Agency Analytic Report.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 2, Endnote 67]

2004-03-24 – “Statement for the Record of the Director of Central Intelligence Before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United State,” Office of Public Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 3, Endnotes 85, 108, Chapter 13, Endnote 15]

            2004-04-14 – “Law Enforcement and the Intelligence Community,” Panel One of the Tenth Hearing of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.
[9/11 Commission Report – Chapter 8, Endnote 38]

 

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